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Abstract 
 
This study is an historical analysis of the American policy of Constructive Engagement 
and serves as a comprehensive review of that policy, its ideological foundation, 
formulation, aims, and strategies. This study also serves as a detailed assessment of the 
policy’s ties to the South African Total National Strategy. 
Constructive Engagement, according to the Reagan Administration, was 
designed to lend American support to a controlled process of change within the 
Republic of South Africa. This change would be accomplished by encouraging a 
“process of reform” that would be accompanied by American “confidence building” 
with the apartheid regime. Before this process could begin, however, the region had to 
be stabilized, and the conflicts within southern Africa resolved. With the assistance of 
American diplomacy, peace could be brought to the region, and South Africa could 
proceed to political reform within the Republic. 
In reality, the most important aims of Constructive Engagement were to 
minimize Soviet influence within the Frontline States of southern Africa and remove 
the Cuban combat forces from Angola. These goals would be largely achieved by 
supporting and encouraging the South African policy of destabilizing its neighbours, 
called the Total National Strategy. This alignment inexorably led to a situation in which 
global policy issues eclipsed regional concerns, thereby making the United States a 
collaborator with the apartheid regime. Consequently, South Africa was allowed to 
continue its program of apartheid while enjoying American encouragement of its policy 
of regional destabilization, particularly its cross-border attacks into Angola and 
Mozambique. The U.S. support for the apartheid government offered through 
Constructive Engagement made the policy vulnerable to criticism that the apartheid 
regime’s “experiment with reform” was not a move toward liberalizing the Republic’s 
political system but that it was tailored to deny citizenship through the establishment of 
Bantustans, a point that provided ammunition to domestic opponents of Constructive 
Engagement. 
For a time, U.S.-South African cooperation was effective; the Frontline States 
were grudgingly forced to accept Pretoria’s regional hegemony. However, dominance 
of the Frontline States did not improve the security of the South African state. The 
African National Congress had not been defeated and was determined to make the 
Republic ungovernable. Furthermore, by the late-1980s, Pretoria could not dominate 
southern Africa and Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, which, although crippled 
from years of war, appeared poised to reassert themselves in the region. For South 
Africa, the Total National Strategy had failed, and coexistence with its neighbours 
would be a necessity. Without a powerful apartheid regime with which to reduce 
communist influence in southern Africa, the Reagan Administration abandoned 
Constructive Engagement. 
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie studie is ’n historiese analise van die Amerikaanse beleid van 
Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid en dien as ’n omvattende oorsig van dié beleid, sy 
ideologiese grondslag, formulering, oogmerke en strategieë. Dit dien ook as ’n 
gedetailleerde beoordeling van die beleid se bande met Suid-Afrika se Totale Nasionale 
Strategie. 
Volgens die Reagan-administrasie was Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid bedoel 
om Amerikaanse steun te verleen aan ’n beheerde proses van verandering binne die 
Republiek van Suid-Afrika. Hierdie verandering sou bereik word deur die 
aanmoediging van ’n ‘hervormingsproses’ wat met Amerikaanse ‘bou van vertroue’ 
met die apartheidregime gepaardgaan. Voordat dié proses kon begin moes die streek 
egter eers gestabiliseer en die konflikte binne Suider-Afrika opgelos word. Met behulp 
van Amerikaanse diplomasie kon vrede in die streek bewerkstellig word, en kon Suid-
Afrika oorgaan tot binnelandse politieke hervorming. 
In werklikheid was die vernaamste oogmerke van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid 
om Sowjet-invloed binne die Frontliniestate van Suider-Afrika te minimaliseer en die 
Kubaanse gevegsmagte uit Angola te verwyder. Dié doelwitte sou grootliks bereik 
word deur die ondersteuning en aanmoediging van Suid-Afrika se beleid om sy 
buurstate te destabiliseer, wat as die Totale Nasionale Strategie bekend gestaan het. 
Hierdie ooreenstemming van belange het noodwendig gelei tot ’n situasie waar globale 
beleidskwessies streeksaangeleenthede oorskadu, en sodoende die Verenigde State van 
Amerika ’n kollaborateur van die apartheidregime gemaak. Gevolglik is Suid-Afrika 
toegelaat om sy apartheidprogram voort te sit terwyl hy Amerikaanse aanmoediging 
van sy beleid van streeksdestabilisering geniet, veral sy oorgrensaanvalle in Angola en 
Mosambiek. Die Amerikaanse steun vir die apartheidregering wat deur Konstruktiewe 
Betrokkenheid gebied is, het die beleid vatbaar gemaak vir kritiek dat die 
apartheidregering se ‘eksperiment met hervorming’ nie ’n stap in die rigting van die 
liberalisering van die Republiek se politieke stelsel is nie, maar eerder toegespits is op 
die ontsegging van burgerskap deur die vestiging van Bantoestans, ’n punt wat 
ammunisie verskaf het aan teenstanders van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid binne die 
VSA. 
Die VSA-RSA-samewerking was vir ’n tyd lank doeltreffend; die 
Frontliniestate moes skoorvoetend Pretoria se streekshegemonie aanvaar. Oorheersing 
van die Frontliniestate het egter nie die veiligheid van die Suid-Afrikaanse staat 
verbeter nie. Die African National Congress was nie verslaan nie en was vasbeslote om 
die Republiek onregeerbaar te maak. Boonop kon Pretoria teen die laat-1980s nie 
Suider-Afrika domineer nie en Angola, Mosambiek en Zimbabwe, hoewel verswak 
weens jare se oorlogvoering, het gereed gelyk om hulle weer in die streek te laat geld. 
Vir Suid-Afrika het die Totale Nasionale Strategie misluk, en naasbestaan met sy 
buurstate sou ’n noodsaaklikheid wees.  Sonder ’n magtige apartheidregime waarmee 
kommunistiese invloed in Suider-Afrika verminder kon word, het die Reagan-
administrasie Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid laat vaar. 
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Chapter I 
1.1 Introduction 
Why did the Reagan Administration pursue a policy of constructive engagement 
with the Republic of South Africa? This dissertation attempts to explain American 
foreign policy in southern Africa in the decade before the end of the Cold War. In the 
broadest sense, this dissertation is about power and the complex channels through 
which it worked in United States Cold War foreign policy and about the political 
players and the web of relations within which they were enmeshed. However, this 
doctoral study is also something more modest, for it focuses on a particular country and 
policy: South Africa and the Reagan Administration’s policy of Constructive 
Engagement. Through this policy, it is possible to see how the United States-South 
African relationship was conceived, implemented, and justified. It is also possible to 
scrutinize the internal disputes within both countries about the nature of their 
relationship and to see the changes the political actors made in strategy and tactics in 
response to shifting domestic circumstances. 
According to its chief architect, Chester Crocker, Constructive Engagement was 
designed to lend American support to an open-ended and long-term process of change 
within the Republic of South Africa. This change would be accomplished by 
encouraging a “process of reform” that would be accompanied by American 
“confidence building” with the apartheid regime. Before this process could begin, 
however, the region had to be stabilized, and the conflicts within southern Africa 
resolved. With the assistance of American diplomacy, peace could be brought to the 
region and South Africa could proceed to political reform within the Republic. 
After decades of research and writing on the American-South African 
relationship, the definition of Constructive Engagement provided by Chester Crocker 
has remained largely unchallenged. However, the end of the Cold War and the 
declassifying of documents related to the period and policy has provided an opportunity 
to re-examine the policy and foreign policy, in general, of the United States. 
1.2 Problem Statement and Focus 
This dissertation will explore the ultimate objectives of Constructive 
Engagement. As it was presented in the 1980s, the policy was designed to provide 
American support for managed political liberalization within the Republic of South 
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Africa and “to create a regional climate conducive to negotiated settlement and political 
change.”1Chester Crocker warned, “these things would not happen if Soviet-Cuban 
adventurism went unanswered and a cycle of reciprocal, cross-border violence was 
allowed to take root.” In Crocker’s estimation, it was only after the Front Line States 
(FLS) accepted South African leadership in the region and abandoned their outdated 
Marxist ideologies and allies, that Pretoria could begin the “steps and sequences” that 
would lead to “piecemeal power-sharing steps” with its own black majority.2 Because 
P.W. Botha’s “commitment to reform was as genuine as the commitment to become an 
autonomous regional superpower capable of assuring the defense of South Africa’s 
interests in Africa,” Secretary Crocker believed the United States should support his 
strategy for change. 
In reality, U.S. policy objectives in southern and South Africa were geopolitical. 
Since this goal was predicated on the existence of a powerful apartheid-dominated 
South Africa, Washington would continue to move closer to and to protect the Pretoria 
regime from strong UN-sponsored sanctions. This was objective was expressed to the 
South Africans who were told that the Reagan Administration wished to: 
establish a new relationship with South Africa based on a realistic 
appraisal of our mutual interests in the Southern African region. . . . We 
have effectively ended the unproductive ostracism of recent years . . . 
The South Africans now have a sure sense of where we are coming from 
in strategic terms. They know that we are determined to roll back Soviet 
influence throughout the world and in their region.3 
To be sure, to the extent that both capitals saw the Soviets as the real threat to 
their security interests, Washington and Pretoria were in agreement. However, South 
Africa opposed a regional settlement that would have ended its control over Namibia 
and compelled it to accept Marxist governments in neighboring countries, even if those 
governments that were not allied with Moscow. Washington continued to ignore that 
fact and supported South Africa’s regional aggression. This stance served as further 
evidence that the administration’s major concern in southern Africa was geopolitical. 
This attitude inexorably led to a situation in which global policy issues overwhelmed 
regional concerns. 
To achieve the primary goal of rolling back communist influence in southern 
Africa, Constructive Engagement would rely on P.W. Botha’s Total National Strategy. 
The South African Total National Strategy—the use of political, military, diplomatic, 
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and economic tools in a long-term effort to develop effective responses to internal and 
external national security threats—reflected Pretoria’s quest to achieve hegemony over 
its neighbors as the best way to preserve the power of white South Africa. Through acts 
of destabilization, Prime Minister P. W. Botha attempted to foster an environment in 
which the Republic could dominate its neighbors whose values, political philosophies, 
and color conflicted outwardly with those of white South Africa. As such, South 
African foreign policy adapted itself to the reality that somehow white South Africa 
must achieve a workable modus vivendi with its black neighbors in order to survive. 
At the same time, Pretoria’s determination to preserve white minority-rule in 
South Africa clashed fundamentally with the interests of its black neighbors. Thus, the 
southern African nations committed themselves to the dismantling of apartheid, 
whether by peaceful or violent means. This stance constituted a prime security threat 
for white South Africa, especially with the region’s determination to give moral and 
sometimes territorial support to the ANC. Pretoria manipulated its links, economic and 
military, with southern Africa to ensure South Africa’s neighbors evicted the ANC 
from their borders. 
Likewise, Pretoria feared the onslaught of communism. With the independence 
of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe and their ostensible commitment to socialism, 
South Africa felt encircled by a communist menace. Under the leadership of President 
Botha and Defence Minister Malan, Pretoria prepared its people and military to ward 
off this regional communist menace. South Africa even hoped that formal economic 
integration under a constellation of states would bind together the anticommunist forces 
of southern Africa to face communism’s onslaught. 
Instead, South Africa found itself isolated from both the region and the world 
community, besieged from all sides. Both the ANC and the communists threatened to 
foment disorder and revolution within the Republic.. With no other option, Pretoria 
turned to destabilization to acquire the cooperation and security that had, until then, 
eluded South Africa. For a time, destabilization seemed to work: southern Africa was 
silenced and grudgingly accepted Pretoria’s regional order. However, Angola, 
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, although jolted from years of unrest, had become 
permanent fixtures in southern Africa and were determined to break free from South 
African dominance. For South Africa, the Total National Strategy had failed and it was 
time to coexist in peace with its neighbors. 
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The fortunes of the Total National Strategy also had important implications for 
Constructive Engagement. First and foremost, the fact that Constructive Engagement 
supported the Botha Administration’s approach within South Africa—an approach 
violently rejected by black South Africans—made the policy vulnerable to criticism 
that the apartheid regime’s “experiment with reform” was not a genuine step toward 
democracy. Consequently, as the townships descended into chaos and the Botha 
Administration responded with harsh security measures, the Reagan Administration 
found it increasingly hard to defend Constructive Engagement as a policy directed at 
addressing black South African concerns such as self-determination, economic 
prosperity, and human rights. 
Part of the reason the policy of Constructive Engagement and its principal 
strategic objectives remain an enigma is that, although numerous newspaper and 
magazine articles had been written on the South African-United States relationship 
during the Cold War, most were long on hyperbolic headlines and short on earnest 
examination. Most journalists focused on the debate over sanctions, with few bothering 
to look past that issue to understand the broader strategic objectives of the policy. 
Similarly, within academia, many works detailed the move toward sanctions that ended 
Constructive Engagement, but the broader geopolitical objectives of the policy remain 
largely unaddressed. Analysts have also tended to treat the policy of Constructive 
Engagement in isolation. None have synthesized the facts into a historical framework, 
and knowledge of the policy’s ultimate aim to rollback Soviet influence in the region 
via South Africa’s Total National Strategy still has not been advanced in any systematic 
manner. Indeed, the shaping of the societies of southern Africa to conform to the 
interests of the United States and South Africa is perhaps the most important but least 
studied aim of the policy of Constructive Engagement. Equally discouraging is that 
much of what has been written about the policy of Constructive Engagement is not 
critical, with very little examination of the policy from an independent perspective. 
When most of the analyses were conducted, the policy was exceptionally controversial, 
and people’s careers and reputations—and even perhaps the policy’s ultimate success—
depended on how journalists, academics, policymakers, and the public understood it. 
Unfortunately, the large numbers of analyses written during the 1980s were often 
polarized from the start, aimed at either extolling the policy to the extent of declaring it 
an “American-style solution to racial segregation” or condemning the policy as 
“Destructive Engagement.” In turn, these biased findings were often misused by the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
12 
Reagan and Botha governments or by their opponents pushing their own agendas. Thus, 
years after the writing of these works, the body of literature concerning the policy of 
Constructive Engagement is incomplete, not only in the arena of known facts about the 
policy and its strategic objectives but also in the lack of historical analysis. This 
dissertation is intended to resolve these issues, both the lack of an historical analysis 
that accounts for the policy’s geopolitical objectives and the limitations of prior 
approaches. 
In addition, this dissertation will explore the role that ideology played in both 
the United States and the Republic of South Africa in the formulation and 
implementation of their foreign policies. In South Africa, the defence of domestic 
institutions and domestic relations was a matter of primary political significance, and 
foreign policy became an extension of that domestic sphere. President Reagan’s 
anticommunist ideology also played a critical role in shaping Constructive 
Engagement. 
Moreover, this work is instructive because it questions the rationale of 
“constructive engagement” as a tool of foreign policy. Constructive engagement—the 
policy of conferring respectability on a policy of appeasing a belligerent or abusive 
foreign state and concealing the fact that the United States was doing so—has lived on 
in American foreign relations, most notably in relation to China. United States policy 
makers have consistently advocated engagement with China and emphasized a lack of 
influence on that state as opposed to those who call for censure and isolation because of 
human rights abuses. In many ways, the debate over China mirrors the debate over 
engagement with South Africa during the Reagan Administration. Clearly, outlining the 
success and failures of Constructive Engagement as implemented by Chester Crocker 
should help policy makers determine the effectiveness of engagement as a foreign 
policy instrument. 
For the above stated reasons, this study will be a useful examination of the 
actions and policies of the United States and South Africa during the Cold War, viewed 
in light of what seems, in retrospect, to have been their alternatives and consequences. 
In addition to the specific policy analysis, this work will help illustrate the broader 
themes important to the wider study of diplomatic history. Apartheid South Africa 
clearly demonstrated the perils to a foreign power that claimed it could affect major 
change in another country’s society. When Constructive Engagement was unable to 
deliver reform acceptable to black South Africans, the policy became vulnerable to 
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attacks within the Republic and the United States. This study will examine if the 
vulnerability to domestic criticism, and the subsequent passage of sanctions by the U.S. 
Congress, was a result of the Reagan Administrations fixation on geopolitical 
objectives in the region rather than political liberalization within the Republic. 
Additionally, a great deal can be added to the history of this period by examining the 
domestic actors in both the United States and South Africa in the mainstream political 
narrative of Constructive Engagement because they took a leading role in its demise. 
Finally, documentation of Constructive Engagement provides a unique opportunity to 
examine a policy in terms of its ideological and theoretical basis and is, therefore, a 
valid and important contribution to the study of diplomatic history in the modern era. 
1.3 Literature Review 
While the Reagan Administration’s policy of Constructive Engagement is not 
unexplored territory, the writings of diplomats and political scientists have long 
provided the central, if not exclusive, body of interpretation. The earliest literature on 
Constructive Engagement was written by American and South African policy analysts 
during the 1980s.4 These studies focused on the issue of sanctions or the debate within 
the United States Congress. One of the most important of these works was Sanctioning 
Apartheid, published in 1991 by Africa World Press.5 This book, edited by Robert E. 
Edgar, has a number of articles covering the sanctions and disinvestment campaign 
against the Republic of South Africa. The book details South Africa’s continued need 
for foreign capital and the corresponding vulnerability to international sanctions and the 
flight of foreign companies. This work is a valuable resource for raw economic data 
concerning South Africa’s in the 1980s. 
Alex Thomson’s book Incomplete Engagement: US Foreign Policy towards the 
Republic of South Africa, 1981–19886 provides one the most comprehensive analyses 
of the Reagan Administration’s South Africa policy yet to be published. Thomson’s 
work deals primarily with the debate within the American political system and 
overstates the importance of American diplomat Chester Crocker. Additionally, 
Thomson never questions Crocker’s assertion that Constructive Engagement was 
ultimately designed to end apartheid and bring peace to southern Africa. This 
dissertation will examine if Crocker’s geopolitical aims in southern Africa differed 
from his public statements concerning ending apartheid in South Africa. 
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Princeton N. Lyman’s work, Partner to History: The U.S. Role in South Africa’s 
Transition to Democracy,7 provides a valuable perspective from an important 
diplomatic player on how the end of apartheid was kept on course and did not devolve 
into violence. Lyman carries the narrative to the election and inauguration of Nelson 
Mandela. This work joins new scholarship detailing the transition period of South 
Africa, and while these all represent substantial contributions to the literature of the 
period, the timeframe of these works postdate Constructive Engagement. 
Les de Villiers, former Senior Deputy Secretary of Information in Pretoria, has 
joined other scholars in detailing how United States economic and trade policy over 
almost 40 years helped transform the social and political system of South Africa and 
contributed to the demise of apartheid, helping create the conditions necessary for the 
elections of 1994.8 This study seeks to build on many of these first works written by 
political scientists and diplomats by creating a more detailed and expansive historical 
analysis of the policy. More specifically, this work will study the strategic objective of 
the United States and Republic of South Africa and how they attempted to reshape the 
countries of southern Africa. 
In 1992, Chester A. Crocker, chief architect of Constructive Engagement, joined 
the debate by offering an emphatically positive interpretation of Constructive 
Engagement in his work, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough 
Neighborhood.9 Though Crocker’s work provides a unique point of view from inside 
the Reagan Administration, his account does not come from the perspective of a 
disinterested observer, but from the viewpoint of someone who wants to vigorously 
defend his place in history. Indeed, when Secretary Crocker wrote his history of 
Constructive Engagement, he clearly had Winston Churchill’s maxim in mind: “History 
will be kind to me for I intend to write it.” While he acknowledges that he did not 
realize how unfair, ignorant and unprofessional the media, the international community 
and the anti-apartheid movement would be—virtually the only mistakes he concedes 
are public relations gaffes—Secretary Crocker believed his policies in the region were a 
“brilliant success” that were responsible for ending the wars in southern Africa and 
paving the way for the end of apartheid. While this viewpoint makes Crocker’s 
narrative informative and useful, High Noon in Southern Africa it is not a critical 
analysis of the policy of Constructive Engagement, nor does it deal at length with the 
South African Total National Strategy. 
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In his dissertation, “Constructive Engagement: The Rise and Fall of an 
American Foreign Policy”, James V. D’Amato argues that:  
Constructive engagement was a subtle policy designed by Chester 
Crocker to lend American support to an open-ended and longterm 
process of change within the Republic of South Africa. Within this 
policy, its first goal was to facilitate the stabilization of the southern 
African region in order to enable Pretoria to proceed with needed 
internal reform without the irritant or worry of hostile activity on its 
borders. As part of this goal, the most important American aim was to 
promote the independence of Namibia in tandem with a Cuban troop 
withdrawal from Angola. Other aims included effecting normalized 
relations between the Republic and black-ruled states in the region—
especially Mozambique. Once the region had attained a sufficient level 
of stabilization, the Reagan administration felt South Africa would 
proceed more rapidly with internal change.10 
D’Amato accepts Crocker’s narrative, never questioning whether there were hidden 
objectives to Constructive Engagement. D’Amato also fails to see the correlation 
between the Total National Strategy and Constructive Engagement. Finally, the author 
states that Constructive Engagement ended with the imposition of sanctions in 1986. In 
fact, the policy continued throughout the Reagan Administration until the Total 
National Strategy was abandoned in favour of regional cooperation. 
J. E. Davies’ book Constructive Engagement? Chester Crocker and American 
Policy in South Africa, Namibia and Angola 1981-811 is the best scholarship on the 
policy of Constructive Engagement yet produced. The author divides the book into two 
parts—”Constructive Engagement and South Africa” and “Linkage: South Africa, 
Angola and Namibia.” The first half of the book focuses on the objectives of the policy, 
the debate within the American Congress, and Pretoria’s response to Constructive 
Engagement. The second portion of the book details the regional objectives of 
Constructive Engagement. It is in this section that Davies presents the policy as a 
failure, with South Africa taking advantage of the Reagan Administration’s largess to 
crack down on internal opposition and destabilize the region. In the author’s estimation, 
negotiations with the Frontline States were only to appease Crocker, who was deceived 
by the South Africans. 
It is on this point that this dissertation will diverge sharply from Davies’ work. 
This dissertation will investigate if the policy of Constructive Engagement’s tolerance 
of South Africa’s policy of destabilization and the use of harsh internal security 
measures and limited constitutional reforms were integral to American ambitions in 
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southern Africa. Additionally, this dissertation will examine if the administration’s 
view of the black opposition helped to ideologically tether Constructive Engagement to 
the Total National Strategy. Illustrating the common objectives of the two policies is an 
important feature that sets this dissertation apart from any previous study of the Reagan 
policy of Constructive Engagement. 
1.4 Methodology and Approach 
The objective of this work is not simply to create a compilation of facts about 
the policy of Constructive Engagement. As significant as it would be simply to collect 
and synthesize all of the often incongruent information about the policy in one place, 
the creation and implementation of an overall analytic and historical architecture is 
more important. This dissertation will organize and integrate what is known about the 
policy of Constructive Engagement in a systematic historical analysis. This project 
employs systemic theories of international politics to illuminate how the Reagan 
Administration formulated Constructive Engagement. Of central importance are how 
and why the strategy was chosen and why the policy continued even after 
circumstances had changed in southern Africa. Neoclassical realism “posits that 
systemic pressures are filtered through intervening domestic variables to produce 
foreign policy behaviors.”12 This emerging approach recognizes that states “react 
differently to similar systemic pressures,” in part, because domestic-level pressures 
have a profound influence on foreign policies, especially on how leaders view external 
threats. I place the Constructive Engagement approach within the neoclassical realist 
framework. During the first stage of formulation, domestic-level variables such as 
domestic politics, ideology, and analogies of appeasement were critical in narrowing 
options and ultimately determining how the Reagan Administration conceived and 
implemented the policy of Constructive Engagement. I argue that these variables, rather 
than systemic pressures and changes in the external security environment, better 
explain American foreign policy in southern Africa during the last decade of the Cold 
War. 
1.5 Limitations 
A brief word about data limitation is necessary. The topic of Constructive 
Engagement and its strategic objectives in southern Africa remains largely unexplored 
by historians for a variety of reasons: the relative newness of this period in history, the 
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policy’s rapid demise after the United States Congress voted for sanctions, the impetus 
to move on to new scholarship related to post-apartheid South Africa, and most 
importantly, the character of the United States-South African relationship itself. 
Because Constructive Engagement was always controversial and secrecy was the norm, 
research into the policy’s geopolitical objectives has remained difficult. Although many 
diplomats and policy makers were seemingly quite open about the policy’s publicly 
stated goal to liberalize the South African political system, many other aspects of the 
policy were classified and concealed. The Reagan and Botha governments walked a 
fine line, considering potentially explosive revelations about their collaboration in 
reordering the strategic balance of the region. The United States and South Africa were 
often at the centre of dangerous covert and semi-covert operations that they did not 
want the world to know about. In consideration with the near universal condemnation 
of the apartheid government and the Reagan policy of Constructive Engagement, most 
documents related to Constructive Engagement were classified, and the undisclosed 
objectives of Constructive Engagement were completely deniable. For decades, this 
secrecy has curtailed outside study of the policy and its broader strategic goals. 
However, the end of the Cold War presented a new opportunity for scholarship on 
Constructive Engagement and the broader study of US-RSA relations. 
The National Security Archive’s South Africa Collection at George Washington 
University is the largest collection of contemporary declassified national security 
information outside the United States government. The collection includes 12,000 
pages of previously classified materials from intelligence agencies, the executive 
branch, the State Department and all National Archives documents dealing with most 
aspects of United States policy toward South Africa from 1962 to 1989. Previously 
hidden behind the “national security” wall, these documents were unavailable to 
scholars before the late-1990s and provided fresh sources for examination of United 
States-South Africa relations during the Cold War. Many of the most important 
documents were included in two major publications of the National Security Archives 
and supplemented by a microfiche collection with over 2,500 hundred previously 
classified documents on American policy in southern Africa. Through these documents 
it is possible to see the internal debates and motivations of the Reagan Administration 
in the formulation and implementation of Constructive Engagement. In fact, former 
members of the both the Carter and Reagan aadministrations—the very people that 
helped to formulate and implement policy in southern and South Africa—have used the 
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National Security Archive to “gain access to papers—including documents they 
authored—that they otherwise have been unable to obtain from the U.S. government.”13 
Also included in the National Security Archive are thousands of newspaper and 
magazine articles, primary and secondary materials and oral history interviews.Every 
archival resource related to United States-South Africa relations dated from 1977 to 
1989 was reviewed and without the National Security Archive it would have been 
impossible to adequately explore the subject covered in this dissertation. 
Although the National Security Archive collection is the most comprehensive 
document set related to American policy on southern and South Africa that exists, it has 
limitations. The biggest limitation is the continued classification of most documents 
related to Reagan’s National Security Council (NSC). These documents are not 
available to historians because the NSC has resisted the release of documents 
postdating the Carter Administration. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has also 
refused to declassify documents related to southern and South African documents 
during the 1980s.14 
This work utilizes the declassified records related to southern and South Africa 
in the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library; these included declassified cables; policy 
briefs, and memorandum from the State Department; the CIA; the National Security 
Council; the National Atomic Energy Agency; and phone transcripts of President 
Reagan with American lawmakers. The documents found in the Reagan Library proved 
invaluable in substantiating the arguments of this dissertation. Unfortunately, like the 
National Security Archive, the library had limited access to the records of the CIA and 
NSC. 
Likewise, the official papers of two key players in the formulation of American 
policy in southern Africa, Central Intelligence Director William Casey and Secretary of 
State George Schultz, are not available to the public, representing a major limitation in 
my research. The Reagan Diaries, edited and abridged by Douglas Brinkley, was 
published in 2007.15The work provides only a handful of references to southern and 
South Africa, few of which were of use in understanding the relationship of 
Constructive Engagement to the Total National Strategy. Similarly, President Reagan’s 
personal letters were of limited use for this dissertation.16 
Another limitation is the lack of firsthand accounts about this topic by officials 
in the Botha Administration. Though multiple interview requests were sent to former 
members of the Botha Administration, no acknowledgment was ever received. This left 
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only the public statements of Botha officials and testimony given to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Though these resources proved valuable, they have 
their limitations. In particular, the legalistic nature of the TRC narrowed the focus of 
the investigation in ways that did little to reveal the relationship of the Total National 
Strategy to Constructive Engagement. Though Niel Barnard made himself available to 
journalists in recent years, his interviews centred on the negotiations to release Nelson 
Mandela and the process to end apartheid in the final years of the 1980s. This makes 
his interviews limited for the purposes of this study. 
 Neither Minister of Foreign Affairs Roelof “Pik” Botha nor State President 
P.W. Botha published memoirs after their years of public service. However, in 2010, 
author Theresa Papenfus published an extensive biography of Pik Botha. Papenfus 
draws on firsthand accounts and also interviews with Botha conducted by Sue Onslow, 
Head of the Southern Africa Programme at the London School of Economics, that 
provided important insights into the American-South African relationship during the 
Reagan Administration. The work also has gives a unique perspective from a member 
of the Botha government on the resolution of Namibian independence and the end to 
the war with Angola.17 
Before he died, P.W. Botha was interviewed at length by Jan Lamprecht, the 
proprietor of the anti-ANC website, AfricanCrisis.org. Lamprecht also compiled 
extracts from speeches of Botha that were organized and published by amateur 
historian J.J.J. Scholtz. According to Lamprecht, Botha reviewed the book and said it 
“represents accurately his views and that he stands by them.” Though the book did 
prove useful in understanding Botha’s views on southern and South Africa, it lacked 
the type of detail one might expect from a memoire.18 
As for the Reagan Administration, requests for interviews were denied or not 
acknowledged by several officials, though Reagan Communications Director, Patrick 
Buchanan, and Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, made 
themselves available and provided valuable insights into the South Africa-United States 
relationship during the 1980s. 
1.6 Outline of Chapters 
The second chapter, “Prelude to Constructive Engagement: U.S. Foreign 
Relations with South Africa (1948-1980),” examines the critical foreign policy 
determination that successive South African regimes used to gain acceptance and 
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legitimacy from the Western powers. The more farsighted of the South African leaders 
understood that identifying with the interests of the Western powers was the best 
defence for the apartheid state. “Legitimacy,” which for the most part was elusive or 
grudgingly granted, was achieved through a number of strategies, among which were 
the forging of economic, strategic, and military alliances with Western powers and the 
adoption of an anti-Communist strategy during the Cold War. These strategies proved 
effective. For three decades, United States administrations consistently resisted calls for 
economic sanctions against South Africa and argued the importance of trade and 
investments as means of encouraging change in South Africa’s policy of apartheid. 
Finally, this chapter will outline the necessary preconditions for Constructive 
Engagement to evolve into a foreign policy of the United States. 
The third chapter, “From Theory to Practice: The Formulation and 
Implementation of Constructive Engagement,” reviews and analyzes Reagan’s anti-
communist ideology. As outlined by its chief architect, Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs Chester Crocker, this policy comprised two ideas: change in South 
Africa had to be controlled and the region had to be stabilized before initiating 
controlled change. There is considerable evidence that the Reagan Administration 
proceeded further than any other in identifying its own interests with those of the 
Nationalist Party and would take a hardline approach to the region. 
The fourth chapter examines the Total National Strategy, the all-embracing, 
counter-revolutionary plan to address the vital components of national security: 
political, military, economic, psychological, scientific, religious, cultural, financial, 
intelligence, and so on. The purpose of the Total National Strategy policy would be to 
stave off the forces of the black liberation movement and roll back any communist 
influence that may have aided in its ascendancy. Drawing on the considerable resources 
of the Republic and with help from the Reagan Administration, the National Party 
would attempt a series of “reforms” that would push the black majority into a series of 
semi-independent “Bantustans”, effectively making black South Africans aliens in their 
own country. Regionally, the Total National Strategy would attempt to establish South 
Africa as the economic and political leader of the region. 
The fifth chapter addresses the tortuous negotiations and parallel military 
attacks that accompanied the Reagan Administration’s attempt to act as a “mediator” 
for South Africa as it brought its neighbours to the negotiating table in terms favourable 
to the Republic and the United States. As part of this process, the administration sought 
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to increase the sway of South Africa over all states in the region and openly sought to 
change the direction of states it regarded as inimical to United States interests, such as 
Angola and Mozambique. Thus encouraged, Pretoria set out to implement its own Total 
National Strategy. For the Botha Government, the Reagan Administration’s regional 
objectives and willingness to work within the framework of apartheid complemented 
the aims of the Total National Strategy and affirmed South Africa’s status as a protector 
of Western values, a bulwark against communism, and a steadying influence in the 
region. As part of this policy, South Africa continued its occupation of Namibia and 
launched a campaign of military, political, and economic destabilization against 
neighbouring states. By the beginning of 1984, the American attempt to “stabilize” 
southern Africa as a first step in its broader policy of Constructive Engagement had 
shown few, if any, results. Namibia still was not independent, the Cubans remained in 
Angola, and the United States received almost universal condemnation for its role in 
the whole affair. 
The sixth chapter, “The Demise of Constructive Engagement,” reviews and 
analyzes the steady erosion of Constructive Engagement after the unprecedented 
explosion of political resistance following Pretoria’s introduction of a new constitution 
in 1983. With the policy so closely linked to the Total National Strategy, Constructive 
Engagement was bound to fail once the township uprisings began.
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Chapter II 
Besides the sin of omission, America has often been positively guilty of 
working in the interest of the minority regime to the detriment of the 
interests of black people. America’s foreign policy seems to have been 
guided by a selfish desire to maintain an imperialistic stranglehold on this 
country irrespective of how the blacks were made to suffer  
 Steve Biko, I Write What I Like1 
We had better look after our own interests where national security and 
international monetary matters are concerned. 
 Richard Nixon, note to Kissinger2 
 
2.1 Prelude to Constructive Engagement: The United States and South 
Africa (1948-1980) 
The United States foreign policy relations with the Republic of South Africa 
from 1948 to 1980 were formulated by the cold, zero-sum calculations of the Cold War. 
For the most part, United States administrations looked at South Africa as a dependable 
ally in the Super Power confrontation and consistently resisted calls for economic 
sanctions against the Republic. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to furnish a full history or analysis of United 
States policy in southern Africa during the pre-Reagan years of the Cold War, but to 
show the patterns of change in the region that provide a historic context to Reagan’s 
policy of Constructive Engagement. With the collapse of the buffer states and the 
subsequent encroachment of black nationalism, it appeared inevitable that the white 
fortress of southern Africa would be toppled, providing a clear victory for the Soviet 
Union. It was this seeming inevitability that Constructive Engagement would be 
designed to reverse. 
2.2 The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations and the Foreign Policy 
Approach of a New Sovereign State 
2.2.1  The Cold War 
In the early morning hours of August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb, named 
Little Boy, was detonated over the city of Hiroshima, Japan, killing seventy thousand 
people in a flash hotter than the surface of the sun. Three days later, the city of 
Nagasaki met the same fate, with 20,000 Japanese killed. On August 10, 1945, Japan’s 
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military leadership accepted the terms of surrender set down by the Allies in the 
Potsdam Declaration. 
The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki symbolized not only the end of one 
war, but also the beginning of a new world order. With fascism relegated to history and 
the United States virtually unrivaled in the world, Americans should have experienced 
a sense of security and confidence perhaps not seen since the Roman Empire. The facts 
of American power were indisputable. The United States accounted for more than half 
the world’s manufacturing, possessed nearly two-thirds of the planet’s gold reserves, 
and controlled half of its shipping. The United State’s economic dominance was also 
reflected in the military strength of the country. The country had nearly 12.5 million 
service members, had the world’s finest navy, and possessed airpower that was second 
to none. Foremost, the United States was the country that possessed the atomic bomb, a 
weapon that had dramatically shifted the balance of power in the country’s favour. But 
from the moment the Second World War ended, the United States felt surrounded by a 
thousand dangers. It could have hardly been otherwise. The Soviet Union had no 
intention of relegating itself to second-tier status in the post-war period and 
immediately began to challenge the nascent “Pax Americana.”3 
On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill spoke of the emerging rivalry when he 
told an American audience that: 
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has 
descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of 
the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, 
Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these 
famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the 
Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to 
Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure 
of control from Moscow. . . . 
In a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and 
throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and 
work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they 
receive from the Communist center. Except in the British 
Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its 
infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing 
challenge and peril to Christian civilization.4 
During the struggle with the Axis powers, the competing political philosophies of the 
Allied powers were subordinated to the practical need to destroy fascism, but by 1946, 
the ideological rivalries of the Cold War would be all too obvious. Not only would the 
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Soviet leadership endeavour to consolidate power at home, but also saw it as their 
responsibility and an historical inevitability for the communist revolution to defeat the 
forces of Western capitalism.  
In the United States, George Kennan outlined a strategy for Western victory in 
this ideological struggle that involved a “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant 
containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”5 The Kennan policy of limited 
containment was to have a shelf-life of less than one year. In March 1947, the President 
officially superseded the Kennan strategy with the Truman Doctrine, which neatly 
delineated the world into two distinct ideological camps: 
One life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by 
free institutions representative government, free elections, guarantees of 
individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from 
political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a 
minority forcibly imposed on the majority. It relies upon terror and 
oppression, a controlled press, framed elections and the suppression of 
personal freedom.6 
Truman continued that it would be the policy of the United States to help “all free 
peoples to maintain their institutions and their integrity against aggressive movements 
that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.”7 With the Truman Doctrine, the 
principals in dispute would be of universal application; hence, there would be no 
regional limitations to American involvement. 
2.2.2  South Africa: Political Transformations 
As the metastasizing impulse to divide the world spread, a distant outpost of the 
West was undergoing its own transformation. On June 1, 1948, the Nationalist Party of 
South Africa took the reins of government from the United Party and its leader, Jan 
Smuts. The Afrikaners, comprising roughly 12 percent of the population, had finally 
wrested political control of the land where their cultural and historical identity had been 
forged for over three hundred years. When Daniel François Malan was made the Prime 
Minster of South Africa, he appealed to that sense of Afrikaner nationalism and its 
attendant sense of persecution, declaring: 
In the past we felt like strangers in our own country, but today South 
Africa belongs to us once more. For the first time since Union, South 
Africa is our own. God grant that it always remains our own.8 
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To ensure that South Africa remained in its hands alone, the Nationalist Party denied a 
voice to the majority of the population through a whole series of institutionalized 
inequalities, which the laws and practices of the South African régime now enforced. 
Differing perhaps only in scale from other systems found in the world, apartheid in its 
completed form was the most formidable racial edifice ever created. South Africa’s 
system was also meant to permanently ensure the survival of white rule at a time when 
Black Nationalism was sweeping across the continent. While a detailed analysis of 
apartheid is outside the scope of this dissertation, it is important to note that, from 
1948 to 1994, South African foreign and security policies were explicitly concerned 
with the survival of Pretoria’s racial system, making South Africa a country whose 
foreign relations were determined almost exclusively by domestic policy.9 
South Africa’s racial policies, however, presented intractable problems for the 
South Africans in the foreign policy arena. Standing against a veritable firestorm in the 
United Nations, the more farsighted of the South African leaders understood that 
identifying with the interests of the Western powers was the best defence for the 
apartheid state. “Legitimacy,” which for the most part was elusive or grudgingly 
granted, was achieved through a number of strategies, among which were the forging of 
economic, strategic, and military alliances with Western powers and the adoption of 
anti-Communist strategy during the Cold War. These strategies proved remarkably 
effective. 
2.2.3  The Western Alliance and South Africa 
Before the Second World War, Africa was of minimal interest to United States 
foreign policy-makers, and Washington’s policies appeared to have identified 
American interests primarily with those of the European colonial powers.10 In the post-
war period, there were periodic complaints about Pretoria’s racial policies, but the 
geopolitical calculations of American policy makers seemed to have held sway. The 
Truman Administration regarded South Africa as a reliable ally in the Cold War and a 
frontline auxiliary against Soviet encroachment in southern Africa.11 
Central to the Truman Administration were South Africa’s abundant raw 
materials for the production of nuclear weapons. Securing South Africa’s allegiance 
and its resources—gold, chromium, vanadium, manganese, the vital platinum group, 
and the non-ferrochrome metals, among others—for the purposes of national defence 
was considered to be of vital strategic importance in maintaining American nuclear 
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superiority over the Soviet Union. In order to increase its nuclear arsenal and hinder 
similar efforts in the Soviet Union, the United States required a monopoly on crucial 
raw materials and, thus, needed to maintain stable relations with white minority 
governments in southern Africa.12 
American dependence on South African minerals, in particular, was one of the 
decisive factors in United States-South Africa relations during the Truman 
Administration. By 1948, American policy makers were aware that the single largest 
limiting factor in the nuclear program was the lack of fissionable material, uranium ore, 
in particular. With the National Party firmly in control of uranium mines, it was 
imperative for the United States to see that relations with apartheid’s architects be on 
good terms. The eventual Combined Development Trust between the United States, 
Britain, and South Africa ensured that those deposits remained permanently within the 
Western alliance. 
The South Africans, for their part, saw a close alliance with the West as critical 
to the country’s security in the post-war period. D. F. Malan outlined this strategy in his 
“African Charter,” a document that called for the preservation of the African continent 
for “Western European Christian Civilization.”13 Specifically, it proposed to keep both 
“Asiatics and Communists” out of southern Africa. While there appeared to be little 
chance of an invasion, swart gevaaror “black peril,” was presented as the major threat 
to South Africa. 
2.2.4  Collaboration and International Condemnation 
In the international arena, the Cold War’s early days corresponded with those of 
apartheid, but apartheid received little attention in the United Nations; communism 
dominated the diplomatic arena. The United States needed as many allies in the war 
against communism and the Soviet Union as it could gather, and in the bipolar world of 
the Cold War, the Afrikaner government was a strong, steadfast defender of capitalism. 
As the United States and South Africa drew closer in military-strategic matters, 
the Truman and Eisenhower administrations would use America’s preeminent position 
in the Western alliance to shield South Africa and its racial policies from international 
criticism. When the issue made its way to the United Nations, Washington fell back on 
a claim that the country was unwilling to meddle in the domestic affairs of a sovereign 
nation, a curious claim considering that Eisenhower had used the CIA to overthrow the 
governments of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran and Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala 
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simultaneously. In fact, during the 1950s, military cooperation between the United 
States and South Africa became more integrated, with American warships docking and 
refueling at South African ports and close collaboration between United States and 
South African intelligence agencies. It was also during this period of intense 
competition between the Super Powers that a close working relationship was developed 
between Washington and Pretoria concerning atomic energy and space research.14 
South Africa never became a close strategic partner on par with America’s European 
allies, but there were sufficient geopolitical and economic ties during the Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations to keep diplomatic relations strong and relatively 
consistent. 
South Africa’s racial policies remained a minor irritation for the United States 
until 1960, when 67 black South Africans were killed, an additional 186 were wounded, 
and 11,000 detained during a protest over the pass laws, causing a minor crisis in the 
American-South African relationship. The Sharpeville Massacre, as it came to be 
known, created an unprecedented international outcry and focused the world’s attention 
on this outpost in the Western alliance. The United Nations condemned the killings, 
and foreign companies and governments withdrew their investments from the country 
with increasing frequency. The U.S. Department of State joined the chorus of criticism 
and issued a statement urging the South African government to address black 
grievances. The Eisenhower Administration, however, had never given its support to 
this statement, and an official retraction was promptly issued. The incident was 
important enough that President Eisenhower personally apologized to the South African 
ambassador, assuring him that the United States supported the white regime and was 
committed to its place in the Western alliance.15 
2.3 Kennedy and Johnson Administrations 
2.3.1  Kennedy and Africa 
The containment of communism and profitability of South African markets 
could not remain forever the sole factors dictating American policy. Some of the more 
farsighted American policy makers understood that the European empires were 
disintegrating and that the newly freed peoples of the Third World would be looking to 
align themselves with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Africa was literally 
a continent to win. 
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While there can be little doubt that President Kennedy was a committed Cold 
Warrior, and stridently opposed to communism, he understood that the momentum of 
Black Nationalism in Africa was a nearly unstoppable force. He thought it best to 
hedge his bets in Africa. Whereas the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had 
offered unqualified support of South Africa, during the Kennedy Administration, that 
support would not come without significant caveats. As one official in the Kennedy 
Administration noted: 
If the Republic of South Africa does not have a policy which is going to meet 
with the satisfaction of its people, there will be upheaval in that area, and the 
moment they start having that kind of upheaval there will be foreign 
intervention and quite likely the Russians would go in and there would be a 
strong Communist penetration . . . detrimental to the security of the U.S.16 
The South African racial policies were also out of step with events in the United 
States. John F. Kennedy’s presidency coincided with the beginnings of the Civil Rights 
movement and the Democratic Party’s first steps to abolishing the American South’s 
“Jim Crow” laws. The Ford Foundation’s Report of the Study Commission on U.S. 
Policy Toward Southern Africa contains a revealing passage: 
The links between the domestic politics of the United States and relations with 
South Africa are unmistakable. It was not by chance that friction developed 
only as the United States began, in the years after World War II, to rectify its 
most glaring domestic inequity. Nor was it by chance that the pressure exerted 
on the South African regime by Washington has correlated with the 
commitment of Particular administrations to advancing the civil Rights of 
America’s own black population.17 
As Richard Bissell reports, the “Democratic administrations of John F. Kennedy and 
Lyndon Johnson established the baseline of U.S. opposition to South African racial 
policies.”18 
From the moment he took office, it was clear that the Kennedy Administration 
was committed to demonstrating United States support for the process of 
decolonization in Africa, particularly at a time when more and more African states were 
gaining independence and forming a substantial voting bloc in the United Nations. 
Washington was eager to see that these newly independent nations would favour 
political and ideological alignment with the West rather than with the Soviet bloc and 
adjusted American policy accordingly. Moreover, Kennedy was determined to employ 
moral pressure to force South Africa to reform its racist policies. In the United Nations, 
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the Kennedy Administration, reflecting its anti-Colonial and anti-apartheid attitude, 
supported the resolutions condemning apartheid and Pretoria’s administration of South-
West Africa, but opposed economic sanctions against South Africa.19 
2.3.2  Dissident Groups 
By 1961, Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd had succeeded J. G. Strijdom as 
prime minister of South Africa and moved decisively to strengthen apartheid during his 
premiership. By 1963, the South African government had penetrated and destroyed 
much of the underground resistance. In its efforts in this direction, the South African 
Police (SAP) were aided by a series of harsh security laws passed beginning in 1961.20 
During this period, spanning from 1961 to the passage of the Terrorism Act of 1967, 
South Africa moved away from the protection of individual rights guaranteed under 
British law to regulations under which the powers of the State were greatly increased. 
By 1964, incidents of sabotage dropped from 100 a year to 10, and by 1965, internal 
resistance had all but disappeared. All the while, the South African government denied 
the country’s internal troubles were related to the racial policies of apartheid, instead 
claiming incidents like Sharpeville were initiated by “subversive, communist and 
liberal elements outside South Africa.”21 
In the end, the Kennedy Administration appears to have seen no credible 
alternative to the white regime in Pretoria.22 With the ANC and most resistance leaders 
forced underground, the Afrikaner government and its apartheid system had clearly 
forestalled any notion of majority rule.23 While at this time it was not clear what shape 
the threat from opposition groups would take, it soon became apparent that they could 
not match the strength of the South African Defence Force (SADF). In a document 
detailing South Africa’s opposition groups, the CIA reported: 
Subversive groups in the Republic of South Africa have recently 
displayed a growing capability to use sabotage and terrorism to harass the 
whites with a series of challenges for several years. The recent history of 
these groups, although it does attest to improved conspiratorial techniques 
tends to confirm their basic weakness when pitted against the power of the 
South African state.24 
Far from supporting these left-leaning elements, there appears to have been at least 
some collaboration between the United States and South Africa in derailing the 
resistance movements within the Republic. The CIA penetrated the ANC and, having 
done so, passed on actionable intelligence to the South African government, including 
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the group’s activities and the whereabouts of ANC leaders. Among the information 
passed to the South African security services was the precise travel itinerary of Nelson 
Mandela, ultimately leading to his apprehension and subsequent twenty-seven year 
incarceration.25 Despite all the talk of human rights, the Kennedy Administration had 
decided to help a Cold War ally over the Soviet supported ANC.  
2.3.3  Fissures in the Cold War Relationship 
By 1963, the United States’ willingness to shield South Africa from 
international pressure began to waver, and a consensus that the Republic was a liability 
began to form in the minds of top administration officials. Undersecretary G. Mennen 
Williams clearly articulated this growing dissatisfaction when, in June 1963, he told 
Secretary Dean Rusk that: 
In my view, the time has come to review our arms supply policy toward 
South Africa. I believe we should be thinking now in terms of a total 
arms embargo. Our present partial arms policy is equivocal, is not an 
effective pressure on the South Africans, and is considered inadequate 
by the African countries and by many influential sources in the U.S. who 
are concerned about racial discrimination. While a total arms embargo 
would fall short . . . it is the only way we can convince both world and 
domestic opinion that we mean business in our disapproval of 
apartheid.26 
Tension continued to mount as communication between Washington and Pretoria was 
intentionally limited and the South African ambassador was denied access to Kennedy 
and to his successor.27 Perhaps more importantly, the Kennedy Administration declined 
to sell weapons to Pretoria after January 1, 1963 and hinted that the United States was 
not opposed to a nonbinding U.N. resolution for other member-states to refuse arms to 
South Africa. However, in a move that would become standardized over the Cold War, 
South Africa would attempt, usually with success, to leverage the spectre of communist 
encroachment in its relationship with the United States. 
Despite a few punitive measures against the Republic, the Kennedy 
Administration’s actions on South Africa proved largely symbolic. Even key advisers 
like Rusk, who saw apartheid as “repugnant,” saw little evidence that the United States 
could exact change in the Republic.28 Furthermore, they had to weigh the costs of 
permanently cutting off arms sales to South Africa, given that the United States had 
promised “prompt and sympathetic attention to reasonable requests for the purchase of 
military equipment required for defence against external aggression”29 and, more 
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importantly, that the United States had “military assets we derive from Portugal and 
South Africa.”30 The administration quickly pivoted from the threat of sanctions and 
decided to quietly license the sale of spare parts for C-130 aircraft to the South 
Africans.31 
While the Kennedy presidency began with a public commitment to end the 
racial systems of southern Africa, by and large, the administration had resorted to a 
traditional Cold War strategy and did very little to influence the South African 
government. Whatever hopes Kennedy had for change in southern Africa ended when 
he was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, in November 1963.32 
2.3.4  Johnson Administration 
President Johnson increased his criticisms of Pretoria’s racial policies initiated 
by Kennedy, but limited American actions to rhetorical pressure. Increasingly bogged 
down in Vietnam, the Johnson Administration decided to avoid entanglements in 
southern Africa, and South Africa virtually disappeared as a foreign policy 
consideration.33 By the late-1960s, both countries had grown increasingly distrustful of 
one another as diplomatic contacts diminished.34 
The relationship, however, came close to fracture in January 1964 over the issue 
of the Odendaal Commission. The commission’s plan advocated the South African 
Government to relocate South West African populations to “homelands” in outlying 
areas formerly leased or owned by commercial farmers. In most cases, this action 
would require forced relocations, involving the resettlement of people on the basis of 
ethnic origin. A National Security Council briefing paper described the plan as “the 
most extreme apartheid legislation yet proposed,” which, if passed, would “remove the 
last vestiges of job security” for South Africa’s non-white population by reducing them 
to the status of migratory workers.”35 In a move seemingly out of step with American 
Cold War policy, the Johnson Administration determined to collaborate with the British 
to derail the Odendaal Plan. Failing that, it appears President Johnson was prepared to 
sever most military and economic ties with Pretoria. A secret memorandum authorized 
NASA to begin looking for new facilities outside South Africa, recommended 
suspending investment loans to the Republic, and instructed the State Department to 
begin looking at potential sanctions to pressure Pretoria into changing its policy on 
South West Africa.36 
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After a series of high-level meetings between Great Britain, the United States, 
and South Africa, in which it was made clear that the United States and Britain were 
vociferously opposed to the commission’s recommendations, Pretoria proved 
“conciliatory” and the Odendaal Plan was permanently shelved.37 This capitulation on 
the part of the South African leadership would go a long way towards repairing 
relations with the Johnson Administration. Thus, the familiar pattern of resisting calls 
for sanctions was re-established and cooperation on nuclear technology reaffirmed. 
The Kennedy-Johnson administrations were considered wholly inadequate by 
many liberal observers who believed that neither president had lived up to his human 
rights rhetoric and “failure to translate public denouncements of apartheid and 
colonialism in Africa into actions that might have forced colonial and minority regimes 
to alter their policies.”38 American conservatives were also dissatisfied with the 
Kennedy-Johnson approach. Many claimed that it amounted to little more than an 
ineffective and counterproductive policy of “harassment,” based on domestic 
considerations rather than geopolitical realities. They also noted that the policy was not 
supported by many Senate Democrats and was frequently considered as hopelessly 
naïve and counterproductive by American foreign policy experts, including Dean 
Acheson, George Ball, and George Kennan.39 
2.4  Nixon Administration 
When Richard Nixon came to office in 1969, he determined to change the 
Kennedy-Johnson policy of sharp public rebukes against Pretoria and immediately 
moved to strengthen Cold War alliances with South Africa. He was disposed to see the 
situation in southern Africa’s white minority regimes of Portuguese Angola and 
Mozambique, Rhodesia, and particularly South Africa as quite different than his 
Democratic counterparts.40 But there was always the zero-sum calculation of the Cold 
War. Nixon wrote, “No one can travel in Africa, even as briefly as I did, without 
realizing the tremendous potentialities of this great continent. Africa is the most rapidly 
changing area in the world today. The course of its development, as its people continue 
to emerge from a colonial status and assume the responsibilities of independence and 
self-government, could well prove to be the decisive factor in the conflict between the 
forces of freedom and international communism.”41 
The South Africans took a keen interest in the Nixon Administration; however, 
there was a concern that American policy toward the Republic would be tailored “to 
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appease liberal and Negro sentiment.”42 Consequently, South African Ambassador 
H. L. T. Taswell informed the United States Secretary of State William Rogers that the 
apartheid government was anxious to move closer to both the United States and the 
new black African nations. The South Africans wanted American support and 
understood that it would be necessary to modify its rhetoric to provide less of a target 
for international and domestic critics of the Nixon Administration if it decided to 
engage communism in southern Africa.43 Fears that the administration would “crack 
down” on South Africa were unfounded.44 As one administration official would 
bluntly concede, the United States was concerned with strategic considerations, not 
“moralistic reformism.”45 With major political backing from parties with considerable 
interests in southern Africa’s banking, commercial, and industrial sectors, Nixon 
quickly shifted to a more conservative approach in his dealings with the region. He was 
responsible for a “partial relaxation” of economic sanctions toward South Africa and 
increased communications with the white minority government.46As the Report of the 
Study Commission stated, “Just as interest in civil rights and support from black leaders 
had contributed to Kennedy’s and Johnson’s rhetorical opposition to South Africa, so 
Nixon’s ‘Southern strategy’ of courting racial conservatives made rapprochement with 
South Africa attractive.”47 The shift in regional approaches was most clearly illustrated 
in “National Security Study Memorandum 39.” This dissertation will now examine the 
preparation, text, and impact of this significant document and the manner in which it 
influenced U.S. foreign policy toward the Republic of South Africa. 
2.4.1  Tar Baby Dilemma 
In 1969, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor, directed the 
National Security Council Interdepartmental Group —composed of officials of the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the Departments of State and Defence—to conduct a 
comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward southern Africa; the research of the 
Interdepartmental Group was to be assisted by representatives from other agencies and 
departments, including Treasury, Commerce, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Agency for 
International Development, and the National Aeronautical and Space Administration.48 
According to Dr. Kissinger’s orders, defined in the secret memorandum of April 10, the 
report: 
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should consider (1) the background and future prospects of major 
problems in the area; (2) alternative views of the U. S. interest in 
Southern Africa; and (3) the full range of basic strategies and policy 
options open to the United States.49 
National Security Study Memorandum 39 did not signal that southern Africa had 
achieved a higher priority on the United States foreign policy agenda; actually, NSSM 
39 was only one of more than eighty such studies of American foreign policy that 
Kissinger had requested in 1969.50 However, as Tierney recalls, “This was the first time 
there had been a close analysis of policy assumptions and interests in Southern 
Africa.”51 
Kissinger, of course, was primarily concerned with managing the superpower 
relationship that he considered central to international politics; although he regarded 
southern Africa as a peripheral concern, it was one that, nevertheless, had become too 
much under the control of a “client-oriented” bureaucracy in the State Department. The 
regions peripheral status was succinctly, if not nauseatingly, summed up when 
President Nixon commented to Secretary Kissinger, “Henry, let’s leave the niggers to 
Bill Rogers [Secretary of State, 1969-1973] and we’ll take care of the rest of the 
world.”52 Given a free hand by the president, Kissinger lost no time in implementing a 
new, more “realist” approach toward the region so that he could concentrate his 
attention on more critical foreign policy problems.53 
National Security Study Memorandum 39 would be the United States’ operating 
template during the Nixon Administration. The document begins with a discussion of 
the actions of previous administrations in response to the nationalist revolutionary 
movements opposing the colonial and white minority governments of Portuguese 
Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa. While the study noted that the 
United States disapproved of the region’s racial policies and implemented a number of 
largely symbolic steps against the white regimes, economic and scientific cooperation, 
particularly with South Africa, had continued with relatively little interference; 
however, Washington had introduced more stringent measures against the white 
minority governments than had London or Paris.54 However, NSSM 39 revealed that, 
in formulating its southern African policy, the United States should remain conscious 
of a number of global realities that must necessarily shape the foundation of American 
policy toward the region. These considerations included the following: 
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the strategic importance of southern Africa, particularly with the closing 
of the Suez Canal following the 1967 Middle East war and the increased 
Soviet naval Activities in the Indian Ocean; the U.S. need to use 
overflight and landing facilities for military aircraft heading to and from 
Indochina; 
Significant investment and balance of trade advantages to both Britain 
and the U. S. in South Africa . . . as the major gold supplier in the 
capitalist world and its importance in guaranteeing the useful 
cooperation of the two-tier gold price system.55 
According to the document, “The aim of [the] present policy is to try to balance our 
economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states with the political interests 
of dissociating the U. S. from the white minority regimes and their repressive racial 
policies.”56 The policy-makers were obviously concerned that American relations with 
black Africa and the remainder of the developing world might be seriously retarded if 
the United States57 was unwilling to distance itself from the white regimes. The text of 
NSSM 39 most certainly betrayed “the contradictions inherent in prevailing American 
policy and the limitations on America’s ability to resolve the contradictions and 
achieve its primary goals by employing politically acceptable means.”58 
The objectives of U. S. policy toward southern Africa, some of which indeed 
appeared contradictory and incompatible, were subsequently defined by NSSM 39: 
• to improve U.S. standing in black Africa and internationally on the racial issue;  
• to minimize the opportunities for the USSR and Communist China to exploit the 
racial issue in the region for propaganda advantage and to gain political 
influence with black governments and liberation movements; 
• to encourage moderation of the current rigid racial and colonial policies of the 
white regimes; 
• to protect economic, scientific, and strategic interests and opportunities in the 
region, including the orderly marketing of South Africa’s gold production. 
After a description of United States interests, objectives, and present policy, NSSM 39 
provided a list of five policy options that the Nixon administration could adopt as a 
foundation for its southern African policy. Ultimately, Option 2—its premise and 
general posture reproduced below—was Kissinger’s choice: 
Premise: 
The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change 
can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain 
the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to 
chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by 
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selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage 
some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and 
through more substantial economic assistance to the black states (a total 
of about $5 million annually in technical assistance to the black states) 
help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both 
for peaceful change. Our tangible interests form a basis for our contacts 
in the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable cost. 
 
General Posture: 
We would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax 
political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states. We 
would begin by modest indications of this relaxation, broadening the 
scope of our relations and contacts gradually and to some degree in 
response to tangible—albeit small and gradual—moderation of white 
policies. . . . At the same time we would take diplomatic steps to 
convince the black states of the area that their current liberation and 
majority rule aspirations in the south are not attainable by violence and 
that their only hope for a peaceful and prosperous future lies in closer 
relations with the white-dominated states. We would emphasize our 
belief that closer relations will help to bring change in the white states. 
We would give increased and more flexible economic aid to black states 
of the area to focus their attention on their internal development and to 
give them a motive to cooperate in reducing tensions. We would 
encourage economic assistance from South Africa to developing black 
nations. This option accepts, at least over a 3 to 5 year period, the 
prospect of unrequited U. S. initiatives towards the whites and some 
opposition from the blacks in order to develop an atmosphere conducive 
to change in white attitudes through persuasion and erosion. To 
encourage this change in white attitudes, we would indicate our 
willingness to accept political arrangements short of guaranteed progress 
toward majority rule, provided they assure broadened political 
participation in some form by the whole population.59 
History suggests that it would have been out of character for the Nixon 
Administration to have selected an option other than the one ultimately chosen. Option 
3 represented the policy of the Kennedy-Johnson approach, which Kissinger was 
determined to change, and Options 1, 4, and 5—which favoured complete United States 
support for one side or the other or complete disengagement from the region 
altogether—were not viable alternatives considering U.S. interests.60 In December 
1969, the National Security Council discussed NSSM 39, and Kissinger subsequently 
determined that Option 2 should be adopted as the foundation of American policy 
towards southern Africa. In addition to supplying the rationale for adopting Option 2 as 
a basis for U.S. policy, the secret study also clearly reinforced the importance of South 
Africa in the estimates of the Nixon policy-makers.61 A number of officials in the State 
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Department, particularly in the Africa Bureau, were apprehensive of this new approach 
to the region, especially towards South Africa. The more aggressive attacks on the 
Nixon Administration’s selection of Option 2 asserted that it amounted to an alliance 
with the forces of racism in southern Africa. Other commentators stated that, at the very 
minimum, Nixon’s decision to support the apartheid government represented a cynical 
promotion of American strategic and economic interests at the expense of African 
aspirations for a liberalized political system.62 Nixon’s defenders on the American 
right, however, believed that the Republic was an important “client” state and a 
bulwark against communist encroachment.63 
Although the administration would maintain public opposition to repressive 
colonial and racial policies, political and economic pressures against the white regimes 
would be relaxed; it was argued that increased communication, selective involvement, 
and friendly persuasion would be more effective instruments in influencing these 
regimes, particularly South Africa, to reform their racial policies.” In any event, it 
should be understood that even though the Nixon Administration had clearly decided to 
change the policy of the previous administrations, in the words of a scholar of South 
Africa, “The change involved a ‘tilt’ rather than a fundamental alteration in the ‘low-
profile’ approach of the U. S. toward southern Africa.”64 
2.4.2  The Nixon Administration Policy in Action 
President Nixon did not initially confer with Congressional leaders concerning 
the implementation of his new policy, nor did he publicly announce the direction that 
U.S-South African relations were likely to follow in the coming months. The Nixon 
Administration did, however, use the newspaper column of Ken Owen, a Washington-
based correspondent with the Johannesburg Star, to communicate the new policy to 
Pretoria and to relay the message that improved relations with South Africa would be 
welcome.65 Despite Nixon’s reluctance to discuss his approach with the American 
electorate, the administration’s actions soon made clear that a change in strategy had 
occurred.66 The first indication of a shift in policy was Nixon’s appointment of John 
Hurd, a conservative Texan, as ambassador to South Africa. The Nixon 
administration’s policy of “communication” had begun.67 
In accordance with the new policy, American officials were instructed to limit 
criticisms of South Africa’s racial policies.68 Nixon’s directive became obvious in U.S. 
voting behavior in the United Nations. The Report of the Study Commission explains 
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“condemnation of apartheid and South African intransigence over Namibia was 
replaced by abstention, and abstention on resolutions requiring action was replaced by 
opposition.”69 In 1972, the United States cast negative votes on seven major resolutions 
involving southern Africa. In the Security Council, the U.S. vetoed an Afro-Asian 
resolution advising an extension of the Rhodesian sanctions against the most blatant 
sanction-busters—South Africa and Portuga1.70 In fact, on nearly every resolution 
concerning the region, the American delegate voted in concert with his colleagues from 
Pretoria and Lisbon.71 
South African embassy personnel and visiting representatives from Pretoria 
were permitted and encouraged to make the diplomatic rounds in Washington. To the 
consternation of the State Department, the Republic’s ambassador was granted direct 
access to Kissinger, and South African diplomats enjoyed warm receptions at the White 
House and Department of Defence. When Kissinger became the Secretary of State, he 
overruled the Department’s Africa Bureau decision to deny entry visas to important 
South African government officials.72 A series of high-level exchanges ensued. 
Cornelius Mulder, the Minister of Information, was received by Vice President Gerald 
Ford and subsequently by top Pentagon officials: Admiral Hugo Biermann, Chief of the 
South African Defence Force, met with Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.73 The South African government must have been encouraged that 
such consultations had become routine. Not only did the meetings provide Pretoria with 
an open channel for cooperation, but also afforded the Republic a renewed sense of 
prestige and legitimacy within the Western community as allies in the war against 
communism.74 
2.4.3  Military and Strategic Collaboration 
While the Nixon Administration admitted that the United States did not have 
critical security interests in southern Africa, “it also viewed this African region as being 
logistically important for its global defence system.”75 Consequently, a militarily secure 
South Africa was seen by Washington as an attractive strategic objective. President 
Nixon agreed to the recommendation of Option 2, which advised continued 
enforcement of the arms embargo against South Africa but with certain latitude in 
regard to equipment that could be used for either military or civilian purposes. 
Moreover, Nixon announced in January 1970 that the embargo remain in place. 
However, he encouraged Kissinger to revise the definitions of the restrictions 
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constituting the embargo.76 An authority reports that these revised “guidelines provided 
substantial relaxation of controls in three areas: (1) certain items were taken off the 
validated license list; (2) items still under validated licensing controls, such as aircraft, 
were made available for export; and (3) items from the munitions control category were 
transferred to the validated license list.”77 Over vehement criticism from liberal and 
black African-oriented interest groups, these revised guidelines allowed the Nixon 
White House to sell $219 million in aircraft to South Africa during its first term and to 
provide parts and repairs for C-130 transport planes sold to the Republic prior to 
1963.78 
2.4.4  Ford Administration 
The Ford Administration remained sympathetic to South Africa in the United 
Nations, vetoing a number of resolutions concerning the urgency of the racial situation 
and the Republic’s expulsion from the General Assembly.79 High-ranking South 
African officials continued their visits to Washington, and Minister Mulder was again 
received by officials at the Departments of State and Defence. Ford Administration 
officials and conservative congressmen were allowed to participate in South African 
government-sponsored trips to confer with cabinet ministers in Pretoria. A number of 
legislators did so and returned to Washington and encouraged closer relations with the 
Republic, particularly in the geopolitical sphere. Similarly, Secretary of Defence James 
Schlesinger publicly advised that the Western Alliance use the intelligence-gathering 
facility at Silvermine.80 With South Africa confronting increased criticism from the 
international community, these gestures from the Ford Administration and 
Congressional conservatives were enormously encouraging to the white regime. 
2.4.5  The Collapse of the Portuguese Empire and Threats to White Rule in 
Southern Africa 
In April, 1974, just months before President Nixon’s resignation, there was a 
coup d’état in Portugal that replaced the Caetano regime and fifty years of neo-fascism 
with a military junta that harboured communist sympathies. The revolutionary 
government in Lisbon made it quite clear that the Portuguese empire in southern Africa 
would no longer be maintained and the colonial possessions of Angola and 
Mozambique would receive their independence. The basic assumption of Option 2 of 
NSSM 39—the whites, at least the Portuguese—were not there to stay. This 
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development would have enormous consequences for the South Africans beyond the 
theoretical foundations of U.S. policy. In the words of one observer, “the demise of the 
Portuguese empire seemed to presage the collapse of the ‘old order’ in southern 
Africa.”81 After years of neglect, the collapse of the Portuguese colonies finally brought 
southern Africa to the attention of the highest U.S. policy-makers.82 
In regard to Mozambique, the Ford Administration had little choice but to 
acknowledge the primacy of the Marxist-leaning Mozambique Liberation Front 
(FRELIMO) because, after the collapse of the rival National Coalition Party 
(COREMO) movement, there was simply no other political organization to assume 
power from the retiring Portuguese.83 Moreover, the United States government “had 
maintained informal contacts with FRELIMO for a number of years.”84 Furthermore, 
Kissinger’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Donald Easum—an 
individual publicly sympathetic to African aspirations for majority rule and a critic of 
Option 2—was the first foreign diplomat to meet formally with the Mozambican 
transitional government and considerably improved the dialogue between Washington 
and Maputo.85 
Kissinger did not necessarily resent Easum’s diplomatic breakthrough with the 
Mozambicans. He did, however, feel that Easum and his colleagues in the Bureau of 
African Affairs were sympathetic toward the emerging African socialist governments 
and the growing Soviet-Cuban involvement in southern Africa. Nor did he particularly 
appreciate Easum’s attempt to redirect the course of U.S. policy toward the region. 
Trying to restore some level of credibility to American policy on the continent, Easum 
commented to the press in Dar es Salem, “We are using our influence to foster change 
in South Africa—not to preserve the status quo.”86 Later the same day, he took on the 
Republic directly, saying that South Africa’s expulsion from the United Nations 
depended on “the degree to which South Africa made meaningful changes.”87 Easum 
returned to find that he had been sacked by Kissinger for his comments. He was 
replaced by Nathaniel Davis, former ambassador to Chile and allegedly involved in 
Pinochet’s coup, who became the new Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. 
Kissinger assured Hilgard Muller, South Africa’s Foreign Minister, that the 
appointment indicated a sharp movement away from the “missionary zeal” of the 
Department of State in its dealings with the Republic.88 
In Angola, there were three liberation movements—the pro-Western National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for 
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the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the South African-supported National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Although MPLA may have been farther 
left-leaning ideologically, there was little to distinguish it from FNLA or UNITA. All 
three groups used anti-colonial rhetoric, all expressed some vague “Marxist” notion of 
governance, and all had been willing to accept support from any country willing to give 
it with few preconditions. For instance, the MPLA, led by Agostinho Neto, had lobbied 
the United States in 1962 for support while not labelling the MPLA as a communist 
organization. The FNLA, led by Holden Roberto, went to Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, China, 
and the Soviet Union in hopes of securing support. Jonas Savimbi, the leader of 
UNITA, approached the same countries—with the exception perhaps of the Soviet 
Union—as well as North Vietnam, and acquired military training for his troops from 
North Korea.89 
Despite a long history of strife between these groups, Secretary Kissinger and 
the international media discovered a new narrative to explain why the Mbundu, the 
Ovimbundu, and the Kongo had been fighting off and on for half a millennia: it was a 
consequence of the Mbundu’s “communist” sympathies and the Ovimbundu and 
Kongo’s “capitalist” inclinations.90 Though the United States had little knowledge of 
the country and few interests to protect there, Angola would become America’s newest 
Cold War battleground, though the U.S Congress would be the last to know.91 
2.4.6  Collaboration on Southern Africa 
How precisely the United States arrived at supporting one or the other group is 
still a mystery. When Ford’s CIA chief was asked by the U.S. Congress what the 
difference between each was, he flatly stated, “They are all independents. They are all 
for black Africa. They are all for some fuzzy kind of social system, you know, without 
really much articulation, but some sort of let’s not be exploited by the capitalist 
nations.” When asked why the Chinese were backing the FNLA or UNITA, he stated: 
“Because the Soviets are backing the MPLA is the simplest answer.” Surprised by 
Colby’s frankness, Congressman Aspin asked the chief if that sort of reasoning was 
dictating American opposition to these groups; he replied, “It is.”92 
In January 1975, each of these groups appeared to have put aside their 
differences and was attempting to cooperate in a transitional government. Their 
differences, however, proved intractable, and the transitional government began to 
dissolve. Civil war appeared inevitable as each group began to arm and to lobby for 
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outside support. Washington was, however, not overly concerned because the 
consensus at the State Department was that the militarily superior FNLA would 
prevail.93 As the fighting between the MPLA and the FNLA-UNITA factions escalated 
between January and July, the Soviet Union and Cuba expanded their support for the 
MPLA, “providing nearly $35 million in arms and several thousand Cuban military 
advisors.”94 Kissinger was concerned that the Marxist MPLA, with substantial Soviet 
assistance, might seize power in Angola, and thought it essential to stop the 
“establishment of a radical and potentially hostile regime in Angola.”95 Additionally, 
the secretary believed the credibility of U.S. policy “throughout the world not permit 
such a power play by the USSR to go totally unchallenged.”96 Although Kissinger, in 
January, 1975, had previously favoured a modest amount of economic assistance only 
for the FNLA, by the summer of that same year, the Secretary had decided that 
diplomatic initiatives were useless unless “they [were] supported by continued military 
pressure on the ground” and against the advice of the State Department, decided to 
provide increased military assistance to both the FNLA and UNITA.97 
With the assistance of Zaire’s President Mobutu, a strong anti-communist ally 
in the region, in June 1975, the CIA began to funnel $31 million in “light arms, 
mortars, ammunition, vehicles, boats and communication equipment.”98 On August 3, 
1975, a small South African contingent crossed into Angola to help tip the balance in 
favour of UNITA. 
The United States Congress became increasingly concerned by the fact that 
Washington and Pretoria were cooperating in regards to Angola. The spectre of 
Vietnam hung over everything, including American involvement in southern Africa. 
Many legislators also believed that the United States had abandoned the moral high-
ground by involving itself in the conflict and were “critical of both the covert U.S. aid 
and South African military intervention, which in their opinions were not 
coincidental.”99 Congressional investigations also uncovered CIA collaboration with 
the South African Defence Force and immediately moved to limit American 
involvement in Angola. 
Despite obfuscations by the administration, the United States had been involved 
in Angola from the start. A declassified State Department memorandum was explicit, 
saying “we believed it was essential to the credibility of our policies throughout the 
world not to permit such a power play by the USSR to go totally unchallenged in 
African and elsewhere, this means showing that the United States, despite recent 
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reverses in southeast Asia and our preoccupation at home is still able to react when a 
power—the Soviet Union in this instance—moves to upset the international political 
environment.” The document continued, indicating that it was “only after exhaustive 
review and assessment of all these factors that the Executive Branch approved, in June 
of this year [1975], undertaking a program of covert activities.”100 Furthermore, the 
Nixon Administration had sought South African support and hoped to use that country 
as a proxy to pursue American interests in the region. There was also a close 
collaboration between the American and South African intelligence agencies, but with 
increased scrutiny from the U.S. Congress, it was becoming more difficult for 
Kissinger to publicly work with the South Africans on the Angolan conflict. It would 
be better if the United States-South Africa collaboration would fall off the front pages 
of the newspapers for awhile. Unfortunately for the secretary, it was not to happen that 
way. 
On the morning of October 23, 5,000 SADF soldiers and an armoured 
division—with a small contingent of American, Portuguese, and European 
mercenaries—struck deep into Angola territory and began a rapid advance on the 
capital.101 The world was stunned, and there were rumours that the military operation 
had been done at the behest of the United States. Kissinger would claim that “we had 
no foreknowledge of South Africa’s intentions, and in no way cooperated militarily.”102 
Characteristically, Kissinger was being less than truthful. Wayne Smith, director of the 
State Department’s Office of Cuban Affairs from 1977 to 1979, wrote that “in August 
and October [1975] South African troops invaded Angola with full U.S. knowledge.”103 
He could have added encouragement as well because a declassified State Department 
memorandum made it obvious that “military pressure” was essential to achieving 
American goals in the region104 and that CIA-funded mercenaries had accompanied the 
SADF during the invasion.105 
Still weary of involvement in conflicts and regions about which the country had 
almost no knowledge, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was determined to keep 
the United States from becoming further involved in Angola. Especially problematic 
was the dubious military competence of the FNLA and UNITA and the possibility that 
the U.S would have to intervene to rescue them. Shortly thereafter, the Congress passed 
the Clark Amendment, which cancelled all covert aid to Angola. The amendment, 
attached to the Foreign Assistance Act, was vetoed by President Ford; however, the 
identical Tunney Amendment passed the Senate on December 19, 1975, and the 
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measure was similarly supported by the House the following month.106 When covert 
American participation in the Angolan civil war was forced underground, Kissinger 
moved to dissociate himself from the South African actions. The congressional action 
and the subsequent abandonment by the Ford Administration happened just as a South 
African armoured division appeared poised to take the capital of Luanda.107 
2.4.7  Cuban Intervention and the Collapse of the South African Military 
Offensive 
On November 4, 1975, in response to the South African invasion of Angola, 
Cuba began to deploy the first of 30,000 troops to Angola to save the MPLA from an 
imminent collapse. Although the Soviets were not initially consulted, they eventually 
threw their considerable financial support to the Cubans and the MPLA to turn back the 
South Africans. That support proved decisive, and what seemed to be a certain victory 
for the SADF became a disaster. As General Sir Walter Walker, a former NATO 
commander, remarked, “Without U.S. support, the South African Government decided 
that discretion was the better part of valour. Therefore the only alternative to shooting 
down Soviet transport planes was to retire.”108 The MPLA took control of the country, 
and Agostinho Neto was sworn in as Angola’s first president shortly after South 
African forces withdrew from the country.109 
Although the U.S. government concealed its suspected role, members of the 
South African defence establishment, including Prime Minister Vorster himself, 
maintained that they had launched the invasion at U.S. instigation. This was confirmed 
by former CIA station chief in Luanda, Robert Hultslander, who told historian Piero 
Gleijeses “that Kissinger’s policy on Africa itself was short sighted and flawed” and 
that  he was “deeply concerned . . . about UNITA’s purported ties with South Africa, 
and the resulting political liability such carried. I was unaware at the time, of course, 
that the U.S. would eventually beg South Africa to directly intervene to pull its 
chestnuts out of the fire.”110 
The effects of the American reversal were immediate. The South Africans were 
angered by Kissinger’s abrupt about-face and anxious about the United States’ 
unwillingness to counter Soviet involvement in the region. Those strategists previously 
keen to work with the United States became disillusioned by the administration’s 
reversal, and relations between the two countries cooled.111 
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Although American involvement in the Angolan war was largely shelved, the 
region did not fade from the attention of Washington. With the emergence of black 
Marxist governments in Mozambique and Angola, there were renewed anxieties 
concerning Soviet-Cuban involvement in the nationalist struggles in Rhodesia and 
Namibia and the OAU states dedicating themselves to the armed struggle in southern 
Africa.112 In Rhodesia, Joshua Nkomo’s Zambia-based guerrilla movement was gaining 
strength and appeared to pose a serious threat to the white regime in Salisbury. 
Additionally, the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), with backing 
from the Soviets, was becoming a formidable military force in Namibia.113 
2.4.8  United States-South African Cooperation concerning Rhodesia 
The Ford Administration was chastened but still determined to contain Soviet-
Cuban encroachment in the region by non-military means. The administration viewed 
the escalating violence in Rhodesia as a product of Soviet meddling in the country.114 
Kissinger concluded that, to forestall Soviet-Cuban involvement, the United States 
should support majority rule in Rhodesia by means of “a negotiated settlement.”115 The 
United States would also encourage a diplomatic solution in Namibia, but management 
of the Rhodesian crisis would remain the primary objective.  
On April 27, 1976, in Lusaka, Zambia, Kissinger delivered a speech directed 
toward a black African audience and sketched out his recalibrated policy toward the 
region. The Secretary guaranteed a U.S. commitment to “majority rule . . . for all the 
peoples of Southern Africa.”116 He outlined America’s role in moving Rhodesia 
towards democracy and affirmed that the United States was committed to the 
independence of Namibia. 
Concerning South Africa, Kissinger was evasive, articulating a vague 
expectation of human rights in the Republic in the near future. He did, however, 
acknowledge that the United States was relying on South Africa to encourage 
Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to reach a negotiated settlement. Declassified 
documents suggest that South Africa nudged Smith toward political compromise and 
the front-line states discouraged guerrilla movements in the region as a quid pro quo.117 
Still smarting from the Angolan debacle, the South African government initially 
reacted negatively to the Lusaka speech. Pretoria, however, soon recognized that the 
Secretary’s speech was not directed at South Africa, but Rhodesia. South African 
policy makers also realized that the Ford Administration required the Republic’s 
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influence to encourage Salisbury to resolve the deepening crisis. As in earlier instances, 
the policy makers believed that it could be useful to the United States as an ally in a 
Cold War crisis.118 
Despite Pretoria’s understandable identification with Ian Smith’s government in 
Rhodesia, it was also true that the escalating insurgency in that country was 
complicating South Africa’s own situation. As one contemporary noted, South Africa 
“would have preferred a moderate African government to a white one that was a 
perpetual invitation to outside intervention in the region.”119 Indeed, Pretoria had 
unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a Rhodesian settlement with the Zambians shortly 
after the Lisbon coup. Naturally, they were not disinclined to Kissinger’s proposal. 
Negotiations between Washington and Pretoria over the Rhodesian situation 
began in May with a meeting between Secretary Kissinger and South African 
ambassador, R. F. “Pik” Botha. Kissinger told Botha that it would be necessary for 
South Africa to convince Ian Smith to compromise or that both countries would lose 
credibility in the future. If a settlement in Rhodesia were achieved, Botha was assured 
that the Ford Administration was willing to accept the South Africa-supported 
Turnhalle constitutional talks in Namibia. In another fortuitous event, President Ford 
suggested a possible summit with Prime Minister Vorster. Thus, a meeting between 
Kissinger and Vorster was scheduled for late June in Bavaria. Vorster had a keen 
interest in seeing the Rhodesian issue settled. Moreover, the meeting conferred an 
enormous legitimacy on the Vorster government. When the Soweto riots erupted in 
mid-June, that legitimacy would be helpful to Pretoria as it was confronted with a 
cascade of international scorn.120 
Secretary Kissinger and the South African Prime Minister met in West 
Germany on June 24. After the meeting, Kissinger flew to multiple capitals in Africa 
and Europe to try to salvage the Rhodesian negotiations. After shoring up the peace 
process, Kissinger and Vorster met again in Zurich and then in Pretoria in mid-
September. At that meeting, it was rumoured that Kissinger assured the Prime Minster 
that the United States would manipulate the gold prices to aid South Africa in exchange 
for cooperation on Rhodesia.121 True or not, shortly thereafter Pretoria began applying 
pressure on the Rhodesians to negotiate.122 
Chastened by his Angolan experience, Kissinger realized that it would be 
necessary to be more cognizant of domestic considerations in regards to Rhodesia. This 
time, he kept the Democratic leadership in the loop, including Senator George 
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McGovern, so the Secretary was careful to acknowledge that he was working with 
South Africa. He also wanted the American public to know that this cooperation was 
not a tacit endorsement of the Republic’s racial policies, even going so far as to assure 
a black audience in Philadelphia that apartheid was “repugnant to the world’s 
conscience.”123 Always the equivocator, he was careful not to mention that apartheid 
was repugnant to the United States in particular. His equivocations worked; this time 
Kissinger’s diplomacy in the region did not raise the ire of liberal Democrats. Quite 
unexpectedly, the main criticism came from the right, with conservative Republicans 
accusing Kissinger of abandoning a pro-Western ally in Rhodesia. The most strident of 
these critics was California governor Ronald Reagan, who was running in the 
Republican presidential primary. 
By late September, Kissinger’s efforts in the region began to show results. The 
leadership in Salisbury announced an “agreement to negotiate a transition to majority 
rule.”124 For Ian Smith, the same man who unilaterally declared independence in order 
to maintain white rule, such an action was unthinkable a few years earlier. However, 
just as the talks appeared to be moving in the right direction, the two black states 
withdrew from the negotiations, and the peace process collapsed.125 
This occurrence was not especially surprising. The process was always bound to 
be a difficult one, and U.S. influence in the region was always limited. Kissinger, 
however, was angered at the political capital expended with no results and placed the 
blame squarely on the black African states. The front-line states, for their part, were 
prepared to wait for Watergate to claim its final causality, bringing with it a Carter 
Administration that would presumably be more inclined to support their interests. It 
was also at this time that South Africa was confronting a crisis after Soweto and was 
focused on the internal situation. Helping save a diplomatic initiative for the Ford 
Administration during a tight presidential election was not a priority for Pretoria.126 
The Ford Administration left the Rhodesian problem as well as the conduct of 
future relations with Pretoria to the incoming Democratic administration. The influence 
of Henry Kissinger, which had been so instrumental in establishing the policy of 
communication with the Republic, along with the ideological inclinations that 
underpinned it, would most certainly be absent from the Carter White House. 
Consequently the controversial Nixon-Kissinger-Ford policy appeared to be drawing to 
a close and with it a real possibility that the United States “tilt” towards Pretoria would 
promptly reverse. 
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2.5 Carter Administration 
2.5.1  The Foundations of the Carter Policy 
When Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977, it was clear that relations 
between the U.S. and South Africa would be promptly restructured. Carter brought to 
the presidency a conviction that the United States must promote the cause of racial 
justice in southern Africa. The President’s beliefs were influenced by a number of 
factors, including his Christian beliefs, his advocacy for human rights, and the political 
support that his election had received from the Black community in the United States. 
On a personal level, Carter was ashamed that he had not more fully embrace the Civil 
Rights Movement in his native Georgia.127 
More importantly, the Carter Administration viewed geopolitics from a more 
“liberal” viewpoint than did its predecessors. Thus, the Cold War confrontation was 
deemphasized, and the United States committed itself to resolving long-neglected 
regional problems throughout the world. As President Carter stated, “We are now free 
of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who 
joined us in that fear.”128  Carter made it clear from the beginning that human rights 
would play a prominent role in his administration, stating in his inaugural address, 
“Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere.”129 
Southern Africa would figure prominently in this new approach. The administration 
believed that the Black Nationalism sweeping the continent was an unstoppable force 
that would eventually topple the white fortress in southern Africa. In that circumstance, 
it made no sense to continue to support South Africa and Rhodesia when their days 
were numbered. Consequently, recognition, encouragement, and eventual support for 
this Black Nationalist movement were the only sensible alternative for U.S. policy.130 
The persistent vestiges of colonialism and racism in southern Africa, not the 
adventurism of Moscow and Havana, were perceived as the adversaries that U.S. 
influence and diplomacy should confront. 
Carter’s election was received with consternation bordering on hysteria in 
Pretoria. Policy makers in the Republic had been consistently disappointed by the 
Nixon-Ford administrations, but they could always count on a certain level of 
understanding and cooperation. With Carter they fully expected to be abandoned 
altogether. Shortly before Carter’s inauguration, Prime Minister Vorstertold expressed 
this sentiment when he told the South African people: 
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It is my firm conclusion that if a communist onslaught should be made 
on South Africa . . . then South Africa will have to face it alone, and 
certain countries who profess to be anti-communist will even refuse to 
sell arms to South Africa to beat off the attack.131 
South African officials expecting to be rebuked by the Carter Administration would not 
be disappointed in the coming months. 
Andrew Young, Ambassador to the United Nations, assumed responsibility as 
Carter’s principal policy-maker for southern Africa and quickly became South Africa’s 
most strident critic. Young indicated that the United States had a “great deal of 
responsibility to pursue majority rule in southern Africa” and “we can’t really assume 
the moral leadership that we need . . . unless we are aggressively pursuing majority 
rule.”132 Young refused to equivocate in his criticism of the Republic, calling the South 
Africans “racists” and advocated an aggressive move “toward majority rule” in South 
Africa because there’s “going to be change . . . and the only question is whether it will 
be rational or violent.”133 Though Young did not want to see the white minority driven 
from the country, he believed the “the fears of the white community . . . really are 
leading them to destroy themselves.”134 
Perhaps most irritating to the South Africans was the seeming reversal on 
regional matters. Rather than staying aligned with white South Africa, the United States 
was siding with black Africa, and if an imminent “bloodbath” was to be averted in the 
region, it would be better if the country “be on the side of the forces of liberation and 
independence.”135 The influence of communism in the region, in Young’s view, was a 
canard: “In no sense should the ferment in southern Africa be attributed to Soviet 
influence; but, rather, to the spirit of freedom and the dignity of humankind.” For the 
Soviets to succeed, all they had to do was wait because the region would fall into 
“inevitable chaos . . . because of forces that we helped to create.”136 Young went so far 
as to remark that the Cuban presence was a “stabilizing force” in Angola and that the 
United States would resolve the Rhodesian crisis.137 However, on a personal level, 
Young never passed up an opportunity to criticize the South African government, even 
declaring the Nationalist Party as “illegitimate.”138 
With the United States actively engaged in a rhetorical assault on South Africa, 
many policy makers in that country thought it wise to find allies outside of the Western 
orbit. In April, Minister Mulder, who was expected to succeed Vorster, made a long 
parliamentary address that espoused the wisdom of cultivating new alliances. In the 
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months following the speech, South Africa expanded contacts with Israel, the Shah’s 
Iran, and the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan, as well as approaching anti-communist 
military regimes of South America. 
2.5.2  Mondale-Vorster Meetings 
In May 1977, Vice President Walter Mondale met with Vorster in Vienna for a 
candid discussion of the gravity of the racial situation in southern Africa. Mondale 
made it quite clear that the Carter Administration had completely rejected the Kissinger 
approach and wanted to see reform in South Africa itself. Mondale told Vorster that the 
Republic’s racial policies would no longer be ignored in return for its cooperation on 
Rhodesia and Namibia; there would also have to be immediate progress towards “full 
political participation”139 for all South Africans. 
White South Africans were unmoved by Mondale’s remarks, and Vorster was 
“very, very direct” in rejecting Mondale’s explicit call for “one man/one vote” in the 
Republic.140 National Party leaders told white South Africans that a “split” had 
occurred between the two countries, and R. F. Botha declared that the Carter 
Administration “should not expect that . . . we will negotiate our own destruction . . . 
There is a point beyond which we cannot go.” The United States, according to Botha, 
was pursuing this policy because “your blacks want us to pay the price for what your 
whites did to them and that your whites likewise want to rid themselves of their guilt 
complex by pushing it off on us.” He went on to say that, by introducing “one man-one 
vote,” the United States had “radicalized American demands to the point of threatening 
our destruction. It is our country yet you tell us your morality requires full and equal 
participation, which Mr. Mondale said means the same as one man, one vote.” If the 
South Africans would follow this policy prescription, it “would inevitably lead to their 
destruction.”141 
Aside from Mondale’s statement on voting rights, a number of other incidents 
continued to complicate U. S.-South African relations, and communication between 
Washington and Pretoria was impeded by distrust. Only a day after the Vienna 
conference, Young, on an official mission to South Africa, toured Soweto and 
encouraged the black residents of the township to adopt a program of economic 
boycotts against white-owned businesses.142 Pretoria was extremely irritated by 
Young’s behaviour. Further complicating matters was the Republic’s nuclear program. 
In August, the Soviet Union informed the United States that its intelligence had 
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discovered South African installations for testing a nuclear device in the Kalahari. 
American satellites confirmed the Soviet allegation, and the United States, its European 
allies, and the Soviet Union warned Pretoria to desist from any experimentation with 
nuclear weapons. Pretoria was stunned and outraged that Washington had collaborated 
with Moscow against South Africa.143 President Carter also issued an order, of which 
Pretoria became aware, that every federal agency was to provide a detailed disclosure 
of all of its departmental links and activities with South Africa. Furthermore, the South 
African finance minister was officially discouraged from making a prearranged visit to 
Washington.144 
As tension over the Republic’s nuclear program consumed the attention of 
American policy makers, South African police officers beat to death Steven Biko, 
leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, while Biko was in their custody. This 
was an inopportune time for an internationally known activist to be killed, and South 
African authorities attempted to cover up the circumstances of Biko’s death, saying he 
died while on a hunger strike. When the findings of a post-mortem were released to the 
public, the police said he might have “hurt his head when he fell out of bed.”145 The 
United States State Department denounced the South African explanation, saying Biko 
was a “victim of flagrant neglect and official irresponsibility.”146 
Vorster undoubtedly anticipated escalated pressure from the United States and 
wanted his political position to be sufficiently secure so as to react decisively to any 
unfriendly initiative that Washington might launch. Therefore, he announced a general 
election for November to reconfirm his mandate. After the snap election was planned, 
anti-American rhetoric in South Africa manifestly increased. When Carter and Mondale 
each offered conciliatory public gestures toward South Africa in October to mitigate 
South African hostility, they were both sharply rebuked for attempting to manipulate 
the election.147 The South African government also ordered an extensive crackdown on 
internal dissent, and numerous black and white anti-apartheid activists were 
incarcerated. The Prime Minister made it quite clear that he was determined to deflect 
pressure from abroad and pre-empt opposition from within. 
2.5.3  The United Nations and the Carter Initiative 
The October crackdown generated an intense wave of international protest that 
prompted the United Nations to enact punitive measures against South Africa. The 
United States lent its support to a mandatory arms embargo adopted by the U.N. The 
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administration had previously been considering such a step if Vorster proved to be 
uncooperative, and there had been a minor U. S. tightening of the voluntary embargo in 
July.148 American participation itself in this resolution did not have a particularly 
significant effect on South Africa, other than bolstering Vorster’s pre-election 
popularity, because the Republic had been obtaining its important armaments from 
Israel and France and through clandestine procurement.149 Moreover, at that point, 
South Africa had developed an effective domestic arms-producing industry. 
However, President Carter was not content merely to enforce U. S. compliance 
with the restrictions of the U.N. embargo, his administration actually extended them. 
Much to the consternation of American businessmen and Congressional conservatives, 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance announced that Carter, by executive order, would 
prohibit the transfer of all items to the South African military and police and cancel the 
continued provision of spare parts for systems already acquired. The Commerce 
Department added that the embargo applied to the entire span of civilian products, 
including sophisticated technology purchased by the South African government.150 The 
Carter Administration, however, encountered stern criticism from the anti-apartheid 
lobby when it authorized the sale of Cessna and Piper light airplanes to private South 
African interests because Pretoria had always reserved the right to commandeer civilian 
aircraft in times of national emergency. 
In contrast to the prompt suspension of security-related equipment to South 
Africa, Carter realized that it was not nearly as convenient to withdraw U. S. 
cooperation from the Republic’s nuclear energy program even though he was under 
increasing public pressure to do so. Pretoria’s clever policy of “calculated 
ambiguity”151—that is retaining the option for the development of nuclear weapons—
made Washington reluctant to sever its atomic technological ties with South Africa, for 
by doing so, the United States would forfeit its supervisory and moderating influence. 
As Young said, “if you break the relationship altogether, there is no way to monitor and 
it is almost because you can’t trust them that you have to stay close to them.”152 
2.5.4  Southern Africa during the Carter Administration 
Secretary Vance continued the herculean task begun by his predecessor of 
negotiating a Rhodesian settlement and worked closely with his British counterpart, 
Foreign Minister David Owen, toward this end. South Africa’s influence on Smith 
would have been helpful in the process.153 However, Pretoria was less willing to 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
54 
pressure Salisbury toward a settlement than it had been during the previous American 
administration when South Africa was accommodated in exchange for its effort. 
Vorster had previously indicated to the Carter Administration that, if the United States 
had nothing to offer in return, he would no longer attempt to coerce the Rhodesian 
prime minister. Warning that the Republic and the United States were close to a 
complete break over Rhodesia, Vorter declared that, if American pressures persisted, 
“the end result for southern Africa would be exactly the same as if it was subverted by 
Marxism. In one case, it will come about as a result of brute force, and in the other it 
will be strangulation with finesse.”154 In any event, Smith ultimately tended to move 
towards an internal settlement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa and other moderate African 
leaders, excluding the more radical elements of the Patriotic Front from the new 
government.155 
With regard to Namibia, a new approach was implemented to accelerate the 
independence of this troubled and disputed territory. Mondale had made it clear at 
Vienna that Pretoria must abandon the Turnhalle constitutional negotiations that 
Kissinger had previously hinted Washington might be induced to recognize. The Carter 
Administration rejected the Turnhalle plan, which would have practically excluded 
SWAPO, because it would have created a provisional government composed of 
politicians, white and black, who were unquestioningly loyal to Pretoria; this 
development would, of course, have inhibited the possibility of free elections. 
Moreover, Turnhalle proposed the establishment of Bantustans as a prelude to 
independence.156 
Instead, the United States in concert with the four other Western members of the 
Security Council—Britain, France, West Germany, and Canada—attempted to promote 
a solution in accordance with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 385, which called 
for free Namibian elections supervised by the U.N.157 Young’s deputy, Ambassador 
Donald McHenry, spearheaded this multilateral initiative. The five Western 
ambassadors in South Africa urged Pretoria to open new Namibian negotiations in 
which the U.N. would participate, and this Western Contact Group approach became 
standard operating procedure in finding a solution in Namibia.158 
McHenry persistently pressured South Africa to permit just one more 
concession toward Namibian independence; in the process, increasingly suspicious 
officials in Pretoria found McHenry to be exceedingly calculating and “over time they 
had decided that he had made up his mind exactly what the final solution in Namibia 
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should be: a handover to SWAPO under U.N. auspices.”159 McHenry’s determined and 
relentless push towards a Namibian settlement greatly agitated South Africa and 
ultimately put the Afrikaner government on the defensive.160 
South Africa had its own ideas as to what would constitute an acceptable 
settlement in Namibia. Even though Pretoria participated in the tedious U.N. 
negotiations, it was reluctant to allow a settlement to mature. The South African 
government understandably had little inclination to compromise its political and 
military position in Namibia—especially not at the insistence of the unfriendly Carter 
Administration, which Pretoria perceived as the champion of radical Black Nationalism 
in southern Africa.161 South Africa was determined to deprive SWAPO of its military 
option and attacked its guerrilla bases in Angola. Despite condemnations from the 
United States, Minister of Defence P.W. Botha ignored the protest and warned, “South 
Africa would not be intimidated and would strike again if its security was 
threatened.”162 South Africa also did not dismiss its very real option of pressing on with 
its internal settlement and eventually established political structures within Namibia to 
facilitate such a contingency.163 
2.5.5  Drift to the Right 
As the Namibian problem demonstrates, Pretoria had no interest in cooperating 
with the Carter White House. The South African government, instead, sought to 
cultivate associations with prominent Americans who were also uncomfortable with the 
current U.S. policy and who may have been helpful in promoting its position.164 
Pretoria had every reason to expect that it would encounter a large and sympathetic 
audience in the United States. Shortly after the Vienna meeting with Mondale, Vorster 
had received standing ovations from two civic organizations, composed largely of 
American businessmen stationed in South Africa, after delivering speeches sharply 
critical of the United States. Also, following the October 1977 crackdown, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce opened an office in Johannesburg and indicated that American 
business did not “necessarily support the Carter initiative.”165 
A number of influential Americans visited the Republic and amplified their 
support of the South African government. New Hampshire’s conservative governor, 
Meldrim Thompson, received a red-carpet welcome and was followed by Dr. Ernest 
Lefever of Georgetown University, who was greeted with equal attention.166 
Congressman James Wright of Texas inspected the SASOL oil-from-coal refining 
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facility and praised South Africa’s technological prowess. Senator Barry Goldwater 
addressed a white audience and confessed that he was very much embarrassed by 
Carter’s policy toward the region.167 
On a highly publicized trip to South Africa in August 1978, presidential 
contender John Connally denounced U.S. policy and furthermore assured Pretoria, 
We can’t dictate to you. This view accords with most of the people back 
home. You are going to see the U.S. Congress reflecting this view and it 
will become more and more manifest as time goes by.168 
Governor Connally’s remarks were off the mark, except perhaps in his native Texas, 
but nonetheless prophetic. By 1979, the Carter Administration had realized that 
American influence in the region was limited, certainly insufficient to produce the 
negotiated settlements desired. A conservative attitude was also increasingly evident in 
the Congress, which reflected the mood of the general population. Meanwhile, within 
the administration itself, “Africanists” such as Young were being pushed aside by 
“globalists” such as National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who argued that 
southern Africa could not be divorced from the superpower struggle; even President 
Carter himself became quite preoccupied with arresting Soviet expansionism with the 
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.169 
A number of observers have noted that, beginning in late 1978 and early 1979 
Carter’s policy seemed to be reverting back to the Kissinger approach, which sought to 
pre-empt Soviet involvement through negotiated settlements while rewarding South 
Africa for its cooperation in the process. Vance visited Pretoria in October 1978 and 
demonstrated that the Carter Administration was indeed willing to employ the 
Kissinger practice of linkage. Much to the dismay of the State Department 
“Africanists,” the Secretary delivered a handwritten letter from President Carter to the 
newly elected South African Prime Minister, P. W. Botha, stating that Botha would be 
invited to make an official visit to Washington if progress toward a Namibian 
settlement could be made. The South African government leaked the letter to the 
press.170 Obviously, Prime Minister Botha was most unenthusiastic in responding to 
Carter’s invitation, and there was other evidence of the erosion of Carter’s activist 
initiative. 
Ambassador Young, the most vocal Africanist, resigned in August 1979. Even 
though his retirement resulted from an indiscreet contact with an envoy of the Palestine 
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Liberation Organization, “his resignation . . . symbolized the decline of U.S. activism in 
Southern Africa.”171 And prior to Young’s departure, McHenry had been replaced as 
the chief negotiator of the Western Contact Group by a British diplomat, Sir James 
Murray, who was more sympathetic to South African sensitivities.172 However, Pretoria 
remained unconvinced of the advantage of cooperating with even this modified Carter 
Administration. The Botha government realized that, considering the current attitude of 
the American public and Congress as well as the divisions within the administration, 
Carter was in an unlikely position to increase economic pressure against the Republic. 
Pretoria now had little reason, positive or negative, to bend towards Washington. 
2.5.6  Muldergate and the Election of P. W. Botha 
South Africa was also preoccupied with a domestic crisis. Pretoria was 
dramatically shaken by the unfolding Information Scandal, which eventually reached 
the highest levels of the Afrikaner establishment. The Secretary of Information, Eschel 
Rhoodie, was involved in the distribution of government funds to private South African 
organizations, as well as to an American publisher, to purchase U.S. newspapers in an 
effort to influence American public opinion. Rhoodie was also embezzling some of the 
funds for his personal use. After Rhoodie was accused, he incriminated his superior, 
Minister of Information Connie Mulder, who accepted responsibility. The scandal then 
became known as “Muldergate.” However, a subsequent parliamentary investigation 
also implicated Hendrick van den Burg, the head of the secret service, and State 
President J. B. Vorster, who had previously, in an unusual move, retired from the 
powerful Prime Ministry to assume this largely ceremonial office. Vorster resigned in 
June 1979 and the South African government was paralyzed politically and 
diplomatically by these shocking revelations.173 
In April, as the scandal was beginning to culminate, Botha provoked a bitter 
fight with the United States over a relatively minor incident. The South African 
government revealed that a spy camera had been detected in the American 
ambassador’s plane, and three U.S. military attaches were ordered to leave Pretoria. 
Washington retaliated by ordering the expulsion of two senior South African military 
officers from the United States.174 Speculation has been that Botha created the crisis to 
divert the attention of the South Africa public away from Muldergate and towards an 
external adversary; other analysts have argued that the “spy plane flap” was 
precipitated as part of a strategy to distance South Africa from the United States so the 
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Botha government could concentrate on promoting a more autonomous direction in 
international relations. In either case, this incident set the pattern of diplomatic 
hostilities between the two nations, a pattern that would persist throughout the final 
days of the Carter Administration. 
When the South African government did recover from the Information Scandal, 
it was with a vigorous momentum that implemented a number of unexpected 
innovations, both internal and external. Botha announced a series of reforms designed 
to abolish “petty apartheid” or social segregation in an effort to defuse domestic unrest 
and to repair South Africa’s international image. The Prime Minister also explained his 
vision for a “constellation” of southern African states as the foundation of a new order. 
Pretoria also began to expand its commercial links with black Africa, including Zambia 
and Mozambique, in an effort to enlarge its economic orbit. These developments would 
prove critical in the South Africa-United States relationship during the Reagan 
Administration175 and are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Botha also accelerated the Vorster government’s policy of securing alliances 
with other anti-communist middle powers. Although Pretoria regretted the fall of its 
good friend, the Shah of Iran, in 1979, during the following year, Botha enjoyed two 
summits with the premier of the Republic of China and continued to maintain close ties 
with the State of Israel. In regard to the United States, Botha was pursuing a longer 
term strategy. Pretoria continued to build bridges to conservative congressmen with the 
hope that it eventually could re-establish closer relations with a post-Carter 
administration.176 
Despite South Africa’s movement toward racial reform, communication with 
the United States government did not improve, and during the concluding months of the 
Carter Administration, bilateral relations disintegrated into a tit-for-tat exercise in 
diplomatic agitation. Washington accused Pretoria of spending $20 million (USD) 
annually for propaganda purposes in the United States. The South African police 
disrupted the operations of the U.S. International Communications Agency (USICA) 
and monitored those who attended the broadcasts of “Roots” at the USICA centre in 
Pretoria. In turn, Washington delayed South Africa’s applications for honorary 
consulates in the United States and sent American embassy personnel as observers to 
trials of political prisoners in the Republic. In addition, the South African Air Force 
harried a U.S. naval detachment as it sailed around the Cape. Finally, N. J. Niewoud, 
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the South African surgeon general, was refused a visa to enter the United States to 
attend an international medical conference.177 
In this climate of bilateral animosity, the activist Carter initiative, which so 
earnestly sought to promote the causes of racial justice and majority rule in Rhodesia 
and Namibia and which was intended to apply pressure on South Africa to dismantle 
apartheid and move toward a pluralistic democratic society, came to a close. Peace and 
majority rule had finally been achieved in Rhodesia, but only after British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher managed to bring the Muzorewa government, the product 
of Smith’s internal settlement, the white minority, and the Patriotic Front guerrillas to 
the bargaining table to reach a workable compromise. However, the Carter 
administration “played no direct role in the breakthrough.”178 
Even though Carter’s negotiators had established the framework for a Namibian 
settlement they were unable to bring it to a successful conclusion. South Africa 
ultimately suspended the negotiations to assess the outcome of the evolving Rhodesian 
situation and to await a more accommodating administration in Washington.179Further, 
although Pretoria finally committed itself to limited racial reforms, the historic decision 
hardly seemed the result of U.S. influence, which had, in fact, reached an all time low. 
These realities tended to indicate the general ineffectiveness of Carter’s policy, in 
which sincere commitments proved to be insufficient agents to accomplish those goals. 
An Afrikaner intellectual, Hermann Giliomee, provides a concise balance sheet 
that evaluates the Carter administration’s stance toward South Africa: 
Under Carter the United States supported the U.N. arms embargo, 
refused to cooperate with South Africa in the production of synthetic 
fuels . . . and expressed concern to the South African government about 
human rights violations. The administration, however, stopped short of 
any action that would seriously harm U.S. interests in South Africa. It 
refused to support the demand for economic sanctions . . . and resisted 
the implementation of the so-called mild economic options, such as a 
ban on new investment or statutory enforcement of the Sullivan 
principles on employment practices.180 
It was Carter’s reluctance to resort to punitive measures that subjected him to criticism 
from even his own ideological constituency. Those same individuals, who so highly 
praised the Carter White House for its firm commitment to change, ultimately criticized 
it for failing “to take dramatic steps that would both give substance to rhetorical 
pressure and withdraw U.S. support.”181 Observers who expected Carter to force a 
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reordering of the status quo in southern Africa were most disappointed in late 1978 and 
early 1979 when U.S. policy again seemed to follow Kissinger’s track. 
Despite the insistence of impatient liberal proponents, Carter realized that his 
activist approach would not succeed. His administration had overestimated 
Washington’s ability to influence events in southern Africa, lost the enthusiasm of an 
American public that was becoming increasingly conservative, and “received little 
support from its European allies who did not want their economic interests in South 
Africa damaged by a reckless U.S. policy.”182 Of course, however, the Carter policy 
received its most vehement criticism from the American right. General Sir Walter 
Walker cynically berated Carter’s political advocacy of human rights as a fraud in 
general and a contemptible hypocrisy as it was applied to Africa. He pointed out that 
the Carter Administration attacked the South African government for detaining political 
dissidents, but remained comparatively silent as Uganda’s Idi Amin inflicted 
unspeakable acts of barbarism and genocide on his population. Carter even provided 
training for Amin’s security forces at Ft. Hood, Texas.183Furthermore, former Secretary 
of State Kissinger warned that the administration had gravitated too far towards 
Africa’s “ideological radicals,” placing U.S. policy in a perplexing situation.184 
Considering the outcome of the 1980 presidential election in the United States, 
perhaps the most compelling critique of the Carter initiative came from Ronald Reagan. 
Candidate Reagan criticized the Africanists in the Carter administration: 
For being insensitive to the need to protect U.S. national interests and 
America’s position of power within the global system. Their policy for 
Southern Africa was pictured as placing African interests above 
American interests and consequently as having failed to check the real 
and potential spread of Soviet power into Southern Africa.185 
According to Reagan, the United States had alienated a reliable Cold War ally without 
any substantive reforms and at the expense of American interests. Furthermore, these 
strategic interests had been sacrificed for nothing. South Africa had not facilitated 
change in southern Africa, and the Republic was no closer to full political 
enfranchisement for black South Africans. 
2.6 Conclusion 
From the Second World War to the Ford Administration, there had been a 
remarkable consistency in American foreign policy towards the Republic of South 
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Africa. Each administration had attempted to balance strategic and economic interests 
against human rights issues. Though the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations chose 
to place slightly higher emphasis on human rights, like the Truman, Nixon, and Ford 
Administrations, American strategic interests would always remain the priority. The 
Carter Administration, however, chose to deemphasize the Cold War confrontation. 
Consequently, security ties with the Republic diminished, and there was an increased 
emphasis on human rights in South Africa. By the time Ronald Reagan came to the 
presidency, bilateral relations were at an all-time low, and many South African policy 
makers believed the United States had abandoned it to the “Marxist Onslaught.”186 
Whereas President Carter had placed an emphasis on full political participation 
for the peoples of southern Africa, including South Africa, the incoming Reagan 
Administration’s policy toward southern Africa would rest on the priorities of 
protecting U.S. interests and containing communist influences in the region. The South 
African leadership was euphoric over Reagan’s victory.187 Two weeks before the 
inauguration, American journalists reported that Pretoria was “anticipating a 
sympathetic White House and . . . looking for shifts in U.S. policy to mark the start of a 
new era of warmer ties.”188The South African government was particularly encouraged 
by the fact that “the Reagan administration viewed the problems of southern Africa in 
the context of East-West relations” and that “Washington had adopted a tough posture 
toward Moscow.”189 Moreover, South African policy makers were calculating that 
Reagan would be far more concerned with the global containment of communism than 
with promoting a “marginally rewarding” campaign for political rights in South Africa; 
they were also aware that conservative Republicans had historically proven to be more 
sympathetic to the continuation of white minority rule in Africa.190 
Regarding the issue of arresting the spread of communism in southern Africa, 
members of the security establishment clearly expected a Untied States-South Africa 
strategic alliance. In fact, Robert Rotberg revealed that some South Africans thought 
that influential U.S. policymakers might even publicly “condone the perpetuation of 
apartheid because the menace of Soviet communism (in the bitter battle between good 
and evil in the world) is the greater of the two dangers.” Furthermore, the South 
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) proclaimed Reagan’s victory a defeat for 
“pseudo-liberalism, permissiveness, state intervention, appeasement, and anti-
patriotism”: “Western Christian culture,” it exclaimed, “still had a fighting chance 
against the continuing expansion of Marxist ideology.”191 It was a reversal of these 
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Soviet gains at the hands of liberal weakness and idealism to which Chester Crocker—
Assistant Secretary of African Affairs during the Reagan Administration—reacted in 
his writings and in his formulation of the future Reagan policy of “Constructive 
Engagement.”192 Though Crocker would publicly present the policy as a balanced 
solution to regional conflict and liberalization of the Republic’s political system, 
implicitly, constructive engagement was designed to support South African initiatives 
to reduce Soviet and Cuban influence throughout southern Africa and to ensure the 
survival of the powerful apartheid state as a bulwark against anti-communism in Africa. 
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Chapter III 
“The African problem is a Russian weapon aimed at us…” 
Ronald Reagan, Radio address, 
November 2, 19761 
3.1 From Theory to Practice: The Formulation and Implementation of 
Constructive Engagement 
This chapter will outline the ideological foundations of the Reagan Doctrine and 
its southern African manifestation called “Constructive Engagement.” As outlined by 
its chief architect, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, 
“Constructive Engagement” comprised two ideas: that change in South Africa had to be 
controlled and that the region had to be “stabilized” before initiating controlled change. 
Considerable evidence suggests that the Reagan Administration proceeded further than 
any other Western nation in identifying its own interests with those of the South 
African state. This stance was taken largely because Constructive Engagement’s 
ultimate objective was not the managed political liberalization of the Republic of South 
Africa, as was claimed in the 1980s, but rather the rollback of Soviet influence in 
southern Africa. Because this latter goal was predicated on the existence of a South 
Africa dominated by apartheid, the policy’s stated objective of political change within 
the Republic was merely a façade. 
3.2 The Reagan Doctrine 
Although President Reagan never used the rubric himself—indeed, the label 
was first used in 1985 by neoconservative writer, Charles Krauthammer—the Reagan 
Doctrine was the administration’s hard-line prescription for national doubt and 
cautiousness that developed in the 1970s in response to a confluence of events that 
included eroding confidence in the American economy, Soviet military and nuclear 
parity, Soviet and Cuban gains in the developing world, and finally the Iranian hostage 
crisis, which seemed to epitomize American helplessness and confusion. According to 
the Reagan Administration, American influence dwindled during this period not 
because the international order was changing in ways that undercut U.S. dominance, 
but because liberal policy makers ignored the country’s vital interests and allowed 
American power to wane in the face of an active and hostile Soviet Union. The Reagan 
Doctrine asserted that the country needed to promote the principal values of “American 
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Exceptionalism”—democracy, freedom, equality, individualism, free enterprise, self-
determination—to reaffirm the United States was the  was still the “Shining City on the 
Hill” and an example for other countries to follow. The Reagan Doctrine was thus 
directed not only at Soviet adventurism in the developing world but also at the 
“introspection, self-doubt, and hesitancy” that Reagan identified as the source of 
American decline in the 1970s.2 
The main advocates of a forceful American posture were members of a small, 
hawkish elite that tended to see liberals in Congress and the policy establishment as the 
greatest threat to democracy after communism.34 The Reagan Doctrine was a rallying 
point for conservatives against the enemy at home as well as abroad. Foremost, the 
Reagan Doctrine made a case for continued high defence spending by emphasizing the 
argument that the decline of American defence capabilities after the Vietnam War 
invited aggressive Soviet behaviour in the 1970s and that, to check the spread of 
Marxism, the U.S. needed to restore its military power and demonstrate America’s 
willingness to defend its interests globally.3 
Among the policy’s most important advocates were neoconservatives such as 
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Elliott Abrams, Norman Podhoretz, and Irving Kristol, many of 
whom broke with the Democratic Party in the early 1970s and became aggressive 
conservative spokespersons during the Carter Administration. Neoconservatives were a 
valuable element of the constituency that put Reagan in office in 1980, but were by no 
means natural allies of more traditional conservatives, especially on economic issues. 
However, neoconservative and traditional conservative views were more compatible on 
foreign policy issues, particularly on the point that, under Carter, lack of resolve and 
illusions about Soviet actions in foreign policy circles caused American influence to 
erode and invited Soviet adventurism abroad. The Reagan Doctrine drew on this 
ideological viewpoint which provided a means by which conservatives from across the 
political spectrum could counter liberal weakness when confronted by Soviet 
belligerence.4 
Reagan Doctrine advocates in the administration reflected the change in U.S. 
foreign policy in their public statements on the Soviet Union and the Cold War. 
Secretary of State George Shultz emphatically stressed the inseparability of power and 
diplomacy and asserted that as the defender of democracy and guarantor of Western 
security, the United States had to defend anticommunist allies and to be more 
aggressive in reversing Soviet gains in the developing world. Labelling the Carter 
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Administration as the archetype of American vacillation and weakness, Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick, at that time a professor at Georgetown University, wrote: 
The failure of the Carter administration’s foreign policy is now clear to 
everyone except its architects, and even they must entertain private 
doubts, from time to time, about a policy whose crowning achievement 
has been to lay the groundwork for a transfer of the Panama Canal from 
the United States to a swaggering Latin dictator of Castroite bent. In the 
thirty-odd months since the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as President 
there has occurred a dramatic Soviet military buildup, matched by the 
stagnation of American armed forces, and a dramatic extension of Soviet 
influence in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Southern Africa, and the 
Caribbean, matched by a declining American position in all these areas. 
The U.S. has never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep 
friends in the Third World.5 
According to Kirkpatrick, the vision of America not just as the defender of 
democracy but as a force for its expansion was infused into U.S. policy from the top 
down by Reagan, against considerable resistance within the bureaucracy.6 Kirkpatrick 
cited three factors that forced the administration to push U.S. foreign policy to the right: 
the Soviet military buildup during the 1970s; the simultaneous expansion of Marxist 
influence throughout the developing world, with the accession of leftist governments in 
Vietnam, Ethiopia, Angola, South Yemen, Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua; 
and a corresponding acceleration of the war of ideas, with growing Soviet influence 
over “language and concepts key to the discussion of morality and law and in such 
political arenas as the United Nations.”7 
The goal of the Reagan Doctrine was to reverse this evolution of the military, 
geopolitical, and ideological correlation of forces in a way that would make the cost of 
Soviet Union adventurism prohibitively high. The question was whether officially 
sponsoring insurgencies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America was the most effective way 
to do so. Theoretically, the U.S. could have responded to Soviet expansionism by 
strengthening its own ties with other key countries, such as China or Egypt, rather than 
trying to reverse particular Soviet gains. However, one premise of the Reagan Doctrine 
was that the countries and regions in which Marxist governments acceded in the 1970s 
were of great strategic value, especially Afghanistan, which the administration viewed 
as a stepping stone for Moscow toward the Persian Gulf, and Nicaragua because of its 
proximity to the United States. In the case of southern Africa, eventual Reagan 
appointee to the head of the State Department, Larry W. Bowman, testified that the 
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region was threatened by a “resource war” waged by “Soviet proxy activity” that could 
bring the “severest consequences” for American interests.8 
Speaking to South Africa more specifically, in 1978, conservatives Peter 
Duignan and L. H. Gann wrote in Business Week, “South Africa at present controls the 
Cape route, a major consideration at a time when Soviet Naval power has become 
predominate in the western part of Indian Ocean. . . . . It plays a major role in the global 
economy as the world’s greatest producer of gold and as a major exporter of uranium, 
diamonds, chrome, magnesium, and other materials.”9 Citing South Africa’s long-
standing and devout opposition to communism, this point of view contended roughly 
that any destabilization of South Africa’s ruling regime was wrong because the 
alternative to white rule was communist rule. For example, on August 21, 1979, 
Richard Viguerie, political consultant and chief architect of Reagan’s 1980 electoral 
victory, said, “The alternative to the current Government is a Communist regime. If 
South Africa falls, freedom is not likely to prevail in the rest of the world for much 
longer.”10 In this view, more support for South Africa was necessary, and punitive 
economic sanctions merely played into Soviet hands. 
Therefore, the Reagan Doctrine called for symmetric response at such key 
points as southern Africa, where Soviet advances were perceived as threats to 
American interests. Primary among those concerns were the United States’ 
considerable economic interests in southern Africa. These interests had their own 
advocates at home and in southern Africa. 
3.2.1  The Anticommunist Lobby 
Southern Africa had been a traditional concern of ideological anticommunists; 
its minerals, Cape sea route, and political juxtaposition of Marxist guerrillas and anti-
Marxist white regimes had guaranteed attention to the region’s phalanx of problems. 
These activists would play a critical role in ideologically conjoining the foreign policy 
of the United States and South Africa in the context of the Super Power struggle. 
In the controversy surrounding the Byrd Amendment, the anticommunist 
Liberty Lobby11 played an important role. Along with its offshoots—the American-
South African Council and the National Coordinating Committee of the Friends of 
Rhodesian Independence—it placed advertisements, arranged tours, published issue 
briefs, and drummed up support for Rhodesia among its 14,000 members nationwide. 
Their arguments made an appeal to the strategic importance, indeed necessity, of 
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supporting minority anticommunist rule. For example, a pro-Rhodesian viewpoint 
argued: 
Rhodesia is the key to the West’s precarious position in the Afro-Asian 
world. If Rhodesia falls, both South Africa and Portuguese Africa will 
inevitably fall like dominoes, leaving the entire continent in anti-
Western hands. . . . We must not allow this to happen.12 
A similar line of argument characterized the anticommunist outlook in the South Africa 
debate. 
In the 1970’s, particularly during the debate over the Clark Amendment, this 
rigid anticommunism was largely in remission. In the context in which the Clark 
Amendment was considered—immediately after the fall of Saigon, following a divisive 
and exhausting war—this point of view carried little weight in the domestic debate.13 
From 1976 to the mid-1980s, the anticommunist lobby was resuscitated and 
began to exert increasing influence on foreign policy debates. Leaving aside the larger 
questions of general public mood swings and shifting policy preferences, the 
ideological anticommunist lobby under Ronald Reagan was growing more assertive and 
effective for a number of reasons. The first was the election of Reagan itself; Ronald 
Reagan was more predisposed to the right-wing foreign policy viewpoint than any 
President before him. A second source of power was the development during the late 
1970’s of a sophisticated, computerized lobbying and fundraising apparatus. These 
groups mastered the techniques of direct mail, achieving a fund-raising capability that 
simply outstripped opposing organizations. For example, it is estimated that in the 1980 
presidential campaign, conservative lobby groups played an important role in providing 
Ronald Reagan with nearly five times as much private campaign monies as President 
Carter. 
A number of groups were established during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s 
that were to play key roles in future debates over southern Africa policy. Examples 
include the Free the Eagle National Citizen’s Lobby, which by 1985 claimed a 
membership of 265,000 and was one of only four lobbying groups that reported 
spending in excess of $1 million on lobbying activities in Congress in 1984. Another 
case is the Heritage Foundation, established in 1973, “to make the voice of responsible 
conservatism heard in Washington, D.C. and throughout the world.” Focusing on 
policy politics, Heritage sought to put out magazines, books, and timely issue briefs and 
summaries to be used in Congressional debate. Other groups involved in the 
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anticommunist debate included Lew Lehrman’s Citizens for America and World 
Anticommunist League, the Conservative Caucus, the American Security Council, 
which would set up Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s meeting with South African intelligence 
officers in 1981, and the National Jewish Coalition, publishers of Commentary 
magazine.14 One Congressional aide estimated that between 10 and 30 such groups 
were involved with the 1985-1986 decision to give aid to Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA 
guerrillas.15 
Additionally, an ethnic lobby, represented by the Cuban American National 
Foundation, was to play a vital role in the debate over Angola. This group’s emphasis 
was on Cuban policies and expansion in the world. Although this ethnic group was 
exclusively concentrated in the state of Florida, it was nonetheless influential in key 
Congressional districts. Congressman Claude Pepper (D-Fla.), chairman of the House 
Rules Committee, had a district of approximately 40% Cuban-Americans, while Sep. 
Dante Fascell (D-Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, had a 25-
30% Cuban-American constituency. 
All these anticommunist pressure groups had a common purpose: to see that 
U.S. policy would tilt heavily to the right in supporting the apartheid regime in South 
Africa and the Republic’s ally in Angola, UNITA. By mobilizing money and public 
opinion, these anticommunist groups could, they hoped, reverse the Marxist gains in 
southern Africa. The Carter Administration had represented a low point in southern 
Africa, with Rhodesia and Mozambique moving into the Marxist camp and an 
unprecedented decline of American influence in the region. With Reagan’s accession to 
the presidency, South Africa and its American allies would vigorously work to reverse 
those gains and to cement a working relationship between the two countries in rolling 
back Marxist influence in the region. 
3.2.2  Support for Right-Wing States 
According to Jeanne Kirkpatrick, one of the primary threats facing the West 
was the failure of its own leaders to stand by autocratic, pro-Western allies. Writing in 
the neoconservative publication Commentary in 1977, Professor Kirkpatrick outlined 
the situation that threatened American interests in places like southern Africa: 
The pattern is familiar enough: an established autocracy with a record of 
friendship with the U.S. is attacked by insurgents, some of whose 
leaders have long ties to the Communist movement, and most of whose 
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arms are of Soviet, Chinese, or Czechoslovak origin. The “Marxist” 
presence is ignored and/or minimized by American officials and by the 
elite media on the ground that U.S. support for the dictator gives the 
rebels little choice but to seek aid “elsewhere.” Violence spreads and 
American officials wonder aloud about the viability of a regime that 
“lacks the support of its own people.” The absence of an opposition 
party is deplored and civil-rights violations are reviewed. Liberal 
columnists question the morality of continuing aid to a “rightist 
dictatorship” and provide assurances concerning the essential 
moderation of some insurgent leaders who “hope” for some sign that the 
U.S. will remember its own revolutionary origins. Requests for help 
from the beleaguered autocrat go unheeded, and the argument is 
increasingly voiced that ties should be established with rebel leaders 
“before it is too late.” The President, delaying U.S. aid, appoints a 
special emissary who confirms the deterioration of the government 
position and its diminished capacity to control the situation and 
recommends various measures for “strengthening” and “liberalizing” the 
regime, all of which involve diluting its power. 
The emissary’s recommendations are presented in the context of a 
growing clamor for American disengagement on grounds that continued 
involvement confirms our status as an agent of imperialism, racism, and 
reaction; is inconsistent with support for human rights; alienates us from 
the “forces of democracy”; and threatens to put the U.S. once more on 
the side of history’s “losers.” This chorus is supplemented daily by 
interviews with returning missionaries and “reasonable” rebels. 
As the situation worsens, the President assures the world that the U.S. 
desires only that the “people choose their own form of government”; he 
blocks delivery of all arms to the government and undertakes 
negotiations to establish a “broadly based” coalition headed by a 
“moderate” critic of the regime who, once elevated, will move quickly 
to seek a “political” settlement to the conflict. Should the incumbent 
autocrat prove resistant to American demands that he step aside, he will 
be readily overwhelmed by the military strength of his opponents, whose 
patrons will have continued to provide sophisticated arms and advisers 
at the same time the U.S. cuts off military sales. Should the incumbent 
be so demoralized as to agree to yield power, he will be replaced by a 
“moderate” of American selection. Only after the insurgents have 
refused the proffered political solution and anarchy has spread 
throughout the nation will it be noticed that the new head of government 
has no significant following, no experience at governing, and no talent 
for leadership. By then, military commanders, no longer bound by 
loyalty to the chief of state, will depose the faltering “moderate” in favor 
of a fanatic of their own choosing. 
In either case, the U.S. will have been led by its own misunderstanding 
of the situation to assist actively in deposing an erstwhile friend and ally 
and installing a government hostile to American interests and policies in 
the world. At best we will have lost access to friendly territory. At worst 
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the Soviets will have gained a new base. And everywhere our friends 
will have noted that the U.S. can not be counted on in times of difficulty 
and our enemies will have observed that American support provides no 
security against the forward march of history.16 
Kirkpatrick and her allies in South Africa would not have to concern themselves 
with such an outcome during the Reagan years. During a television interview on March 
3, 1981, for instance, Reagan had expressed sympathy for the South Africans in a 
manner that called into question just how close the new U.S. policy toward the 
Republic was to be. Paralleling frequent South African arguments, Reagan had asked 
“Can we abandon a country that has stood beside us in every war we have fought? A 
country that, strategically, is essential to the free world in its production of minerals 
that we all must have?”17 As long as the South African government continued to make 
“a sincere and honest effort” to solve its racial problems, Reagan felt, the United States 
should help in every way possible.18 The South Africans were ecstatic. Under a 
headline entitled “US Will Not Leave South Africa in the Lurch,” Die Vaderland 
praised the new US “policy”: “Not only is it virtually the opposite of that adopted by 
the Carter Government, but it is even more friendly than the policy of Richard 
Nixon.”19 
In a manner that must have greatly pleased the apartheid regime, the Reagan 
Administration denied the African National Congress was a legitimate alternative to the 
Nationalist Party because “any group that is supported by the Soviet Union does not 
have freedom as one of its objectives.”20 Reagan himself made his feelings known 
when he referred to the ANC as “Soviet guerillas” and stated that the government of 
South Africa “was under no obligation to negotiate the future of the country with any 
organization that proclaims a goal of creating a communist state and uses terrorist 
tactics and violence to achieve it.”21 Republican Representative Dan Burton was just as 
explicit, declaring that: 
For roughly a year at black political gatherings it has been a custom to 
pay some kind of homage to Marxism for which any support is 
perceived as a challenge by the white authorities. Sometimes it is then 
furling of a Soviet flag that makes the tribute. Other times demonstrators 
chant slogans lauding the formal alliance between the outlawed African 
National Congress and the banned South African Communist Party. This 
is done on a regular basis. And they point out in very vivid terms that the 
ANC and the South African Communist Party are very closely affiliated 
with one another . . . Some 19 of the 30 members of the executive 
committee of the African National Congress are known communists, and 
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we believe as many as 25 . . . committee would not support an 
organization allied with Nazis or fascists, and I do not think we should 
lend legitimacy to a group allied with people who are equally anti-
democratic and anti-American.22 
The denial of the ANC as an alternative to the apartheid regime was a given in 
the containment militarist policies such as the Reagan Doctrine, which were predicated 
on a particular set of beliefs about Soviet actions: that the USSR was an inherently 
expansionist power with global ambitions; that it was likely to be an instigator or at 
least a supporter of instability in the developing world; and that the language it 
understood best was power, not accommodation. Soviet-American relations were seen 
as a zero-sum contest, in which peripheral conflicts had major implications because of 
their impact on perceptions of the relative strengths of the superpowers. Such beliefs 
gave policy makers ideological guidelines for evaluating events and making decisions 
and were crucial in dealing with ambiguous events such as political instability in 
southern Africa.23 
The problem arose when the Reagan Administration refused to acknowledge 
any evidence that there may have been alternative explanations for events. When policy 
makers remained rigidly committed to one conception of how the world worked, policy 
based on these beliefs became inconsistent with reality. Southern Africa was a case in 
point. Even “Marxist” states like Angola and Mozambique remained economically 
unaligned with the Soviet Union and refused a request for a “much sought after naval 
base.”24 Despite this fact, southern Africa would remain central to the architects of the 
Reagan Doctrine, even as the CIA challenged that assumption when it admitted that the 
region was “largely peripheral” to the Soviet Union’s strategic ambitions.25 
Reagan Doctrine advocates showed a similar ideological inflexibility in their 
response to the overthrow of right-wing governments in the Philippines and Haiti in 
1986. These events challenged a basic premise of the Reagan Doctrine: that right-wing, 
anticommunist regimes were less oppressive and less of a threat to the international 
order than Marxist governments.26 Reagan, however, believed that Marxist 
dictatorships were a greater threat to peace because internal oppression often leads to 
external belligerence. This was no abstraction, but an operating principal in the 
administration’s foreign policy. Chester Crocker was rebuked for his tacit support for 
majority rule in South Africa, and Shultz stated shortly afterward that there were many 
models for transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, but no peaceful way to 
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democratize a Marxist regime.27 The authoritarian-totalitarian rule remained as an 
essential criterion for how to deal with Cold War relationships. Called by some critics 
“ballots for the right, bullets for the left,” the information that fit the Reagan Doctrine’s 
ideological view—democracy spreading in the developing world—was included; that 
which did not—the fact that right-wing regimes were often illegitimate and diplomatic 
liabilities—apparently was not taken into consideration. 
3.2.3  War by Proxy 
The Reagan Administration had a spectrum of possible methods by which to 
counter the expansion of Soviet influence, ranging from diplomatic overtures and 
foreign aid at one end of the spectrum to military action at the other. Options between 
these extremes included many possible combinations of incentives to change 
behaviour, beginning with diplomatic pressure and escalating to political and/or 
economic sanctions; covert actions, from propaganda to full-scale guerrilla warfare; 
and overt military threats, posed through either words or demonstrations of force. 
Several factors placed important constraints on where and how the 
administration could realistically hope to implement the Reagan Doctrine. American 
public opinion was foremost. From the Nixon Doctrine’s assignment of containment 
responsibility to regional surrogates, through Carter’s reassertion of American interests 
abroad in his pledge to repel aggression in the Persian Gulf, to the Reagan Doctrine’s 
support for rebellions against leftist governments, containment policy reflected the 
indelible impact of Vietnam on the American public’s attitude toward foreign 
commitments. Each program delegated the primary burden of containment to allied 
governments. Although the Reagan Administration had sought to exorcise Vietnam 
syndrome from the national outlook, public support for military actions abroad 
remained limited to quick, decisive, low-cost initiatives, and voters were wary of 
situations that seemed to require long-term commitments for uncertain ends. This point 
was clearly demonstrated by the generally positive public response to the 1983 
American “liberation” of Grenada and simultaneous criticism of the deployment of 
U.S. Marines in Lebanon. In one analyst’s words, Americans “want to stop the spread 
of communism, but only from a safe distance offshore, without getting involved in 
other countries’ problems.”28 
In southern Africa, this responsibility would fall to South Africa and UNITA as 
the region was represented a question of America’s national will to stand up to Soviet 
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oppression and a geopolitical and moral necessity. For example, Representative Jack 
Keep (R-NY) contended, “We Americans have not the right to sit on our hands while 
soldiers from Cuba and commanders from the USSR crush the aspirations of 5 million 
African blacks.”29 Aid to MNR guerrillas in Mozambique was described, less 
successfully, in similar terms.30 Hence, the Reagan Doctrine adjusted but maintained 
the division of labour that marked post-Vietnam containment policy. This factor would 
prove critical in linking the geopolitical aims of the Total National Strategy with the 
Reagan Doctrine. 
3.3 Constructive Engagement 
In the first term of the Reagan Administration, policy toward southern Africa 
was crafted and implemented by the African Affairs Bureau of the State Department 
(AF), under the lead of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Chester Crocker. 
Constructive Engagement, as the policy was labelled, made a complex and delicate 
public argument that American concerns could all be pursued and satisfied 
simultaneously. The fragile domestic agreement or, at least, the wait-and-see attitude 
that the policy initially enjoyed among the few interested policy makers rested on a 
series of risky and uncertain propositions—that South Africa would undertake internal 
reforms that could provide political cover for the administration but did not go so far as 
to threaten the rule of the National Party, that a solution to Namibian independence 
(including Cuban troop withdrawal) could be worked out on terms favourable to the 
United States, and that Soviet influence could be eliminated from the region using the 
combined power of South African military force and American diplomacy. 
Chester Crocker came back to head AF after serving on the Reagan transition 
team that reviewed Africa policy. During the Nixon Administration, he had served on 
the National Security Council staff when NSSM 39 was implemented, and some critics 
attributed him with having an important role in its execution.31 Thereafter, he had been 
Director of African Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at 
Georgetown University and had chaired the Africa Subcommittee of the Republican 
National Committee’s foreign policy study group. 
Like other policies before it, Constructive Engagement needed to convey to 
American and international audiences that the United States considered apartheid 
repugnant. In diplomatic fashion, Crocker expressed this sentiment in articulating U.S. 
goals related to the Republic: “the emergence in South Africa of a society with which 
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the United States can pursue its varied interests in a full and friendly relationship 
without constraint, embarrassment, or political damage.”32 Pursuing American interests 
without embarrassment required that South Africa change in certain directions. Most 
importantly, South Africa needed to begin a “process” that would end racial 
segregation and encourage a new political dispensation that included black South 
Africans. In addition, American attitudes on “democracy, pluralism . . . a strong market 
economy required that the process of this change be evolutionary rather than 
cataclysmic.”33 The administration, however, did not advocate any specific outcomes, 
preferring to leave the reform process in the hands of the Botha Administration. As 
Crocker would tell the United States Senate, “We do not aim to impose ourselves, our 
solutions, or our favorites in South Africa; such an intrusion would be unwarranted and 
unwise for an outside party.”34 
There were, of course, many voices of dissent in the State Department and a 
public uproar from the anti-apartheid lobby concerning this policy, which would reduce 
official criticism of South Africa’s racist policies and seek to improve relations between 
Washington and Pretoria. However, the Reagan Administration argued that, even 
though it found apartheid repugnant, it could still pursue positive relations with a 
government committed to racial reform.35 When and how that racial reform would 
proceed would remain a matter for the white South African leadership to decide. 
Some of the domestic controversy that eventually unravelled Constructive 
Engagement was apparent before Crocker was even in place as Assistant Secretary. 
Sen. Jesse Helms(R-NC), dean of Congress’ ideological anticommunists, delayed 
Crocker’s confirmation until April of 1981. Helms expressed concern about Crocker’s 
more realist approach to superpower competition, questioning whether Crocker would 
see issues “through Nigerian eyes rather than American.”36 The ideological right’s 
influence was further evident in the composition of the transition team that included, in 
addition to Crocker, a Helms staffer; Helms’s choice for the Assistant Secretary slot, 
John Carbaugh; and. Marion Smoak, a lobbyist for the South Africa-imposed 
and -supported Democratic Turnhalle Alliance regime in Namibia.37 
After his confirmation process finally concluded, Assistant Secretary Crocker 
found himself in an unusual position in several respects. First, he already had publicly 
articulated his views on what U.S. policy should be in a number of articles and 
publications.38 In addition, he had a remarkable amount of autonomy in formulating 
and implementing these ideas.39 
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Foremost, Crocker stressed that American opposition to Soviet or Cuban 
expansion needed to receive more emphasis than it had under the Carter 
Administration. Crocker wrote, “While a reflexive response by the West is not called 
for, there are no grounds for complacency about the impact of Soviet-Cuban military 
intervention in Africa.”40 American strategic concerns needed sufficient consideration 
in a region “where important Western economic, resource, and strategic interests are 
exposed.”41 However, Crocker’s approach to East-West issues was squarely in the 
realist school of anticommunism. He stressed the need in U.S. policy for sophistication 
and intimate local understanding: “A serious policy will restrain our tendency to 
stereotype local factions and will thereby broaden our options to conduct a flexible 
policy.”42 
Crocker identified American strategic interests with a resolution of the military 
conflicts that had consumed the region. Heightened conflict increased opportunities for 
the Soviets to expand their involvement; peaceful economic development gave the 
United States the edge in superpower competition in the region. “Far from resolving 
conflict or meeting regional development needs,” Crocker wrote, “Moscow and its 
allies profit from keeping the pot boiling.”43 In his estimation, American policy could 
best ease the tense border conflicts in the region—in Namibia, in Angola, in 
Mozambique—by reducing communist influence in the region. 
This regional demilitarization had the additional benefit of contributing to 
another set of fundamental American concerns, the ending of the Republic’s draconian 
racial system. Peace along South Africa’s borders would presumably make it easier for 
the apartheid regime to consider meaningful internal reforms. Crocker told a Senate 
subcommittee, “We strongly doubt that serious internal reform is likely in a climate of 
constant fighting with adversaries along South Africa’s borders,” and “The quest for 
security and the imperative of change are dependent upon one another.”44 
Constructive Engagement also argued for the free extension and expansion of 
commerce. The policy argument for economic activity dovetailed nicely with other 
guiding concerns and assumptions. Western investment would help to foster change in 
South Africa. “Capitalism and apartheid cannot coexist. We believe that capitalism will 
help to bring about the end of apartheid through a process of peaceful, evolutionary 
change based on adequate economic growth,” Deputy Assistant Secretary Wisner told a 
Congressional committee.45 Constructive Engagement was “totally opposed” to 
economic sanctions: they would damage American economic interests, “sabotage” 
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needed job opportunities for blacks in South Africa, remove the “positive force for 
change” of the Sullivan codes, and “produce disastrous consequences” for the states 
surrounding South Africa.46 The policy also encouraged American economic aid and 
investment in such “Marxist” countries surrounding South Africa as Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe.21 
Constructive Engagement’s ideological foundation was based in the assumption 
that, while black politics was growing increasingly important, control over the pace and 
substance of political change lay squarely with the white minority in South Africa, 
particularly the Afrikaners. In his 1980 Foreign Affairs article, Crocker contended, “It 
is fatuous to argue that whites have already lost the initiative within South Africa.”47 
Thus, U.S. policy needed most importantly to work with the internal dynamics of white 
politics while building black political and economic capabilities for the future. Thus, 
Constructive Engagement stressed “white-led change in the direction of real power-
sharing.”48 
If white politics were the relevant arena, policy tactics would need to be tailored 
to the peculiar characteristics of South African white, most importantly Afrikaner, 
politics. Constructive Engagement urged a “tone of empathy” not only for black 
suffering “but also for the awesome political dilemma in which Afrikaners and other 
whites find themselves.”49 American tactics had to be sensitive to the “cult of Afrikaner 
unity” and siege mentality. This sensitivity meant praising white attempts at reform as 
well as criticizing elements of apartheid. While pressure could be useful in 
strengthening reformist tendencies in South Africa, “publicly expressed encouragement 
and support of positive steps [was] another important tool of policy.”50 The process, in 
the words of one analyst, took “the form of reliance upon stability and constructive 
change generated by the white political leadership in South Africa to create a more 
harmonious policy, one that will protect important U. S. interests in the region.”51For 
the Reagan Administration, political liberalization in South Africa would remain a 
distant objective, the details and mechanics of which would be left to the white 
leadership of that country. 
Crocker believed that the key to this change was not to be found within the 
Republic, but in the dynamics of southern Africa. Much like Botha’s vision of a 
constellation of states, Crocker’s writings suggested that the U.S. focus should be on 
the creation of a southern Africa economic alliance with South Africa assuming the 
leadership role. In his estimation, the United States had to be “as pragmatic as the 
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politically diverse states of the region” in accepting South African economic linkages 
with the region as a whole. Moreover, the United States should “where possible . . . try 
to build on and strengthen linkages between them on conditions they are prepared to 
accept.” These links represented “more than a past history of colonial convenience and 
domination by white-ruled South Africa; they also signify a basis for the survival and 
future development of highly vulnerable economies.”52 While this did not mean that the 
United States should encourage the “satellitization” of southern African black states to 
Pretoria, it was a recognition that “the region’s substantial potential rested on such 
integration and on rational economic policies.”53 These notions of a southern economic 
alliance were essentially the same as those envisioned by P. W. Botha.54 
More importantly perhaps, there would be virtually no daylight between Botha 
and Crocker on the Namibia-Southwest Africa and the Angola issues. These matters 
were in Crocker’s estimation “closely intertwined” and could not be easily 
disentangled. Although Crocker never precisely outlined how these issues should be 
resolved, he stated that, “the ultimate goal should be to reduce or eliminate the 
communist combat presence in southern Africa and to bring about a political 
compromise acceptable to all major political forces in Angola.”55 This change could be 
accomplished, in large measure, by recognizing the importance of UNITA in the 
process and by “maintaining the pressure for a departure of communist combat 
forces.”56 In the case of Namibia, it would be in American interests to move that 
country towards independence. Though Crocker saw the South African notion of an 
“internal settlement” as unworkable, he believed it critical to “allay Pretoria’s concern” 
about the role of the U.N. in the process and to accept as inevitable that any solution 
would collapse “unless or until Pretoria gains confidence that it can live with the 
outcome of a transition that it does not control unilaterally.”57 He also believed it 
critical for the US to “retain its flexibility about the modalities of an international 
settlement for Namibia.”58 Essentially, he was arguing that the U.N. framework for 
independence would only serve as a loose blueprint, with the United States providing 
alternative solutions when necessary to move the process forward. 
These ideas would have enormous consequences for the region after Crocker’s 
appointment as Assistant Secretary. Regional policies would be oriented around South 
Africa, with alliance and economic linkages cultivated by the Reagan Administration 
vigorously pursuing “treaties” of nonaggression between the Republic and its 
neighbours. At various points, the United States would play a pivotal role in seeking 
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separate accords between South Africa and Mozambique, Angola, and Botswana, 
Lesotho, and Swaziland. For Crocker, it would be necessary to eliminate ANC cross-
border incursions into the Republic from these countries before any meaningful 
progress could be made on internal reform in South Africa. Perhaps more importantly, 
the establishment of non-aggression agreements between South Africa and its black 
neighbours would deprive the Soviets and Cubans of a southern African base of 
operations.59 
Indeed, Chester Crocker believed that it was critical for the United States to 
remove Cuba from southern Africa, a notion shared by Ronald Reagan and his 
conservative allies. Like the communist presence in Nicaragua and Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan, it would become a priority of the Reagan Administration to see the 
Marxist forces rolled back from southern Africa. UNITA would prove critical in 
advancing that goal. Crocker believed that Jonas Savimbi’s guerrilla organization 
enjoyed a high level of “popular and indigenous support.”  He also thought that UNITA 
strength could be leveraged to push the Cubans from Angola. That notion would 
become the crux of the Reagan Administration’s efforts to link U.S. recognition, 
“explicitly, to Cuban withdrawal, and implicitly, to a reconciliation between the MPLA 
and UNITA.”60 
Crocker, however, had few illusions about how difficult this linkage would be. 
Force or, at least, the threat of force would be necessary to push the MPLA to evict the 
Cubans from Angola. Therefore, it would be essential for the Reagan Administration to 
see that the Clark Amendment was overturned and covert assistance begin to the 
UNITA guerrillas. Using proxies like the South Africans and UNITA, the United States 
could secure its own interests and set back Soviet regional ambitions. Once communist 
influences were removed from southern Africa, the issue of racial reconciliation in 
South Africa could begin in earnest, or so Crocker said. In Crocker’s estimation, “The 
American stance must be firmly supportive of a regional climate conducive to 
compromise and accommodation in the face of concerted attempts to discredit 
evolutionary change and to exploit the inevitable ambiguity and periodic ‘incidents’ 
that will accompany political liberalization.”61 For Crocker, the major shortcoming 
with the Carter approach—and that advocated by critics in the U.S. Congress—was the 
fixation with the final disposition of the Republic, rather than the process itself.62A 
viable and lasting solution that was attained with regional agreements with South 
Africa and its black neighbours—agreements that ensured the permanent removal of 
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Soviet influence from southern Africa—were the outcomes the United States should 
focus on.63 
Crocker had expressed a belief that the coalition that had come to dominate 
P. W. Botha’s government believed in movement—though perhaps limited in scope—
toward political reform in the Republic; in his words, “The long-delayed prospects for 
political change have opened up.”64 Moreover, Crocker was optimistic that Washington 
could help promote such change by adopting a strategy that coupled quiet but concerted 
diplomatic pressure with a program of incentives and rewards for movement in the 
right direction. However, Crocker clarified, “Since the power to coerce Pretoria is not 
in American hands, the limited influence available should be carefully husbanded for 
specific application to concrete issues of change.”65 Crocker cautioned that instead of 
impatiently demanding full political rights, it would be more realistic and productive 
for United States to encourage “the process of getting there.” He contended, “The 
argument that the West can only support power sharing preceded by a full-blown 
national convention keeps us immobilized by a distant objective.”66 
Nevertheless, Crocker insisted that the long-awaited process of reform would 
never develop if Pretoria failed to receive the active engagement of an understanding 
American administration to “strengthen the hand of official modernizers and other 
agents of change” and to provide positive incentives needed to push the process 
forward. Consequently, U.S. policy makers must be willing to “normalize” the 
relationship with South Africa and publicly applaud Pretoria’s reform process as it 
opened up opportunities for black participation. Crocker made it clear that punitive 
measures were not part of the strategy when he stated: “Constructive Engagement does 
not mean waging economic warfare against the Republic; nor does it mean erecting 
foolish pinpricks that only erode the American position in South African and world 
markets.”67 
Constructive Engagement’s fate, however, was made insecure by the danger or 
even the probability of offending powerful forces in the United States. Crocker 
recognized this risk before embarking on the policy. In an article entitled “The U.S. 
Policy Process and South Africa,” he wrote: 
Once African issues are taken from the Africanists because of pressures 
from outside the policy maker community, the political extremes seize 
the initiative. The twin poles of East-West theology and black-white 
theology take over the African debate at this point. 
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This debate, Crocker further contended, had dire consequences: 
The net result, given our system of government, will be nasty debate 
followed by compromise, inconsistencies, public-relations posturing, 
and, at times, a paralysis of policy. The United States, in sum, may be 
destined by its own complexity to be an ineffective actor in southern 
Africa. Or to put it more accurately, the U.S. government may be so 
destined by the nature of American society and politics.68 
Crocker took a very condescending view of the intentions and tactics of 
domestic forces that might oppose his policy. He warned against the “deliberate 
obfuscation” of anti-apartheid activists who “trade on the currency of crisis and 
polarization.”69 Although he did not dwell on it in this article, the potential opposition 
to Constructive Engagement from ideological anticommunists also posed a challenge to 
the policy, as Crocker’s own confirmation saga made evident. The only domestic allies 
outside the State Department that Constructive Engagement could expect were in the 
business community. 
The same article also argued that domestic politics made it likely that Congress 
would become involved in making the policy, with dire consequences. Crocker, critical 
of opponents of his policy to the point of scorn, thought such involvement was 
disastrous for coherent, sophisticated debate and policy. Citing “structural and 
leadership weakness in the legislative branch,” Crocker claimed that Congress could 
only paralyze government action because it was “not equipped to lead in any direction 
or even to help shape the national debate on key public policy issues except by 
distorting and oversimplifying them.”70 With congressional involvement, “further 
domestication of foreign policy toward Africa” was likely, with the end result being 
that policy would be “a sloppy compromise.”71 In the article, Crocker added, “A 
sophisticated policy can be expected only when the Congress is not heavily involved in 
it.”72 Crocker, however, knew better than anyone that, in the absence of positive results, 
Constructive Engagement could be undone by domestic criticisms. 
While Crocker would pitch Constructive Engagement as a policy largely 
directed at the internal dynamics of South Africa, in reality, it should be seen as a 
regional policy through which American and South African interests converged. Al 
Haig made this aim clear when he sent a secret memorandum to President Reagan 
stating that his meetings with the South African Foreign Minister were a success: 
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In our meetings with Pik Botha, I believe we accomplished our major 
objective – to establish a new relationship with South Africa based on a 
realistic appraisal of our mutual interests in the Southern African 
region. The capstone was your meeting with the Foreign Minister, which 
had major symbolic and substantive overtones and reflected the frank 
and friendly tone in our discussions throughout the visit. We have 
effectively ended the unproductive ostracism of recent years . . . The 
South Africans now have a sure sense of where we are coming from in 
strategic terms. They know that we are determined to roll back Soviet 
influence throughout the world and in their region. They understand our 
determination to get the Cubans out of Angola and that we will not 
allow UNITA to be sacrificed (original emphasis). 
Though Haig would acknowledge that American credibility in southern Africa 
“hinges on continued South African Government progress on the home front,” the 
detailed list of goals in the region did not include the aspirations of the black majority 
in South or southern Africa. Indeed, the South Africans asked for “firm assurances that 
the agreement will not simply lead to a ‘one-man, one-vote, one-time’ outcome” in 
Namibia. Haig’s response was simply: “We agree.” He added: 
To complete the picture, we have publicly endorsed a stance of 
“constructive engagement” toward the Republic. We have tabled 
forthcoming proposals on consular matters, restoring our military 
attached link, and Coast Guard training for South African sea and air 
rescue personnel. On the nuclear matter, we will seek relief for the South 
African Government . . .73 
According to Crocker, “Haig wanted the Soviets and their surrogates to know that this 
was a new era. We did not intend that pro-Western states like South Africa to be 
written off as fair game for Moscow, Havana, Luanda, and their SWAPO guerrilla 
allies.”74 This was not Haig side-stepping Crocker in his dealings with the South 
Africans. Indeed, Crocker advised Haig that the administration saw: 
a new era of cooperation, stability and security in the region. We also 
share their view that the chief threat to the realization of this hope is the 
presence and influence in the region of the Soviet Union and its allies.75 
Though Crocker would attempt to present his policy as reforming the political system 
of South Africa, these documents leave little doubt that strategic interests and the zero-
sum calculus of the Cold War were the primary drivers of Constructive Engagement. In 
fact, when asked if he believed that the Total National Strategy and Constructive 
Engagement served as mutually reinforcing policies, Chester Crocker said, “sometime 
it was, other times not so much . . . they could be compatible if the South Africans were 
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cooperative.” Ultimately, he believed American-South African cooperation in the 
region would help push back communist influence and expose “the bankruptcy of 
Soviet militarism in the region.”76 Crocker believed the time was right for just such 
cooperation because the Soviets were a “stale and uncreative geritocracy” that was 
becoming increasingly “marginalized in Africa.” Though he conceded the Soviets were 
“dinosaurs with big muscles” and were willing to “fight hard” to protect their “sunk 
costs in Ethiopia and Mozambique,” he thought it was time to pursue a more aggressive 
anticommunist strategy in the region.77 The tightrope Crocker would have to walk was 
between achieving the primary goal of reducing communism in the region while 
engaging South “in a full and friendly relationship without constraint, embarrassment, 
or political damage.”78 Time was not, however, on Crocker’s side. The Secretary knew 
that the Total National Strategy needed to show positive results promptly, both in the 
region and within the Republic, before domestic forces in the United States mobilized 
against South Africa. 
3.4 United States-South African Rapprochement, 1981-1986 
With the transition to the Reagan Administration, the United States relaxed both 
its rhetoric and concrete restrictions toward Pretoria.79 In the summer of 1981, for 
instance, the Reagan Administration moved to re-establish military attaché ties between 
the United States and Pretoria, to allow South African Coast Guard personnel to 
participate in American training programs, and to permit the South African consulates 
to have honorary personnel assigned to the United States in Phoenix and Pittsburgh. 
These moves were integral to Crocker’s plan to support and encourage cooperation and 
trust between the two countries in the early days of the Reagan Administration.80 
Crocker stressed that American opposition to Soviet-Communist expansion needed to 
receive more emphasis than it had under the Carter Administration. Crocker wrote, 
“While a reflexive response by the West is not called for, there are no grounds for 
complacency about the impact of Soviet-Cuban military intervention in Africa.”81 
American strategic concerns needed sufficient consideration in a region “where 
important Western economic, resource, and strategic interests are exposed.”82 
Crocker linked American strategic interests with a resolution of the military 
conflicts plaguing southern Africa. Heightened conflict increased opportunities for the 
Soviets to expand their involvement, but peaceful economic development gave the 
United States the advantage in southern Africa. “Far from resolving conflict or meeting 
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regional development needs,” Crocker wrote, “Moscow and its allies profit from 
keeping the pot boiling.”83 American policies could best combat communism by easing 
the tense border conflicts in the region—in Namibia, in Angola, in Mozambique. If 
American demands were rejected, Crocker warned: “it was important for Luanda, 
SWAPO, and their Soviet and Cuban backers to know that it was a new situation after 
1981. If they obstructed our settlement terms, the price and the pain would grow. South 
African power was one of the anvils of our diplomacy.”84 
Given Crocker’s admission, it is difficult not to conclude that the Reagan 
Administration’s policy of Constructive Engagement was relying on the South Africans 
Total National Strategy to roll back communist influence in the region. Indeed, when 
asked specifically if the South African Defence Force would serve as the military 
“anvil” to American diplomacy in the region, Chester Crocker answered, “we never had 
any intention of putting troops in the ground, so it speaks for itself.”85 
Though Crocker conceded that “the anvil was difficult . . . and often undercut us 
because of suspicion,”86 it seems clear that the South Africans understood that the 
Reagan Administration wanted a “new era of cooperation, stability and security in the 
region” based on their agreement with the administration that the “chief threat to the 
realization of this hope is the presence and influence in the region of the Soviet Union 
and its allies.”87 The fact there was only one act of destabilization directed at South 
Africa’s neighbours during the Carter Administration and dozens against the FLS 
during the Reagan Administration, should have suggested to Crocker that the chief 
threat to “new era of cooperation, stability and security in the region” might actually be 
the South African destabilization campaign and the administration’s support might be 
compounding the problem. In fact, Secretary Crocker was perfectly aware there was a 
correlation between South Africa’s regional military campaign and American 
diplomatic initiatives in the region. As Crocker would bluntly admit, if Constructive 
Engagement’s “settlement terms” were rejected by the FLS, “the price and the pain 
would grow”88 Since the United States had few effective measures to punish the states 
of southern Africa the “SADF and UNITA would have a key role to play in wearing 
down resistance on the other side.”89 
3.4.1  Military Cooperation 
During the Reagan Administration, military cooperation between the United 
States and South Africa took a new turn on several fronts. Five high-ranking South 
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African military officials visited the United States in March 1981, breaking an 18-year-
old U.S. ban on officer-level meetings between the two countries. The State 
Department, in order to avoid criticism, distanced itself from the visit and announced 
that these officers had obtained U.S. visas by falsely identifying themselves as civilians 
to American visa officers in South Africa. The Department also denied having held any 
talks with the South African military officials. However, the press soon learned that the 
visitors had actually met with key officials from the National Security Council and the 
Pentagon’s Defence Intelligence Agency, as well as with the U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick.90 
The administration later admitted this fact, but it maintained that Kirkpatrick 
had been “unaware of the identity of the gentlemen.”91 However, despite the 
administration’s argument that it had been tricked into granting the visas, a State 
Department memorandum indicated that there was, indeed, great interest within the 
administration in receiving such visits. This interest was reflected in a memorandum 
from the State Department responding to a request by a private right-wing lobbying 
group, the American Security Council, which sought to invite top South African 
military officials to brief the Council on the situation in South Africa.92 
The memorandum correctly points out that a long-standing policy of the United 
States (revived and reaffirmed by President Carter) forbade meetings between military 
officers of the two countries. However, without necessarily confirming that the Reagan 
Administration would change the policy, the memo concluded on a very promising 
note, assuring General Robert C. Richardson of the American Security Council that 
“his views would receive a prompt response from the State Department.”93 
It is not possible on the strength of the administration’s response to the 
American Security Council to say that the Reagan Administration did change this 
policy. However, judging from official visits made by South African military officials 
and the exchange of military attachés between Washington and Pretoria shortly after 
Reagan’s ascendance to the Presidency, one can make the claim that, indeed, the policy 
was changed to allow the development of a military relationship between the two 
countries. In defence of the reinstitution of military attaché ties, Crocker stated: “We do 
not believe that by sending attachés there or by having them here, that we are doing 
South Africa a favor.”94 Rather, by fulfilling a basic intelligence function as liaisons 
with members of the South African military, American military attachés were providing 
“proper coverage . . . of our interests in South Africa.”95 
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On June 10-11, 1981, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, William Clark, held talks 
with South African Defence Minister, Magnus Malan, and in August, several South 
African military personnel were sent for training at the U.S. Coast Guard station at 
Governor’s Island, New York. Again, on October 13, South African police and military 
officials were granted visas by the State Department and allowed into the United States 
on “a working visit.” Naval attachés were exchanged between the two countries in early 
December.96 
The Coast Guard issue was pitched as an essential function of American 
interests. Because the “crucial waters around the southern tip of Africa,” were 
important to the United States, it made sense to see that they were properly defended.97 
The addition of consulates in Pittsburgh and Phoenix were said to serve American 
interests because they helped facilitate trade, travel, and commerce between the United 
States and the Republic. Every effort was made to tie these steps to American interests 
and make it clear to the South Africans that the administration saw its own interests in 
the region as closely linked with those of the Republic.98 
Nowhere was the U.S. partnership with South Africa more clearly demonstrated 
than in U.S. arms supplies to Pretoria. As outlined in Chapter 2, U.S. administrations 
had a tendency to use their support and endorsement of an arms embargo against South 
Africa as a manifestation of their opposition to apartheid. On the surface, the embargo 
constituted a significant step toward reducing apartheid’s military threat in southern 
Africa. However, despite the embargo, South Africa never failed to acquire substantial 
military supplies from the United States and other Western countries.99 
U.S. businesses also began to export non-military goods—including food, 
industrial chemicals, computers, and surveillance aircraft—to the South African police 
and military.100 One particularly controversial sale, attributed to an error, involved 
2,500 high voltage cattle prods exported after clearance by the Commerce Department. 
Although the sale of some computer equipment and hardware to the South 
Africans had continued throughout the Carter Administration, the selling of more 
advanced technology had generally been restricted on the grounds it could used for 
non-civilian purposes by the Republic.101 That practice would change in 1982, when 
the Reagan Administration approved the sale of the Cyber 170/750 computer to the 
South African’s Center for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). As the most 
advanced computer manufactured in the world, it was believed that the technology 
could be used by South Africa’s intelligence services. More importantly, the 
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computer’s capacity to break encryption codes and model nuclear explosions had the 
potential to add to the Republic’s nuclear capabilities.102 
The decision to sell military equipment to the Republic was dictated in large 
part by the Reagan Administration’s strong emphasis on South Africa’s strategic 
importance, which favoured proponents of continued military cooperation with South 
Africa within the national security bureaucracies. Peter Schraeder, for example, 
maintained that the administration’s efforts to bolster United States-South African 
military cooperation were supported by bureaucracies such as the CIA and the 
Pentagon: 
whose organizational missions looked upon the staunchly anti-
communist Afrikaner government as a natural ally. . . . Sharing the 
CIA’s concern over the growing levels of Soviet involvement in 
southern Africa, the Defence Department favored any policy that 
rationalized growing levels of U.S.-South African military 
cooperation.103 
It was clear that arming South Africa would neither promote nor encourage regional 
stability, which the United States had proclaimed to be its goal in southern Africa in the 
postwar period. Rather, these weapons were intended to be and were used to preclude 
any further Soviet gains in southern Africa.104 
President Reagan was not solely responsible for arming South Africa. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the military partnership with Pretoria existed under every U.S. 
administration since World War II, including the Kennedy and Carter Administrations, 
with the latter’s policy rhetoric raising high expectations among black South Africans 
and the growing anti-apartheid movement throughout the region that Pretoria’s 
friendship with Washington was over. Reagan, however, contributed more than any 
other U.S. President before and after him to South Africa’s determination to suppress 
the liberation struggles of the black majority and to destabilize neighbouring 
governments that supported that struggle. 
A clear testament to Reagan’s approval of these incursions came in September 
1982, when CIA director William Casey informed P. W. Botha that the administration 
wanted destabilization to continue until the ANC was effectively removed from the 
FLS.105 Because of Casey’s history of sidestepping proper channels, it could be argued 
that that the director’s comments to Botha were not official policy.106 When Chester 
Crocker was asked if Casey had told the South Africans that the United States approved 
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of the removal of the ANC from the FLS, he responded, “I have no idea what he told 
them. . . . He might have told them one thing at breakfast but after a few drinks at 
dinner, who knows what he told them?”  He added that Casey had “a history of going 
off the reservation” because he “always wanted to be wanted to be Secretary of State” 
and often attempted to “conduct foreign policy from the CIA.”107 
There is, however, considerable evidence that that the elimination of the ANC 
from the FLS was indeed part of Constructive Engagement’s principal objectives. To 
achieve this goal, among others, the administration would engage the Republic in a 
“new era of cooperation” based on the shared view that “the chief threat . . . is the 
presence and influence in the region of the Soviet Union and its allies.108 Like P.W. 
Botha, President Reagan considered the ANC among those allies and would rely on the 
Total National Strategy to reduce the threat the organization posed to American 
geopolitical objectives.109 
3.4.2  Nuclear Cooperation 
The Reagan Administration also revived nuclear collaboration with South 
Africa, despite growing international fears that Pretoria might have been using its 
supply of nuclear material from the United States and other Western countries (France 
and West Germany) to make its own nuclear bomb. As soon as Reagan took office, 
American nuclear assistance to South Africa was reactivated. In his meetings with 
Foreign Minister Pik Botha, Alexander Haig assured the South Africans that “we will 
seek relief for the South African Government on their Department of Energy Contract 
and will make a best effort on fuel supply for their reactors within our legal and 
legislative constraints.”110  At the meeting Pik Botha explicitly brought up the question 
of the supply of fuel elements to Koeberg. When Haig “nearly lost his temper” and 
interjected that the subject had not been cleared with him, Botha reported: 
Reagan overruled him, and asked me directly, ‘Are you producing a 
bomb?’ I replied, ‘Mr President, we have the capacity to do so. But I 
commit my Government in assuring you that we will never test such a 
device without first consulting the US government’. Reagan’s response 
was, ‘That sounds fair.’ Haig again objected, ‘We cannot be associated 
with this at all.’ I appealed to Reagan, ‘Mr President, I believe the Soviet 
Union also believes we are in the process and have the capacity. And 
this suspicion may act as a deterrent not to go too far in fomenting unrest 
in Southern Africa. And we believe that is a deterrent.’111 
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After Botha’s visit, Reagan authorized exports of nuclear material, computers, and 
other high technology items and also invited South African nuclear experts to visit a 
gaseous diffusion plant in Piketon, Ohio.112 As a State Department draft paper clearly 
pointed out, “the United States placed a high priority on the resumption of nuclear 
cooperation with South Africa.”113 
The administration’s decision, it seems, was made largely in pursuit of 
America’s geopolitical and economic objectives to face the challenge of the Soviet 
threat and to cash in on the sales of being a major supplier for South Africa’s nuclear 
fuel needs. The Reagan Administration encouraged the South Africans to sign contracts 
with American companies for its fuel requirements, including Helium-3, which could 
be used to manufacture tritium, a component of thermonuclear weapons.114 
Administration officials defended the policy by claiming that such cooperation 
would be restricted to civilian uses of nuclear energy. However, there were no 
guarantees that South Africa would abide by the rules of the agreement. The Chairman 
of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Government 
Processes, Senator Charles Percy, asked Commerce Secretary Malcom Baldridge “what 
assurances will the United States receive that this material will be put to use in the 
manner South Africa has stated?”115 The Secretary did not wish to paint himself or the 
administration into a corner. He politely brushed off the Senator, saying, “the United 
States will require assurances that this material will be put to use in the manner that 
South Africa has stated.”116 How these assurances were to be obtained and enforced is 
not known. 
As the Cold War receded into history, South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty on July 10, 1991. Two years later, Pretoria broke its silence to 
confess that it had, in fact, embarked on a nuclear arms building program. It is now 
known from President F. W.de Klerk’s March 1993 address to Parliament that “at one 
stage, South Africa did . . . develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability,” a decision 
that was made as early as 1974 “against the background of a Soviet expansionist threat 
in Southern Africa” and reinforced by “the build-up of Cuban forces in Angola from 
1975 onwards.”117 The original plan, according to de Klerk, was to build seven nuclear 
devices. When the project was terminated in 1990, six of those devices had been 
completed.118One can only conclude, therefore, that by continuing nuclear 
collaboration with South Africa, the United States and other Western countries 
contributed to the buildup of South Africa’s nuclear capability.119 
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3.4.2  Economic Engagement 
Economic cooperation between the United States and South Africa was a 
prominent feature of Constructive Engagement and an important means by which the 
Reagan Administration could aid the Republic as it embarked on its campaign to 
dominate southern Africa. Shortly after Reagan’s arrival in Washington, the United 
States surpassed Britain to become South Africa’s leading trade partner in both exports 
and imports. The Reagan Administration made a concerted effort to ease government 
regulations on U.S. exports to South Africa, thus facilitating greater American 
participation in the apartheid economy.120 The relaxing of trade restrictions by the 
Reagan Administration was a major boost to U.S. private capital willing to do business 
with South Africa, an important constituency of the Republican Party, but most 
importantly, it was a great benefit to the Pretoria government. William Pomeroy, 
among others, maintained that “the activity of U.S. loan capital has literally been the 
savior of the racist government . . . and played a vanguard role in creating financial 
respectability and stability for the apartheid regime.”121 
The Reagan Administration saw things differently. Government officials argued 
that economic cooperation would help to foster meaningful change away from 
apartheid, and such being the case, the administration was opposed to trade restrictions 
and divestment by U.S. firms in South Africa. Instead of divesting, U.S. officials 
argued that American corporations operating in South Africa could help promote social 
change by adopting the Sullivan principles, which advocated, among other things, fair 
employment practices, higher wages for black South Africans, and the establishment of 
training programs that would prepare blacks for supervisory, administrative, and 
technical jobs. The Sullivan principles were endorsed by many within the government, 
including the State Department—no doubt at the urging of the administration—which 
pitched the policy as a significant and definite force for change in South Africa. In 
short, it carried the promise of providing a solution to the problem of job discrimination 
and segregation that precluded black South Africans from decent employment and 
occupational advancement opportunities. 
While the Sullivan Code could have conceivably helped to improve the 
economic and social status of some South African blacks, its effect was limited by the 
fact that it was not obligatory on the part of U.S. corporations. As a result, those 
companies that valued financial considerations over the plight of black workers 
continued to ignore the Sullivan principles and reaped handsome profits from the 
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exploitative system guaranteed by the apartheid government. In 1983, 29 of the 145 
companies that had committed themselves to the Sullivan principles dropped out of the 
program. By 1987, only 92 American companies operating in South Africa continued to 
be signatories to the Sullivan Code. 
Furthermore, the Sullivan Code could not produce any significant changes in 
the apartheid system because it did not address two of the most critical issues in South 
Africa. It made no recommendations for black political participation, nor did it 
challenge South Africa’s separate development policy, which confined blacks to the 
poverty-stricken homelands and severely restricted the movement of those in the urban 
areas through the pass laws. 
Substantial increases in loans from U.S. banks to South African also occurred 
during the first four years of the Reagan Administration. By the end of 1984, American 
banks had given loans of up to $4.7 billion to South African businesses, twice the 
amount that had been given in 1978. American investments in the South African 
mining industry alone stood at $6.5 billion. The United States also strongly supported a 
$1 billion IMF loan to South Africa in November of 1982.122 The application for the 
loan coincided with a period of economic decline in the Republic. The depreciation of 
South African gold, the corresponding decline of the Rand, and the enormous increase 
in military expenditures had helped push the country into its worst decade since the 
1930s.123 The application, however, was bound to be controversial from the beginning. 
Democratic members of the U.S. Congress saw the loan as conveying legitimacy on the 
apartheid government and directly financing its racial policies. To international critics, 
the loan was a naked attempt to subsidize South Africa’s military expenditures and, 
consequently, its destabilization program in southern Africa.124 
This, of course, was not lost on the ANC. Speaking in Lisbon, Oliver Tambo 
viciously attacked the administration’s policies in South Africa, stating: 
Under the United States policy of "constructive engagement" there has 
been an increase in United States investments, loans, and the financing 
of apartheid; new avenues of military and nuclear cooperation with the 
racist regime have been opened up - as for example, the sale of Helium-
3, which is used in the production of thermonuclear weapons and the 
sale of sophisticated computers and technology directly related to the 
nuclear research and development programme of the regime. 
"Constructive engagement" has destroyed rather than saved life. For the 
black majority, infant mortality remains the highest in the world while 
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life expectancy is the lowest in the world; unemployment of black 
workers has now reached the astronomical figure of two and a half 
million - more than 20 percent of the economically active population; 
educational spending for blacks continues to be 20 times less than for 
white South Africans; more than 80 percent of the black people live 
below the poverty datum line; millions of African people have been 
denied their birthright and dumped into the bantustans where 
unemployment, starvation, disease and other deaths await them. All this 
is happening whilst the Pretoria regime is proclaiming a policy of 
reform. But it is not a policy of reform: it is a policy of ever more 
violence and repression. As Newsweek Magazine (March 21, 1983) has 
stated, apartheid has a "harsh new grip". A "harsh new grip" is part of 
the reality we have come to associate with "constructive 
engagement."125 
The Reagan Administration ignored these criticisms and advocated aggressively 
for the loan, arguing that it was purely apolitical. The administration understood that 
the loan was essential for the South Africans in a period of financial insecurity. To be 
sure, IMF lending was to become one of the Reagan Administration’s most frequently 
used tactics in rewarding allies in the President’s anticommunist crusade; for instance, 
the United States exerted considerable effort to have the IMF approve an $85 million 
loan to the threatened Duarte regime in El Salvador.126 In contrast, America’s decision 
to successfully oppose similar requests to the IMF from the governments of Grenada, 
Vietnam, and Nicaragua carried undeniable ideological and political overtones. 
Despite protestations from a number of African and Arab nations, the United 
States, with considerable help from its Western friends, was able to secure the loan for 
South Africa, and when Democrats in the House of Representatives moved to limit 
future IMF loans to South Africa, the administration was able to mobilize Republicans 
and conservative Democrats in the Senate to block the measure.127 As in other policy 
areas, the Reagan Administration viewed its efforts toward facilitating the South 
African request for an IMF loan as an essential aspect of its overall strategy of aiding 
South Africans in reducing communist influence in southern Africa. 
Even though the administration maintained that it did not encourage or 
discourage investments in South Africa, some officials clearly favoured greater 
American involvement in the South African economy. Assistant Secretary of State 
Crocker left little doubt as to the administration’s position in this regard when he spoke 
to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in November 1981. The administration, 
Crocker stated, hoped to eliminate “legal and regulatory disincentives to U.S. 
businessmen . . . to propose legislation to permit export trading companies,” and to 
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pursue economic profits, through trade and investments, in those African countries with 
healthy economies, such as “Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Botswana, 
Zimbabwe and of course, South Africa.”128 
3.4.3  Non-criticism of South Africa’s Domestic Institutions  
As Chester Crocker implemented the policy, it became increasingly clear that 
opponents of the Reagan policy of Constructive Engagement shared a worldview 
incompatible with that of the policy’s advocates. The proponents of Constructive 
Engagement, as exemplified by Chester Crocker, viewed the situation in South Africa 
in terms of power and influence: The situation in the Republic and southern Africa was 
simply too complex to reduce to “one man-one vote.” 
The opponents of Constructive Engagement, on the other hand, viewed the 
situation in South Africa in terms of a wrong that had to be righted or of an abominable 
evil that had to be eradicated. Crocker’s perceived attempt to gently prod Pretoria into 
slowly moving toward what was so evidently “right” was wrong-headed, for not only 
did it fail to lead to substantive change, but it also accepted the presence of and worked 
with the “evil” at the same time that it attempted to diminish it.129 Punitive sanctions 
would prove to be popular with this group, therefore, for such sanctions represented 
both a punishment for the “evil” as well as a literal “turning of the back” upon it. There 
could be no middle ground on the issue of apartheid. 
A perfect example of this philosophical clash—and one that exemplified the 
polarized views of both quarters—concerned the controversy over a Crocker statement 
made during an important August 1981 speech before the American Legion in 
Honolulu. Attempting to portray the neutral “honest-broker” role that the United States 
planned to play in its South Africa policy, Crocker stressed that the United States 
should, by no means, “choose between black and white [elements of South African 
society].” Instead, the United States must necessarily “avoid action that aggravates the 
awesome challenges facing South Africans of all races.”130 
Crocker’s explanation of United States policy was immediately dismissed by 
the ANC, which stated in 1981: 
Since Botha and Reagan have proclaimed themselves as allies we must 
consider what are their common objectives in southern Africa. What 
interests, and most importantly whose interests, will this alliance 
promote? 
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For the imperialists and racist South Africa alike, the ultimate objectives 
are: to regain economic, political and military control over the entire 
southern African region and to perpetuate the plunder of the region`s 
mineral resources. The strategy applied in order to secure these 
objectives includes: 
Firstly, the denial of the legitimacy of the liberation struggle and the 
attempted isolation of the liberation movement. 
Secondly, the isolation of independent African countries from the world 
progressive forces in order to weaken them, the destabilisation and the 
overthrow of their legal governments. 
Thirdly, the attempt to transform the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans 
into military zones as an extension of the NATO alliance. 
Within this strategy the maintenance of the apartheid system is an a 
priori condition and its success requires, as an indispensable element, the 
strengthening of the apartheid regime. 
The arrogant assumption of the paramountcy of outside interests above 
those of Africans is but one aspect of the ideology that unites Pretoria 
and Washington. The inevitable victory of the liberation struggle will 
teach them that it is the interests of sovereign governments and of the 
majority of the people that need to be taken into account when 
considering our countries, our future, and, need I emphasise it, our 
minerals and wealth.131 
To Gerry Studds (D-Mass) an American refusal to take sides indicated that 
Crocker did not have “an awareness of the Western moral issues at stake.” Such a 
policy, moreover, sent the wrong type of signals to the world at large. As Studds 
insisted, “Surely you have squandered much of the moral stature and credibility of this 
country in that region and in that continent by persisting in giving statements like 
this.”132Crocker’s speech and its message was “a document of shame in terms of a 
signal to the world that this country either no longer stands for or is from this point 
forward no longer going to articulate what many of us thought made us unique in the 
world.”133 
Refusing to accept Studds’ view, Crocker, for his part, reiterated what he felt 
remained the pragmatic course of action for the United States if it truly desired to 
perform an important role in southern Africa: “We do not think it is going to be helpful 
to us and our ability to be in any way relevant, excepting as a source of moral 
posturing, irrelevant moral posturing when the chips are down, for us to indicate that 
we have already chosen as between the different contending forces in South Africa.”134 
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In reality, the Reagan Administration had chosen sides in South Africa. As Crocker 
would point out to American audiences: “We do not want to destabilize South Africa or 
jeopardize our own strategic interests. . . .”135 The liberation movement, on the other 
hand, was dismissed alternately as dangerously “Marxist” or lacking the “means for a 
direct assault on white power” that could bring the Botha Administration to the 
bargaining table.136 
If Crocker could keep the debate centred on the possibility of gradual change, 
the policy would have a chance of survival; however, if the debate ever began to focus 
on the realities of apartheid, as it eventually would, Constructive Engagement would be 
doomed. Crocker argued that, if official U. S. rhetoric on domestic reform was 
minimized, then the political climate would be more favourable for the Botha 
government to proceed with its program of racial reconciliation. However, Pretoria’s 
critics were not convinced of the Republic’s commitment to change and were 
unimpressed by the progress that Reagan’s quiet diplomacy had produced. Soon-to-be 
Nobel laureate Bishop Desmond Tutu, for instance, charged that the government, rather 
than offering “real” change, was only “applying an inhuman system more 
humanely.”137 
The ANC, for its part, viewed the “reforms” as predictable examples of changes 
“that could occur—and in fact did occur—in slave societies” as the regime attempted to 
maintain its power in a historically untenable situation.138 In addition, in the American 
Congress, such opponents of the Reagan policy as Solarz, Wolpe, and Gray were on 
record as stating that anything less than “one man-one vote,” majority rule within South 
Africa would be both insufficient and insignificant.139 
Chester Crocker saw these reductionist views as hopelessly naïve. First, it was 
not in the United States’ power to convince the South Africans to liberalize. More 
importantly, it was not in U.S. interests to do so. The administration needed a powerful 
ally in the region to serve as one of the “anvils” of American diplomacy. For Crocker, it 
would be necessary to keep all constituencies focused on the “process” of reform, not 
results, while the Republic helped roll back communist influence in southern Africa. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In sum, it is clear that the Reagan Administration’s Constructive Engagement 
policy was formulated largely within the context of American geopolitical and 
economic interests. Washington was interested more in blocking Soviet expansionism 
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than in encouraging the growth of representative governance and the fostering of 
human rights in South Africa. The administration’s argument that constructive change 
could only come through the maintenance of friendly ties with the South African 
government was largely a cover for its intention to bolster white domination. 
Washington could, thus, be guaranteed of South Africa’s support for its overall Cold 
War objective of containing the Soviet Union in Africa. 
The election of Ronald Reagan—who in a 1976 campaign speech would state 
“the African problem is a Russian weapon aimed at us”—would indeed prove 
extremely fortuitous for the apartheid regime. On taking the office of Prime Minster in 
September 1978, P. W. Botha, in his inaugural address, echoed a similar sentiment 
when he declared he would not let South Africa fall to “the forces of chaos.”140 Only a 
few months before Reagan’s election, Botha would add: “There is only way of 
withstanding this onslaught . . . and that is to establish a Total National Strategy.”141 
The aim of this policy would be to stave off the forces of the black liberation movement 
and roll back any communist influence that may have aided that movement. 
Marshalling all the resources of the South African state, the Total National Strategy 
would attempt a series of modest reforms that would confine the black majority to a 
series of semi-independent “Bantustans”—thereby not challenging the existing power 
structure within the Republic—and regionally establish South Africa as the economic 
and political hegemeon of the region. 
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Chapter IV 
4.1 Introduction: Fears of a “Total Onslaught” 
In the late 1970s, Pretoria developed a new approach for its foreign policy. The 
defensive, reactionary style that characterized the Vorster years gave way to a new 
commitment to self-assertiveness and self-reliance. Policy makers believed that the 
Republic faced a “total onslaught” of forces, working from every possible direction to 
undermine the stability of South Africa. Orchestrated by the Soviet Union, the notion of 
a “total onslaught” represented the fear and paranoia that both the white populace and 
the government felt in the face of a dangerous future. To counter this “total onslaught,” 
a “Total National Strategy” became a security necessity. When P.W. Botha became 
Prime Minister in 1978, Pretoria rationalized and implemented just such a strategy. 
Implicit in the Total National Strategy was a commitment to self-reliance—to develop 
South Africa’s capacity to stand alone. Two broad characteristics defined this approach: 
an overall militarization of South Africa and a new initiative aimed at achieving 
regional domination. 
This chapter describes the historical and ideological development of the South 
African notion of a “total onslaught” and the subsequent implementation of Botha’s 
“Total National Strategy,” which was largely formulated and refined by the country’s 
defence establishment. The second half of the chapter will detail the crisis in the 
Republic that followed the constitutional reforms enacted by the National Party in 
1983. 
“Ons volk enons land en sy mense ervaar vandag die totale aanslag van die 
marxistiese ekspansionisme.”1Such were the words with which Prime Minister P. W. 
Botha characterized the nature of the “onslaught.” Convinced that South Africa was the 
“focal point in the struggle between the major powers of the world,” Pretoria saw itself 
as the prime African prize for the Soviet Union.2 For Pretoria, Moscow had designed 
and implemented a communist-inspired, communist-planned, and communist-supported 
“onslaught” to capture for the Kremlin South Africa’s geographic position, mineral 
wealth, transport facilities, industrial capacity, and communications systems.3 As Botha 
would warn the House of Assembly: 
The rationale lies in the strategic position and the mineral wealth of 
RSA. Soviet Russia believes that it can control the supply of oil from the 
Middle East and minerals from South Africa to the West, it can 
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dominate the West and force it to surrender . . . The totality of the 
onslaught is brought about by the combination of and interaction 
between the Soviet desire for world domination on the one hand and the 
struggle for political power by Black Power organisations on the other. 
The Soviet Union exploits Black nationalism for its own purposes.4 
Several distinct components were seen as parts of the “onslaught.”5 First, the 
extensive Soviet armaments buildup in southern Africa, especially in Angola and 
Mozambique, indicated to Pretoria that Moscow was preparing its satellites for a 
conventional war with South Africa.6 Second, South Africa believed that Soviet aid to 
the ANC and SWAPO served to promote the direct and indirect guerrilla infiltration 
necessary to weaken both the capacity of South Africa to respond and the morale of the 
white populace to resist. As he would tell a National Party meeting in Bethlehem, “The 
war we wage today is about 20 to 30 per cent military and more than 70 per cent non-
military. We must adapt ourselves accordingly, or we shall in the end lose the military 
war as well.”7 Third, Soviet diplomatic efforts seemed to be aimed at isolating South 
Africa. Such international punitive measures as the arms and oil embargoes were 
labelled by Pretoria as the successful outcome of Soviet machinations. 
Pretoria even implicated the West in the “total onslaught.” By not taking an 
aggressive stance in blocking Soviet encroachment in southern Africa, the West had 
“gleefully” cooperated in the mission to strangle South Africa.8 Speaking at a National 
Party meeting, P.W. Botha would warn his counterparts in the West: “South Africa will 
never fight for the West on its battlefields again. South Africa will in future be neutral. . 
. . I will not allow the sons of South Africa to die for West who has rejected South 
Africa and has completely abandoned her.”9 Western support for sanctions and other 
diplomatic measures only served to bolster the perception of the West’s betrayal of 
South Africa. For example, actions such as the Clark Amendment and Britain’s 
violation of the Simonstown agreement confirmed for South Africa the malevolent 
intent of the Western powers.10 Moreover, Pretoria frequently cited the Western 
media’s portrayal of South Africa as an instrument of Moscow’s subversion campaign. 
Thus, for Pretoria, Moscow had employed the nations of both southern Africa 
and the international community to establish its dominion over South Africa. Similarly, 
in the government’s view, the Soviet Union also organized domestic subversion in its 
campaign to undermine South Africa. In response, Pretoria branded internal opponents 
of the South African government, including opposition parties, anti-apartheid groups, 
and seditious individuals, as direct participants in the “onslaught.”11 For instance, 
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government officials vehemently criticized liberal academics in Parliament and 
ostracized white anti-apartheid church leaders. Likewise, leading South African 
scholars countered ecclesiastical condemnations of apartheid by finding in them a 
definite inclination toward communism.12 Furthermore, the apartheid government 
accused black trade unions and associated black trade unionists with efforts to promote 
large-scale unemployment in order to foment a social revolution.13 
In short, for Pretoria, the Soviet Union represented the chief planner and 
initiator of the “onslaught” against South Africa, involving its African satellites, 
liberation movements, the West, and local South Africans.14 As capsulated by the 
Department of Defence in the 1982 White Paper: 
The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union . . . is to overthrow the present 
body politic in the RSA and to replace it with a Marxist-oriented form of 
government to further the objectives of the U.S.S.R. . . . All possible 
methods and means are used to attain this objective . . . instigating social 
and labour unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infra-
structure of the RSA.15 
There are two important points to be taken from this refinement of the 
Republic’s comprehensive threat assessment of the “total onslaught.” First, the threat 
appraisal discounted the likelihood that apartheid might be the driving force in South 
Africa’s domestic problems, instead placing the blame for internal instability on a 
Soviet-orchestrated conspiracy. For nearly two decades, this view of the world was 
meticulously constructed and maintained within South Africa’s security establishment. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the comprehensive “Total National Strategy,” 
which seemed to be the only appropriate response to the envisioned “total onslaught,” 
provided the state with the tools it needed to destroy its opposition, both internal and 
external. 
4.2 A Total National Strategy 
The Total Strategy was an all-embracing, counter-revolutionary plan to address 
the vital components of national security: political, military, economic, psychological, 
scientific, religious, cultural, financial, intelligence, and so on.16 As such, the Total 
Strategy involved all of South Africa, from government departments to population 
groups to social organizations. The 1977 White Paper defined a Total Strategy as 
the comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to a state 
according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims 
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within the framework of the specific policies. A Total National Strategy 
is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all 
levels and to all functions of the state structure.17 
The Total National Strategy consisted of two basic components—a quest for domestic 
preparedness against the external threats and a reorientation of South Africa’s relations 
with both the West and the rest of Africa. 
The Total National Strategy was based conceptually on the writings of the 
French General André Beaufre. Often referred to as the “brain behind the French 
Army,” Beaufre had been director of the French Institute of Strategic Studies, past 
editor of its journal, Stratégie, and an internationally recognized strategist and expert on 
European political-military affairs. His military career had included command 
assignments in Europe and Africa in World War II, in Indochina in 1947, and in Egypt 
in 1956.18 
In Strategy for Tomorrow, Beaufre contended that the West must plan long-
range “political, economic, and social objectives before devising a common security 
strategy that would support societal goals.”19 Beaufre believed that the “total 
onslaught” required “total indirect or counter-strategies that coordinated and aligned 
military and political policy, as well as with foreign, financial, economic policy and 
production.” This is where “contestants manoeuvre for advantage on a broad social 
plane and where the brute actualities of military combat are only one more direct 
dimension of the competitive process.”20 Believing that communism had brought 
together ideology and terror in what appeared to be a “permanent fusion,” Beaufre 
believed that the West needed to formulate a Total Strategy and pleaded for policy 
makers to accept that eventuality.21 
It was perhaps natural for South Africans to see a parallel with Beaufre’s 
general theme, which embraced the broad context of European and Atlantic security. 
He asserted that, in the future even more than in the past, the military power of a nation 
would depend on its economic strength and the self-discipline of its people. The 
credibility of such a nation in the future, among both its allies and adversaries, would 
depend on their assessment of its moral, productive, and staying powers. 
Beaufre’s ideas were subsequently adopted and brought to the Republic by 
academics like Deon Fourie and military officers such as Lieutenant General C. A. 
Fraser and Brigadier General Magnus Malan. Beaufre’s conceptual framework began to 
appear in the official documents of the Ministry of Defence as early as 1971, but it was 
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the 1977 Defence White Paper that definitively committed the country to a Beaufrean 
framework.22 In an RSA White Paper on Defence 1977,P.W. Botha outlined his 
strategic vision for ensuring the survival of the apartheid state, largely in terms drawn 
directly from the writings of André Beaufre. According to Botha: 
1. The process of ensuring and maintaining the sovereignty of a 
state’s authority in a conflict situation has, through the evolution of 
warfare, shifted from a purely military to an integrated national action. 
Up to and including the beginning of the 20th century, the successful 
resolution of a conflict situation was based purely upon victory of one 
army over another. Since World War I, however, this type of warfare has 
made such excessive demands upon all states that, due to a lack of 
coordinated national action, the result in many countries has been the 
total disruption of the national economy and the psychological 
disruption of the population. The resolution of a conflict in the times in 
which we now live demands interdependent and coordinated action in all 
fields—military, psychological, economic, political, sociological, 
technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc. Germany had 
already realized this before World War II, and Russia has maintained a 
multi-dimensional campaign against the West since this war. 
Consequently, we are today involved in a war, whether we wish to 
accept it or not. 
2. It is therefore essential that a Total National Strategy be 
formulated at the highest level. The defence of the RSA is not solely the 
responsibility of the Department of Defence. On the contrary, the 
maintenance of the sovereignty of the RSA is the combined 
responsibility of all government departments. This can be taken 
further—it is the responsibility of the entire population, the nation and 
every population group. The Department of Defence is merely an 
executive body responsible for the achievement of certain national 
security goals, as directed by the Government. 
3. On account of the inherent strength of Defence, it is essential, and 
it has indeed already been acknowledged, that the employment of the 
Defence Force be directed by Parliament. The powers of the Defence 
Force are determined, limited and defined in the Defence Act which also 
prescribes the aims and functions of the Defence Force. The striving for 
specific aims cannot, however, take place in isolation. It must be co-
ordinated with all the means available to the state. . . . 
4. The RSA has already recognized this need by the establishment of 
the State Security Council. . . . 
5. As already indicated, one of the functions of the State Security 
Council is to formulate the Total National Strategy for the RSA. Total 
Strategy is, however, a complex subject. It can perhaps be described as 
the comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to a state 
according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims 
within the framework of the specific policies. A national strategy is, 
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therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all 
levels and to all functions of the state structure [author’s emphasis]. 
6. The main elements that influence this, namely the political, 
psychological, technological, and military means, are, in the strategic 
sense, dynamic and interacting. Strategy, therefore, is not something 
constraining, since a change in one of the factors must have an effect on 
all the others. It must be constantly adapted to changing situations in 
respect of, for example, the threat, manpower potential, the financial 
climate, domestic or foreign policies, etc. Constant interaction and 
revision of planning and implementation at all levels of the various 
government departments are essential. 
7. Since strategy is normally directed towards the enemy’s actions, it 
cannot be determined purely on the basis of one’s own actions, but the 
reaction of the enemy must also be determined; this, in turn, demands a 
counter-reaction. This characteristic of strategy calls for an outstanding 
intelligence service in order to forecast the action of the enemy. 
8. It is clear that in order to formulate and implement military 
strategy meaningfully, there is a need for a Total National Strategy. This 
has already been acknowledged by the Government. It is because of the 
complexity of this need and with a view to national security that co-
ordination between government departments is of the utmost 
importance. There are few, if any, government departments which are 
not concerned with one or other aspect of national security, or which do 
not contribute to the realization of [national security]. . . . 
10. Our country’s defence is not a matter for the SA Defence Force 
alone. The defence of one’s country demands dedication, vigilance and a 
willingness to sacrifice on the part of everyone whose privilege it is to 
live in this country. 
Just as Botha had said in the 1977 Defence Whitepaper, the Total National Strategy 
would not be limited to a single sphere, but was “applicable to all levels and to all 
functions of the state structure.”23 
4.2.1  Militarization of South Africa 
Working from the Twelve-Point Plan, Botha oversaw a complete militarization 
of South Africa. At the top, Botha reorganized the government to centralize decision-
making in the most effective way to meet the “onslaught.” The ad hoc style of the 
Verwoerd and Vorster years that featured prominently in the Muldergate scandal and 
the failed Angola intervention focused Botha’s attention on the urgent necessity for 
governmental reorganization.24 
At the heart of Botha’s centralization was a new Cabinet structure. Botha 
developed an interlocking system of Cabinet committees to coordinate policy 
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formulation and implementation. In place of the twenty ad hoc committees that met 
under Vorster, Botha centralized power into five core committees: the SSC, Economic 
Affairs, Finance, Internal Affairs, and Social Affairs.25 Moreover, Botha consolidated 
the thirty-nine government departments into twenty-two. At the same time, the Office 
of the Prime Minister was expanded to give the Prime Minister more power, 
culminating in the creation of the Executive State President. Botha’s government 
became one of executive order and executive power, a Herrenvolk democracy.26 In this 
manner, Botha hoped to do a better job administering policy to counter domestic and 
international pressures. 
At the top of this reorganized system rested the State Security Council (SSC), 
tasked with formulating and executing all issues related to national security. Thus, the 
powers of the SSC were broad enough to include nearly every decision or action 
needed, including foreign and domestic policy.27 Although officially, the SSC was 
equal among the other Cabinet committees, “in fact, it was primus inter pares.”28Not 
only did the SSC have more responsibility than any of the other committees, but it also 
had more than ten times as many full-time employees. Furthermore, the SSC was 
shrouded in secrecy, giving it an air of importance that the other committees lacked. 
For instance, SSC meetings were open only to primary and co-opted members while 
most would be expected to attend other cabinet meetings.29 Likewise, much speculation 
existed as to the actual membership roster of the SSC.30 
With the threat of war shaping Pretoria’s national security policy, the military 
influence in SSC decision-making became prominent, especially with Generals Magnus 
Malan and Constand Viljoen acting as the primary members. It was undeniable that the 
military had assumed a greater role in policy formulation, especially with regard to 
foreign policy, overshadowing at times the Department of Foreign Affairs.31 At the 
same time, however, the team-style approach of the SSC prevented any part of policy 
from becoming the exclusive domain of any one bureaucratic faction. If it was true that 
the Department of Defence had gained significant influence in foreign policy, it was 
also true that the Department of Foreign Affairs had acquired limited leverage in 
defence policy.32 
Broadly, however, the Botha centralization measures contributed to an overall 
militarization of South African foreign policy. With a more tightly controlled 
leadership, bodies with heavy military influence such as the SSC directly affected the 
direction of foreign policy, especially those measures relating to South Africa’s 
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national security. With the “total onslaught” contributing to a siege mentality in South 
Africa, foreign policy became a matter of military survival. Consequently, increased 
military involvement was inevitable. 
The South African military was most affected by the implementation of the 
Total National Strategy. Indeed, the opening words of the 1982 White Paper reiterated 
the charge of the military: “A MOTIVATED AND PREPARED SOUTH AFRICAN 
DEFENCE FORCE MUST AT ALL TIMES BE READY TO DEFEND THE REPUBLIC 
OF SOUTH AFRICA WITH DETERMINATION AND PERSEVERANCE AGAINST 
ANY MILITARY ‘ONSLAUGHT.’”33The introduction of Cuban troops and sophisticated 
Soviet arms into the region provided the impetus for South Africa to aggressively 
improve its conventional capabilities. 
First, the military modernized its technology to guard against surprise attacks.34 
Such moves included the expansion of coastal surveillance through radar, patrol 
vessels, and so on. Second, Pretoria took steps to strengthen the South African Defence 
Force (SADF). As part of this effort, the government extended conscription from 
twelve to twenty-four months and passed an amendment legalizing the deployment of 
the SADF outside of South African territory. Moreover, military exercises expanded to 
demonstrate to both the region and the world the growing strength of the SADF. Third, 
South Africa acquired a series of anti-tank projectiles and long-range strike aircraft to 
improve its capacity to fight and win a conventional war. 
The soaring defence budget reflected the heightened importance of military 
preparedness in South African national security. For example, the expenditure on 
armed forces increased from R847 million in 1973 to R1972 million in1980.35 Even 
accounting for inflation, this growth evidenced the increased importance of the military 
to a threat-conscious South Africa.36 Similarly, the growth of SADF personnel as a 
percentage of the white population from 3.1% in 1970 to 8.6% in 1983 illustrated the 
growing militarization of South Africa. Moreover, the total manpower potential of the 
SADF jumped from 78,000 troops in 1970 to 239,100 in 1983.37 
By far, the most successful attempt to achieve military self-sufficiency occurred 
in the arms industry. Beginning with the first U.N. voluntary arms embargo in 1963, 
South Africa had sought to overcome its dependency on Western sources for weapons 
by developing its own arms industry. By the time the U.N. passed its 1977 mandatory 
arms embargo, the Armaments Development and Manufacturing Corporation of South 
Africa (ARMSCOR) was producing approximately 75% of its non-naval weapon 
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needs. In fact, ARMSCOR production had enabled South Africa to become militarily 
self-sufficient in many categories of arms production.38 As a result, South Africa 
allocated only 15% of its defence budget to arms imports, as opposed to the 70% it had 
typically spent in the early 1970s. Even so, South Africa was not entirely militarily self-
sufficient. It still largely depended on imports to meet its aviation requirements, 
especially as its planes became outdated. 
By the mid-1980s, ARMSCOR was the world’s tenth largest arms 
manufacturer. South Africa had developed the capacity to export, as its presence at 
arms expositions suggested. As one of the three largest financial undertakings in South 
Africa, ARMSCOR possessed assets greater than R1617 million ($627 million at 
current prices).39 Furthermore, ARMSCOR was one of the largest year-round 
employers of labour. It directly employed over 23,000 workers and indirectly provided 
employment for over 100,000 workers at 9 subsidiaries and 3000 private 
subcontractors. Such statistics illustrated the importance of ARMSCOR to the South 
African economy. An indigenous arms industry represented both a major savings of 
foreign exchange and a major stimulus to the economy, especially during times of 
recession.40 
Along the lines of the Total National Strategy, ARMSCOR contributed to the 
militarization of South Africa. At the locus of the government, military, and private 
sector, ARMSCOR symbolized the union of disparate South African forces inherent to 
the Total National Strategy. Indeed, 70% of ARMSCOR production was contracted to 
the private sector. Through ARMSCOR, private enterprises supplied items ranging 
from SADF uniforms to sophisticated weapons. With such extensive links to the arms 
industry, the private sector clearly had a material stake in armaments production.41 
Likewise, the main ARMSCOR board reflected the links between the government and 
private sector. Appointed by the State President (formerly the Prime Minister) and 
responsible to the Defence Minister, the board included the chief of the SADF, the 
director general of finance, and a variety of individuals from the major financial, 
manufacturing, and commercial areas of the private sector.42 As a result, observers 
labelled ARMSCOR a “paradox.” It was “a state corporation run almost exclusively by 
private enterprise.”43 
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4.2.2  SADF Defence Posture and Threat Perceptions 
By 1975, it had become apparent that South Africa’s strategic policy makers 
perceived a two-fold threat. The 1982 Defence White Paper discussed the threat in 
broad terms of the Marxist “onslaught” against Africa, but specifically assigned both 
conventional and counterinsurgency roles to the combat branches of the SADF. 
In June 1979, Magnus Malan, stated, “The possibility of a conventional military 
threat to South Africa in the not too distant future cannot be ruled out.”44 However, a 
review of all the forces that that it might bring to bear in a confrontation against any 
one or any combination of the front-line states showed that, with regard to equipment 
alone, South Africa was at least equal to and, in many areas, superior to all potential 
regional adversaries.45 In addition to material considerations, a brief review of many 
other areas related to the armed forces of these nations, including sources of 
recruitment, military traditions and backgrounds, defence infrastructure, and reserve 
organizations, also indicated the superiority of the SADF.46 
Another consideration was the perceived conventional threat of the Soviet 
Union and its proxies. With the election of Botha, South Africa had expanded its 
concept of the conventional threat to include the possibility of an attack by Soviet, 
Cuban, or Eastern European troops staging through neighbouring countries and using 
prepositioned military equipment. In February 1981, General Malan stated, “There is an 
unprecedented buildup of conventional heavy armaments in Southern Africa and should 
these be manned and used by Communist proxy forces, it could very rapidly lead to a 
conventional onslaught against South Africa.”47 Later, in 1982, General Malan said, 
“The presence of sophisticated weaponry of Russian origin in South Africa’s 
neighbouring states indicates that South Africa and Southwest Africa/Namibia could 
become targets of a conventional onslaught.”48 
Finally, the possibility of a conventional attack was seen in conjunction with 
other pressures. This type of threat could take the form of conventional force raids 
conducted in coordination with terrorist tactics. The possibility of such attacks had been 
discussed since 1979 and had received increased attention since 1981. However, while 
the composition and training of the SADF made it clear that the government was 
planning to meet the threat of a conventional attack, it was also apparent that the 
possibility of a conventional attack had been used to justify increases in defence 
expenditures, new security legislation, and in support of a new conscription law. As 
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General Malan stated in 1982, “the possibility of a conventional attack against South 
Africa is the main reason for the country’s new national service system.”49 
This use of the threat of conventional attack made sense when viewed within 
the framework of justifying the implementation of various facets of the Total National 
Strategy and, in part, explained the difference between South African statements and 
the real military potential of the Republic’s neighbours. What was probably a more 
accurate description of South African defence planners’ estimates of the conventional 
threat faced by South Africa was put forward by General Constand L. Viljoen, Chief of 
the SADF, in 1983. In examining the conventional threat, he concluded that “in light of 
factors such as poor economic conditions, internal instability, relatively deficient 
physical infrastructures, the inability to properly maintain or to replace advanced 
military equipment and discord arising from old regional conflicts, the African 
countries (individually and collectively) are not a real offensive military threat to the 
RSA.”50 
According to General Vilojen, the real threat of conventional weapons in South 
Africa’s neighbours was in the possibility of these weapons being provided to 
“terrorist” organizations and in the use of these weapons by host countries in defending 
“terrorist” bases and headquarters against South African pre-emption and reprisals.51 
4.2.3  The Terrorist Threat 
To understand South Africa’s regional policy, one must first recognize that 
South Africa’s domestic conditions limited its foreign policy. Specifically, South Africa 
had externalized many of its domestic problems into its relations with its neighbors. In 
the South African view, the major threat to its domestic order stemmed neither from 
internally based discontent nor from African nationalism. Prime Minister Botha 
expounded upon this theme in his 28 January 1981 address to the House of Assembly: 
We do not see the struggle in Southern Africa as a struggle 
between Whites and non-Whites. It is an entirely different 
struggle. It is a struggle between the powers of chaos, 
Marxism and destruction on the one hand and the powers 
of order, Christian civilization and the upliftment of people 
on the other.52 
 
This attitude prevailed among both policy makers and the white public. For example, 
77.4 percent of those surveyed in a 1984 opinion poll strongly disagreed with the 
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statement, “South Africa’s blacks have good reason to take up arms against the 
government.”53 
Consequently, events in the region had far greater significance to both the South 
African policy elite and the general public. Believing that the “terrorist threat” to South 
Africa had emanated primarily from the black-ruled states of the region, Pretoria 
combated internal threats to the existing power structure through its regional policy. 
Many observers of South African affairs saw, besides the danger of 
conventional attack, two other types of dangers to the Republic. The first of these was 
the danger posed by internally and externally supported guerrilla movements, such as 
Umkonto We Sizwe.54 The second was the danger of domestic unrest in response to the 
internal repression, such as the 1976 Soweto disturbances. However, it was clear that 
South African defence planners did not distinguish between these two types of threats. 
This tendency to group all non-conventional threats under the general heading of 
“terrorist” can be seen in the statements of South African government officials. For 
example, in 1981, the Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General J. J. Geldenjuys, defined 
two types of modern warfare, “insurgency or terrorist warfare and conventional 
warfare.” Furthermore, the missions assigned to the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the 
1982 White Paper on Defence were divided between conventional and 
counterinsurgency.55 
Two points should be made about the terms in which the South African 
government discussed its perception of the threat. First, the terms terrorism, insurgency, 
insurrection, and guerrilla warfare were all used interchangeably by government 
officials. Second, the armed forces also made no distinction between confronting 
externally supported and mounted threats and assisting the SAP in the enforcement of 
internal security regulations. Both were classified as counterinsurgency duties. The 
tendency in South Africa not to distinguish between an external non-conventional 
threat and internal unrest, to lump all forms of unconventional threat under the heading 
“terrorism,” was significant for two reasons. First, this view allowed, within the 
framework of the Total Onslaught/Total National Strategy, a logical connection 
between the communist threat, “terrorist” organizations, and internal unrest in South 
Africa. For the Republic, the ANC was an agent of “revolutionary and terrorist warfare. 
. . playing in the orchestra of Moscow. . . to further the process of destabilisation in the 
region of the Republic of South Africa.”56 Once this connection was made, it was 
possible to see internal unrest, such as boycotts and the actions of labor unions, as 
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resulting, not from South Africa’s internal apartheid policies, but as a result of external 
interference from black Africa and the Soviet Union.57 In 1981, Prime Minister Botha 
accurately asserted that the Soviet Union was providing financial support to such 
revolutionary organizations inside South Africa as the banned ANC and that some of 
South Africa’s neighboring states were providing bases for terrorists.58 
The second point to be made is that this view of terrorism as inspired by 
external interference rather than internal policies had implications for South Africa’s 
neighbours. Since it first became involved in Angola, South Africa had justified cross-
border operations as a legitimate reaction to disturbances inside South Africa: “It is the 
clear and repeatedly stated policy of the South African government that it will take 
whatever measures are necessary to counter political violence. That policy includes 
striking at terrorists in their bases wherever they may be.”59 As long as internal unrest 
was linked to intervention by its neighbours in the Republic’s internal affairs, the 
government could justify a wide variety of defensive responses. These ranged from 
“hot pursuit” operations to pre-emptive strikes to the actual occupation of territory and 
destabilization of neighbouring governments. 
With the upsurge in ANC attacks after 1980, mostly from Mozambique, these 
raids assumed greater importance.60 In February, 1980, South African security forces 
discovered the biggest cache of ANC ammunition ever found in South Africa near the 
Mozambique border in Natal. A few months later, the ANC performed its highly 
successful sabotage of the Sasol plant. In 1981, the ANC claimed responsibility for the 
sabotage of two major power stations in the Transvaal. Worse, in May, 1982, the ANC 
car bombed the SAAF Headquarters on a busy Pretoria street, killing eighteen South 
Africans and wounding 200. Finally, the damage done to the Koeberg nuclear power 
complex by a 1982 ANC attack demonstrated to all South Africans the power and 
sophistication of ANC sabotage. 61 
As such, driving the ANC as far from South Africa’s borders as possible 
dominated much of the Republic’s national security policy. Standing in Pretoria’s way 
of totally expelling the ANC from southern Africa were regional governments 
sympathetic to the political aims of the ANC and willing to afford the ANC shelter, aid, 
and encouragement. To combat this situation, Pretoria oriented much of its national 
security policy to: 
The fact that certain states in the region adapted an 
unfriendly stance towards South Africa, in the sense of 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
11
8 
making their territories available to the ANC for terrorist 
attacks on South Africa, compelled the government to 
safeguard its wider national interests. There was no other 
choice.62 
Thus, a fundamental component of South African national security was an attempt to 
prevent its neighbours from supporting the ANC and affording it direct access to South 
Africa. 
South Africa claimed that its raids in the neighbouring states responded to such 
ANC terrorist acts. For instance, the discovery of the arms cache in Natal led directly to 
the South African attack of the ANC in Matola in January, 1981.63 Similarly, South 
Africa answered the Pretoria car bombing with an air attack against suspected ANC 
quarters in Maputo and a blockade on all trade to and from Lesotho, forcing the 
expulsion of over 3000 South African refugees from Lesotho.64 As General C.L. 
Viljoen, chief of the SADF, explained, terror raids formed an integral component of 
South African defence: 
The South African Defence Force has no other choice but 
to launch cross-border operations with the purpose of 
destroying enemy bases, supply stores, and logistical 
channels, and in the process to check enemy action from 
areas on the borders of the Republic of South Africa. 
Enemy host countries have already been warned 
repeatedly and at the highest level that support for and 
harbouring of terrorist organisations which are directed at 
overthrowing the authorities are not to be tolerated and 
that there will be no hesitation in taking the appropriate 
steps against such enemies.65 
 
Finally, SADF raids appealed to President Reagan’s anti-terrorist measures, 
especially American anti-terrorist strikes in Libya. For example, Botha and Malan 
linked ANC, PAC, and SWAPO actions to Libyan terrorism. Malan even claimed that 
these anti-South African organizations were part of the same international terror 
network to which Libya belonged.66 As such, Pretoria attempted to link South Africa 
with American attempts to extinguish terrorism. 
The efficacy of this approach was confirmed when, on June 18, 1985, President 
Reagan was asked about the South African retaliation against ANC targets in Botswana 
that killed twelve. In his response, the president linked ANC violence to the Trans 
World Airlines hijacking incident that resulted in the murder of U.S. Navy diver, 
Robert Dean Stethem: 
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 The raid across the border was perhaps the kind of 
incident that I’ve just been talking about here in our own 
situation. There is no question about the violence of the 
ANC [African National Congress] and their striking and 
their attacks on people and their murdering and so forth.67 
In the same question and answer session with the media that he linked the ANC with 
terrorism, President Reagan would declare to “international assassins” and “terrorists” 
that: 
America will never make concessions to terrorists—to do 
so would only invite more terrorism—nor will we ask nor 
pressure any other government to do so. Once we head 
down that path there would be no end to it, no end to the 
suffering of innocent people, no end to the bloody ransom 
all civilized nations must pay. 
 
In subsequent remarks to the media and in speeches, Regan would continue to 
refer to “the Soviet-armed guerrillas of the African National Congress, operating both 
within South Africa and from some neighboring countries” that had “embarked upon 
new acts of terrorism.” In his June 22, 1986 speech, just days after the shooting of 
unarmed protestors by South African security forces, the president detailed the tactics 
of the ANC as: 
the mining of roads, the bombings of public places, 
designed to bring about further repression, the imposition 
of martial law, eventually creating the conditions for racial 
war. The most common method of terror is the so-called 
necklace. In this barbaric way of reprisal, a tire is filled 
with kerosene or gasoline, placed around the neck of an 
alleged collaborator, and ignited. The victim may be a 
black policeman, a teacher, a soldier, a civil servant. It 
makes no difference. The atrocity is designed to terrorize 
blacks into ending all racial cooperation and to polarize 
South Africa as prelude to a final, climactic struggle for 
power.68 
 
In dealing with the ANC, Reagan believed the South Africans had “a right and 
responsibility to maintain order in the face of terrorists.” He would unequivocally state 
that the South African government was under no obligation to “negotiate the future of 
the country with any organization that . . . uses terrorist tactics and violence.” This 
rhetoric perfectly mirrored that used by the South African government, which described 
the ANC as “revolutionaries, perpetrators of violence and adventurers” that would not 
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be included in the reform process because it wanted to “dominate through 
dictatorship.”69 
In October, 1986 the apartheid government took to the airwaves to state that 
“where the ANC’s commitment to violence and revolution is concerned, there is 
abundant and incontrovertible evidence” including: 
the most depraved acts of violence the necklacing murders 
have been endorsed by the African National Congress, 
with its Secretary General, Mr Alfred Nzo, saying that this 
is something that black people should use against other 
black people who are suspected of being what he calls 
collaborators. Mrs Winnie Mandela, wife of Nelson 
Mandela, has said: Together, hand-in-hand with our boxes 
of matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate this 
country.70 
This radio address was directed at the United States Congress, which was then 
advocating for sanctions and that the ANC be unbanned and Nelson Mandela released. 
Pretoria urged the U.S. Congress to “take note” of the organization’s use of terrorism 
and “of much other evidence of the ANC’s stance on violence and . . . not merely set 
out to whitewash the organisation.” Botha’s government would continue to foster this 
theme by disseminating a video to American legislators and friendly media outlets 
titled The ANC Method: Violence.71 The video included pictures and video of members 
of the ANC juxtaposed with images of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish 
Republican Army, the Red Brigades, and the German Baader-Meinhoff gang. A screen 
shot of ANC President Oliver Tambo was inserted between Lybia’s Moammar Gadhafi 
and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, while scenes of political assassinations, the murder 
of civilians in the Roman airport, and the murdered of American sailorRobert Dean 
Stethemon the AchilleLauro were linked to necklacings in South Africa.  
The approach was effective, with President Reagan’s Republican allies in the 
United States Congress labelling the ANC and other “so-called ‘National Liberation 
Movements’” as “Soviet-sponsored terrorist organizations.”72 In testimony to the 
subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, witnesses detail acts of violence by the ANC 
including the “horrifying consequences” of “bombing an urban shopping center and 
automobile showrooms, and attacks on small police stations manned by South African 
blacks.” The Republican congressmen were building on a June 1981 hearing titled 
“Historical Antecedents of Soviet Terrorism” that found “subcontractors” like the ANC 
were part of the “Soviet Union’s commitment to the use of terrorism and armed 
revolution to achieve its goal of Communist world domination.”73 The committee 
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warned that “Western interests is enhanced by southern Africa’s geopolitical 
importance along the strategic sea routes around Africa and by its growing importance 
as a source of critical minerals” and added “We will not lend our voice to support those 
dedicated to seizing and holding power through violence.” The fact that the current 
South African government was holding onto power using violence apparently never 
occurred to the committee that concluded “that humane values are not necessarily 
served by the overthrow of conservative regimes. If we encourage upheavals without 
putting in their place a moderate democratic alternative, a foreign policy conducted in 
the name of justice and human rights, could wind up by making the world safe for anti-
American radicalism.” To highlight the violent nature of the ANC, the committee 
issued a statement that “the witnesses who appeared before the subcommittee [were] 
protected while in Washington by the . . . U.S. Marshal Services” because the 
organization had issued a “death notice” on all defectors. 74 
Another committee headed by Republican Congressman Dan Burton would 
claim the ANC was a terrorist organization comparable to the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and would “kill anyone who participates in any sort of reform.”75 
Burton told the committee that he had no objection to the South Africans negotiating 
with “legitimate organizations representing the black majority” but: 
My objection is to naming a particular organization as 
representing the black majority, and especially to naming 
an organization that is clearly allied to the South African 
Communist Party. This committee would not support an 
organization allied with nazis or facists[sic], and I do not 
think we should lend legitimacy to a group allied with 
people who are equally antidemocratic and anti-American 
On the House floor, I was charged with saying that because 
of communism we cannot do anything about apartheid. I 
resent that charge. I resent the idea that because I look at 
history and see nation after nation fall to Communist-
backed revolutions claiming to bring freedom and each 
time, after a great bloodbath, bringing greater misery and 
oppression that I am against freedom or for apartheid. All I 
am pointing out is that alliances between Communists and 
non-Communists have always resulted in a complete 
tyranny and great bloodshed. It happened in Nicaragua. It 
happened in Angola. It happened in Vietnam.  It happened 
in Mozambique. It happened in Grenada. And it happened 
in Ethiopia. Why are we helping to bring the same fate to 
South Africa? 
 Burton urged his fellow congressmen to support “the many non-Communist 
black groups in South Africa” and “not support blindly any group that opposes 
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apartheid regardless of Communist influence that would bring a new tyranny—this 
time, compliments of the Soviet Union.” The anti-ANC rhetoric emanating from the 
U.S. Congress would continue with Senator Jesse Helms questioning Chester Crocker 
about “that violent group in South Africa, the African National Congress, the crowd 
that is fighting for freedom by hanging tires around the necks of people who disagree 
with them, filling them with gasoline, setting them afire, including children.” Senator 
Helm’s, however, failed to see the irony when he asked Crocker why the United States 
State Department was not opening a dialogue with RENAMO, a group that committed 
acts of terror against Mozambican citizens.76 
4.2.4  South African Society and the Total Strategy 
Not only had the commitment to Total Strategy militarized the government and 
industry of South Africa, it had also affected South African society. Pretoria had tried 
to foster an atmosphere that made military service attractive and made military 
responses to policy issues look sensible. It had tried to justify increased expenditures on 
the armed forces as vital to national security.77 This process had permeated every sector 
of South African society. First, military propaganda pervaded the South African media. 
South African television abounded with heavily edited documentaries designed to 
emphasize the “total onslaught” and the SADF’s role in combating the Soviet advance. 
Often, radio and television news, especially the state-owned and operated radio-
television network, featured military events and frequently covered military parades 
that promoted and glorified South African military service. With the advertising 
industry on the military bandwagon, South African media both directly and indirectly 
created an emotional climate conducive to the Total National Strategy.78 
Second, white education had also acquired a military dimension. The SADF had 
set up cadet programs of paramilitary drills and training, which were compulsory for all 
white boys in government schools. Elementary and even nursery school students 
journeyed to local military installations for field trips.79 Third, citizens were 
encouraged to participate in counter-infiltration manoeuvres in their local districts. In 
areas sensitive to ANC terrorist raids, especially in northern Natal and the eastern 
Transvaal, citizens belonged to “area-protection” units of the South African Army and 
were tasked with defending their districts from communist subversion.80 
The Total National Strategy found a receptive audience among white South 
Africans, particularly among Afrikaans-speakers. National militarization was deeply 
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rooted in the Afrikaner way of defining his social and political world. A nation armed 
in unity was characteristic of the way the Afrikaner has confronted threats to his 
security throughout South African history.81 As former Prime Minister D.F. Malan 
explained, the national survival of the Afrikaner in the face of threats from the 
“barbarians” should be the goal of national security policy: 
It is through the will of God that the Afrikaner People 
exists at all. In His wisdom He determined that on the 
southern point of Africa. . . People should be born who 
would be the bearer of Christian culture and 
civilization…God also willed that the Afrikaans People 
should be continually threatened by other Peoples ... there 
were times when as a result of this Afrikaner was deeply 
despairing, but God at the same time prevented the 
swamping of the young Afrikaner People in the sea of 
barbarianism.82 
 
Furthermore, communism’s advocacy of racial equality rendered the anticommunist 
component of Total Strategy crucial to the national defence of white South Africa.83 
The ideology that formed the basis for Afrikaner perceptions of the world was 
that of the volk as an ethnic group with its own distinct religion, culture, and political 
sovereignty.84 The survival of the volk had preoccupied Afrikaners for 150 years. The 
assumption of power by the National Party in 1948 did not allay the feelings of concern 
over the preservation of this identity. Instead, having a majority in Parliament meant 
that, for the first time, Afrikaners would be able to control the government and ensure 
the survival of the volk. As internal and external pressures on South Africa had grown 
since 1960, the focus of the South African response had remained the preservation of 
their identity. The debate between verligte (enlightened) and verkrampte (closed off) 
Afrikaners was not a struggle between liberal and conservative, but a narrower dispute 
over the most effective means to accomplish the same end. 
Religious and legal principles formed an important part of the ideological 
foundation of the Total National Strategy. Maintenance of Christian values in the face 
of Western materialism and communist atheism was a real concern of the Dutch 
Reformed churches of South Africa, a concern that was shared with many South 
African English-speaking churches. Regard for law and morality in international 
relations was included in Afrikaner university instruction. Ironically, non-interference 
in the internal affairs of other countries was an often-quoted legal principle, reflecting 
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South Africa’s disinterest in the affairs of other nations and the desire of South Africa 
to detach its own domestic affairs from its dealings with other countries. 
Another facet of the concern with law and religion was a preoccupation with the 
view that South Africa stood alone as an isolated outpost of Western Christian 
civilization against a growing “onslaught” on these values. The communists of the 
Soviet Union were responsible for this attack, but they were unintentionally supported 
by other forces weakening the Western world, including liberalism, materialism, 
secularism, and socialism. South African leaders took seriously the idea that the 
ultimate goal of the Soviet Union was world domination and apparently viewed other 
communist states, such as the Peoples’ Republic of China, as Soviet agents. The 1982 
Defence White Paper defined the threat in these terms: 
The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies is to overthrow the 
present body politic in the RSA and replace it with a Marxist-oriented 
form of government to further the objectives of the U.S.S.R., therefore 
all possible methods and means are used to attain this objective. This 
includes instigating social and labor unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist 
attacks against the infrastructure of the RSA and the intimidation of 
Black leaders and members of the Security Forces. This “onslaught” is 
supported by a worldwide propaganda campaign and the involvement of 
various front organizations, such as trade unions and even certain church 
organizations and leaders.85 
This is not to say that all the whites in South Africa were united behind the 
government on every issue. There was a traditional split between Afrikaner and 
English-speaking South Africans to be considered. Equally important within the 
context of South African defence policy was how white South Africans supported the 
government on defence matters and how willing they were to endure military service in 
support of, as they saw it, their way of life. With regard to white support for 
government defence policies, it is useful to examine a public opinion survey conducted 
by Geldenhuys in 1982.86 This survey found that the government’s explanation of the 
communist threat was shared by the majority of the white population. Furthermore, 
there were indications that the majority of the white population supported such 
government defence policies as cross-border operations in order to meet the threat. In 
addition, white South Africans had endured an ever-increasing burden of military 
service with little outward display of opposition. These stances did not mean that 
opposition to government defence policies and conscription could not increase in 
response to increased pressure on South Africa, as happened in Rhodesia in the waning 
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days of the Smith regime. It did mean that, as long as the government could redirect, 
diffuse, or effectively respond to these pressures, white approval would remain high, 
allowing the government to rely on a continued high level of support from the nation’s 
white population. 
Thus, with political, economic, social, technological, and media support, one 
observer concluded: 
Total Strategy selectively interprets the world in the narrow, didactic and 
melodramatic terms with which white South Africa is so familiar, 
confusing communism, nationalism, dissidence, subversion, racism and 
imperialism into an interpenetrable [sic] mélange from which only the 
security of the white state emerges as constant and paramount.87 
In short, through the militarization of South Africa, Pretoria hoped to enhance 
South African capabilities to preserve apartheid and dominate its neighbours. Operating 
under the guidelines of the Total National Strategy, Pretoria oversaw a major 
governmental reorganization, military expansion, increase in arms production, and 
social militarization in order to render South Africa self-reliant in face of the “total 
onslaught.”  
4.2.5  The Twelve-Point Plan 
Throughout the first half of 1979, Botha, who had begun formulating the Total 
National Strategy while Minster of Defence, and his main spokesperson, General 
Malan, continued to expand upon the total conflict and the need for a strategy to 
combat the threats it posed. In June, Malan called for cohesion of population groups to 
face the communist conventional, unconventional, and psychological threats. In July 
1979, P. W. Botha raised the “total conflict” issue with regard to South Africa’s 
position in Namibia.88 By August 1979, Botha was ready to unveil his new strategy. 
Speaking at the Natal National Party Congress, he outlined what came to be known as 
the Twelve-Point Plan. This plan, as it was stated and fine-tuned over the following 
months, attempted to define policy objectives for the government over a wide range of 
interests. Botha presented the plan as one to which the government was totally 
committed and as the only hope for salvation in the face of the “total onslaught.”89 
The first six points of the plan dealt largely with domestic political matters. In 
short, these points stated the ideological foundation of the plan, making it clear that the 
plan was a restatement of National Party policy, committing South Africa to separate 
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development. The seventh point recognized the economic integration between the races 
that had already occurred and could be seen as an effort on the part of the government 
to remove ideology from economic activity. The eighth point announced what had 
already become a major foreign policy initiative of the Botha regime: the creation of a 
“peaceful constellation of states in southern Africa.” The formation of this constellation 
was seen as inevitable because economic, political, and security considerations drew 
the states of the region into closer relationships. In short, the constellation was a South 
African attempt to detach its internal policies from its external relations and to draw its 
neighbours closer together, mainly by establishing economic ties.90 
The ninth, tenth, and eleventh points dealt with South Africa’s defence policies. 
The ninth proclaimed South Africa’s determination to defend itself from any form of 
outside interference. The tenth called for a policy of neutrality in the East-West 
conflict. The eleventh concerned the “maintenance of effective decision making by the 
state, which rests on a strong Defence Force and Police Force to guarantee orderly 
government as well as efficient, clear administration.” This point reflected Botha’s 
style of governing and his upcoming reorganization, as well as the increased role that 
the military would play in South Africa’s government. The twelfth point committed the 
South African government to the maintenance of free enterprise as the economic basis 
of the country. This point reflected Botha’s attempt to draw the economic sector into 
his plans for both the constellation and internal change and, thus, was related to points 
seven and eight.91 
4.2.6  Racial Dimension of the Twelve-Point Plan 
In the area of relations between the races, the Twelve-Point Plan adhered to the 
tenets of separate development, but with a difference. Points one through three 
reconfirmed the commitment of South Africa to apartheid. Point four assigned some 
political power in the newly reorganized government to coloured and Asian peoples.92 
In addition, administrative exemptions in the Group Areas Act would allow Asians and 
coloureds the right to house black servants and to receive general preference over 
blacks in the expenditure of government money. In these and other matters, it was 
apparently the intention of the government to blur the racial boundary between 
coloureds, Asians, and whites while widening the inequalities between these groups 
and blacks. This was clearly an attempt to pull two ambiguously situated groups into 
the white camp, thereby denying their support to the black majority.93 
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Under the Total National Strategy concept, blacks were dealt with in a twofold 
strategy. First, rural blacks were handled by the homeland policy, the goal of which 
was to create a system of semi-independent, semi-autonomous states dominated by 
South Africa. Political development in these states was carefully monitored to ensure 
that these states remained dependent on and under the control of South Africa.94 
Second, urban blacks received new “rights” that allowed them some local 
political power, limited rights of citizenship and property holding, and the promise of 
increased participation in the country’s economic institutions. Moves to accommodate 
urban blacks were supposed to result in new reform measures and greater 
responsiveness to the needs of this group. In reality, when considered in the light of the 
Total National Strategy, it seems that these moves were intended to split opposition to 
white dominance by separating rural and urban blacks. Just as the “political 
dispensation” accorded to Asians and coloureds was intended to split these groups from 
blacks, giving urban blacks a stake in the system was intended to separate them from 
rural blacks. As Frankel states, the “Total Strategy is also devoted to realizing the ‘old’ 
liberal belief that the existence of a black middle class committed to the ideals of free 
enterprise capitalism is an important ingredient in the maintenance of the 
system.”95This strategy would be obvious when Minister Piet Koornhof stated, “If 
Gazankulu, Lebowa, QwaQwa and Kwa Ndebele become independent it means that 
there will be 13,5 million completely independent blacks. Then only about 6,25 million 
blacks will be fewer than the sum total of 7,8 million whites, coloureds and Asians in 
South Africa.”96 
In 1983, South African government announced the creation of the new 
constitutional structure with a Tricameral legislature into which coloureds and Indians 
would be independently incorporated but black South Africans (73% of the 
populations) were to be denied any political participation. The first elections for this 
constitution were held in the fall of 1984 and were overwhelmingly boycotted by 
coloured and Indian voters. Only 30.9% of coloured and 20.3% of Indian voters who 
had even registered actually voted. For their part, blacks in South Africa regarded the 
elections as a “farce” and began to mobilize in opposition to the Total National 
Strategy’s new political dispensation.97 
The Reagan Administration, for its part, presented the new constitutional plan 
as evidence of an ongoing reform process that could eventually lead to a nonracial 
society.98 Under-Secretary of State of Political Affairs Laurence Eagleburger declared 
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in a major speech on southern Africa in the summer of 1983, “the indisputable fact 
which we must recognize is that the South African Government has taken the first step 
toward extending national political rights beyond the white minority.” While critics of 
the regime had a tendency “to reject all incremental improvements that are not 
explicitly linked to a full-blown democratic blueprint,” the Reagan Administration, 
while recognizing “the limits of current change,” still expected such reforms to lead, in 
a careful, controlled, and evolutionary manner, to yet further change. Thus the 
administration believed it was “incumbent on us to avoid the arrogance of rejecting 
such steps. Nor, if we would be credible, can we expect South Africa’s would-be 
reformers to announce their game plan and their bottom line to the world at large.”99 
The South African constitutional plan, therefore, was viewed as deserving of the 
administration’s support and as evidence of the propriety of its policy of Constructive 
Engagement. 
In the United States, interpretations of the new constitution’s significance 
differed sharply. Crocker hailed it as a limited but meaningful step toward “wider 
political participation,”100while Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA) condemned it as 
“merely an attempt at ‘divide and rule.’”101 Although the Reagan Administration was 
not uncritical of the exclusion of blacks in the proposed system, it applauded Pretoria’s 
decision to extend political participation for nonwhite segments of the South African 
population. Some analysts argued that it “was the impression that the United States was 
identifying itself with the South African government’s latest scheme for preserving and 
prolonging apartheid that was critical to the view of Constructive Engagement held by 
most black South Africans.”102 
The view of Constructive Engagement held by a number of American 
congressmen was also further damaged when they realized that, not only would blacks 
be excluded from the new political dispensation, but many would be deprived of their 
South African citizenship because it appeared Pretoria would press on with its policy of 
removing Africans to the tribal homelands. A growing number of the members of 
Congress insisted that a tougher approach was needed if blacks in South Africa were 
ever to experience genuine change.103 The administration, however, was determined to 
shield the Republic from criticism concerning apartheid to help further its own strategic 
ambitions that could only be achieved with a powerful and active anticommunist 
government operating within the region. 
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4.3 “People’s War” 
By the beginning of the second Reagan Administration, a new movement against 
the apartheid regime was beginning in the Republic of South Africa. Undaunted by the 
uprisings, P.W. Botha warned: 
The South African Government has not yet applied the full authority and 
powers of the State to create order in this country. If we are forced to use 
the full powers of the State, many people will be hurt. I want to issue 
this warning: There are people who are provoking us. There are people 
who they can play with us. There are people who think they can call in 
foreign powers to harm South Africa. Do make the mistakes of your 
lives. You will be hurt, and will be hurt badly.104 
 Despite Botha’s threats, the constitutional reform sparked black opposition and 
protest all over South Africa on a scale not seen since the 1976 Soweto student 
uprising.105 Discontented black South Africans expressed their outrage in many ways: 
work stay-aways; rent, school, and bus boycotts; peaceful demonstrations; political 
speeches; and so forth. The disturbances in the urban areas of the Pretoria-
Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area were the most severe, with an official death toll 
between August 1 and September 20, 1983, of eighty, sixty-five of whom were shot by 
the police. By the beginning of November, 155 South Africans had died in the 
protests.106 
Clearly a new chapter was unfolding in the history of black opposition to 
apartheid in South Africa. Pretoria had assumed that the existential threat to South 
Africa was chiefly the Soviet Union operating through proxy states. However, with the 
increase in domestic protests against apartheid, Pretoria was forced to realize that the 
real challenge to its existence and the cornerstone of the black struggle for freedom was 
actually within South Africa itself.107 
The new black anti-apartheid campaign was coordinated by the United 
Democratic Front (UDF), which brought together over four hundred community-based 
groups, trade unions, churches, student associations, and other anti-apartheid 
organizations. Even though it had its own local leadership, the UDF had strong contacts 
with the exiled African National Congress. In fact, it was understood from its inception 
that the UDF was the proxy for the outlawed ANC within South Africa. The 
movement’s strong links with the ANC were further indicated by the naming of Nelson 
Mandela as the organization’s patron.108 
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Even though the UDF’s immediate goal was to oppose the new constitutional 
reforms, its long-term vision was nearly identical to that of the ANC and was, in fact, 
very similar to the aims of the ANC’s Freedom Charter: the creation of a democratic, 
nonracial and apartheid-free South Africa. As David Mckean noted, this vision was 
embodied in the movement’s 1983 declaration: 
We, the freedom loving people of South Africa, say with one voice to the 
whole world that we cherish the vision of a united, democratic South 
Africa based on the will of our people, and will strive for the unity of 
our people through united action against the evils of apartheid.109 
The UDF staged demonstrations across South Africa, calling upon the Indians 
and coloureds to boycott the proposed 1984 elections held under the new constitution. 
Strikes were also organized by emerging nonracial organizations and black trade unions 
as additional forms of protest against the government’s constitutional reforms. Two 
umbrella organizations, the Transvaal Regional Stay-Away Committee (TRSC) and the 
Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), were at the forefront of this 
growing black labour challenge to the political order in South Africa.110 
The mid-1980s in South Africa were characterized by intensified violence, 
including violence against municipal facilities, counter revolutionary violence directed 
at the liberation movement and protestors, and the “necklace” for black South Africans 
deemed as “impipis.” The necklace method involved hanging a gasoline soaked tire 
around the neck of black collaborators and setting it alight. The heat generated was so 
high it resulted in the skull of the victim bursting, providing a gruesome warning to any 
who might inform to the government.111 As the chaos raged in the townships, Oliver 
Tambo, speaking for the ANC, called on the protestors to make the Republic 
“ungovernable.”112 Concurrently, the number of MK guerrilla attacks jumped from 44 in 
1984, to 136 in 1985, to 228 in 1986, adding to the bloodshed and pushing the country 
closer to anarchy.113 Considering the ANC’s historical hesitance to use popular 
uprisings in the battle against Pretoria, this was an important change in strategy. 
Many authors believe that Oliver Tambo’s call, in 1985, for a “people’s war” 
was a cynical attempt to catch up to the reality on the streets. In fact, the ANC had been 
advocating for an escalation from the beginning of the township uprisings, contradicting 
the assertion that the ANC’s endorsement of a “people’ war” was retroactive, intended 
to consolidate its prominence in the liberation movement. 
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In his examination of the history of the UDF, Jeremy Seekings notes that pro- 
confrontationists within the UDF “not only were inspired by the events on the East Rand 
and Vaal Triangle, but also felt that they were doing the ANC’s bidding.”114 As early as 
the second day of the Vaal Uprising in September 1984, the ANC “called on its 
supporters to ‘intensify the struggle and . . . open new fronts. We must render 
inoperative the ability of apartheid to exploit and oppress us further. The sharp 
confrontations now raging in Sharpeville, Evaton, Sebokeng, Lenasia and other areas 
must be widened and extended to other areas.”115 
The ANC repeated such calls over the following months of 1984: “What is 
happening today . . . in the African areas around the Vaal Triangle must be extended to 
cover the entire country.” The protestors saw themselves as implementing the ANC’s 
calls for mass-based direct action, or what was later called “ungovernability.”116 The 
ANC had already made calls to render South Africa “ungovernable” when it met for its 
Second National Consultative Conference in Kabwe, Zambia, in June 1985, but the 
conference incorporated this new tactic into the organization’s official strategy.117 
Kabwe introduced three significant shifts in policy that deviated from the 
strategic conceptions the ANC had held since the turn to violence in the early 1960s: the 
endorsement of mass uprisings, the decentralization and expansion of armed activity to a 
“people’s war,” and the removal of the prohibition on “soft” targets.  ANC statements 
before, during, and after Kabwe explicitly endorsed the mass uprising in which township 
residents across the country were encouraging blacks to make the nation 
“ungovernable.” The ANC thereby abandoned its former belief that mass uprising was 
an ineffective or even counter-productive method of struggle. Kabwe officially 
encouraged “a decentralized form of armed struggle reminiscent of the PAC’s earlier 
call for mass insurrection.”118 
At Kabwe, the ANC also decided that the armed struggle against the apartheid 
government and its institutions should be stepped up and “endorsed the conversion of 
Umkhonto strategy from sporadic attack to ‘people’s war.’”119 Essentially, people’s war 
meant the intensification of violence inside South Africa.120 In conjunction with the 
spontaneous violence black South Africans were undertaking, the MK trained people 
locally and, more significantly, distributed weapons extensively throughout the 
townships.121The fact that the number of MK guerrilla attacks jumped from 44 in 1984, 
to 136 in 1985—with fully 80 of those attacks occurring in the second half of 1985 after 
the June Kabwe conference—to 228 in 1986 indicates that the wider distribution of 
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weapons resulting from the ANC’s new strategy was having an immediate impact.122 
Additionally, the ANC “encouraged all militants to identify themselves as part of MK, 
regardless of formal affiliation or training.”123 Therefore, the ANC did not merely 
endorse the uprising—it actively supported it and tried to escalate the unrest to create 
chaos in the Republic. 
After Kabwe in 1985, the ANC continued to call for a decentralized armed 
struggle. In January 1986, the National Executive Committee of the ANC issued a 
statement entitled “Attack, Advance, Give the Enemy No Quarter!” The title of the 
document is an accurate indication of its incendiary rhetoric. Reflecting on the successes 
of 1985, it praised the “mass combat units” that had helped make South Africa 
ungovernable while continuing to emphasize that the “urgent task we face this year is 
the rapid expansion and extensive activisation of Umkhonto we Sizwe within the 
country, drawing in the millions of our people into combat” with the goal of 
“intensifying and transforming the armed struggle into a real people’s war.”124In another 
call to the people in May 1986—”From Ungovernability to People’s Power”— the ANC 
was even more explicit in its advocacy of arming the masses, calling for the formation 
of “mobile defence units.”125 
Let us intensify our armed activities at all levels. More and more 
contingents of our people must be armed. . . . We must multiply the 
formation of people’s defence militia everywhere so as to meet more 
effectively the assault by the enemy’s armed forces and the treacherous 
vigilantes and “impis” which they employ. Our People’s Army, 
strengthened by the emerging popular militia, must intensify and spread 
its armed actions across the country.126 
The Kabwe proceedings also made a decisive break with the ANC’s tradition of non-
violence and sustained commitment to avoiding bloodshed,127 resolving that the war 
should become more violent in its tactics by dissolving the prohibition on attacking “soft 
targets,” that is, civilians.128 
In a press conference on June 25, 1985, immediately following the close of the 
Kabwe conference, Oliver Tambo was questioned about the conference’s conclusions 
about what were legitimate military targets. Tambo admitted that the ANC had indeed 
relaxed the distinction between hard and soft targets, explaining simply that “the 
struggle must be intensified at all costs.”129 Justifying the move because of the 
government’s own soft-target attacks, Tambo claimed that “the distinction between 
‘soft’ and ‘hard’ is going to disappear in an intensified confrontation, in an escalating 
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conflict.”130 Furthermore, when asked specifically whether the ANC would start 
attacking white civilians rather than adhere to its old tactic of sabotage, Tambo reiterated 
the ANC’s new stance that “in the course of intensification of the struggle the distinction 
between soft and hard targets—buildings and people—will naturally disappear. . . . In 
the course of escalation, that is not going to be avoidable.”131 
However, the ANC did not reject the possibility of negotiations with the 
apartheid government. Although the Political Report of the Kabwe Conference states 
that the ANC believed the government was trying to use negotiations to divide the 
liberation movement, it also asserts that “the NEC is of the view that we cannot be seen 
to be rejecting a negotiated settlement in principle. . . . No revolutionary movement can 
be against negotiations in principle.”132 Such vagueness and ambiguity about the 
endgame of the uprisings not only allowed such a double vision to exist within the ANC, 
but more importantly, gave the ANC the strategic flexibility to react to whatever course 
the struggle ended up taking. 
In the short term, the ANC’s encouragement of all-out intensification of the 
struggle in order to put pressure on the state created some complications for the leaders 
who aimed at negotiated settlement. Thabo Mbeki, head of the ANC’s department of 
information and one of the proponents for the negotiations strategy, stated in an 
interview in 1985 that “our aim is to win whites away from apartheid . . . So, terrorist 
attacks hurt us.”133 In the end, however, the radical rhetoric served a essential purpose in 
spite of its short term consequences because it kept the ANC’s radical supporters faithful 
to the organization as it secretly began negotiations, giving the ANC the base of mass 
political support that substantiated the ANC’s claim to be the chief political player in 
future negotiations with the state. 
This development would have important implications for the Reagan 
Administration’s policy of Constructive Engagement. From the beginning, the 
administration had shown no interest in dealing with the ANC and had minimized 
contact as early as 1981 when the administration had declined to take a meeting with the 
group. In the administration’s view, the ANC was a Soviet sponsored terrorist proxy that 
“does not want a peaceful settlement . . . who want trouble in the streets and that’s 
what’s going on.”134 A year later, the U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on Security and 
Terrorism added to that sentiment, reporting: 
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The evidence received by the subcommittee is deeply disturbing. It 
suggests strongly that the original purposes of the ANC and SWAPO 
have been subverted, and that the Soviets and their allies have achieved 
alarmingly effective control over them. The demonstrated activities of 
these organisations, moreover, cannot easily be reconciled with the goal 
of liberation or the promotion of freedom. The evidence has thus served 
to illustrate once again the Soviet Union’s support for terrorism under 
the guise of aiding struggles for national liberation. It is past time to 
bring these facts to the attention of our policymakers, the American 
people, and the world at large.135 
The ANC and SWAPO had become “Soviet sponsored terrorist organizations” in the 
subcommittee’s view. While American foreign policy should be “grounded in the 
humane values of our people and of our democratic traditions,” the committee warned 
that: 
Iran should teach us that humane values are not necessarily served by the 
overthrow of conservative regimes. If we encourage upheavals without 
putting in their place a moderate democratic alternative, a foreign policy 
conducted in the name of justice and human rights, could wind up by 
making the world safe for anti-American radicalism. . . . The findings of 
the subcommittee appear particularly relevant at a time when SWAPO 
and the ANC are being touted as the sole legitimate political forces and 
representatives of the people in Namibia and South Africa, respectively. 
Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Iran are glaring and tragic reminders of 
our failure to fully comprehend and appreciate the motives, ideologies 
and interrelationships of those who sought political power under the 
guise of national liberation. These situations also serve as graphic 
examples of the terrible price which others have paid for our previous 
mistakes. 
Therefore, all diplomatic contacts with the organization were severed by the Reagan 
Administration and contacts with more moderate elements within the black community, 
including Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelez. The President meet with Buthelezi in February 
1985 and described the chief as a “very impressive man—well educated & while 
dedicated to ending apartheid in S. Africa still is well balanced & knows it will take 
time.”136Reagan believed that leaders like Buthelezi represented not just the interests of 
black South Africans, but also enjoyed popular support in the Republic. In a letter to his 
friend George Murphy, the president wrote that he had “recent figures” that showed the 
majority of black South Africans opposed punitive sanctions and “are well aware they 
would be the first to suffer and many of their leaders flatly declare that the radicals who 
do not want them, want them because of the chaos they would bring. And, of course, 
they would be ready to seize power with the help of the Red Brethren.”137 This rhetoric 
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would dovetail perfectly with the policies of the Botha Administration that refused to 
negotiate with the ANC on the grounds it was a “tool of the South African Communist 
Party” working “at the behest of a foreign power.”138 
Events in the Republic should certainly have changed how the Reagan 
Administration addressed events in South Africa. With black South Africans—many 
loyal to the ANC—prepared to risk imprisonment and death to achieve full political 
rights, it stands to reason that Constructive Engagement, which stressed process over 
specifics goals, would have to adapt to survive. However, American officials talked to 
the National Party only, relying on the Total National Strategy to produce change in 
South Africa that would reduce internal violence and provide political cover for 
Constructive Engagement. 
In short, the Reagan Administration could not achieve its goal of rolling back 
communist influence in the region by negotiating with what it considered a Soviet 
proxy. When asked if the administration believed the ANC was “antithetical to 
American interests” and needed to be rolled back in the region, Reagan official Pat 
Buchanan replied, “By then, the ANC was the predominant opposition force, and just as 
we had to deal with the VC [Vietcong] and NVA [North Vietnamese Army] in Veitnam 
[sic], no one would have believed that we could ignore the main opposition force, the 
ANC.”139When asked about Buchanan’s viewpoint on the ANC and if this represented 
President Reagan’s view, Secretary Crocker replied, “that was Pat Buchanan’s policy” 
and that American policy in southern Africa was a success “no thanks to him.”140 When 
asked if he thought majority rule, which would have inevitability resulted in the ANC 
taking power in the Republic, was antithetical to American interests, Chester Crocker 
replied, “We never believed the ANC was a terrorist movement . . . We were concerned 
about their policies, but were convinced they were worthwhile.”141 While the secretary 
may have viewed the ANC as a legitimate political force, there is considerable evidence 
that Crocker indeed viewed the organization as antithetical to American interests. This is 
most obvious when Secretary Crocker reasoned that one of the best moments for a 
“fresh opportunity” for change during this period would come only when “Pretoria had 
physically broken the back of the resistance movement” through the Total National 
Strategy.142 
According to press reports, the Reagan Administration moved beyond rhetorical 
attacks on the ANC by providing Pretoria with intelligence on “communications 
between the African National Congress headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, its guerrilla 
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training camps in Angola and its offices in Africa and Western Europe” that was 
intended to provide “specific advance information on planned bombings and disruptions 
by the congress.” One former administration official said that the intelligence gathering 
was “routine” and added “they also wanted any and all tasking related to the A.N.C., 
including the movements of Oliver Tambo. We got a list of 10 people of Tambo’s 
staff—the A.N.C. high command.” An intelligence officer serving in the Reagan 
Administration was quoted as saying “I’ve known about it for a long time, that we target 
the A.N.C. We’ve always considered them to be the bad guys, to be Soviet pawns, 
stalking horses for the Soviets.”143 
On July 23, 1986, Secretary of State Schultz acknowledged that the 
administration had “serious concerns about the ultimate objectives” of the ANC but 
denied the CIA was conducting intelligence operations aimed at the organization—a 
curious denial considering it was the National Security Agency (NSA) that was alleged 
to have undertaken those activities. CBS News reported the same day as the Schultz 
denial that it had confirmed that the National Security Agency had “spied on the African 
National Congress” during the Reagan Administration and “passed the information on to 
British intelligence.” The British, in turn, then passed the information to the “South 
African secret police.”144 Though the administration would continue to deny any 
intelligence gathering on behalf of Pretoria, when the U.S. Congress drafted sanctions 
legislation aimed at South Africa, the Reagan Administration successfully lobbied to 
have intelligence cooperation between the United States and the Republic exempted—a 
strange request if no such cooperation existed. 
4.4 State of Emergency and the Total Strategy 
As violence began to overwhelm the townships, Botha faced the certainty that 
his reform package was insufficient to overcome the “sabotage” of the black 
opposition.145 Though he had always presented the Tricameral parliament as a first step 
in his reform process, the black population’s near universal rejection of the constitution 
would now force Botha to push forward with new reforms.146 Determined to maintain 
control, the administration had to bring black leaders into the process or risk the unrest 
in the townships overwhelming the Republic’s ability to effectively govern the country. 
Botha’s new approach would consist of driving a wedge between black constituencies 
and the introduction of new security measures to improve his bargaining position when 
the black leadership was brought to the negotiating table. The Botha approach was 
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applauded by the Reagan Administration as it attempted to rollback Soviet influence in 
the region vis-à-vis the South African Total National Strategy. 
At the opening of the Tricameral parliament in January 1985, Botha announced 
that full property rights for Africans in urban areas would be legislated into existence, 
that the detested influx control would be altered to make them less cumbersome, and 
that the policy of forced removals would be reviewed.147Other legislative matters 
addressed during this period included the replacement of the hated passbooks—central 
to the enforcement of the influx control system—in April 1985 by a universal identity 
book for all South Africans. In December that same year, Minister of Constitutional 
Development and Planning, Chris Heunis, announced that qualified black South 
Africans would be eligible for freeholder rights rather than the ninety-nine year property 
leasing system. The basic constitutional dispensation, however, would continue to 
exclude blacks from direct participation at the national level and white dominance of the 
political system would continue.148 
Essential to Botha’s reforms was a rethinking of the relationship between South 
African and the homelands from that of a series of bi-lateral contacts to that of a multi-
lateral system. At the National party congress in Durban, Botha’s speech focused on the 
need for the abandonment of the “outdated” system of influx control, one of the 
cornerstones of apartheid.149 This was followed by a speech at Bloemfontein where 
Botha declared that South African citizenship would be restored to black Africans, both 
within the homelands and the Republic.150 Botha indicated that black leaders in the 
homelands would be involved in the negotiating process as long as they agreed to 
renounce “violence as a tool for change.”151 Botha would also agree that his 
administration would be committed to a single South Africa citizenship.152 Legislatively 
speaking, these speeches outlined Botha’s way forward when face with violent uprisings 
in the townships. These reforms, however, would not fundamentally change the racial 
basis of political representation in South Africa nor threaten the integrity of group 
identity. Indeed, Botha would continue to claim that the white population was not a 
minority. In an October 1985 National Party meeting Botha stated: “We are a land of 
minorities, not a land of white minorities as against a vast Black majority.” This would 
echo an earlier statement that: “There is nothing to prevent the Black peoples of South 
Africa from becoming one state. They have not formed it because they are different 
peoples with different backgrounds, different cultures, different languages, different 
ambitions, different lifestyles, different customs.”153 President Reagan would express 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
13
8 
similar sentiments, referring to the issue of “tribalism” in South Africa and claiming that 
dissolving apartheid was complicated because “we have a great division even among the 
people who are being oppressed. It is a tribal policy more than it is a racial policy, and 
that is one of the most difficult parts here.”154 
While the Prime Minister continued to address the issue of reconciliation 
throughout the early the 1980s, it was his August 1985 speech to the National Party 
Congress, dubbed the “Rubicon Speech,” that was to layout the reform agenda for the 
second half of the decade. After ridiculing those elements of South African society that 
had offered unsolicited opinions on what he should propose in his speech, Botha 
outlined the accomplishments of his reform process, including “modernizing our labor 
laws, the creation of a Development Bank for Southern Africa, as well as a Corporation 
for the Development of Small Business Activities” and a “provision for R100 million to 
provide people with work.” On the political front, the Prime Minister reminded his 
audience that “since South Africa freed itself from colonialism, democracy has already 
been broadened and millions of people who never had a say in Governmental affairs 
under the British Colonial system, have it today.”  Though Botha foresaw a place for 
black participation in the Homelands and offered the vague promise of “broadening of 
democracy,” he assured his audience that “reasonable South Africans will not accept the 
principle of one-man-one-vote in a unitary system. That would lead to domination of 
one over the other and it would lead to chaos. Consequently, I reject it as a solution.” He 
labeled the black opposition as “barbaric communist agitators and murderers” that were 
on the “payroll of their communist masters.” Even Nelson Mandela, at that point 
imprisoned for decades, was singled out as a violent, communist revolutionary and his 
past crimes against the apartheid government were recounted in detail. How this laundry 
list of grievances and reiteration of previously established government policy was a 
departure from the status quo, a “crossing of the Rubicon,” Prime Minister Botha never 
explained.155 
The Botha speech, widely anticipated as a blueprint for a move away from 
apartheid, was widely panned as a failure, both within the Republic and 
internationally.156 The Prime Minister, however, never conceded that his reform package 
had failed and in January 1985 the government moved ahead with a plan to establish a 
negotiating forum comprising the government and African leaders to debate the future 
direction of political reform.157 Seeking to draw prominent figures from the homelands 
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and black local authorities into the process, Botha declared that the National Council 
would be empowered to discuss: 
a wide range of constitutional and related matters to improve 
communication between the Government and Black communities and to 
create a more favorable basis for negotiations aimed at arriving at 
mutually acceptable development steps in the constitutional field.158 
Participants would include government officials from all three houses of 
parliament, “homeland” leaders, leaders from the urbanized African communities, and 
other African leaders outside of established structures.159 Its initial focus would be 
community concerns, but the National Council would also address the issue of creating a 
new political dispensation that would be “a starting point for power-sharing.”160 
There, however, was one persistent problem with Botha’s vision of black South 
African cooperation in his reform process—no black South African leader would 
actually participate. Even the usually reliable Chief Buthelezi, whose participation was 
essential to the success of the process, dismissed the President’s National Council 
stating: 
I would start negotiation with the State President tomorrow if he was 
serious about addressing the fundamental issues of black constitutional 
rights in our country. But if he wants to go it alone in the national 
council then he is welcome to try with whomever is prepared to sit with 
him on it.161 
His plan now totally rejected, Botha pushed ahead without input from the black 
majority. He would reaffirm his basic approach to gradual reform in September 1986, 
declaring: 
Our reform is a process of modernization. In announcing the Twelve 
Point Plan for orderly change and reform seven years ago, I then stated 
this truth. Through the adoption of the Twelve Point Plan, we undertook 
to continue with meaningful reform on a wide and balanced basis. On 
the one hand the plan was the affirmation of a framework and a point of 
departure through which the realities of our multi-cultural society would 
serve as the guidelines for reform and modernisation. On the other hand 
it was also the basis on which concrete reform steps in the fields of 
constitutional, economic and social affairs could be implemented. It was 
enunciated with due cognisance of our national security, prosperity, 
foreign relations and our national interests. Any objective observer who 
has kept a close watch on developments during the past seven years 
since the Twelve Point Plan was announced, would have to agree that 
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we are indeed succeeding in the realisation of those goals we have set 
for ourselves.162 
On the issue of one-man-one-vote, however, Botha would not compromise. To 
enter into a unitary system would amount to suicide: 
We do not want to forfeit our civilised values. We want to improve them 
and share them with others. We believe that it is ours, that it belongs to 
our children, that it belongs to South Africa. These include respect for 
property and for religious freedom. They include respect for our 
language rights and those of others; they include our culture and cultures 
of others; they include our family and the traditional way of life of 
others as families.163 
Two years later, Prime Minister Botha would reiterate this theme stating “Our policy is 
one of orderly evolutionary liberation. If we fail, a light will die that our forefathers 
helped to light in Africa.”164 
At every stage of the process, the Reagan Administration would support Botha’s 
approach to political reform—a process that would ensure that the black majority 
remained without any say in the foreign policy of the Republic. Secretary George Shultz 
would declare that the constitutional reforms were of “major importance” and that 
“blacks are acquiring a steadily expanding base of de facto leverage as consumers, 
workers, professionals and fellow South Africans” though the “time for broadened and 
overt political bargaining (except in the South African-Homeland context) has not yet 
arrived.” Shultz warned detractors of Botha’s reform process that they were “cheering 
on a . . . race war in southern Africa.”165 For his part, Chester Crocker dismissed critics 
as too focused on outcomes and described the Botha Administration as a “reformist 
government”166 that had created “many opportunities in terms of the peaceful 
organization by black South Africans for acquiring a greater stake, acquiring a better 
bargaining stance in the future.”167 When pressed on how exactly this could be 
accomplished given the lack of black representation in the government, Crocker 
commented that the black majority needed to drop their myopic demand to end apartheid 
and enter the political process without preconditions.168 
It was in the days following Botha’s disastrous “Rubicon Speech” that American 
audiences, including the U.S. Congress, waited to see if the Reagan Administration 
would finally break with the Botha Administration and support sanctions against 
Pretoria. Prime Minister Botha had nothing to fear. The Reagan Administration 
described the speech as an “important development” that “could be an important step 
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away from ‘Grand Apartheid’ under which all blacks are to be based—and have their 
political voice—in tribal homelands.”169 The State Department memo described Botha’s 
approach as “dismantling apartheid” and that “his newly stated vision of the reform 
process” signalled “a new determination to reduce racial polarization at home and to 
defuse foreign criticism.”170 Because the administration’s reaction would be “carefully 
watched both here and there . . . We cannot be overly warm” but: 
we also must see the speech in its historical context; it may be the most 
important step to date by the Afrikaners to come to terms publicly with 
South African political reality and the imperative of change. We should 
cautiously welcome the spirit in which it appears to have been issued, 
indicate that we hope the important subjects it raises are clarified and 
that a genuine reform process based on dialogue between all peoples in 
South Africa will flow from it.171 
The administration view was no doubt favourable because the Botha version of reform, 
based on representation through the Homelands, was a framework that would not 
compromise American interests in southern Africa by allowing an ANC takeover of the 
Republic. Constructive Engagement would be based, on American and South African 
“mutual interest in the Southern African region” and the goal to “roll back Soviet 
influence” in the region.172 
In an effort to win international support for South Africa’s constitutional reforms 
the Reagan Administration created a public diplomacy initiative aimed at highlighting 
the “subtler story of reform.”173 Following the line of Botha, who declared that moving 
to “one man, one vote” would create a “situation of blood and strife,”174 Ambassador 
Nichols said that the United States should avoid a path that “could fan the flames of a 
tragic holocaust” and that the administration needed to “put across” that it held the 
“moral high ground.” He added that despite “a Nobel laureate of charismatic talents who 
plays the media like a violin” the reform process “has in fact contributed more change 
than South Africa had witnessed in decades.”175 The real problem, according to a secret 
State Department memorandum, was that the Reagan Administration needed to “change 
the terms of the debate” not the policy of Constructive Engagement or the reform 
measures undertaken by the South African government.176 The administration’s 
initiative was directed at multiple constituencies, including the “right-of-center” groups 
in the United States, the U.S. Congress and the international community. The president 
would “Sound a healing note” and convey that the administration saw apartheid as a 
“profound evil” that ran counter to “the President’s personal as well as American 
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values” but also “accept that a race war would be a tragedy in human terms and in terms 
of our interests of our in stability in this important region.” Americans needed to 
understand that “racial problems are not solved overnight and cannot be solved by 
outsiders . . . 6,000+ miles away.” Congress would be warned not to “play with 
Matches” or risk the “Moral Nightmare of an Apocalyptic Scenario” where “the Soviets 
thrive.” Though the initiative would “communicate effectively with South African 
audiences,” black South Africans were to be largely ignored—except to increase ‘black 
awareness of U.S. initiatives and policies”—while other “hostile audiences” were to be 
avoided altogether.177 
On September 5, 1985, the White House created a “Special Working Group” to 
put the plan into action. In an “urgent” memorandum, National Security Advisor Robert 
McFarlane stressed the need to convey to international and domestic audiences: 
We seek to use the influence we have to end apartheid peacefully but 
rapidly, achieve peace in Namibia and in that context achieve a 
withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, end cross border violence in 
the region, and limit Soviet influence there.178 
On September 7, the White House circulated National Security Directive 187, which 
stated in part: 
The United States and its allies have important political, commercial, 
and strategic interests in South Africa. These are being threatened by 
widespread violence and increased tensions in South Africa, and 
continued Soviet challenges to our important interests in the area.179 
Despite the administration’s public diplomatic efforts that stressed the “moral” aspects 
of American policy in southern Africa, the real aim of U.S. policy continued to be to 
“reduce the prospect of revolutionary violence and the opportunities for expansion of 
Soviet influence.”180 
Within a month of being formed, the White House provided three specific 
measures to implement the diplomatic initiative: 
An initial PR effort, closely coordinated with our efforts to prevent 
Congressional adoption of unhelpful legislation, to get an explanation 
for our policy to key leadership groups and audiences. 
A medium-term program strengthen Embassy Pretoria’s ability to 
communicate effectively with audiences in South Africa through 
expanded political reporting, press and public outreach, and educational, 
human rights and economic aid to black South Africa. 
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A long-term effort to build a broader base of domestic support by 
involving key American citizens and institutions in contacts with South 
African counterparts and programs for constructive, peaceful change in 
South Africa.181 
President Reagan, members of his cabinet and the federal bureaucracy were involved 
from the start, though the State Department took the lead in implementing the plan. By 
September, 1985, Assistant Secretary Richard Armitage informed Chester Crocker that 
the effort had done “a fine job” in “crafting an immediate public diplomacy counter 
offensive.” Armitage, however, advised Crocker to the engage the State Department’s 
Soviet Active Measures Working Group to counter “Soviet Disinformation in 
Africa.”182 
 The administration followed up with their initial efforts by creating the U.S. 
Corporate Council of South Africa designed to “coordinate business efforts to resist 
divestment and promote reform” and was to work in tandem with the administration’s 
public diplomacy effort in South Africa. Vice President George H.W. Bush would be 
tasked with selling American involvement as a “process” that required U.S. involvement 
in South Africa “rather than calling for symbolic, one-time gestures, or a negative 
approach.”183 
President Reagan would take the lead in selling the American public and the 
international community on the legitimacy of Botha’s reform efforts. An examination of 
Reagan’s public comments on South Africa after the public relations initiative began 
indicate that he almost always prefaced his remarks concerning apartheid with the word 
“repugnant.” Nevertheless, the overall policy would not be altered and American 
support for Botha would remain steadfast. In a speech, the president said he did not 
anticipate any change in policy towards South Africa “because I have to look at what 
has been accomplished so far.” The president would go on to explain: 
Our relationship with South Africa, which has always over the years 
been a friendly one . . . we have made it plain, in spite of that, that 
apartheid is very repugnant to us and that they should go down the path 
of reform and bringing about a more perfect democracy in their country. 
And our present relationship has, we believe, resulted in some very 
substantial changes: the very fact that now the blacks have ability—
being in labor unions or even having their own labor unions; the fact 
they can buy property in the heretofore white areas; that they can own 
businesses in some 40 white-dominated business districts. They have 
eliminated the segregation that we once had in our own country—the 
type of thing where hotels and restaurants and places of entertainment 
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and so forth were segregated—that has all been eliminated. They 
recognize now interracial marriages and all. But we believe that for us to 
take an action now such as some are suggesting, turning our backs and 
walking away, would leave us with no persuasive power whatsoever. We 
think that if we continue we can help the present administration there, 
which is a reformist administration as evidenced by the things that I have 
just mentioned. 
Just as Botha had warned that the “war being waged against us by the South African 
Communist Party and the ANC”184 was meant to install a “dictatorship of communist 
origins,” President Reagan warned that “the Soviet Union” was “in its usual style, 
stirring up the pot and waiting in the wings for whatever advantage they can take—we’d 
be very innocent, naive, if we didn’t believe that they’re there ready to do that.”185 
In a secret memorandum to Communications Director Pat Buchanan, the 
Associate Director of the Public Liaison, Mona Charen, would urge the administration 
to change tactics in regards to South Africa. She warned that the administration was 
“bound to lose the argument on South Africa unless we make some changes . . . We’ve 
already lost the high ground. The left adores this issue.” She urged the administration to 
switch the terms of the debate and tell the American public that full political 
participation for the black majority would result in a communist state: 
We know that the choice is not between apartheid and Jeffersonian 
Democracy but between the current system and (as you eloquently put is 
[sic] last Friday) “The People’s Republic of South Africa.” We don’t 
like apartheid but we’re just afraid to be too hard on S. Africa if the 
likely outcome will be communism. Everyone will be permanently 
worse off then, with no incremental steps toward democracy such as 
Botha is currently taking. . . . Let’s say it plainly. We have nothing to be 
ashamed of. By rights, the high ground belongs to us. 
Therefore, the United States should accept apartheid as the lesser of two evils because 
the “American people understand opposition to communism. They have no idea that 
that’s what we’re worried about because we haven’t told them yet.”186 The president 
would adopt this strategy in his public remarks, explaining why an apartheid 
government was preferable to a state run by a black majority: 
In South Africa you’re talking about a country—yes, we disagree and 
find repugnant some of the practices of their government, but they’re not 
seeking to impose their government on other surrounding countries. 
Nicaragua is a totalitarian, Communist State. It is a sort of a vassal of the 
Soviet Union. And it has made plain in utterance after utterance, even 
since the Somoza revolution, that their revolution is not going to be 
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confined to their borders, that they intend to spread that revolution 
throughout Latin America.187 
Though the administration would continue to stress that the Republic needed to 
“reform energetically and without delay” and “take steps to address black 
grievances,”188 the official line was that the United States would not specifically ask for 
full enfranchisement for black South Africans. In fact, when pressed about the issue by 
congressional critics, Chester Crocker responded that the “administration would not 
impose ourselves, our favorites, our solutions” on the Republic.189 This must have come 
as a great relief to the Botha Administration that had announced to the world that “A 
system of one man, one vote in a unitary state in the Republic of South Africa simply 
will not work”190 
For the Botha and Reagan administrations, it would be necessary and proper to 
foster and empower “responsible black leaders” like Zulu Chief Chief M. Buthelezi.191 
The administration, however, must have been greatly disappointed when Chief 
Buthelezi referred to Botha’s national council as “a castration chamber” where only 
“political eunuchs will want to go.”192 Despite these setbacks, the administration ignored 
its detractors and challenged groups that would not participate to “review what 
contribution . . . each could make to create a climate conducive to the beginning of 
negotiations.”193 Though Secretary Schultz believed that ANC involvement in the 
process was possible and represented the choice between “Armageddon and serious 
relevance to change in South Africa,” President Reagan would soon make it abundantly 
clear that he agreed entirely with the Botha Administration and saw no reason to include 
the banned organization. 
By 1986, Botha’s national council had failed to bring in any “responsible” black 
leaders and critics of Constructive Engagement were pressing the administration to 
justify continued American support for the apartheid regime. According to Secretary 
Crocker, the administration’s support was “not a question of whether to ‘help Botha,’ 
but of how best to help ourselves.”194 It would be necessary to make “policy 
adjustments” or risk “serving up our strategy as an entree to the carnivores of 
Washington.”195 
The situation was further complicated by a South African request for an 
invitation of P.W. Botha to the United States. As President Reagan would nonchalantly 
acknowledge in his diaries, “having him here will present some touchy problems.”196 To 
explore the possibility, Crocker meet with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha—
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who had just recently been “publicly slapped down by P.W. Botha” for suggesting there 
might come a time when a black South African could be president—to address 
American concerns over the reform process and the request for a presidential invitation. 
Citing the “power of the white right and the SAG’s own legalistic knots as brakes on 
more rapid change,” the foreign minister told Chester Crocker that the Botha 
Administration was not willing to lift of the state of emergency or accelerate the reform 
process. Pik Botha “bluntly” told Crocker that “I cannot give you the clarity you think 
you need for such a meeting to take place . . . We simply cannot meet your price.”197 
Though Crocker told Botha that the Reagan Administration was not interested in “trying 
to sell our public the same rusty Studebaker,” he understood the “continuing stress 
within the governing party over the tactics and timing of reform.”198 
It was also during this period that South Africa stepped up attacks on the FLS. 
While President Reagan had “sympathy & understanding for the complexity of South 
Africa’s problem,” he believed there was no “justification for acts of this kind” and 
withdrew Ambassador Herman Nickel.199 With “South Africa’s recent aggressive 
regional policies” creating an “impasse in the Namibian peace process,” a debate over 
the effectiveness of Constructive Engagement began within the Reagan Administration. 
In a secret NSC memorandum, Phillip Ringdhal wroteRobert McFarlane: 
There is also a perception by Chet Crocker, fed mainly by media reports 
and outside conservatives “close to the White House” that Constructive 
Engagement is no longer a viable policy and needs to be changed, and 
that the White House is therefore distancing itself from the policy . . . 
There has been much debate within at State since Nickel’s return 
regarding suggested policy changes in light of recent developments, but 
Crocker has not accepted any suggestions—at least not yet. He would 
maintain that Nickel was recalled to review the situation, not the policy, 
to review the implications of recent South African actions, and to decide 
whether South Africa is still prepared to work toward peaceful 
settlement in the region . . . The key policy question for us is whether the 
parties themselves want to pursue a settlement at this time. Recent South 
Africa paramilitary actions, its establishment of the MPC government in 
Namibia, its recent attitudes toward the U.S., and Angola’s near paranoia 
suggest otherwise. [Redacted Section] Another question is whether we 
should continue to commit our diplomatic prestige where the key 
player—South Africa—appears to be immune to any U.S. influence or 
suggestions which rub against its policy aims.200 
With the “problem of U.S. diplomatic fallout to South Africa’s actions, and the 
appropriate U.S. visibility” in mind, Secretary Crocker’s office was tasked with creating 
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a limited sanctions package aimed at pre-empting U.S. Congressional action and 
increasing funding for “assistance programs for black South Africans and for the 
regional Front Line State economies.” They would also develop “ideas for raising the 
profile of our dialogue with ANC leaders” though Crocker wanted the South Africans to 
understand that “talking with someone does not mean that you approve of them or agree 
with them.”201 President Reagan also informed Secretary of State Schultz that the 
administration “should offer a plan to Pres. Botha that could offer something other than 
just turning the 5 mil. Whites over to a govt. by 26 mil. Blacks.”202 
The task of writing the President’s speech on American policy In South Africa 
was handed to Pat Buchanan, who stressed that Reagan should avoid “weakness” and 
should unapologetically support the Botha regime.203 Chester Crocker was distressed to 
discover that Buchanan, a frequent critic of the “Boer bashers”204 at the State 
Department, had been brought into the process and described the first draft of his speech 
as a: 
[S]tridently polarizing message. It would give no U.S. Senator part from 
Jesse Helms and a few associates any ground to stand on. A presidential 
veto of economic sanctions was threatened up front. There were two or 
three lines about Pretoria’s official violence and nearly a page about 
ANC terrorism and the “necklacing” of blacks by township comrades. 
South Africa was compared favorably to the rest of Africa, and our 
interests in the region reduced essentially to an anti-Communist 
manifesto. The real bottom line was to keep South Africa’s minerals and 
ports out of Soviet hands! There was no diplomatic game plan, no effort 
to reposition ourselves in the debate, no call for contact and negotiation 
with the ANC, no regional assistance program in the Front Line States, 
and no real call to action or threat of action. This draft was unequivocal; 
it was pro-Pretoria.205 
While the final draft of the speech was being hammered out, the CIA circulated a 
“special estimate” on the ANC “to discredit the concept of higher-level American 
contacts with the ANC and to undermine the argument for pressing Pretoria to unban 
and negotiate with it.” As President Reagan went to the media to talk about the 
importance of South African minerals, he cynically reminded American women that 
sanctions would mean they had to “give up all their jewelry.”206 Simultaneously, the 
South African ambassador, Herbert Beukes, was being reassured by the administration 
that “Pretoria need not worry.”207 
On July 22, 1986, President Reagan stepped to the podium in the East Room of 
the White House and gave his speech to the World Affairs Council and Foreign Policy 
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Association. The president acknowledged that apartheid was “morally wrong and 
politically unacceptable,” but he opposed additional sanctions against Pretoria on the 
premise that it would primarily harm black Africans—an argument that Reagan officials 
acknowledged before the speech was “garbage.”208Rather than abolish all apartheid 
laws, the president would ask the South Africans to eliminate “apartheid laws.” He also 
referred to the “calculated terror by elements of the African National Congress,” which 
he tagged as “Soviet-armed guerrillas.” The ANC’s campaign involved: 
the mining of roads, the bombings of public places, designed to bring 
about further repression--the imposition of martial law and eventually 
creating the conditions for racial war. 
The most common method of terror is the so-called necklace. In this 
barbaric way of reprisal, a tire is filled with kerosene or gasoline, placed 
around the neck of an alleged “collaborator,’ and ignited. The victim 
may be a black policeman, a teacher, a soldier, a civil servant. It makes 
no difference. The atrocity is designed to terrorize blacks into ending all 
racial cooperation and to polarize South Africa as prelude to a final, 
climactic struggle for power. 
In defending their society and people, the South African Government 
has a right and responsibility to maintain order in the face of terrorists. 
Given the ANC’s use of violence and ties to the Soviet Union, he declared that “the 
South African Government is under no obligation to negotiate the future of the country 
with an organization that proclaims a goal of creating a communist state and uses 
terrorist tactics and violence to achieve it.”209 If the apartheid regime were replaced by 
the ANC, “the Soviet Union will be the main beneficiary. And the critical ocean corridor 
of South Africa and the strategic minerals of the region would be at risk. Thus, it would 
be a historic act of folly for the United States and the West—out of anguish and 
frustration and anger—to write off South Africa.” 
President Reagan said that Americans needed to see beyond the images of the 
“terrorism, violence, and repression” and see the larger picture of “dramatic change” in 
the Republic: 
Black workers have been permitted to unionize, bargain collectively, and 
build the strongest free trade union movement in all of Africa. The 
infamous pass laws have been ended, as have many of the laws denying 
blacks the right to live, work, and own property in South Africa’s cities. 
Citizenship, wrongly stripped away, has been restored to nearly 6 
million blacks. Segregation in universities and public facilities is being 
set aside. Social apartheid laws prohibiting interracial sex and marriage 
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have been struck down. It is because State President Botha has presided 
over these reforms that extremists have denounced him as a traitor.210 
While Chester Crocker claimed that the Reagan speech was “daylight robbery” 
committed by ultra-conservative elements within the administration hoping to hijack his 
policy in southern Africa, the speech did not represent a watershed for Constructive 
Engagement. President Reagan was publicly articulating what had been established 
policy for six years and reflected in official, though often classified, documents of the 
U.S. government. When asked by the author if the speech accurately reflected the 
president’s views, Pat Buchanan, though conceding he no longer remembered the 
specifics, replied, “I did write the Reagan speech after a clash with Schultz and State 
and . . .  those speech views reflected the president’s real views.”211 When asked if the 
speech correctly represented President Reagan’s views concerning the ANC, as Pat 
Buchanan indicated, Chester Crocker was effusive in his praise of the president but said 
Reagan often had “strong views—views not carefully vetted or researched” and that 
those opinions were “were put in front of him by other advisors.”212 He said this type of 
incongruity in “political and diplomatic” message was typical when “tensions in the 
White House” arise when trying to communicate to “four or five constituencies.” 
Crocker said he was not interested in engaging in a “pissing contest with Pat Buchanan” 
and simply added that “Casey and Buchanan had done what they thought they 
should.”213 
It was, however, not just the ideological right-wing Reagan officials that 
emphasized the danger of the ANC. Chester Crocker warned that the U.S. did not “want 
to destabilize South Africa or jeopardize our own strategic and economic interests” by 
allowing communist proxies to take over the country.214 By the mid 1980s, Crocker was 
still identifying the ANC as close allies of the Soviets215 and continued to negotiate only 
with the Botha Administration. Even after Reagan’s speech in 1986, Crocker’s own 
State Department stated in a secret memorandum written in May 1987 that it should be 
the goal of the U.S.to avoid and prevent “a scenario in South Africa of revolutionary 
violence and expanded influence” of the Soviet Union and broaden “participation in and 
acceptance” of “a strong market-based economic system in South Africa.”216 A State 
Department briefing paper revealed how this objective would be accomplished: 
While encouraging peaceful evolution from the apartheid system, we 
must assure that the communist-led violent opposition groups are unable 
to bring a hostile, anti-western repressive dictatorship to power in the 
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name of equal rights for all. The U.S. should identify and enhance the 
standing of moderate and peaceful anti-apartheid groups like Inkatha, 
and end the legitimization of terrorist, pro-Soviet groups such as the 
ANC and the Azanian People’s organization.217 
While the Reagan Administration was providing support for Botha’s reform 
process—a process that would ensure the ANC was excluded from power sharing—the 
Republic faced uprisings in the townships that threatened to make the country 
ungovernable. The South African government initially responded to the conflagration by 
declaring a partial state of emergency in July 1985, giving the police sweeping powers 
to suppress the protests and to place stringent restrictions on political gatherings. 
Speaking to the South African people, Prime Minister Botha declared on July 21, 1985: 
Every responsible South African has, with growing concern, taken note 
of conditions of violence and lawlessness which, in recent times, have 
increased and have become more cruel and more severe in certain parts 
of the country, especially in the black townships. These acts of violence 
and thuggery are mainly directed at the property and persons of law-
abiding black people, and take the form of incitement, intimidation, 
arson, inhuman forms of assault, and even murder. This state of affairs 
can no longer be tolerated. Thus far, the government has shown the 
utmost patience. However, I cannot ignore the insistence of all 
responsible South Africans, especially of the majority of the black 
communities, who ask that conditions are normalised and that they are 
granted the full protection of the law to continue their normal way of 
life. It is the duty of the government to ensure that a normal community 
life is re-established and that community services are efficiently 
rendered. Children must be able to receive tuition. Breadwinners must be 
able to fulfill their daily task. The life and property of all people must be 
protected, and law and order must be maintained. In view of the 
prevailing conditions, it is essential that the situation be normalised in 
such a way that the climate for continued dialogue in the interest of all 
people in the constitutional, economic, and social fields in ensured. 
Against this background, the government has . . . decided to proclaim a 
state of emergency.218 
Security forces were deployed in thirty-six magisterial districts to suppress the protests, 
and in the ensuing violence, thousands of protesters were killed or arrested.219 With 
public gatherings banned, the funerals of those killed in the protests became the primary 
venue for disseminating political information to tens of thousands of mourners who 
turned out to hear the eulogies. 
For the first eleven months of the uprisings the South African government 
allowed the press to show television images of the deteriorating situation. As a result, 
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the international community witnessed an uncensored view of the government 
crackdown that gave a significant boost to the sanctions campaign. By November 1985, 
Botha had seen his reform agenda sufficiently damaged by the international press 
coverage. Later that year, Botha decided to rectify that mistake and banned the media 
from recording or printing about incidents of unrest in South Africa.220 
Given the methods employed by the government, Botha was wise to banish the 
media from the townships. During the state of emergency, the use of brutality was to 
become a common practice for members of the South African police. In one incident, 19 
mourners attending a funeral procession in the Uitenhage area were killed by security 
forces. The violence extended beyond simple misconduct by police. The abduction and 
murder of activists was also used by the apartheid government, with assassination 
squads working with the consent of the State Security Council. In particular, Botha 
favoured, though subsequently denied for the remainder of his life, the development of 
advanced weapons and covert operations that would give South Africa additional 
advantages against its adversaries. South Africa initiated a series of internal and external 
military and paramilitary operations. These included assassinations, torture, and 
smuggling as well as forgery, propaganda, and subversion. All were defined as 
“legitimate” weapons against the “total onslaught” of “red” and “black” forces. These 
practices were established at the top and legitimized brutal tactics throughout the 
military, police, and intelligence services.221 
Among the more ambitious programs created within the framework of the Total 
National Strategy was Project Coast. The program was tasked with creating chemical 
and biological weapons (CBW) that could not only counter those of the Soviets but also 
be used against domestic enemies of the apartheid government. The program was 
nominally under the supervision of Surgeon General, Major General Nieuwoudt, though 
it was largely to be directed by Wouter Basson, a young SADF cardiologist and one-
time personal physician of P. W. Botha. Project Coast was eventually brought under the 
umbrella of activities directed by the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB). The CCB was 
created in 1986 and drew on the tactics and experiences of the Selous Scouts, a Special 
Forces regiment of the Rhodesian Army tasked with liquidating opponents of the 
government both within and outside the country. The CCB would serve as the 
foundation of an alleged “third force” that would combine the military capacity of the 
SADF and the police functions of the SAP in keeping black South Africans from taking 
control of the country. 
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Though its explicit aim was neutralizing any Soviet launched CBW attack, it 
appears that, from the start, Project Coast was aimed primarily at domestic foes of the 
government.222 The CCB used a variety of techniques, including assassination and 
biological warfare. Domestic opponents in Dukuduku in KwaZulu-Natal were the first 
to fall victim to the regime’s CBW program. It is reported that, in November 1983, 
Basson instructed South African agents “to tie their intended victims to trees and smear 
a jell-like ointment on their bodies. When that failed to kill them, they were allegedly 
injected with an anaesthetic drug and then a muscle relaxant. After they had died, their 
bodies were thrown into the sea.” Dr. Basson was also accused of supplying poisoned 
tea and fruit that was used to murder Special Forces member Lance Corporal Victor de 
Fonseca, who was believed to be leaking details of South Africa’s clandestine operations 
in southern Africa.223 
The use of lethal toxins was not nearly as ambitious as the fertility research 
undertaken by scientists with Project Coast. In an interview with the BBC, Daan 
Goosen, the managing director of Roodeplaat Research Laboratories between 1983 and 
1986, verified that Project Coast’s researchers were tasked with developing agents to 
cause sterility in black South Africans.224 Initial attempts to introduce these agents 
secretly via topical lotions was deemed unworkable, and according to testimony given at 
the TRC, the scientists turned their attention to creating a delivery system that could be 
introduced via the water supply.225 The scientists were told that this project, aimed at 
altering the racial demographics of the Republic, was the most important research they 
would undertake in their careers with Project Coast.226 
The urgency felt by the apartheid government would only accelerate with the 
onset of violence in the Vaal Triangle, which would spread throughout the country 
within months. Project Coast figured prominently in the Total National Strategy’s 
attempt to bring the unrest under control. According to SADF General Meiring: 
SADF Chief of Staff, General ConstandViljoen, as well as Generals 
Liebenberg and Meiring, were seeking an offensive CBW substance that 
would weaken and incapacitate rioters and was less irritating than tear gas. 
They consulted Basson and Project Coast. Also, the SADF sought a 
chemical that would color the skin for about two weeks and allow the 
identification of frontrunners in the violence. 
In response to General Viljoen, Delta G Scientific developed a “New 
Generation Tear (NGT) Gas,” also known as CR gas. The NGT gas was 
designed to be more powerful than conventional CS tear gas and to 
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incapacitate without lethality or excessive irritation. NGT (CR) gas was 
intended to counteract rolling mass actions led by the ANC or its 
surrogates. According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, NGT (CR) gas was used 
rarely and only on the Chief of the Army’s say-so. When NGT (CR) gas 
was used, it was usually mixed with CS gas and solved in water to be used 
by water cannon. . . . General Liebenberg revealed that chemical agents 
were being developed to make people passive and to render equipment 
unusable. Gen. LotharNeethling, South African Police forensics 
commander, ordered the development of tear gas, gas grenades, and 
tranquilizing drugs for use in pacifying rioters. Neethling was also an expert 
in use of CBW for assassination and worked closely with Basson, who 
supplied poisons to get rid of individual opponents of the regime.227 
In addition to research into nonlethal gases and irritants, researchers attempted to 
create a biological agent that could kill or incapacitate blacks Africans. This “black 
bomb” would be deployed in the event of an uprising over the area where the 
insurrection was taking place.228 
Despite the South African strategies to undercut the protests, incidents of unrest 
actually increased more than twofold over the first four months of 1985, from 
approximately 1,000 on the eve of the imposition of emergency to almost 3,000 during 
September-October. As the government contained the insurrection in the emergency 
districts, activists fled those areas, spreading the rebellion outside to districts previously 
unaffected. Realizing that the uprisings were widening, in October, Botha lifted the state 
of emergency on six of the magisterial districts previously covered, only to extend it to 
an additional eight districts the next day. Finally, after 229 days, Botha lifted the state of 
emergency entirely.229 
Notwithstanding Botha’s assertion to the contrary, the state of emergency had 
not achieved its objectives; the townships were still in turmoil, the ANC was resuming 
its revolutionary activities, and the Republic faced a crisis of epic proportions. Using a 
counter-revolutionary strategy formulated at the highest levels of government, the state 
of emergency was re-imposed on June 12, 1986. In contrast to the earlier state of 
emergency, the measure broadened the definition of domestic subversion to include 
virtually every anti-apartheid group.230 The emergency led to the arrest and detention of 
over 20,000 people of all races and ages. Major UDF and trade union leaders were 
arrested and charged with treason. Furthermore, Pretoria imposed strict media 
regulations on both the domestic and foreign press, banning coverage of the unrest in the 
black townships. Domestic journals such as the New Nation and the Weekly Mail were 
either permanently or temporarily closed. 
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Although the unrest had slackened by May 1987, it surged again in 1988, 
claiming the lives of 883 more people. By February 1989, 52,000 South Africans had 
been arrested under the state of emergency and over 4000 had died.231Worse, the unrest 
began to pit black South Africans against each other. Violence among rival and-
apartheid groups reached shocking new levels, especially in the area of 
Pietermaritzburg: 
Killing has become such a norm . . . Death has become so common that 
people scan newspapers for violent stories like punters gunning for a tip. 
. . . Even at the worse in Soweto, bursts of firing would be guaranteed to 
make people rush to lock doors and close curtains, but here people just 
shiver and tense up and go on with what they were doing, as if very 
fatalistic.232 
The imprint of such violence on South Africa’s youth added to the horror of the 
situation. A psychiatrist who examined ex-South African detainees claimed that the 
youth of South Africa had begun to fantasize about violence as a symbol of their 
desperation.233 
Even the ANC threatened to exacerbate South Africa’s volatile domestic order. 
ANC guerrilla activity emphasized increased sabotage activity, including targets in 
white areas. After several undisciplined guerrilla attacks that killed civilians in 
supermarkets, fast-food restaurants, and a sports stadium, the ANC publicly repudiated 
its policy of striking civilian targets.234 More importantly, in 1988, the ANC released its 
constitution for a post-apartheid South Africa that called for a multiparty democracy in a 
multiracial state. By doing so, the ANC acquired the status of a potential government in 
exile.235 
4.5 Regional Cooperation—A Constellation of States 
The Total National Strategy also gave a new direction to Pretoria’s foreign 
policy. The primary objectives of the Total Strategy were (1) to ensure that 
neighbouring states would refrain from actively supporting the armed liberation 
struggles led by the African National Congress in South Africa, (2) to force those states 
to prohibit political activity by South African expatriates residing in their territory, and 
(3) to accept South Africa’s leadership in the region. Once Pretoria imposed its will on 
surrounding states, by persuasion or by force, its neighbours would have to 
acknowledge South Africa as the de facto regional hegemon.236 
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Using the incentive of what he termed “formative action,” P. W. Botha sought 
to create a network of dependencies that would coerce neighbouring countries into 
cooperating with Pretoria and convince them to abandon their “Marxist onslaught.”237 
Against those countries that would not cooperate, destabilization and overt military 
action would be used. Botha likened this strategy to a “southern Africa Monroe 
Doctrine,” with South Africa assuming “special responsibilities” in the region.238 
As the first step of the Total Strategy’s foreign policy component, South 
African regional policy was pursued through the idea of the Constellation of Southern 
African States (CONSAS). Recognizing that apartheid was a barrier to normal 
diplomatic relations with neighbouring states, Pretoria raised the spectre of communist 
subversion in order to generate a counter-strategy. It was argued that all the states in the 
region faced a common “Marxist” enemy and that a unified front would be required to 
combat this threat. As General Magnus Malan stated, “No self-respecting country that 
had the welfare and security of its people at heart” would allow “Marxist organizations 
to jeopardize its future.”239 Pretoria proposed “regional solutions” to this allegedly 
“regional problem,” which essentially boiled down to the creation of a regional political 
and economic alliance, centred on South Africa. This alliance was to be accomplished 
in part by the promotion of collaborative economic projects and development assistance 
that touted the superiority of South African capitalism over socialist alternatives. 
Additionally, regional states were to be coerced into “non-aggression pacts” with 
Pretoria, the first step toward forging the basis for what Foreign Minister Pik Botha 
termed a “common approach in the security field, the economic field, and even the 
political field.”240 Such a confederation of southern African forces would include the 
“independent” Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Namibia, Rhodesia, and possibly 
BLS and other states in the region.241 
The constellation accorded with the overall emphasis of the Total Strategy. By 
proposing a constellation, Botha hoped to reorder the political landscape of the 
subcontinent to deny the ANC a base of operations. At the Carlton Conference in 1979, 
where Botha formally outlined the constellation idea to the South African business 
elite, he declared: 
Nothing can overcome us if we employ our assets of technological 
expertise, resources and, above all, our human material, in an orderly 
manner and in the interests of this southern land, if we stand united and 
accept joint responsibility for our region, and if we create institutions 
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that will abolish any fear of domination by one over another. Then we 
need have no fear of the future.242 
Specifically, the constellation of states would offer South Africa significant benefits in 
the political, economic, and security realms, all of them vital to the success of the Total 
Strategy. 
Botha also hoped that a successful constellation would render South Africa’s 
domestic policies acceptable to the international community. By including the 
“independent” homelands in the constellation framework, he hoped to achieve implicit 
acceptance of its policy of separate development. Recognition by some African states 
of the homelands would pave the way for diplomatic recognition by the West and other 
nations. Thus, South Africa would achieve what it had sought for thirty years—
international legitimacy for the doctrine of separate development.243 Moreover, a 
constellation would benefit the South African economy. Further economic cooperation 
and integration would bring the requisite stability for the profitable trade and 
investment carried on between South and southern Africa. Likewise, closer economic 
integration with the region would offer South African manufacturers a larger market for 
their exports, thereby stimulating increased industrial production for the stagnant South 
African economy. 
Finally, and most importantly, the type of regional economic cooperation 
envisaged by a constellation was believed essential in improving Pretoria’s security 
environment. In particular, Pretoria could leverage strengthened economic links to its 
security advantage and reduce the threat posed by hostile border-states. By delaying the 
delivery of regional commodities or by providing efficient services on lenient terms of 
credit, Pretoria could leverage its neighbours to moderate their anti-apartheid rhetoric 
and curtail operation of anti-South African forces within their territories.244 Thus, the 
accessibility of groups like the ANC to South African territory would diminish, vastly 
improving the security situation for South Africa. 
Furthermore, South Africa believed that a constellation of states constituted a 
basis for rapprochement with the West. By promoting stability through regional 
economic integration, a constellation appeared as an attractive method to solicit 
Western support. In the late 1970s, for instance, a successful constellation scheme 
might have benefited South Africa’s bargaining position with the West in the stalled 
Namibia talks. At the Carlton Conference, Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, then-chairman of 
Anglo, reiterated the importance of positively influencing South Africa’s relations with 
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the West through the constellation: “I hope, and I believe, that the government’s policy 
in regard to this constellation is being developed in the context of an effort to mend our 
fences with the countries who used to be our friends and who I still believe are.”245 
Thus, in terms of improving the security of South Africa, Pretoria hoped that a 
constellation would both undermine regional support for the ANC and enhance South 
Africa’s status with the West. This approach was endorsed by the Reagan 
Administration that wanted South Africa’s “regional dominance to acquire a legitimate 
form.”246 
The success of CONSAS largely depended on Zimbabwe’s achieving 
independence under the pro-South African “internal settlement” government of Bishop 
Abel Muzorewa. Zimbabwe could then join CONSAS—obliging Zambia, Zaire, and 
probably Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, which were already linked to South 
Africa in the Southern African Customs Union—to do the same. South Africa 
disavowed U.N. Resolution 435, which would have provided for an independent 
Namibia, with U.N.-supervised elections and a U.N. peacekeeping force, and 
concentrated on creating its own “internal settlement” under the Democratic Turnhalle 
Alliance (DTA). However, the victory of Robert Mugabe in the 1980 Zimbabwean 
elections, followed quickly by the formation by nine regional states of the Southern 
African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), which was designed to 
reduce economic dependence on South Africa, represented a clear defeat for CONSAS. 
By 1981, the idea of a constellation of states had completely unravelled. South 
and southern Africa did not share the common philosophical ground necessary for such 
an association of states.247 Predictably, the leaders of the prospective member states 
overtly vetoed any formal link with South Africa. President Kaunda of Zambia called it 
“an evil plan which envisages tying us to the apron of South Africa,” and Lesotho’s 
Prime Minister Jonathan said that he “feared even the intrinsically sound idea of an 
economic association of Southern African states mooted by South Africa, because of its 
apartheid undertones.”248 
The most obvious objection of the southern African states to a constellation 
with South Africa was the way it implied approval of South Africa’s domestic policies, 
by belonging to a constellation that included the “independent” homelands. Under no 
circumstances would any black African state, no matter how conservative, join in an 
association that included the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, or Ciskei. For them, 
membership in a constellation meant accepting separate development under another 
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name.249 Thus, a formal constellation of southern African states was bound to fail, for 
its political goals clashed fundamentally with notions of a black African state.250 Thus, 
one of the primary components of the Total Strategy implemented in the late 1970s to 
early1980s yielded no positive results for Pretoria. 
4.6 The End of the Decade, the Advent of Destabilization 
The collapse of the constellation of states represented only one of the many 
security challenges that South Africa faced at the beginning of the 1980s. The region 
committed itself to economic independence from South Africa; Rhodesia became 
Zimbabwe; SWAPO infiltration in Namibia escalated; and sophisticated ANC sabotage 
caught white South Africa off guard. For Prime Minister Botha, past efforts at regional 
cooperation were seen as insufficient to stem the “total onslaught.” A new and drastic 
policy was necessary. 
First, the rejection of economic cooperation with South Africa coincided with 
the establishment of the SADCC. With the overarching goal of reducing South African 
regional hegemony, SADCC incorporated the black-ruled states of southern Africa, 
including the most conservative, into an anti-South Africa economic unit.251 Overtly 
rejecting economic links with Pretoria, SADCC represented a threat to Pretoria. In 
particular, the possibility of SADCC states providing each other with the goods and 
services currently obtained from South Africa, especially those on which South African 
businesses depended, had the potential to harm the South African economy.252 
Second, the domestic upsurge of guerrilla acts in Namibia did not bode well for 
South Africa.253 From Angola, SWAPO guerrillas had infiltrated Namibia and 
proceeded to attack power lines, vehicles, and farms—acts that rendered armed 
convoys necessary to move traffic in northern Namibia. More significantly, a May 1980 
SWAPO mortar attack destroyed military aircraft at a South African Air Force base in 
Namibia. Likewise, SWAPO demonstrated improvement in its weapons and training. 
Third, the independence of a radical, Marxist-inspired Zimbabwe ended 
Pretoria’s hopes that a client state would emerge north of the Limpopo. For South 
Africa, the optimal outcome of Rhodesian independence would have been the election 
of the moderate black, Bishop Muzorewa. After the Lancaster House Agreement, which 
brought independence to Rhodesia in December 1979, South Africa supported the 
Muzorewa campaign both politically and financially. For instance, Pretoria provided 
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Muzorewa with 400 motor vehicles for his campaign and, through Anglo, gave him $5 
million (US).254 
The overwhelming victory of Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National 
Union (ZANU), capturing 57 of the 80 contested seats in Parliament, caught South 
Africa totally by surprise. With Mugabe came unwavering support for SWAPO, the 
ANC, and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Moreover, Zimbabwe became a member 
of SADCC and the Front Line States, both of which were committed to the end of 
apartheid in South Africa. Not surprisingly, fear and anxiety swept the Republic with 
Zimbabwe’s independence. Pretoria was convinced that the Soviet Union had 
committed Zimbabwe to play a role in the “onslaught” against South Africa.255 
Similarly, seventy percent of white South Africans surveyed agreed that the 
government of Zimbabwe constituted a central threat to South Africa’s safety.256 
Domestically, the independence of Zimbabwe gave new strength to local 
resistance. Black South Africans overwhelmingly supported Mugabe. His reputation as 
a freedom fighter and a promoter of black interests endeared him to South Africans 
struggling for majority rule. The findings of opinion surveys in KwaZulu/Natal 
concluded that Zimbabwe’s independence suggested “to black South Africans that there 
is a possibility of a violent overthrow of the government, provided that the 
neighbouring African countries were to lend support to insurgency.”257 
Finally, the upsurge of ANC sabotage within South Africa eroded the 
confidence of the white electorate in the government’s ability to protect South African 
national security. By 1980, the ANC had permission to maintain a sizeable number of 
personnel throughout southern Africa. Operating from neighbouring states, ANC 
actions inside South Africa increased dramatically, from nineteen in 1980 to fifty-five 
in 1981. Sophisticated sabotage of the Sasol plant near Johannesburg and the Koeberg 
nuclear complex underscored the threat posed by the ANC. 
Thus, despite the strides South Africa had made developing itself and its 
military capability, whites were less certain than ever of their control over the 
country.258 In its initial phase, the Total National Strategy, based on militarization and 
economic integration, had done little to improve the poor security environment that 
South Africa faced in 1977. In fact, the situation had worsened appreciably. The 
militarization of South Africa seemed misguided within the cooperative framework of a 
constellation of southern African states. Both to achieve the goals of Total Strategy and 
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to reduce the threat of the “total onslaught,” Pretoria decided to reorient its relations 
with southern Africa by militarily and economically dominating its neighbours. 
This regional component would be the key to linking Constructive Engagement 
to the Total National Strategy.259 As the leader in the struggle against the Soviet Union, 
Reagan defined most events in international politics in terms of the East-West conflict. 
Southern Africa was no exception. Thus, for the Reagan Administration, southern Africa 
was an area in which the activity of the Soviet Union threatened vital strategic and 
economic interests of the United States.260 For that reason, Reagan sought to back South 
Africa as an anticommunist bulwark: “The enemy is not racism, it is Communism.”261 
Understandably, this attitude was perfectly understood by Pretoria. As the protector of 
the West’s interests in southern Africa, Pretoria could justify destabilization as an 
anticommunist crusade.262 In return, Constructive Engagement could achieve its major 
goal of reducing Soviet influence in the region using the power of the SADF. 
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CHAPTER V 
5.1 The Total National Strategy and Regional Hegemony 
As detailed in Chapter 4, by the end of the 1970s, the Republic of South Africa 
had failed to achieve its objectives in southern Africa. Volster’s attempt at détente had 
not seen any real results, and the constellation of states had been rejected by the 
country’s neighbours. The Republic was also the last white-ruled country on the 
continent, and demographics within South Africa indicated a rapidly growing black 
population that would be increasingly difficult to dominate. Consequently, the National 
Party needed a potent means of confronting the threats to the apartheid state without 
damaging its considerable interests in southern Africa. Thus, South Africa resorted to 
military and economic destabilization to force its neighbours to accept its plan for 
regional integration, which Pretoria had until that time expected the region to embrace 
voluntarily.1 
Since 1978, the destabilization of its neighbours had become one of the most 
frequently employed tactics used by the South African leadership. It was in 1981, 
however, that this program was fully implemented. The goals of destabilization were 
simple: to reduce the ANC threat and solidify the region’s dependence on South 
Africa.2 In this manner, Pretoria hoped to achieve the regional security that had eluded 
South Africa since the 1974 Portuguese coup. Where détente and the constellation had 
failed, the 1980-1984 destabilization campaign would partially succeed. By 1984, 
South Africa had pushed back the ANC to Zambia, and Mozambique and Swaziland 
had signed treaties of nonaggression and economic cooperation. Although South Africa 
certainly suffered major setbacks in this period, especially in its war with Angola and in 
the upsurge of domestic protest, destabilization appeared to offer South Africa 
substantial security benefits. 
The program of destabilization would not be without risks. The promotion of 
instability and dislocation through a destabilization campaign threatened to spill over 
into South Africa. While South Africa could sponsor unrest in certain southern African 
states, it did not have the power to ensure that this process remained under Pretoria’s 
guidance. As one contemporary noted, “Destabilisation is not control. South Africa can 
throw its weight about the subcontinent; but it cannot rule it. Its achievement will be 
anarchy.”3 
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Yet South Africa chose to destabilize its neighbours, in large measure because 
circumstances at the beginning of the 1980s seemed to intimate an opening for 
aggressive military action. Regionally, South Africa felt confident that it could take 
advantage of dissident movements within southern Africa to further its destabilization 
campaign. In Angola, UNITA continued to represent a credible insurgency group 
through which Pretoria could wage war on both SWAPO and the MPLA. Similarly, 
with the onset of Zimbabwean independence, South Africa took control of the 
Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) from Rhodesian intelligence. In the 
RENAMO, Pretoria nurtured a willing instrument of destabilization. In addition, 
Pretoria found that it could capitalize on dissent in Lesotho through the Lesotho 
Liberation Army (LLA). Likewise, tensions in Zimbabwe between ZANU and ZAPU 
guerrillas were easily exploitable. 
Ultimately, the cost of these military and economic actions was staggering. 
SADCC estimated the costs of South African destabilization from 1980-1985 at over 
$10 billion. This figure exceeded the total foreign grants and loans to the region, 40% 
of the region’s exports revenue, and 10% of the GDP for this five-year period.4 
5.1.1  Angola 
The primary target for Pretoria’s campaign of violence would be Angola. South 
Africa’s motives for destabilizing Angola were obvious. Since its independence, 
Angola represented a direct security and conventional threat to South Africa. As a 
Marxist, Soviet-backed African state, Angola had been a major source of support and 
sanctuary for the ANC and SWAPO. In addition, the Soviet Union spent over $500 
million to install and strengthen the MPLA in Luanda and repeatedly supplied Angola 
with sophisticated arms and ammunition, including early-warning radar systems and 
ground-to-air missiles.5 More importantly, Angola threatened South Africa’s economic 
dominance of the region. With substantial oil reserves and an alternative port and 
railway system, Angola could aid regional attempts at economically delinking from 
South Africa. 
To minimize the Angolan threat, South Africa opted for large-scale military 
destabilization. SADF involvement in Angola began in earnest with Operation 
Reindeer in 1978 through massive strikes against SWAPO bases in southern Angola. 
The success of these strikes, destroying over twelve SWAPO camps in Angola and 
Namibia, gave rise to more ambitious SADF actions in the 1980s. The largest of these 
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actions was Operation Protea, launched on August 23, 1981, and involving 11,000 men, 
90 Centurion M-41 tanks, 210 armoured cars, surface-to-surface missiles, and ninety 
planes and helicopters.6 This invasion resulted in the occupation of more than three 
years of the southern portion of Angola’s Cunene province.7 Several months later, the 
SADF followed with Operation Daisy, launched 150 miles into Angolan territory. 
These operations symbolized a new approach in South Africa’s Angola strategy. For 
the first time, South Africa directed its high-speed bombing strikes at Angolan forces 
rather than solely those of SWAPO.8 
South Africa’s destabilization of Angola did have setbacks. For instance, the 
December 1983 Operation Askari resulted in heavy losses for the SADF.9 These 
problems would not derail the larger program. Indeed, the mere presence of UNITA 
and South African soldiers promoted the destabilization necessary to undermine 
Angolan development. With 4000 intrusions into Angolan airspace, 168 bombing 
missions, 234 airborne troop landings, 74 ground attacks, and 7 full-scale invasions 
coupled with UNITA sabotage, South African involvement devastated Angola.10 The 
war displaced over 500,000 Angolans from their homes; Operation Protea produced 
80,000 refugees in three weeks.11 Additionally, over 200,000 Angolans died because of 
war and famine caused by South African and UNITA actions. The destruction of health 
facilities, schools, and relief convoys prevented any relief for the displaced population. 
Land mines had also given Angola the dubious distinction of having the world’s 
greatest proportion of amputees—a number between 20,000 and 50,000.12 
In addition, the Angolan economy had been laid waste by war. Defence 
spending had absorbed 75% of Angola’s national budget and 50% of its export revenue. 
The war had disrupted internal trade, production, and planting; fields were abandoned, 
and large numbers of cattle were intentionally destroyed, killed by land mines, or 
starved. Additionally, Angola’s once profitable mining sector was generally abandoned 
in 1975, with an estimated foreign exchange loss of $2.1 billion.13 
5.1.2  United States, South Africa and Support for UNITA 
While Washington closed its doors to the ANC, SWAPO, and the MPLA, it 
showed a keen interest in communicating with and supporting those African groups that 
had no attachments to Moscow. In particular, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi’s Inkatha 
Freedom Movement in South Africa, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(FNLA), and Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement in Angola were praised as cautious 
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and restrained nationalists whose hostility to Moscow was an added bonus for the 
protection of Western interests. This would work in harmony with Botha’s Total 
National Strategy, which helped foster and support the same African groups.14 
The first official contact between UNITA and the Reagan Administration 
appears to have been a March 1981 meeting between Savimbi and Senior Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Lannon Walker in Morocco. This 
meeting was followed by several visits to the White House, where Savimbi met with 
the President and several top government officials. During these contacts, Savimbi 
made it his primary objective to sell his anti-communist credentials, stating: 
The goals of UNITA are clear and open. . . . . We will drive the Cubans 
and Soviets and Eastern-bloc personnel from Angola. . . . We reject 
foreign ideologies that presuppose masses of industrial workers and men 
without souls. . . . The political program of UNITA is simple and clear. 
We fight for an independent Angola, free from all foreign troops. We 
believe that peasants, not the state, should own farm land. We favor 
democratic elections, freedom of religion and respect for tribal customs 
and languages.15 
Working within the friendly confines of conservative publications, Savimbi 
wrote articles detailing his commitment to aiding the United States in defeating their 
common enemies, the Soviet Union and Cuba. He explained “Our struggle in Angola . . 
. is the battle for the West and its values”16 and asked that the United States not let 
Angola become the “Munich of Africa,” explaining: 
the refusal to aid UNITA in its fight against the Cubans and the Soviets, 
will be taken as a signal by all the countries in the region that the United 
States has abandoned them to the Soviets as the West abandoned 
Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe to Hitler in 1938.17 
Desiring to push the Cubans and Soviets from southern Africa, presidential 
candidate Reagan was explicit in his support for UNITA, declaring that he “would 
provide them [UNITA] with weapons.”18 After the election, the Reagan Administration 
assured Savimbi of its recognition of UNITA as a “legitimate political force” and of 
“Washington’s wish to see the Cubans . . . leave Angola.” Throughout his 
administration, President Reagan would continue to support UNITA as bulwark against 
communism and integral to resolving the impasse on Namibian independence. As he 
would explain to the Washington Times: 
What Secretary Crocker’s been doing is actually having to do with 
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Namibia – Namibia and its independence. And there is the 435 
Resolution of the United Nations about Namibia’s right to become a 
country. Well, right now, it’s South Africa territory. Now, South Africa 
is willing for Namibia to become independent, but not while on the 
northern border of Namibia sits Angola with the Cubans and the 
possibility remains of Namibia becoming another satellite of the 
Communist bloc. So, what he’s back and forth negotiating is that – for to 
create Namibia, for Angola to agree to remove the Cuban troops, and 
South Africa has agreed that they will move out, and they will be helpful 
in making this a state. And he’s made quite a bit of progress. For the 
first time, Angola has made a declaration that they are prepared to bring 
about the withdrawal. It’s a negotiating matter. They want to phase it, 
and they have some conditions on doing this. And so, he has come back 
just recently, but he’ll be going back again.19 
Again, when Savimbi returned to Washington in 1986, Crocker urged Secretary 
of State Shultz “to assure Savimbi that we support him . . . and we will not abandon 
him . . . to seek his views on the role of American business in Angola . . . and to assure 
him that we will continue to monitor the situation on the ground, and his needs, 
carefully.”20 He would reiterate his belief that UNITA was critical to solving the 
Namibian issue, telling the media in 1984: 
This is all part of the Namibian package that we’ve been negotiating. 
Now, the Savimbi forces are not a part of the negotiations; haven’t been. 
But at the same time, Savimbi supports the removal of the Cubans from 
Angola and says there is no chance of reconciliation as long as they’re 
there. So once the Cubans leave, UNITA and the Angolan Government 
would have a better chance of coming to a reconciliation.21 
By the time Reagan came to power, there was reason to believe UNITA could 
be a useful ally in the administration’s geopolitical objectives. UNITA had 
distinguished itself among its “freedom fighting” peers with a robust black market trade 
in the commodities of Angola. Critical to UNITA’s viability was the selling of elephant 
ivory and rhino horns. A U.S. environmental group testified before Congress that, 
between 1976 and 1988, UNITA had killed as many as 100,000 elephants to subsidize 
the war effort.22 Extensive ivory harvesting by UNITA was confirmed by SADF 
Colonel Jan Breytenbach—who had established the “32 Buffalo” Battalion designed 
specifically for action in Angola—when in November 1989 he stated publicly that 
UNITA had “conducted a massive extermination campaign” against Angola’s elephants 
for the purpose of funding military operations.23 
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Director of Central Intelligence William Casey was tasked with providing aid to 
UNITA in violation of the Clark Amendment. Casey, however, never intended to fund 
UNITA to victory, only to play the global game of keeping the Soviet Union busy with 
small unwinnable wars as part of an eventual rollback. Since his service in the Board of 
Economic Warfare in World War II, before he joined the OSS, Casey was “interested in 
the economic infrastructure of adversary countries . . . how the economic jugular could 
be squeezed.”24 
From the beginning, Casey worked to provide aid to the UNITA anti-
communist fight, regardless of congressional restraints. Casey was interested in Africa 
as a region and had re-opened CIA stations in several countries there. In September 
1982, he visited Africa to “see for himself how the new pipelines were working,” 
including South Africa, where aid to the Contras and the Afghan mujahedin were 
discussed. Casey was fully aware of the cooperation between UNITA and the South 
African government and apparently supported it. The August 1981 “Operation 
Smokeshell” entailed 15,000 SADF soldiers with tanks and air support advancing 200 
kilometres into Angola’s Cunene province. The Republic defended this action as an 
operation against SWAPO guerrilla bases. However, the real intention was to create a 
“liberated zone” where UNITA could create its own government inside Angola.25 
Presumably, SADF operations against communist forces like SWAPO and the 
MPLA were also discussed during Casey’s visit. Given the SADF support to Savimbi 
and the fact that a propaganda operation by the South African government to promote 
Savimbi was in play, it seems likely that Casey was presented with a very positive 
impression of Savimbi and, through his own channels to the President, communicated 
as much. Casey, however, appears to have preferred no overt public statements about 
Savimbi by the administration in order to reduce the glare on American-South African 
cooperation in southern Africa and the role UNITA played in their regional 
ambitions.26 
Because UNITA could help apply pressure to the MPLA, South Africa would 
do more than any country in funding Savimbi. The Republic sent $80 million worth of 
assistance each year during the 1980s and served as UNITA’s principal source of arms, 
logistical, and intelligence support. The SADF also provided training to UNITA 
recruits in both Namibia and southern Angola.27 In a move nearly identical to American 
efforts to disguise Russian weapons captured by the Israelis then smuggled to the 
mujahedeen in Afghanistan, it was reported in 1980 that South Africa had purchased 
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$8.1 million of Soviet arms from Bulgaria and Poland and flown them into Angola so 
that “UNITA troops could then claim to have captured them from the Cubans.”28 
As early as 1981, Director of Central Intelligence Casey and Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig began to use the National Security Planning Group to support UNITA 
through surrogates and covert funding. Following a pattern set by the much maligned 
Carter Administration, Reagan policy “explicitly encouraged South Africa, Saudi 
Arabia, Morocco, Zaire and Israel to lend UNITA assistance.”29 
Morocco’s ties with UNITA stretched back to the Carter Administration but it 
was during the Reagan Administration that cooperation between the United States, 
Morocco, and UNITA would take on a new, more sophisticated dimension. In the first 
year of the Reagan Administration, U.S. economic assistance to Morocco nearly 
doubled. Shortly thereafter, Morocco hosted UNITA military training efforts. The $50 
to $70 million per year training operation was funded by another financial supporter of 
the Reagan Doctrine, Saudi Arabia.30 In 1983, the Congressional testimony of 
California businessman Sam Amieh indicated that Saudi Arabia made at least one “$15 
million cash payment to UNITA” through Morocco at the encouragement of CIA 
Director Casey.31 Perhaps not coincidentally, the first Reagan budget nearly tripled 
foreign military sales credits for Morocco from $34 million to slightly over $100 
million.32 
Another important player in the CIA program for UNITA was Zaire. Mobutu 
was the beneficiary of military and economic assistance from the United States and 
appears to have diverted a portion of that funding to UNITA. Additionally, Zaire 
provided logistical support and intelligence to UNITA throughout the Reagan 
Administration. By 1989, however, Zaire grew weary of supporting UNITA and 
abruptly withdrew aid.33 
Other types of funding for operations in Angola were more complicated than 
simply arranging for allies to divert American assistance to UNITA. An example of 
these efforts was provided by Sam Bamieh,34 a businessman and wealthy Reagan 
supporter, who claimed at a Clark Amendment hearing that Saudi Prince Bandar 
described to him 
an arrangement by which an offshore company would buy oil from 
Saudi Arabia, resell to South Africa at a profit of up to a dollar a barrel 
and then direct the proceeds to Angola. Thus South Africa could evade 
the oil embargo and covertly finance its intervention in Angola.35 
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Israel also reportedly took part in a series of meetings with South Africa, 
UNITA, and the CIA in May 1983 and February 1984 in Kinshasa and in March 1984 
and October 1985 in Morocco.36 Though much of the U.S.-Israel and South African 
cooperation appears to have been part of the administration’s effort to fund and arm the 
Contras, John Stockwell gave an interview to the Jerusalem Post, published December 
19th, 1986, stating that the United States had funded the inoperable Grail missiles that 
were sent by Israel to UNITA, along with the more sophisticated Redeye 
missiles.37Further, the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), when chaired by 
retired General John Singlaub, directly solicited Israel for captured Soviet arms for all 
of the four Reagan Doctrine cases, including UNITA, and he coordinated contacts with 
UNITA, which had earlier also joined the WACL. 
Another example of how the United States funded UNITA is found in an 
operation that occurred in 1984. A CIA-supported company, Southern Air Transport, 
contracted with the MPLA government Diamond Company (DIAMANG) to fly in to 
the diamond mining areas and receive diamonds to deliver to Luanda. While unloading 
the diamonds, the CIA would deliver weapons taken in battle by South Africa to 
UNITA forces.38 
These types of arrangements between an informal network of countries and 
organizations that could do “favours” for the United States in return for needed aid or 
policy positions were effective. Income for UNITA during the Clark Amendment years 
is roughly estimated to include a straightforward $80 million a year from South Africa, 
$50 to $70 million from Saudi Arabia through Morocco for UNITA training, at least 
one and possibly more direct allocations of up to $15 million from the CIA, a variety of 
assistance in kind by countries like Zaire and South Africa, and income earned by 
UNITA’s own economic and smuggling activities.39 
To further strengthen this new official military relationship, the administration 
submitted a proposal to Congress seeking the repeal of the Clark Amendment. 
Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1981, Secretary 
of State-designate Alexander Haig stated that the amendment was “a self-defeating and 
unnecessary restriction on the executive branch in its attempt to carry out a successful 
American foreign policy.”40 Two months later, asked whether the United States should 
resume its assistance to UNITA, President Reagan echoed Haig’s words, saying, “of 
course, our hands are a little bit tied right now. A President of the United States is 
restricted by the so-called Clark Act that does not give us freedom to deal. . . .The 
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Angolan government is dominated by the presence of Cubans, surrogates of the Soviet 
Union.”41 
By seeking to repeal the amendment, Washington sought to increase UNITA’s 
military capacity; a move that the administration hoped would force the MPLA to agree 
to share power with UNITA.42 A secret CIA memorandum stated that the MPLA could 
“not afford to lose more than 5,000 to 7,500 members of the Cuban military force 
without suffering appreciable territorial loses to UNITA.”43 As earlier as 1982, there 
were those in Washington and Pretoria that believed that UNITA could win militarily 
and the presence of the Soviets in southern Africa eliminated. Historian Theresa 
Papenfus would write that Pik Botha: 
foresaw dire problems for the Russians. He predicted that ultimately the 
realities of black Africa would defeat them. The scales were already 
tipping against them. Unita, which South Africa supported, was now 
much stronger than in 1981 and South Africa and the West had the 
capability to defeat the Marxist alliance.44 
The notion that Savimbi could win the war in Angola was largely a pipedream. 
A secret memorandum from George Schultz to President Reagan in June 1983 warned 
that it was “essential that our views get directly to Savimbi, and not through the filter of 
the South African military which is taking the line with him and others that a military 
solution in Angola is possible.”45 This opinion was shared by Chester Crocker who 
called the notion that Savimbi and the South Africans could “push the Soviets from 
Luanda” as “bullshit.”46Nevertheless, South Africa would still have been the major 
beneficiary of American support for Savimbi, for a stronger UNITA would have 
compelled the MPLA to concentrate all its resources toward meeting that challenge, 
abandoning in the process its efforts to give assistance to SWAPO. 
Although the administration’s initial efforts failed, it did successfully get the 
Clark Amendment repealed in 1985. Chester Crocker said that repeal was most 
important for Savimbi, who needed to “diversify his options” and acquire some “level 
of autonomy from South Africa” least he been seen as a “cat’s paw” for Pretoria.47 
Though never expressly articulated as such, within the Reagan Administration, 
UNITA had the officially accepted purpose of not winning militarily but remaining a 
viable force to keep pressure on Luanda to participate in the Namibian independence 
negotiations and eventually to send the Cuban troops home.The strategy seemed to be 
paying dividends in1986 when President Reagan stated: 
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In Angola, Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA forces have waged an armed 
struggle against the Soviet-and Cuban-backed Marxist regime, and in 
recent years UNITA has steadily expanded the territory under its 
control. . . . In southern Africa, the recent announcement by the South 
African government of a date for the creation of an independent 
Namibia provides a new test of its own and of the Angolan regime’s 
interest in a settlement that truly begins to reduce the threats to security 
in this region.48 
Crocker himself noted in 1988, “Our role in Angola is to try and get a signal across that 
we represent a political solution. . . . We want Cuban forces out of Angola so that 
Angolans themselves can for the first time discover themselves.”49 However, behind 
Crocker’s thin humanitarian veneer there was the zero-sum calculus of the Cold War. 
As Crocker would admit, “If they obstructed our settlement terms, the price and the 
pain would grow.”50 President Reagan would point to the strategy when he remarked: 
In Angola in the past few weeks, Jonas Savimbi’s freedom fighters 
inflicted another crushing defeat on the Soviet-backed MPLA forces. 
This fall’s Communist offensive, the biggest ever in Angola, ended in a 
rout for the Soviets and their protégés. The heroes of the Lomba River 
did it again, pushing back the massive Soviet assault, capturing hundreds 
of operational trucks and tanks, and shooting down a substantial number 
of helicopters and Cuban-piloted planes. The Soviets truly are beginning 
to feel the sting of free people fighting back.51 
This obvious bias in Washington’s relations with the region’s black nationalists 
further reveals Constructive Engagement’s real ambition, the rolling back of Soviet 
influence in southern Africa. Though the administration often engaged the MPLA in 
negotiations for power-sharing with UNITA and for Cuban withdrawal, the United 
States did not cease to perceive Eduardo dos Santos’ MPLA government as the enemy. 
By 1987, even when Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet 
Union had been greatly reduced, Washington’s policy toward Angola remained fixed in 
its emphasis “to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Soviet and Soviet proxy influence, 
military presence and opportunities in Angola and southern Africa.”52 
5.1.3  Mozambique 
Mozambique would also become a focus of South Africa’s destabilization 
campaign. South Africa’s clearest attack on that country was its backing for Resistência 
Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), which was moved to South Africa under Botha. 
RENAMO was founded in Rhodesia in 1974 by Rhodesian security forces to punish 
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Mozambique for supporting the Patriotic Front. It was initially composed entirely of 
Portuguese ex-colonials and Mozambican exiles who had worked for FIDE. In 1980, 
RENAMO moved its base of operations to South Africa at the behest of South African 
Military Intelligence (SAMI). Once there, RENAMO president Alfonso Dhlakama 
boasted to journalists that he had been assured, “Your Army is now part of the South 
African Defence Forces.”53 In October of that year, SADF Colonel van Niekerk 
instructed RENAMO to begin striking at targets in southern Mozambique, launching a 
build-up that would paralyze that country. South African destabilization meant that 
development projects were destroyed and economic growth slowed. The Mozambican 
government estimated the total cost of RENAMO attacks at over 300 million dollars for 
1982 alone.54 
After 1982, RENAMO activities were stepped up. Torture of civilians was 
commonplace, and relief workers complained that RENAMO paralysis of roads and 
communications were responsible for many of the famine deaths. RENAMO also made 
appeals to ethnicity in its propaganda. Because the Shona suffered severe dislocations 
during colonialism and endured the worst of the drought, many became disillusioned 
with the government. They were also geographically isolated from the party during the 
liberation struggle and were under-represented in the government.55 Indeed 
RENAMO’s strongholds were in Tete, Manica, and Sofala provinces—traditionally 
Shona areas.56 
South Africa had several reasons for its destabilization of Mozambique. First, 
Mozambique was a potential transport hub in southern Africa, offering the region the 
possibility to reduce its transport dependence on South Africa. The ports of Maputo, 
Beira, and Nacala could service all of Zimbabwe’s and Malawi’s trade, including cargo 
from other landlocked states. Although South African firms from the northern 
Transvaal profited from exporting through Maputo, the smooth operation of 
Mozambique’s ports could greatly facilitate the region’s access to non-South African, 
well-equipped deep water ports—a goal central to SADCC efforts to delink from South 
Africa. Furthermore, Mozambique rested at the terminus of the Beira Corridor, a 
parallel system of rail, road, and oil pipeline links connecting landlocked southern 
Africa to the sea and providing these states with their petroleum needs.57 A stable 
Mozambique would be able to develop the potential of these transport links at the 
expense of South African transport facilities. 
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Second, Pretoria cited the presence of the ANC in Mozambique as justifying 
South African support for RENAMO, as Pik Botha explained, “There was of course a 
time when we helped to train RENAMO and assisted it. There was such a time. Why? 
More than 90% of all violent attacks on South Africa . . . were planned and carried out 
from Mozambican territory. . . . It was the main channel for ANC terrorists.”58 With 
FRELIMO abetting ANC actions within the Republic, Pretoria decided to reciprocate 
through the RENAMO. 
RENAMO actions devastated the fragile Mozambican economy and left its 
infrastructure in shambles. Roads, rails, trains, bridges, oil tanks, port facilities, the 
CahoraBassa dam, food distribution, villages, government officials, schools, cotton and 
tea processing facilities, local population groups—everything was affected by 
RENAMO sabotage. Similarly, the RENAMO attacked SADCC traffic from both 
Zimbabwe and Malawi. In three years, 93 locomotives and 250 wagons were destroyed 
leaving 150 rail workers dead. In addition, roads and railways were mined, destroying 
vans, trucks, and private cars indiscriminately.59 
More severe was the horrific RENAMO impact on the Mozambican population. 
The RENAMO burned peasant grain stores and destroyed 900 rural shops in 1982 and 
1983. In 1982 alone, the RENAMO burned 140 villages, destroyed 102 medical centres 
and rural health posts, forced the closure of 489 primary schools, and hacked the ears 
off of school teachers. Additionally, the RENAMO and its compatriots employed 
murder, abduction, forced labour, rape, and mutilation to terrorize Mozambique’s 
population.60 
The economic links between South Africa and Mozambique made it 
comparatively easy for South Africa to put pressure on the FRELIMO government. 
One example is the reduction in the number of mine contracts awarded to Mozambican 
workers. It was Vorster who abrogated South Africa’s gold agreement with 
Mozambique in 1978; by breaking this arrangement, South Africa cost Mozambique 
two-and-half billion dollars in lost revenue. At a high cost to itself and despite the 
protests of the business community, South Africa reduced exports through the port of 
Maputo to a fraction of the former level, entirely eliminating some categories of high 
tariff commodities such as steel, copper, and nickel. As a result, Mozambique lost 
another 250 million dollars in uncollected duties.61 Some of the sanctions adopted by 
Pretoria were petty, yet their toll was terrible. When an epidemic of cholera broke out 
in Mozambique, South Africa suddenly stopped shipments of chlorine.62 
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Natural disasters compounded the crisis, exposing the vulnerability of 
Mozambique’s economy; alternating years of drought and flooding cost Mozambique 
an estimated 250 million dollars. In 1982, rainfall was less than half of the normal 
amount over the entire country. Suddenly Inhambane and Tete provinces began to face 
famine. Famine is estimated to have taken between 30 and 100 thousand lives during 
1982-1983. However, communication with the capital was so slow that officials were 
not aware of the crisis until people were already dying. It was not until January 1983 
that the world became aware of what was going on and Mozambique made a plea for 
emergency assistance. 
In an effort to control the deteriorating situation, FRELIMO resorted to 
authoritarian measures. Flogging, a punishment not seen since colonial times, was 
reintroduced for political crimes, and the death penalty was extended to economic 
crimes. Six RENAMO guerrillas were publicly executed without trials. A far worse 
move on the part of FRELIMO was “Operation Production.” Initially conceived as a 
resettlement program for urban migrants fleeing rural unemployment, Operation 
Production deteriorated into a forced explosion. Fifty to one hundred thousand people 
were moved from Maputo and Beira in a few weeks and dumped in Zambia province, 
where they were supposed to start working in agriculture. These moves generated so 
much resistance that they were quickly halted, but serious damage was done to 
FRELIMO’s credibility, and RENAMO’s case against the government began to take on 
new meaning. 
In 1982, Mozambique had a debt to the noncommunist world of one-and-a-half 
billion dollars. It was facing arrears on its payments for the first time and had to 
approach its creditors asking for a rescheduling of its payments.63FRELIMO found 
itself unable to find alternatives to its position in the global economy. The economic 
structures inherited by independent Mozambique continued to create poverty after 
liberation. This poverty made Mozambique vulnerable to natural disasters and to 
political disasters as well: Mozambique not only needed to feed its people, it had to be 
able to defend its experiment if it were to succeed. 
The costs were staggering for Maputo. Economically, Mozambique lost 
approximately $4 billion from the dislocation of its economy.64The human costs were 
worse. Over 500,000 Mozambicans died between 1980 and the signing of Nkomati, 
half of which were children under five. Furthermore, RENAMO disruption of food 
production placed 5.9 million people at risk of imminent starvation. Mozambique’s 
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refugee problem was also enormous, with 700,000 Mozambicans fleeing the country by 
April 1988.65 
5.1.4  Lesotho 
Similarly, along with the SADF raids and border restrictions, South Africa had 
supported the dissident Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), which had operated from 
bases in the Orange Free State, QwaQwa, and the Transkei.66 South Africa also 
conducted cross-border operations into Lesotho against purported ANC targets, such as 
the December 9, 1982, raid on Maseru in which 37 people were killed. Economic 
pressures on Lesotho, which as a landlocked country entirely surrounded by South 
Africa was highly vulnerable, resulted in the expulsion of ANC personnel. 
Non-military economic destabilization was more subtle, especially in terms of 
transport diplomacy. Likewise, efforts to strangle economically the states of southern 
Africa were effective. In fact, such moves led to the collapse of Chief Jonathan’s 
government in Lesotho. After several years of growing friction between Pretoria and 
Maseru, South Africa hardened its stance toward the anti-apartheid government of 
Lesotho. In response to a land mine incident near the Lesotho border that claimed the 
lives of six South African civilians in 1985, South Africa launched an SADF raid. Two 
weeks later, South Africa completely closed Lesotho’s border—restricting all 
commercial traffic. As a result, Lesotho’s fragile economy reached an absolute 
standstill. A few weeks later, on January 20, 1986, a military council ousted Jonathan in 
a near-bloodless coup. After the military council expelled sixty ANC activists five days 
later, South Africa lifted the economic blockade and reopened the Lesotho economy to 
the world.67 Although not as blatant as SADF operations in Angola, this form of 
destabilization certainly brought Pretoria positive political results. 
5.1.5  Zambia 
For its part, Zambia had been described by South Africa as a centre for 
subversion and as a “Marxist” satellite state engaged in a Soviet-inspired conspiracy 
against the Republic. In response to the alleged Zambian threat, South Africa reportedly 
trained up to 600 Zambian dissidents and was involved in at least two conspiracies in 
that country after 1980. In addition, South Africa had also engaged in economic 
destabilization against Zambia. After 1980, direct attacks were made against Zambian 
economic targets from the Caprivi Strip, including one in April 1982 by two battalions 
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of the SADF that resulted in a decline in agricultural production and a deterrence of 
mineral prospecting in the area. In July 1982, southern Zambia was declared a disaster 
zone, partly due to these deprivations. 
Similar actions included transport disruptions. After the Commonwealth agreed 
to impose limited sanctions in August 1986, South Africa immediately placed a steep 
levy on all goods passing through the Republic en route to Zambia. The ensuing effects 
on their economies provoked food riots in Zambia. After Zambia had not imposed 
sanctions by the January 1, 1987, deadline, South Africa eased its transport 
restrictions.68 
5.1.6  Botswana 
Most incidents involving Botswana were clashes between Botswana and South 
African forces around the Caprivi Strip and attacks on South African refugees in 
Botswana. Protests by Botswana elicited little response from South Africa, or in most 
cases, the Republic simply denied that any incident ever occurred. Despite these 
incidents, Botswana did not suffer the same kinds of attacks that other neighbours of 
South Africa had. One possible reason for this was that Botswana kept tight control 
over South African refugees and was careful to discourage any attempts either to 
smuggle arms across the border to South Africa or to allow armed attacks against South 
Africa or Bophuthatswana to originate in Botswana.69 
5.1.7  Swaziland 
Swaziland had, like Botswana, always been careful in not giving unnecessary 
offense to South Africa. Alarmed by the Maseru raid, Swaziland reacted by rounding 
up ANC refugees and either expelling them or removing them to a detention camp at 
Makerns. 
5.1.8  Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe was a special case for South Africa. It was the only state in the 
region where a reasonable possibility existed of establishing a stable, multi-racial 
society. It was seen by South Africa to be the only state in the region outside of the 
Republic capable of becoming an industrial power. 
Shortly after Zimbabwean independence, South Africa transported a number of 
former black Rhodesian troops and ZIPRA guerrillas to camps in the northern 
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Transvaal, from where the Ndebele language “Radio Truth” operated. In Zimbabwe, 
South Africa was also involved in sabotage, such as the destruction of two-thirds of the 
country’s air force at Gweru in July 1982, and the heavy-handed use of economic 
pressures, such as the withdrawal-of railroad equipment needed to haul the country’s 
record harvest in 1981.70 
South Africa could hardly deny involvement in the so-called “month of the 
hawks” in December 1982, when the destruction of the oil depot at Beira by 
commandos, sabotage to the rail route between Maputo and Chicualacuala, and a 
supposed labour dispute on the South African railway lines to Zimbabwe all combined 
to put a serious economic squeeze on Zimbabwe. While fuel supplies did eventually 
reach the country, South Africa had shown just how much pressure it could apply.71 
Although less profound than that directed at Angola and Mozambique, South 
African military action likewise affected Zimbabwe. South Africa’s alleged support for 
the Super-ZAPU dissidents in the Matabeleland province of Zimbabwe had been the 
subject of much concern for the Mugabe leadership, especially in the early 1980s. More 
direct was the destruction of the strong and potentially threatening Zimbabwean Air 
Force in July 1982 by guerrillas armed with South African equipment. 
Like the military component of destabilization, economic destabilization 
illustrated Pretoria’s effort to maintain regional economic dependence and secure 
political concessions. As mentioned earlier, a key form of economic destabilization was 
military, especially acts of sabotage of transport and oil links. For instance, South 
Africa’s decision to cut off Zimbabwe’s oil shipments nearly shut down the 
Zimbabwean economy in December 1982. Similarly, RENAMO disruptions of the 
Beira and Limpopo rail links cost the region extra in rerouting their goods to South 
African ports. Fortification of these routes against South African sponsored sabotage 
was done at great expense. For instance, to defend the Beira route against RENAMO 
attacks, Zimbabwe spent over half a million dollars per day.72 
5.2 Non-criticism of South Africa’s Destabilization Campaign 
Throughout his tenure, Reagan not only avoided criticizing the South African 
government but, in addition, shielded Pretoria from international isolation and ridicule. 
When South African forces attacked and destroyed an ANC-occupied building in 
Maputo in early 1981, President Reagan seemed to sympathize with the operation even 
though the administration later expressed regret over the incident. Called before a U.S. 
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House Subcommittee, Secretary Crocker was accused of tacitly supporting the raid by 
failing to condemn South Africa’s military actions. Crocker replied that it was “not our 
view that public confrontation . . . was necessarily going to produce any productive 
result of a kind we would like to see.” He would go on to say the administration 
“deplored the raid,” but “we put it in a broader context” of Angola allowing SWAPO 
guerrillas to remain in Angola. In a subsequent statement on the matter, U.S. delegate 
Charles M. Lichenstein asserted that it was the presence of “foreign combat forces in 
Angola, particularly the large Cuban force, and the provision of Soviet-originated arms 
to SWAPO” that explained South African actions.73 
The issue would flare up again following another raid into Angola in 1982. The 
U.S. House African subcommittee condemned the raid in the strongest terms and pulled 
the Secretary back to answer for the administration’s assumed duplicity. Crocker 
refused to concede the South Africans were at fault, lecturing the House members that 
“There is a guerrilla war going on, launched from Angolan territory against the people 
and property of Namibia, and as long as that continues, South Africa will go after 
them.” Additionally, the Reagan Administration would support South Africa’s right to 
“self-defence” and recognized “no state’s right to harbor plotters or perpetrators of 
violence across borders and against other lands.”74 
A similar South African attack was conducted in Lesotho in May of 1983. The 
Reagan Administration protested the South African actions, but largely foisted the 
blame on the ANC for two car bombings in the Republic that were thought to have 
been planned and directed from within Lesotho.75 The administration would show 
similar restraint in criticizing Pretoria after the South African government destroyed a 
black squatter camp outside of Cape Town in 1981.76 
Crocker’s talking points on each of these raids closely mirrored those used by 
Pretoria after each military incursion into a neighbouring country. For instance, as the 
Secretary was addressing members of congress, General Constand L. Viljoen, Chief of 
the South African Defence Force, defended his nation’s actions as legitimate counter-
terrorist measures and warned southern African states of the inevitable consequences of 
harbouring the ANC.77 It appears that the South African leadership was disposed to 
follow such a belligerent course because it realized that the Reagan Administration 
looked at these measures as reducing communist influence in the region.78 In fact, 
South African commandos first struck at ANC diplomatic facilities in Matola, 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
18
6 
Mozambique, on January 30, 1981, only days after Reagan made a speech in which he 
called South Africa an “old friend.” 
In 1981 alone, out of 14 anti-apartheid resolutions discussed at the United 
Nations, the United States cast a “No” vote twelve times and abstained twice.79 
Additionally, on April 30, the United States, together with Britain and France, vetoed 
five Security Council resolutions that, in addition to recommending punitive sanctions 
including an oil embargo, sought to pressure South Africa into submitting to the 
implementation of UN Resolution 435.80 Exiled ANC President Oliver Tambo 
condemned the Western allies for vetoing sanctions against South Africa and 
complained a year later: 
The problem about the imposition of sanctions against South Africa 
emanates from a few Western countries which reap lucrative profits 
from the apartheid system and the human crimes associated with it. It is 
common knowledge that Britain, West Germany, Italy, France and the 
United States, together, and hundreds of transnational corporations have 
vested interests in the perpetuation and survival of the apartheid system. 
. . . The United States has entered the picture as the latter-day leader of 
the group which has, like the racist regime of South Africa, never 
accepted the independence of African countries.81 
Among the most strident critics of the Reagan Administration’s policies in 
southern Africa were the OAU countries, which in late June 1981 unanimously 
condemned the United States for its “overt and covert collusion with the South African 
racists.” Specifically, the Reagan Administration was accused of trying to “turn the 
clock back” on the whole issue of Namibian independence by its linkage to a Cuban 
withdrawal with a concurrent settlement.82 Sam Nujoma, the head of SWAPO, called 
for continuing sanctions against the South Africans, and if the United States did not 
support them, he would ask the OAU and Nigeria to implement economic sanctions 
against the West.83 
The Nigerians, for their part, responded with near identical threats. In an 
interview with the New York Times, Chuka Okadigbu, a senior policy advisor to then-
President Shehu Shagari, accused Reagan of desiring to “give more credence to the 
apartheid regime in South Africa and to slow down independence in Namibia.” 
According to Okadigbu, Nigeria would respond by mobilizing opposition to the new 
American policy within the OAU and by using “when necessary . . . economic 
measures to persuade the United States to understand our position with a view to 
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stopping it being so patently anti-African. This means oil and other economic 
measures.” On the other hand, some thought “that as a result of a temporary glut in the 
world oil market, Nigeria will have to jettison its foreign policy. That is naive. A 
temporary situation should not be considered a permanent situation.”84 
Following Operation Protea in Angola and the refusal of the Reagan 
Administration to unreservedly condemn it, the African view of American policy 
became even more critical. After the African states introduced a harsh motion of 
condemnation against the Republic in the Security Council—which was promptly 
vetoed by the United States—the Angolan delegate, Elisio di Figueiredo, publicly 
stated the U.S. veto was “nothing short of support for South Africa’s racism, South 
Africa’s flouting of UN resolutions, and South Africa’s disregard for human dignity 
and life.”85 Despite the protestations of the Republic’s neighbours, it would soon 
become clear that the policy of regional destabilization paid dividends for South Africa 
and the United States. 
5.3 The Diplomatic Tract 
In early 1984, the United States and South Africa believed there were promising 
developments in the region that tended to validate their efforts, at least as they 
concerned the geopolitical objectives of the Total National Strategy and Constructive 
Engagement. After years of constant strife, the region was growing weary of instability 
and dislocation. Southern African governments had come to realize that the costs of 
maintaining order in the face of external threats and internal unrest were well beyond 
their immediate capabilities. In short, peace with South Africa, even on the Republic’s 
terms, was less devastating than the continuance of war. 
South Africa, too, had begun to grow weary. The colonization of Namibia 
annually drained more than R1 billion, approximately U.S. $600 million in 1983, from 
an already strained treasury. South Africa’s invasion of Angola in December 1983 
resulted in casualties that shocked both the government and the white population. And 
for the first time, pro-regime Afrikaans newspapers began to print hesitant calls for a 
withdrawal from Namibia. Additionally, the sweeping destabilization campaign began 
to cause serious damage to one of South Africa’s principal allies, the United States. By 
mid-1983 the Reagan Administration was actively pushing for rapprochement in 
southern Africa in terms of its regional security doctrine. In 1984, after prolonged 
negotiations, South Africa signed the Lusaka Agreement with Angola and the Nkomati 
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Accord with Mozambique, inaugurating a new phase of The Total Strategy and 
Constructive Engagement. 
For South Africa, the peace accords signed at Lusaka and Nkomati seemed to 
signal a triumph for its military campaign. Destabilization had achieved what no 
previous policy had—South African hegemony over it neighbours. As for the Reagan 
Administration, the negotiating process could not have come at a better time. With 
criticism coming from the U.S. Congress and international community, Crocker needed 
positive developments in southern Africa to mute criticism of the Republic’s racial 
policies. 
In 1983 and 1984, South Africa faced a new set of domestic, regional, and 
international conditions that heightened the appeal for peace settlements. Domestically, 
the South African public had become less threat-conscious, more conciliatory toward 
South Africa’s enemies, and less gloomy about South Africa’s future.86 For example, in 
1982, seven out of every ten white South Africans viewed Zimbabwe as a threat to the 
Republic’s national security. In 1984, not only did the number of people subscribing to 
this feeling drop but the intensity of agreement also declined. In 1982, 22.7% of white 
South Africans polled “definitely” saw Zimbabwe as a principal threat, whereas in 
1984 this number decreased to 14.9%. The white public even began to view 
Mozambique in a favourable light, with over two-thirds of the white population 
sympathetic to Marxist Maputo’s plight.87 
Furthermore, the South African economy began to show signs of severe strain. 
In a deep economic recession characterized by falling gold prices, drought, rising 
interest rates, inflation, and a declining rand, the South African economy was 
struggling to afford the high cost of destabilization. With recession cutting into a 
declining defence budget,88 increased SADF actions in the region undermined the 
acquisition, modernization, and preparedness programs necessary for South African 
defence: 
Objectives in respect of preparedness programmes and the manufacture 
of arms could not be fully achieved owing to a restricted SADF budget 
during the past five years and also as a result of the economic 
recession.89 
Regionally, South Africa suffered setbacks in its destabilization campaign. The 
1983 Operation Askari in Angola ended in significant South African losses in both 
material and men, necessitating an early South African withdrawal. Likewise, the costs 
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of Angola involvement, estimated at $4 million per day, began to seem prohibitive. 
Even relations with the West signalled to Pretoria the benefits of peace. The United 
States and its European allies desperately needed to see some movement in the region 
and began to draw closer to the Republic’s neighbours.90 France hosted Angolan leader 
Dos Santos in 1981, and Mozambican President Machel made a triumphant tour of 
Europe, attracting the sympathies of Thatcher and Mitterrand. Likewise, the EEC and 
Scandinavian countries actively backed SADCC efforts. Even Washington began to 
modify its stance as new policy makers replaced the ultra-right wingers in the Reagan 
Administration.91 As a result, statements of Constructive Engagement became more 
belligerent, and Washington-Maputo relations thawed significantly. 
Thus, destabilization was no longer as attractive to Pretoria. Instead, South 
Africa, as Pik Botha outlined, embarked on a more cooperative stance in the region: 
Winds of change are again blowing through Africa. There is an 
irresistible attraction of new forces and new continental realities. There 
is a growing realisation that South Africa is not on the defensive. South 
Africa is an increasingly confident regional power which has the will, 
the power and the resources to play the role it has been invited to fulfill 
in the search for peace in the region.92 
With such an outlook, South Africa and the United States attempted to capitalize 
diplomatically on the Republic’s destabilization campaign. 
5.3.1  Namibia: The Captive State 
The issue of Namibian independence provides what may be one of the best 
illustrations of the Reagan Administration’s use of Pretoria in achieving its geopolitical 
objectives in southern Africa. As briefly discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, South Africa’s 
control over Namibia became an issue of international focus long before Reagan came 
into office. After World War I, the League of Nations declared Namibia a mandated 
territory to be administered by South Africa on behalf of Britain. At the close of the 
Second World War, all mandated territories were placed under U.N. trusteeship with 
the objective of ensuring their gradual progression toward total independence. South 
Africa, however, planned to incorporate Namibia and make it part of the Union, a move 
that the U.N. General Assembly resisted. In 1969, the Security Council demanded 
South Africa’s total withdrawal from Namibia, and in 1971, the International Court of 
Justice declared Pretoria’s control over the territory illegal. Nevertheless, South Africa 
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defied all international efforts and continued to occupy and extend its apartheid policy 
into Namibia.93 
A significant U.S. involvement in the mediation process began with the Carter 
Administration. At Carter’s initiative, the United States, Britain, Canada, France, and 
West Germany formed a Western Contact Group (WCG), which began a series of 
multilateral talks with South Africa, SWAPO, and the Frontline States.94 The efforts of 
the WCG resulted in elaborate proposals for a settlement that included a cease-fire 
between South Africa and SWAPO, withdrawal of South African troops, disbanding of 
local police forces, and the appointment of a U.N. Transition Action Group (UNTAG) 
to administer the territory until elections were held under U.N. supervision. The U.N. 
Security Council accepted these proposals and adopted them as UN Resolution 435 in 
August 1978.95 
South Africa, however, rejected the resolution and, through a series of 
manoeuvres, frustrated its implementation. As Robert Jaster put it: 
South Africa’s diplomats played an astute game of calculated ambiguity. 
. . . They would agree in principle with, or to cooperate with various 
elements in the negotiations, yet avoid making binding commitments. 
On several occasions, after winning a major concession, they raised a 
new objection.96 
Pretoria also stepped up its attacks on SWAPO fighters who operated 
from bases in southern Angola. 
South Africa’s publicized objection to Resolution 435 was that it favoured 
SWAPO, but there was more at stake.97 First, Pretoria feared that if elections were 
allowed to take place in Namibia, SWAPO, which commanded a large following 
among the Ovambo, the country’s largest ethnic group, would trounce its rivals. One of 
these opponents was the South African backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, a party 
that comprised Namibia’s largely conservative white minority and most of the 
conservative tribal chiefs from the rural areas. Prime Minister P. W. Botha was aware 
that a SWAPO victory would result in a mass exodus of those right-wingers into South 
Africa, a move that would have swelled the ranks of his main challengers within the 
National Party.98 
No less important was Namibia’s geographical location to the west of South 
Africa and south of Angola. This location made the territory a suitable buffer against 
possible guerrilla or conventional incursions into South Africa. Therefore, a South 
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African withdrawal, according to Defence chief Magnus Malan and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Pik Botha, would “place the enemy closer to the heartland of the 
Republic.”99 
Thus, contrary to the conventional explanation that the Namibian talks reached 
a stalemate because the WCG had leaned too much toward SWAPO, the failure to 
reach a settlement during the Carter Administration should be understood in the context 
of South Africa’s own intransigence and fear of the political costs that Namibian 
independence would have engendered. In short, South Africa was just not prepared for 
or even interested in a settlement. 
When the Reagan Administration assumed power in 1981, it altered the 
recommendations of Resolution 435 and dropped the WCG’s multilateral approach in 
favour of a bilateral policy that linked the issue of Namibian independence to the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Thinking largely within a Cold War 
framework, Assistant Secretary of State Crocker, through his linkage policy, 
precipitated a protracted diplomatic struggle that delayed Namibia’s independence for a 
full eight years, thus granting South Africa’s desire for continued control over the 
territory a major boost. 
The new approach adopted by Reagan and his aides was a clear indication of the 
administration’s conviction that the major problem in southern Africa was the Soviet 
Union and its Cuban proxy. As a result, the presence of 30,000 Cuban troops in Angola 
became the central focus of Washington, not Namibian independence. A secret 
communiqué from Alexander Haig to President Reagan following his meeting with Pik 
Botha outlined “our [the administration’s] framework for a settlement.” The key 
elements included: 
constitutional arrangements and guarantees prior to the elections. The 
South Africans are not pressing for a full-fledged constitution but want 
full assurances that the settlements will not simply lead to a one-man, 
one-vote, one-time” outcome. We agree. 
no Soviet flag in Windhoek. Translated into diplomatic terms, this will 
require a provision for Namibia’s non-alignment (no foreign bases or 
troops) as part of the settlement package. While neither the South 
Africans nor ourselves want a SWAPO victory, both sides recognize 
SWAPO must be included in the settlement if it is be internationally 
acceptable. 
consultations with the internal parties. The South Africans cannot be 
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seen to be forcing a settlement down the throats of the internal parties. 
We assured the South Africans that we have every intention of helping 
them on this by talking directly to the internal parties. 
no deadlines. We explained that at this point we wanted to obtain South 
Africa’s good faith commitment to the search for an internationally 
acceptable settlement but we’re not interested in posing deadlines on the 
process. We have given them time. At the same time, they understand 
we do not want to be manipulated or to have this item on our agenda for 
the immediate future. 
On Angola, there is a common understanding that the first requirements 
is to establish momentum on Namibiaand to avoid explicit public 
linkage of the Angolan and Namibian situations. Once momentum is 
obtained, our leverage with the Africans in general and the Angolans in 
particular will geometrically increase to get the Cuban forces out of 
Angola. The South Africans recognize this is our hand to play. 
At first,administrationofficials denied that the new approach originated from the 
White House. They maintained that linking Cuban withdrawal from Angola with South 
Africa’s pull-out from Namibia had been advocated by Pretoria.100 However, a set of 
policy documents leaked to the press in May 1981 exposed the administration’s 
determination to make Namibian independence contingent upon Cuba withdrawing 
from Angola, the MPLA agreeing to share power with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, 
and the possibility of excluding SWAPO from any future government in Namibia, thus 
curbing the spread of Soviet influence in the region.101 
These documents, which were prepared by Crocker and subsequently approved 
by Secretary of State Alexander Haig and the White House, indicate a desire to rollback 
Soviet and Cuban influence through diplomacy. At one stage, Crocker wrote that “we 
would insist that Namibian independence and Cuban withdrawal are unrelated, but in 
fact they would be mutually reinforcing, parallel tracks of an overall strategy. . . . We 
would avoid linking the two publicly.”102 Crocker further asserted: 
African leaders would have no basis for resisting the Namibia-Angola 
linkage once they realize that they can only get a Namibia settlement 
through us. . . . As for the Soviet-backed government in Angola, it 
would be told that Moscow could not help it economically; that 
Washington could; that recognition is out unless the Cubans leave and 
they cut a deal with Savimbi.103 
Again, a memorandum from Crocker to Shultz in 1982 reiterated the administration’s 
primary objective behind the linkage policy: “Our objective remains the withdrawal of 
all Cuban combat forces from Angola” and to make UNITA “a key factor in the 
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negotiations. . . . UNITA is a viable force which must be taken into account in 
Angola.”104 
The administration, it appears, was quite aware of the numerous problems 
inherent in its linkage strategy. Crocker’s memo to Shultz stated that, while the MPLA, 
SWAPO, and the frontline states wished to see progress in Namibia, they rejected 
outright a formula that predicated Namibian independence on the withdrawal of Cubans 
forces from Angola.105 The reason for this objection is obvious. Crocker’s linkage 
strategy failed to take into account the MPLA’s concern about its own security, 
particularly if South African troops were to remain in Namibia until elections were 
held. To be sure, the MPLA did look forward to the Cubans’ departure from Luanda, 
largely because of the heavy financial costs incurred from subsidizing such a large 
military presence there. However, as long as South Africa maintained a strong military 
presence in Namibia, the MPLA government consistently held to the position that 
“Cuban troops would be sent home as soon as Namibia gained independence and the 
threat of a South African attack had been removed.”106 
Meanwhile South Africa, by insisting that Cuban withdrawal should take place 
before it removed its forces from Namibia, did not make things any easier for Crocker 
and other advocates of linkage. Moreover, Pretoria was very sceptical about allowing 
the Namibian elections to take place because it was obvious to everyone that SWAPO 
would win. As Crocker told Shultz: 
Part of the problem is persistent South African doubt about the value of 
an experience which appears likely to place a SWAPO government in 
office. Additionally, South African demands on the sequence of Cuban 
withdrawal . . . all Cubans out within twelve weeks, are completely 
unsalable in the context of the phased, confidence-building concept we 
have presented to the Angolans.107 
Notwithstanding these problems or perhaps the impracticality of the linkage strategy, 
Washington nevertheless went ahead with its implementation. Central to Crocker’s plan 
was to allay South Africa’s fears by assuring it of the Reagan Administration’s 
“commitment to achieving Cuban withdrawal” while lying deliberately to the U.N., the 
OAU, the Frontline states, and other parties opposed to linkage “by defining the 
Angolan issue as separate, not formally linked and not part of Security Council 
Resolution 435.”108 
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The hypocrisy displayed by the administration in dealing with the Namibian 
issue was nothing if not a revelation of the bankruptcy of the whole policy of 
Constructive Engagement. While the United States went to all lengths—even to the 
extent of lying—in order to ease South Africa’s proclaimed security concerns, it 
received no cooperation from South Africa insofar as working toward a settlement was 
concerned. Instead, Pretoria used Washington’s linkage policy as a bargaining chip to 
prolong its presence in Namibia. As would Pik Botha would remark to Brand Fourier, 
South Africa “would get pretty far with Reagan administration when they were trying 
to halt Russian expansion.”109 
South Africa deliberately increased its support of UNITA by stepping up its 
incursions into Angola, thereby making it difficult, if not impossible, for the MPLA to 
even contemplate letting the Cubans go. Chester Crocker acknowledged this, saying the 
South African campaign necessitated the Cubans doing something “dramatic” and that 
the subsequent doubling of Cuban forces “upped the ante . . . creating a herding 
stalemate.”110 George Shepherd, Jr., provides a good summary of how South Africa 
exploited the linkage policy: 
The South African military and political leaders were not slow in 
adopting this strategy as they realized more quickly than the Reagan 
brain trust that this provided them with an excuse to remain in Namibia 
as long as they kept sufficient pressure on the Angolan government, thus 
requiring them to keep the Cubans to help with internal security. They, 
therefore, stepped up assistance to Savimbi and his UNITA enabling 
them to provide increasing guerrilla harassment of roads, railways and 
villages.111 
Strategic considerations blinded the Reagan Administration to the realities of 
southern Africa. Not only did American officials fail to appreciate the MPLA’s 
concerns about its own security, but they seem to have ignored the fact that South 
Africa’s occupation of Namibia was illegal, while the Cubans were in Angola at the 
invitation of that country’s sovereign government.112 Crocker would answer this 
criticism by claiming that the “feckless” Angolans were “not independent” and had to 
“look over their shoulder at Moscow or Havana” to make any decision.113 Writing a 
decade later, Crocker left little doubt that his linkage policy was, indeed, a product of 
geopolitical rationalization aimed at Soviet containment and concern over SWAPO’s 
Moscow-Luanda connection: 
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A winner-take-all SWAPO victory posed risks for the West, especially if 
it continued to enjoy cross-border support from the Communist powers 
ensconced in Angola. Ronald Reagan had not been elected to make 
Africa safer for Marxism, still less to work for yet another Marxist 
takeover in the wake of the 1975-78 Soviet-Cuban gains in Angola, 
Mozambique and Ethiopia and the Mugabe victory in Zimbabwe.114 
This was a clear indication that the Reagan Administration’s interest in southern Africa 
was primarily geopolitical, with little or no concern for the aspirations of black 
Africans. The major objective of linkage was the removal of Cuban forces from 
Angola, not the attainment of independence for Namibia. David Winder of The 
Christian Science Monitor noted the administration’s principal interest in the Namibian 
settlement: “the removal of some 30,000 Cuban troops from Angola whose presence 
contributes to the Reagan administration’s concerns about Soviet expansionism and the 
degree to which it is achieved through Cuban proxies.”115 Crocker vindicated Winder 
when he later stated, “We believed that we were promoting that which best served 
American interests . . . the likely reduction of communist influence in the region; a 
serious constraint on SWAPO; and a likely boost for UNITA.”116 
5.3.1  The Lusaka Agreement 
Early in 1984, Crocker’s strategy seemed to be producing the desired results. In 
December of 1983, Crocker and Pik Botha met in Rome, where the United States 
reportedly convinced the South Africans that, in order to move the negotiations 
forward, they should offer both a ceasefire and a withdrawal of South African forces 
from southern Angola if Angola would reciprocate in kind.117 Consequently, in mid-
December, the South Africans sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, Javier Perez 
de Cuellar, advancing such an agreement and proposing that it commence at the end of 
January 1984. While the proposal offered a “disengagement” for only a one-month trial 
period, it did agree to extend its provisions if the Angolans and the Cubans did not 
“exploit the resulting situation” by mounting or supporting attacks on Namibia.118 
Although the letter arrived at the U.N. one day before a scheduled Security Council 
debate on the latest South African incursion into Angola, the United States praised the 
South African offer as a generous proposal that would lead toward an improved climate 
for further negotiations on Namibia and that would meet previous Angolan demands 
that South African troops withdraw from its territory before Luanda consider 
negotiations leading toward Cuban withdrawal.119 
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In order to pursue this initiative, Crocker left Washington on January 25 for 
discussions in South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Mozambique and then travelled to 
Europe to brief the various members of the Contact Group. Meanwhile, Crocker’s 
deputy, Frank Wisner, met with the Angolans at Cape Verde and then went to Lisbon in 
order to brief the Portuguese—who were attempting to re-establish closer ties with both 
Angola and Mozambique—, after which he was to return to Africa in order to speak 
with the Angolans in Luanda.120 The purposes of these visits were to make sure that the 
South Africans did not scuttle the initiative, to obtain support from the frontline states 
for the initiative, to request that those same African states pressure Angola to respond 
favourably to the South African proposal, to coordinate the Angolan plan with the 
concurrent South Africa-Mozambique peace effort, and generally to persuade all 
concerned that this initiative was the best hope for a peaceful outcome in southern 
Africa. 
On January 27, Crocker met with Pik Botha in Cape Town and attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to pressure the South Africans into transforming their proposal into a 
firm commitment without conditions to withdraw from southern Angola and to expand 
their offer of a ceasefire from 30 to 90 days.121 Crocker’s primary worry was that the 
Angolans would not publicly accept the South African conditions, especially the 
required movement of Angolan troops within Angola, because they could undoubtedly 
be interpreted as a sovereignty question, and without such an Angolan 
acknowledgement, the South Africans would refuse to withdraw, essentially dooming 
the initiative. After two days of negotiations, however, Botha, while refusing to 
broaden South Africa’s proposal of a 30-day ceasefire, did concede Crocker’s point 
concerning Angola’s public acceptance of prior conditions and offered instead to accept 
American “assurances” that the Angolans would abide by Pretoria’s conditions.122 
After the Angolans told Wisner that they would agree to the South African conditions 
in private but not in public, that potential difficulty appeared to be resolved and the 
initiative remained on track.123 
Following Crocker’s visit to South Africa, Prime Minister P. W. Botha 
announced in Parliament that the SADF was beginning its “disengagement” from 
southern Angola. In early February, at the conclusion of a meeting of the SADCC that 
included all of the members of the frontline states, that organization’s final 
communiqué welcomed “signs of a less aggressive stance from South Africa” and 
alluded favourably to the recent Botha disengagement speech in the South African 
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Parliament. This SADCC communiqué appeared to indicate that Crocker was 
successful in obtaining frontline support for his initiative. More tellingly, not only were 
the ANC and SWAPO not invited to the meeting, but both Angola and Mozambique 
reportedly went to great lengths to encourage moderation at the conference in favour of 
the settlements underway.124 
On February 16, 1984, South Africa, Angola, and the United States met together 
in Lusaka for the first time since the three-way bilateral talks began in 1981. In order to 
preserve the ceasefire that was essential if the process was to lead to a full settlement, 
Crocker proposed the formation of a so-called Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) to 
be composed of South Africans, Angolans, and a small group of American military and 
diplomatic personnel. To be stationed at Cuvelai, Angola, the JMC force would be 
comprised of 600 Angolan and South African soldiers (300 from each nation) who 
would jointly patrol southern Angola in order to prevent SWAPO infiltration into 
Namibia. The dozen or so American members would act as mediators in case of 
disagreement.125 
The resultant Lusaka Accord was duly signed by representatives from both 
Angola and South Africa and appeared to signify a major American accomplishment 
and a positive first step in the Administration’s new policy toward a Namibian 
settlement. As Secretary of State Shultz stated the day before the Lusaka meeting 
began, the U.S. task was “to consolidate what has started and build upon it in the weeks 
and months ahead.”126 According to Crocker, this is the work of persistent, “quiet 
diplomacy” with the United States in the role of “an honest broker.” In fact, Crocker 
and the United States viewed the whole enterprise both as a practical arrangement that 
prevented SWAPO from taking advantage of the South African withdrawal and as a 
first step towards a Cuban withdrawal. If the initiative could be held together, the 
United States would achieve both a significant diplomatic triumph and a stunning 
strategic victory. 
5.3.2  TheNkomati Accord 
Whatever pressures the United States and South Africa felt concerning moving 
forward on the diplomatic process, it paled in comparison to that felt by Mozambique. 
Mozambique made the first move toward peace in 1981, soon after the United States 
pull-out from that country, when Samora Machel met with Wayne Smith of the U.S. 
Interests Section in Cuba and asked how bilateral relations with the United States could 
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be improved. The following year, three Mozambican diplomats visited Washington, 
D.C., to tell Secretary of State George Schultz, “Relations would be improved 
immediately if, instead of remaining silent, the United States condemned South African 
aggression.”127 This campaign for international understanding, which would come to be 
called the “diplomatic offensive,” was carefully planned by Mozambique and had as its 
goal a cessation of South Africa’s aggression and the cultivation of new sources of aid. 
Mozambique’s inquiries laid the ground for an exploratory mission by Special 
Envoy Frank Wisner to Maputo in December 1982. During the visit, Wisner reflected 
continuing Reagan Administration concern that Mozambique would move closer to the 
Soviet Union by warning against the “internationalization” of the regional conflict.128 
The State Department was particularly worried that Mozambique might call for Cuban 
troops to guard against RENAMO. However, a significant breakthrough did occur in 
that Wisner agreed that Mozambique had legitimate regional security problems, an 
element of Chester Crocker’s policy. This breakthrough was followed by a 
congressional study mission to Mozambique that was in the country on the 14th and 
15th of January 1983 and a multi-agency delegation led by Chester Crocker from the 
23rd to the 28th. At Mozambique’s request, the representatives reportedly told South 
African diplomats on a stopover in Pretoria that destabilization had become 
excessive.129 Thereafter, Mozambique and the United States began a rapid 
rapprochement.  
Behind the scenes, Chester Crocker was playing a leading role in increasing 
western influence in Mozambique by informing that country’s diplomats that regional 
stability in southern Africa would clear the way for more western aid. Crocker is 
reported to have put pressure on South Africa to sit down with Mozambique, and 
FRELIMO credits him with bringing about a more responsive attitude from South 
Africa,130 although no details of what leverage the United States used have been 
released.131 Given the fact that 1982 and 1983 were years of close cooperation between 
the United States and South Africa, it is doubtful that any warnings were issued. South 
Africa and Mozambique had, in fact, already held talks at Komatiport in December at 
which, Mozambique claims, South Africa rejected a proposal for an agreement, 
demanding that the ANC be expelled first. 
By January, however, Botha announced his willingness to talk again and new 
meetings were held in May. South Africa wanted any regional détente to be on its own 
terms and was willing to jeopardize the process to force the ANC out of Mozambique. 
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While efforts were being made to secure a pact, SADF planes bombed Matola again in 
May 1983, killing six people and wounding forty. In October, yet another commando 
raid was launched. Afterwards, Defence Minister Magnus Malan announced that a 
“Lebanese style” occupation of Mozambique might occur.132 
Mozambique, at that point, had no intention of expelling the ANC and stepped 
up the diplomatic offensive to bring more pressure on Pretoria. Chissano played to 
western fears about the Cuban presence in order to bring attention to the crisis: 
If international measures are not taken to stop South Africa from 
escalating its aggression, Mozambique, in the long run, may require 
more and more military assistance from the socialist countries that 
supported us during our struggle for independence.133 
With the economic crisis deepening and South Africa growing more aggressive, 
the FRELIMO leadership sought understanding of their plight from the international 
community. In October, Samora Machel capped the diplomatic offensive with a six-
nation tour of Europe. There is no general agreement concerning whether the tour was a 
success. Taking their lead from the United States, European nations had reduced aid as 
Washington cut back. At first, the tour of Europe produced only a slight improvement. 
However, Machel won agreement from heads of state to pressure Botha on a 
nonaggression pact when Botha toured Europe himself the following month.134 After 
his trip, Botha did agree to new talks. 
Other nations figured prominently in the movement toward an accord. In 
February 1983, Chester Crocker met with Soviet diplomats who were known to be 
concerned about Mozambique’s international position and had agreed to reschedule 
Mozambique’s debt while providing 13 million dollars in consumer goods plus new 
fuel credits and grain donations.135 However, it was Portugal that did the most to 
encourage the United States to deepen its involvement in Mozambique. In 1982 and 
1983, Portugal and Mozambique had signed several agreements on foreign aid, trade, 
and mutual security, setting an example for the United States. Portugal had even agreed 
to train Mozambican troops. In 1983, Portuguese president Ramalho Eanes had made 
an historic first post-colonial tour of Mozambique. Eanes and his staff met with their 
counterparts in the United States in August, and Eanes encouraged Reagan to respond 
positively to Mozambique when they met during Reagan’s tour of Europe in 
September.136 Thus, the United States continued to deepen its involvement in 
Mozambique. In September 1983, the two nations exchanged ambassadors. In 
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November, George Shultz announced that U.S. aid to Mozambique was in the national 
interest, clearing the way for emergency food supplies.137 President Reagan was an 
enthusiastic advocate for rapprochement with Mozambique, writing in his diary that 
now that the Soviets had failed the country, he “told our gang to get underway and ride 
to the rescue.”138  This change in policy, however, was not supported by all members of 
the administration. A personal note scrawled on the bottom of a memorandum to 
Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger warned about Samora Machel’s communist 
bent and said the “Administration needs to review the whole issue. I’m not sure that the 
President isn’t getting a sold a bill of goods with this guy.”139 
Despite scientism by some within the administration, rapid motion toward an 
accord became apparent by late 1983. On December 20, South Africa and Mozambique 
again met in Mbabane, Swaziland. Both were intent on getting an agreement. South 
Africa, facing growing internal economic pressure and international political pressure, 
recognized that it would get what it wanted from an agreement. Mozambique, on the 
other hand, had received assurances from the United States that it would receive the aid 
it required to extricate itself from its deepening financial crisis. Robert Gelbard, 
Director of the Office of Southern African Affairs in the State Department, explained: 
While we made no specific inducements to the government of 
Mozambique to implement Nkomati, we indicated that the entire process 
of reaching agreement with South Africa, liberalizing their economy and 
opening it up to the West (for example by joining the World Bank and 
IMF) would lead to new possibilities for dealing with their critical 
economic problems.140 
By the end of the meeting the two nations had, in principle, agreed to each 
other’s minimum demands—that South Africa cut off aid to RENAMO and that 
Mozambique stop ANC infiltration. Four commissions were established to discuss 
mutual security, economic relations, the supply of electricity, and tourism. Later, at a 
new year’s banquet for the diplomatic corps in Maputo, Samora Machel hailed 
cooperation with the west. During a speech, he said the only barrier to peace with South 
Africa was Pretoria’s support of RENAMO,141 which had signalled its distain for the 
peace process by massacring 50 people on a bus on Christmas day.142 
Throughout January ministerial-level meetings were held in both Maputo and 
Pretoria between the two countries. Washington added to the momentum. Senator John 
Danforth met with Ronald Reagan after returning from a tour of Africa and reported on 
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Mozambique’s drought and efforts at securing help. Reagan agreed to release the first 
instalment of what would be a huge increase in United States aid.143 
Furthermore, Chester Crocker shuttled between the two southern African 
capitals in early February meeting with Machel and Botha.144 On February 20, Machel 
and Botha met in Cape Town, clearing the way for a final round of ministerial-level 
meetings there that established the final wording of the accord. On March 16, 1984, 
amid great fanfare, the two presidents met at Komatiport and signed Nkomati, agreeing 
in part: 
The High Contracting Parties shall not allow their respective territories, 
territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or in 
any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces, 
organizations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of 
violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its 
inhabitants.145 
After the signing, Mozambique tried to present the accord publicly in the best possible 
light. Aquino de Braganca, a close adviser of Machel, explained that Nkomati was “a 
step backward which will permit us to consolidate our power toward the liberation of 
all southern Africa in different ways—through economic and political struggle.”146 
Reaction by southern African heads of state was mixed, but there was general 
agreement that it was inevitable. Even the ANC, although it reacted “like a jilted, 
petulant lover,”147 admitted that there was little else Mozambique could do. A State 
Department official was blunter, explicitly stating that Nkomati was a victory for the 
South African program of destabilization.148 
South Africa felt the same way. A white paper published in April indicated, 
“Firm SADF action laid the basis for peace.”149 Nkomati was seen as an important step 
in building the constellation of states.“South Africa, after Nkomati, is standing on the 
brink of the most dramatic breakthrough in its efforts to ensure peace in our part of the 
continent,” claimed an editorial.150 
Apparently Mozambique had not realized how much pressure would be put on it 
to expel the ANC. In February, a month before Nkomati was signed, Chief 
Mozambican negotiator Jacinto Veloso said the ANC would not have to leave the 
country. The ANC announced that it was aware of Mozambique’s vulnerable position 
and that “discussions are continuing in a spirit of comradeship.” When talk of expulsion 
surfaced, Alfred Nzo, ANC Secretary General, angrily denounced it as a “lie.”151 
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However, Nkomati Accords’ Article 3, committed both South Africa and Mozambique 
to prevent their territories from being used as “a base, thoroughfare, or in any other way 
by another state, government, foreign military forces . . . that may threaten the security 
of its inhabitants.”152 For South Africa, it meant Mozambique’s denying support for the 
ANC; conversely, Nkomati bound South Africa to restrict its support for the 
RENAMO. Consequently, within weeks of the signing, Mozambican troops had 
searched all ANC offices, closed most down, and had detained all but a few essential 
staff members for deportation. 
With the expulsion of more than 800 ANC activists from Mozambique and the 
reduction of the ANC presence to a 10-man Maputo office, the ANC threat from 
Mozambique disappeared overnight. The reaction of the ANC National Executive 
revealed the blow Nkomati struck the ANC.153 
Economically, Nkomati brought the hope of increased trade and investment 
between South Africa and Mozambique. Since the enactment of Nkomati, South 
African business constituencies such as the South African Foreign Trade Organization, 
the South African Agricultural Union, the Afrikaner Handelsinstitut, and individual 
South African businessmen were actively exploring the prospects of greater economic 
links. As the Financial Times noted, South African business interests became quite 
significant, especially in both tourism and the revitalization of plants and machinery.154 
Thus, South African businessmen developed an enormous stake in the success of the 
peace initiatives in southern Africa, especially in Mozambique.155 Moreover, South 
African businessmen hoped that South Africa’s improved international image would 
generate new loans and investment. For the first half of 1984, international credit terms 
for South Africa eased, and loans were extended for five to eight years—acts that 
would have been unthinkable a year earlier.156 
One of the most significant gains won by Nkomati was the international 
diplomatic credit P. W. Botha received, evidenced primarily by his 1984 tour of 
Europe. From May 29 to June 9, Botha conducted high-level talks in Lisbon, Bern, 
London, Bonn, Brussels, and Rome, selling South Africa’s new image as the 
“peacemaker” in southern Africa.157 
After the conclusion of Nkomati, South Africa and Swaziland publicized the 
signing of a similar treaty of nonaggression that sought to prevent the installation and 
maintenance of a foreign military presence within their respective territories.158 With 
the Swazi agreement, Nkomati, and the Lusaka Accord, it was clear that southern 
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Africa had been humbled and forced into treaties with South Africa out of desperation. 
Destabilization, combined with severe drought and economic recession, rendered 
questionable the region’s economic viability and political survival. As President 
Kaunda explained, “Yes, humble Swaziland agrees, humble Mozambique accepts, 
humble Zambia hosts meeting of unequal neighbours like South Africa and Angola. 
What else can we do? But we are not doing it with happy hearts. We do it out of 
fear.”159 
In short, a regional Pax Pretoriana seemed to have emerged. By beating the 
region into submission, the Republic achieved its longstanding desire of peace on South 
African terms, the ANC no longer directly threatened South Africa, and economic 
integration progressed at a rapid pace. For many in South Africa, such results 
vindicated the destabilization policy. The numerous SADF raids, support for UNITA 
and the RENAMO, transport diplomacy, and economic strangulation appeared to create 
the modus vivendi for which South Africa had searched since the Portuguese coup. 
For the United States, the diplomatic success was a vindication for Constructive 
Engagement and a major step towards removing communist influence in southern 
Africa. In a cable to all African diplomatic posts, Secretary George Schultz stated that 
Nkomati represented a blow to the “notion of – Armed Struggle – as the solution to 
South Africa’s Apartheid system” and the never viable “juggernaut theory of African 
liberation.”160 Schultz gave a nod of approval to the Total National Strategy, noting 
thatafter “carefully calculating the odds and assessing national interests” the FLS 
decided to rethink their support for the ANC and would “prevent violent actions from 
their territory.” Just as important as denying “guerrilla strategist” a safe-zone, the 
agreement helped to “reduce South Africa’s pariah status . . . Thus enabling South 
Africa’s regional dominance to acquire a legitimate form.” He added that the ANC—
who he described as a “hardened Soviet-back terrorist cadre and teenagers with AK-47s 
. . . but also urban activists and . . . grandmother in rockers”—needed to focus on 
“inside South Africa where the real job remains to be done.” This would prove 
prophetic. After Nkomati, the ANC would move the resistance into the Republic itself 
and do so with devastating effect.161 
5.4 The Resumption of Destabilization 
In 1985, after “sponsoring peace” in southern Africa the previous year, South 
Africa resumed its destabilization campaign. On May 21, 1985, an Angolan military 
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patrol foiled the attempt of a South African commando unit to sabotage the Gulf Oil 
installations in Cabinda that the Republic said was necessitated by ANC saboteurs in 
the country. Though the raid was a “setback” to American efforts to maintain stability 
after Lusaka, several weeks later, Pretoria launched another SADF raid on Gaborone.162 
Furthermore, in overt violation of the Lusaka Accord, the SADF re-entered Angola, 
ostensibly to attack SWAPO units. By September, South African forces were again 
engaged with Angolan troops, providing UNITA with SADF reinforcements and SAAF 
air cover in its defence against advancing Angolan divisions. 
The Lusaka Agreement was soon abandoned on the pretext of an Angolan 
violation. By mid-1984, South Africa appeared confident that Angola’s MPLA 
government would soon disintegrate, and support for UNITA drastically increased. In 
Namibia, a new “internal settlement” plan was put forward, and attacks against 
SWAPO forces were drastically increased. These actions were now possible because 
South Africa had freed itself of the stigma of “destabilization.”163 
Mozambique had been naive about Pretoria’s intentions. As Nkomati was being 
signed, 1,500 newly South African resupplied RENAMO troops crossed into Maputo 
province. In April, power to the capital was cut for the first time. Soon outages were 
constant. As RENAMO strength climbed to over 10,000, roads became impassable,164 
but as late as May 16, Information Minister Luis Cabap was still maintaining that 
RENAMO was withering without South African support.165 
Mozambique began a second campaign, this time to save the accord. South 
African businesses anxious to begin saving money by exporting through Maputo were 
told by Mozambique they would have to wait because of the security problems. 
Effected corporations complained to the South African government and an outcry grew 
in the press. RENAMO activities began to hurt South Africa directly. Forty pylons on 
the CahoraBassa lines were down, making a farce of electricity agreements. In 
September, Jacinto Veloso, after a fruitless meeting with Jorge Correira, RENAMO 
European spokesperson, warned the United States and South Africa that Nkomati was 
in danger.166 
RENAMO insisted that it would renegotiate only if there were a government of 
national unity. Finally, South African Foreign Minister Botha convinced RENAMO to 
talk to FRELIMO, and the two groups met in Pretoria. After a week of negotiating in 
October 1984, Botha announced that Mozambique and RENAMO had agreed to a 
ceasefire. According to Botha, RENAMO had recognized Machel as Mozambique’s 
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head-of-state, dropping demands for a government of national unity, and Mozambique 
had agreed to amnesty for the guerrillas. They also agreed to continue discussions on 
integrating RENAMO into the Armed Forces of Mozambique (FAM).167 The 
negotiations, however, were all for naught. Fernandes vowed to fight on the day after 
the announcement, and the war continued.168 
By the end of 1984, it was clear that South Africa was willing neither to rein in 
RENAMO nor to provide economic assistance to Mozambique. Authorities in Maputo 
accused South Africa of continuing its clandestine aid to the RENAMO. Despite South 
African assurances to the contrary, the increased strength of the RENAMO suggested 
that South Africa still supported its Mozambican proxy. In September 1985, Maputo 
released the RENAMO Vaz diaries, captured in a joint Mozambican-Zimbabwean 
offensive in the Gorongosa area of Mozambique in August. These diaries provided 
conclusive evidence of South African violations of the Nkomati Accord. For example, 
the diaries revealed that South Africa had carried out twenty-five pre-Nkomati supply 
drops to fortify the RENAMO for at least six months after the conclusion of the accord. 
After Nkomati, South African planes flew arms and other supplies to the RENAMO 
base and shuttled RENAMO and South African officials between South Africa and the 
Gorongosa base. In fact, the then-Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Nel, flew 
to Gorongosa for meetings with the MNR three times during June, July, and August 
1985.253 At a press conference on September 18, 1985, Pik Botha confirmed many of 
the infractions contained in the Vaz diaries, including the Nel visits to Gorongosa and 
various South African supply drops. 
For all intents and purposes, the accord collapsed. Mozambique continued to 
adhere to the bargain, but by early 1985, Pretoria had abandoned any pretence of 
political solutions in the region and had resorted once again to economic and military 
action. The continued destabilization of Mozambique; the threats against Zimbabwe; 
the commando raid against Angola’s Cabinda oil installation in May and the large-scale 
invasion of southern Angola in September-October; the SADF attacks against 
Botswana in June and Lesotho in December; the threat in December to invade 
Botswana yet again; and the January 1986 blockade of Lesotho, which precipitated a 
coup d’état followed by a rapidly concluded security agreement and the expulsion of all 
ANC members, all pointed to a new militarized phase in the Total National Strategy. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
By 1984, it was obvious to even the most ideologically blinkered observer that 
apartheid South Africa was not willing to live peacefully with its neighbours and had 
never had that intention. The Total National Strategy was about power, not peace. The 
regime’s regional policy had sought to internationalize its domestic problems and force 
its neighbours to recognize South African hegemony in the region. Despite the fact that 
the ANC was denied effective access to Mozambique, its armed actions did not 
correspondingly decrease, and by the end of 1984, Pretoria was confronted with a 
growing urban revolt. The Nkomati Accord, like all of South Africa’s region actions, 
had done nothing to stem the violence and conflict within South Africa. By 1985, the 
Total Strategy had failed to stem the internal revolt and further isolated the country in 
the international arena.169 The Botha government’s attempt to export apartheid’s 
problems through the Total Strategy had shown some promise, but ultimately, it was 
not enough to stem the country’s internal problems. 
Therefore, in view of South Africa’s failure to honour both the Lusaka and 
Nkomati Accords, Washington’s claims of victory for its policy of Constructive 
Engagement were hallow. In both instances, its trusted ally, the Botha Administration, 
proved to be ungrateful for the confidence bestowed upon it by the Reagan 
Administration and was only interested in those aspects of Constructive Engagement 
that complemented the Total National Strategy.170 Not only was this an indication of 
the flaws inherent in Constructive Engagement concerning the source of violence in 
southern Africa, but it also made the United States look like a collaborator in South 
Africa’s regional destabilization strategy as a means to protect white minority 
domination. According to a Washington Post article, critics of Constructive 
Engagement also asserted that the policy made the United States look “very foolish. A 
friendly government for which it did a great favor has duped it. . . . The Reagan policy . 
. . is embarrassed on the very ground where its greatest triumph had been 
proclaimed.”171 
Not only did the South African government extend its stay in Namibia by hiding 
behind Western fears of communism, but it also launched a spirited assault on 
SWAPO, the ANC, and the governments of Angola and Mozambique, all in the name 
of anti-communism. James Mittelman, a specialist on southern Africa, correctly 
evaluated the impact of the U.S.-South African anti-communist alliance on U.S. policy 
toward southern Africa: 
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Our policy . . . tells us more about anti-communist preconceptions in the 
U.S. than it does about problems in the sub-continent. A careful 
examination of the policy demonstrates that American insistence on 
South African and Cuban troop withdrawals . . . gives South Africa a 
pretext to linger in Namibia.172 
The outcome should have come as no surprise. The Reagan Administration was 
preoccupied with getting the Cubans out of Angola, thus reducing the threat of Soviet 
expansion in the region. As part of this process, the administration sought to increase 
the sway of South Africa over all states in the region and openly sought to change the 
direction of states it regarded as inimical to U.S. interests, such as Angola and 
Mozambique. By the beginning of 1985, however, the region was still at war. Without 
substantive progress at securing regional stability, the Reagan Administration’s policy 
of Constructive Engagement would be increasingly hard to defend on the domestic 
front, especially after uprisings began in South Africa in 1984. 
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Chapter VI 
6.1 The Demise of Constructive Engagement 
As publicly spelled out by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, the 
central objectives of the policy of Constructive Engagement were fourfold: first, to 
achieve a settlement for Namibian independence; second, to promote regional peace 
and security in southern Africa; third, to encourage the white-led reform process in 
South Africa; and fourth, to curb Soviet expansion and influence in the region by 
getting the Cubans out of Angola.1 The fourth objective, which was clearly the most 
important in the estimation of Reagan the Administration, necessitated that the third 
objective, the process of political reform, did not go so far as unseating the Nationalist 
Party, whose Total National Strategy would serve as the “anvil” of American 
diplomacy in southern Africa. 
By the end of the Reagan Administration’s first term, none of the central 
objectives of Constructive Engagement had been achieved. Namibia had not attained its 
independence and would not do so until two years after Reagan’s departure from office. 
Regional peace was still far from being a reality, largely because South Africa’s 
incursions into neighbouring countries continued unabated. Not only were Cubans 
troops still in Angola, but they were also increasing in numbers. Even more important, 
political repression and violence in South Africa was at its highest point in fifty years. 
One can conclude, therefore, that Constructive Engagement had not achieved its stated 
objectives. 
Consequently, as it moved into its second term, the Reagan Administration was 
assailed at home and abroad for failing to deliver on its promise to promote orderly 
change in southern Africa. The administration’s critics charged that Constructive 
Engagement made the United States a sponsor of the apartheid regime rather than a 
broker for peace and stability in the region.2 In the United States, discontent with the 
administration’s embrace of South Africa’s white minority government manifested 
itself through a growing public campaign and demonstrations at the South African 
Embassy in Washington, DC. By mid-1985, the tide of public protest had spread to 
other cities and university campuses across the country.3This public outcry was 
channelled largely through the Free South Africa Movement, a Washington-based 
coalition of over two hundred groups, including prominent political leaders, trade 
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unionists, athletes, and television personalities. The movement also appealed directly to 
the U.S. Congress to pass legislation imposing economic sanctions against South 
Africa.4 
Meanwhile, inside the White House and on Capitol Hill, the administration’s 
entire southern African strategy was coming under increasing attack from both 
Republicans and Democrats alike.5As violence continued within the Republic during 
the second Reagan term, the move to disassociate with the Republic’s domestic and 
regional policies grew even stronger, driving the Administration into a defensive 
position from which it would never recover. Hoping to mitigate these criticisms, the 
Reagan Administration attempted to persuade Pretoria to relax its suppression of 
political unrest, but to no avail. Convinced that, to relax its control over its black 
minority would lead to chaos within the Republic, the South African government made 
no moves toward liberalization of the political system. Rather, Pretoria continued to 
crack down on the opposition with draconian security measures. Such actions, in turn, 
gave momentum to the American opposition’s push for legislative action. Punitive 
sanctions, when implemented, destroyed the basis of the administration policy, and the 
U.S. foreign policy of Constructive Engagement and South Africa’s Total National 
Strategy could no longer function as mutually reinforcing policies. 
6.1.1  Mobilization of the Opposition in the United States 
The impact of television and other media reports about South Africa’s 
draconian security measures had an immediate and profound influence on world 
opinion. The American public, in particular, became convinced that their government’s 
claim to significant change taking place in the Republic as a result of Constructive 
Engagement was illusory if not deceptive. As a result, demonstrations against the 
administration’s southern African policy increased and spread to almost every corner in 
the United States. The demonstrators called upon U.S. companies and universities to 
withdraw their investments from South Africa and urged Congress to grab the initiative 
from the administration by legislating economic sanctions.6 
Several American state and city administrations also added to the pressure on 
these companies by adopting divestment legislation. For example, in early 1985, New 
York City passed legislation forbidding city deposits in banks that offered loans to the 
South African government.7Later that same year, New York and Pittsburgh passed 
measures that restricted city purchases from companies involved in South Africa.8 By 
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the end of the year, “fourteen states, nine counties and 58 cities [across the U.S.] had 
adopted policies either withdrawing funds or limiting other business with banks making 
loans to South Africa.”9 
In addition, by the end of 1985, major international and local banks, including 
Seafirst, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, The Bank of Boston, and First Bank System, 
stopped short-term loans to the South African government and the private sector. Most 
importantly, North Carolina Bank Corporation, which held the largest loan to South 
Africa and was the only regional bank with an office in that country, cancelled all new 
loans.10 Pretoria was confronted by a serious financial crisis and was compelled to 
declare a one-year moratorium on its foreign debt payments, amounting to almost $20 
billion.11 South Africa’s economic woes became even more critical following a drastic 
drop in the value of the rand, whose exchange rate reached below U.S. $0.40.12 
Furthermore, by the mid-1980s, several Western governments had begun 
serious consideration of imposing economic sanctions against South Africa. In July 
1985, France placed a ban on new investments and introduced a resolution in the U.N. 
Security Council imploring member states to adopt similar action.13 In October 1986, 
foreign ministers from the twelve European Community countries met in Luxembourg 
to discuss further sanctions against South Africa.14 
Thus, the Reagan Administration, as it settled into its second term, found itself 
confronted by a combination of domestic and external forces that were too powerful to 
ignore. As a result, Washington concluded that it had to do something about its 
southern African policy or risk standing alone as the sole world sponsor of the 
apartheid regime. The shifts that occurred in U.S. policy toward South Africa in the late 
1980s should, therefore, be understood in the dual contexts of this increasing pressure 
and of the Reagan Administration’s attempt to prevent Congress from limiting its 
options in the conduct of foreign policy in southern Africa. 
6.1.2  The U.S. Congress Goes on the Attack 
The onset of violence within the Republic and its coverage in the American 
news media led to a renewed effort by the anti-South African forces within the United 
States not only to disseminate their convictions regarding the South African regime and 
the policy of Constructive Engagement but to enlist the U.S. Congress in taking the 
lead on policy in southern Africa. Emboldened by dramatic events within the Republic, 
the opposition staged protests at the South African Embassy with the press in tow. It 
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was at the height of these actions that Bishop Desmond Tutu, recipient of the Nobel 
Peace Prize, came to the United States to add his voice to the growing attacks against 
Constructive Engagement and the Total National Strategy. 
Introduced to the American public by Harold Wolpe, the chairman of the House 
subcommittee on Africa, Tutu brought the “South African black” perspective, which 
had been ignored in the Reagan Administration’s pursuit of geopolitical objectives in 
southern Africa. The bishop’s views mirrored those held by congressional critics of 
Constructive Engagement and the Total National Strategy, attacking directly the 
constitutional “reform” as “an instrument of the politics of exclusion” that denied rights 
to 73% of the South African population.15 Similarly, Tutu asserted that the Reagan 
Administration’s policy of Constructive Engagement was “immoral, evil, and totally 
un-Christian. . . . You are either for or against apartheid and not by rhetoric. You are 
either in favour of evil or you are in favour of good. You are either on the side of the 
oppressed or on the side of the oppressor. You can’t be neutral.”16 He warned that it 
was in America’s best interest to change course in South Africa because “we shall be 
free, and we will remember who helped us to become free. That is not a threat. It is just 
a statement of fact.”17 If the United States would not help, it was inevitable that South 
African blacks would turn to the Soviet Union, for while “blacks deplore communism 
as being atheistic and materialistic . . . they would regard the Russians as their saviors, 
were they to come to South Africa, because anything in their view would be better than 
apartheid.” Accordingly, Tutu urged the U.S. Congress to pursue punitive economic 
sanctions against the Republic and put an “end to collaboration with the perpetrators of 
apartheid.”18 
On December 7, 1984, Bishop Tutu, who the President would later privately 
admit he did not like,19 was invited to the White House to share his views with Reagan. 
While the president acknowledged Tutu’s sincerity, he believed he was “naive” and did 
not understand or appreciate the American approach that had achieved “considerable 
progress with quiet diplomacy.” Writing in his diaries, he added: 
There are S. Africans who want an end to Apartheid & I think they 
understand what we are doing. American owned firms in S.A. treat their 
employees as they would in Am. This has meant a tremendous 
improvement for thousands & thousands of S.A. Blacks. There have 
been other improvements but there is still a long way to go. The Bishop 
seems unaware, even though he himself is Black, that part of the 
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problem is tribal not racial. If apartheid ended now there still would be 
civil strife between the Black tribes.20 
Because of the publicity associated with the South African unrest and the visit 
to Washington by Bishop Tutu, it was inevitable that the Congress would focus its 
attention on the carnage in the Republic. Even the Republican controlled Senate, which 
had normally deferred to the administration’s judgment on foreign policy, began to 
waver in its support of President Reagan’s policies in southern Africa. The first of 
dozens of hearings by the Senate Subcommittee on Africa began in September of 1984, 
with the outbreak of violence. High profile members of the Senate would also lend their 
stature to political protests organized by Transafrica at the South African embassy in 
Washington. Beginning in November 1984, Transafrica, organized by the 
Congressional Black Caucus, proved extremely savvy at focusing the public’s attention 
on South Africa’s racial policies. Using Democratic Party politicians and high-profile 
actors and musicians, the group’s demonstrations resulted in arrests that were followed 
closely by print and television media.21 
The demonstrations were followed by Senator Edward Kennedy’s January 1985 
visit to South Africa. Presented to the public as a fact-finding mission to “highlight the 
harshness of apartheid,” Kennedy, accompanied by the media, visited townships, 
squatter camps, and resettlement areas with Allan Boesak and Desmond Tutu. Speaking 
outside Pollsmoor prison, Kennedy praised the political prisoners’ “commitment to 
freedom” and asked South African officials for a meeting with Nelson Mandela. 
Denied access to Mandela, Kennedy announced that the apartheid regime was not 
committed to making “meaningful progress” in its racial policies.22 Joined by 
Republican Lowell Weicker (R-Conn.), Kennedy introduced a bill that would ban all 
new bank loans to the South African government and to the South African private 
sector, prohibit all new investments in the Republic, terminate the importation of gold 
Kruggerand coins into the United States, and stop the sale of American computers to 
the South African government.23 
Declaring Constructive Engagement a “catastrophic failure,” Kennedy 
demanded that “this system of apartheid not be furthered or strengthened anymore by 
American investment and by American support.”24 While he took pains to point out 
that his proposed legislation was not a “disinvestment bill,” Kennedy did feel that 
implementing punitive measures against the South Africans would 
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make our policy consistent with American values. Because of 
Constructive Engagement, we have not only lost the rightful position as 
a moral leader on the questions of rights and liberties, but also we 
endanger our position in South Africa for the future. South Africa will 
be free some day and, make no mistake about it, those in that 
government when it is free are going to ask whether the United States 
was the last country to go down with apartheid. . . . It certainly appears 
to blacks in South Africa today that this is the case.25 
Companion legislation within the House to the Kennedy-Weicker bill was 
introduced by William Gray, with the acknowledged assistance of Steven Solarz and 
Howard Wolpe. According to Gray, the primary purpose of the legislation was to 
prevent indirect American financing of apartheid by forbidding American investment, 
loans, and imports of South African gold, which theoretically allowed the government 
to “cover” its expanded budget requirements due to its enforcement of its racial system. 
Like Kennedy, Gray stressed that the legislation was by no means a divestment bill that 
would force American firms to pull out of South Africa:26 “The argument that this 
legislation would cause divestment is absolutely wrong . . . absurd and ludicrous” and 
“is like arguing you cannot end slavery because you will have an unemployment 
problem.” Black leaders like Tutu and Boesak had stated that they were already 
suffering and, thus, were “crying out” for economic sanctions against the South African 
government. It was the moral duty of the United States to accommodate them.27 
Not to be outdone by Congressional Democrats, Senate Republicans also 
expressed their doubts about the administration’s policy and were eager to reflect their 
concerns in a tangible manner. Senator John Heinz (R-Penn.), the chairman of the 
International Finance and Monetary Policy Subcommittee, which like the Foreign 
Relations Committee was reviewing the possibility of South African sanctions, warned 
the Administration that Congressional action was imminent and that the Administration 
would be “well advised” to do everything it could “within its policy framework to get 
better results . . . because it is results—or I should say the lack of them—that has the 
majority of the House and Senate very, very concerned.” In Heinz’s view, there was “a 
substantial amount of House and Senate bipartisan support for doing something more 
than we are doing now.” This was, in part, “related to the fact that the perception of 
Constructive Engagement as an effective force in bringing about peaceful change in 
South Africa is simply not yielding the results that [the administration] would like it to 
yield.”28 
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Although Nancy Kassebaum, the Republican chairman of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Africa, shared many of the above problems with the Administration’s 
policy, she did think it important that any proposed legislation “not do something that 
could perpetuate the violence in such a way that any attempt for constructive . . . 
involvement by the United States becomes irrelevant.”29 In Kassebaum’s view, “if we 
throw down a gauntlet with demands, we will be met . . . by an intransigence. I think it 
has to be done in such a way that we are not appearing to be dictating a policy that . . . 
has to be met, or else.30 
Aware of these difficulties but nonetheless, like their Democratic-counterparts, 
wishing to become directly and publicly involved, Senate Republicans introduced their 
own legislation that, in a sense, was a compromise between the strict Democratic 
legislation and the well-known Administration aversion to sanctions. Introduced by 
Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, the Republican legislation intended, in Lugar’s words, to provide a “strong 
mix of concern, encouragement, and incentive to guide our policies toward South 
Africa.”31 Bristling because the Washington Post had called his legislation “an 
Administration bill,” Lugar maintained that his proposed legislation was purely an 
initiative of Republicans within the Senate and that its purpose was both to demonstrate 
American support for the black population of South Africa and to impose select 
punitive sanctions against that state.32 
Although Lugar’s bill was less severe than the Democratic version, it was 
indicative of general Republican uneasiness over the Administration’s policy—
especially as well-publicized violence and unrest continued within the Republic. 
Lugar’s proposed legislation had two aspects. First, it proposed that the U.S. 
government show its support toward black South Africans by granting $15 million for 
scholarships to be used both in the United States and in South Africa and $1.5 million 
per year to be used especially for legal purposes by the U.S. human rights program in 
the Republic. It similarly directed that American government facilities and agencies 
support and assist black South African businesses and that the Sullivan principles—
voluntary “fair employment” codes for American firms operating within South 
Africa—become mandatory for all U.S.-South African subsidiaries that employed 25 or 
more employees.33 
Second, the Republican legislation advocated a number of punitive sanctions 
with the promise of more to come in eighteen months if the South African government 
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failed to make “significant progress” toward abolishing apartheid. Including such 
provisions as banning loans to the South African government, prohibiting the sale of 
computers and similar technology to government agencies involved in the enforcement 
of apartheid, and forbidding nuclear trade between the United States and the Republic, 
the Republican sanctions were in reality quite mild because they paralleled either 
existing practices (American bank loans to the South African government) or areas in 
which the executive branch had current restrictions in effect (sales of computers and 
nuclear cooperation).34 They did, however, indicate to the Administration that 
Republican Senate support for its policy was lukewarm at best and, consequently, that 
if Republicans within the Senate did eventually fail to support the Administration’s 
position on its South African policy, harsh sanctions and the resultant destruction of 
Constructive Engagement were probable in the immediate future. It was with these 
thoughts in mind that the Administration launched a comprehensive assault on its 
critics and a spirited defence of its policy in the spring of 1985. 
6.1.3  Pre-empting Sanctions 
In order to prevent Congress from taking the initiative in the unfolding South 
African debate, the Reagan Administration attempted a series of manoeuvres that were 
aimed at creating the impression that it was, indeed, doing something to alter its 
southern African strategy. In September 1985, President Reagan issued Executive 
Order 12532, which invoked trade restrictions, prohibited U.S. financial institutions 
from granting loans to the South African government, and outlawed the sale of South 
African Krugerrands in the United States.35 It also banned 
all export of computers, computer software, or goods . . . intended to 
service computers or for use by . . . the military, the police, the prison 
system, national security agencies, Armscor and its subsidiaries...and 
any apartheid enforcement agency.36 
The President’s Executive Order, which was to take effect on November 11, 1985, was 
followed by the appointment of an advisory committee to the Secretary of State. The 
committee was given a mandate to study and recommend “guidelines for a U.S. policy 
toward South Africa that was most likely to further the peaceful elimination of 
apartheid and the creation of a nonracial democratic political system”37 
The administration had hoped that the advisory committee would uphold its 
policy of Constructive Engagement and recommend against adopting a confrontational 
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approach toward the South African government.38However, much to the President’s 
disappointment, when the committee submitted its report in January 1987, it declared 
that “the administration’s strategy of Constructive Engagement has failed to achieve its 
objectives,” and it urged the President to take the lead in helping to enforce more 
substantial economic sanctions against South Africa.39 
Also, in an effort to disarm its critics, the Reagan Administration resolved to 
adopt strong rhetoric denouncing South Africa for its naked brutality against its 
political opponents and for its persistent cross-border attacks into neighbouring 
countries allegedly in search of “ANC terrorists.” For instance, in May 1985, a U.S. 
Representative to the U.N. Security Council condemned South African raids into 
Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The South African attacks, the official noted, 
were reprehensible, irresponsible and inexcusable. The United States 
condemns them, without reservations, and calls upon Pretoria to 
examine the consequences of its latest aggression. . . . Instead of taking 
steps to bridge the gaps separating [it and its] neighbors, who have so 
many reasons to live in peace, South Africa has chosen to lash out at 
Sovereign states. . . . It is . . . employing these strong-arm tactics to prop 
up apartheid, a system my government is committed to eliminate by 
every peaceful, appropriate measure at our disposal.40 
The administration also issued official statements urging Pretoria to lift the state 
of emergency and to “enter into a dialog with black nationalist leaders, to work out a 
negotiated settlement to the problems that exist in South Africa.”41 
As already noted, the actions taken by the Reagan Administration at the 
beginning of its second term were not aimed at altering its policy toward South Africa. 
These measures constituted to a large extent shifts in strategy rather than a reversal of 
the overall policy. Though clearly President Reagan was unsettled by South Africa’s 
brutality towards its neighbours, the administration had not changed its views on how 
to influence change in southern Africa and still regarded South Africa as critical in 
rolling back Soviet influence in the region.42 Thus, the administration’s strong anti-
apartheid rhetoric was often mixed with a determined effort to frustrate any 
congressional effort to invoke sanctions against Pretoria. It is in this context that the 
President’s Executive Order 12532 should be understood as a calculated bid to pre-
empt a stronger congressional sanctions bill that could have led to a total U.S. embargo 
against South Africa.43As Secretary of State George Shultz noted in his memoirs: 
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Neither the President, nor I, had changed our views on the importance of 
maintaining an American business presence in South Africa, but I saw 
the Executive Order as a necessary response to South African behaviour 
and compatible with a continued American presence.44 
6.1.4  Sanctions 
The changes made by the Reagan Administration to its southern African policy 
proved insufficient to discourage the Congressional drive for harsher economic 
sanctions against Pretoria. Throughout 1986, a string of bills dealing with the issue of 
sanctions against South Africa were introduced in Congress. In June, the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee endorsed the bill sponsored by Congressman Gray.45 When debate 
on the bill began, House members voted to substitute for the Gray bill a much tougher 
bill sponsored by Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-California). The new bill called for 
a complete trade embargo against South Africa and ordered all U.S. companies there to 
withdraw their investments within 180 days after enactment.46 
In August, the Senate passed its own version of the economic sanctions bill by a 
vote of 84 to 14. Prepared by Republican moderate and Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee chairman, Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), the Senate bill incorporated the major 
provisions of the President’s 1985 Executive Order and called for a ban on new 
investments in South Africa and on new loans to the Pretoria government.47 
Under normal procedures, a House-Senate Conference Committee would have 
been formed to reconcile the Senate and House bills. However, after Lugar informed 
the House leadership that he would not accept any changes to his bill, the House, in 
order to avoid a political showdown, chose by a vote of 308 to 77 to accept without 
amendments Lugar’s bill.48The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA), 
as the compromise bill came to be called, was approved by both the Senate and the 
House in September 1986. 
Despite the fact that the provisions of the final version of the Comprehensive 
Anti-Apartheid Act were mild compared to the bill proposed by House Democrats in 
June, the President still opposed several measures included in the Act. Consequently, 
on September 26, Reagan vetoed the bill despite advice to the contrary from Senator 
Lugar and other Republican leaders who feared that a presidential veto would arouse 
public discontent. Three days later, President Reagan wrote a letter to Congress 
offering to sign a new Executive Order expanding the provisions of his 1985 Executive 
Order. He also promised to launch a comprehensive multi-year program that would 
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promote economic reform and development in the black-ruled states of southern 
Africa.49In October 1986, President Reagan lobbied Congressional Republicans to 
sustain his veto or “risk undermining the President’s position as the chief executive 
responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs—just prior to meeting the head of state of 
the world’s other superpower.”50 In a phone conversation with Republican Frank 
Murkowski, President Reagan argued that since the veto “I’ve proposed taking some 
significant actions similar to measures taken by our allies—coupled with some positive 
measures of assistance for victims of apartheid and a multi-year program for economic 
reform and development of black-ruled southern African states.” Despite the 
congressional offensive, the President’s compromise was overwhelmed by bipartisan 
support for the sanctions bill sitting in front of Congress. On October 2, the U.S. 
Congress overrode President Reagan’s veto by a wide margin to pass the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.51 
The circumstances surrounding the passage of this act epitomized the great 
disagreements that prevailed during the mid-1980s between the executive and 
legislative branches over apartheid in South Africa. While the President and his aides 
continued to emphasize South Africa’s strategic and economic importance to the 
United States, Congress was prepared to look past the Cold War rivalry and to 
concentrate on Pretoria’s racial policies. 
The CAAA enumerated a list of U.S. policy goals whose overall purpose was to 
apply economic pressure on South Africa, forcing it to take fundamental steps to 
abolish apartheid and to establish in its place a nonracial, democratic form of 
government. Among other things, the CAAA demanded the release of political 
prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, and the repeal of the state of emergency and 
other key laws that enforced apartheid. Perhaps more importantly from the viewpoint of 
the Reagan Administration, it urged Pretoria to begin negotiations with representatives 
of all racial groups in South Africa and to terminate its acts of aggression against 
neighbouring countries.52 
The CAAA also listed areas of trade that would no longer be permitted between 
the United States and South Africa, including a ban on the importation of South African 
coal, iron, steel, uranium, and sugar as well as nuclear and arms trade. It also prohibited 
air traffic between the two countries along with new U.S. investments in South Africa, 
and it terminated the tax treaty that protected transnational corporations operating in 
South Africa from “double taxation.”53Finally, the act threatened to invoke further 
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sanctions if South Africa did not make substantial progress toward reform. Legally 
obliged to implement the CAAA, despite his open hostility toward it, President Reagan, 
on October 27, issued Executive Order 12571 instructing “all affected Executive 
departments to take all steps necessary, consistent with the [American] Constitution, to 
implement the requirements of the act.”54 
On paper, the CAAA appeared to be a powerful piece of legislation capable of 
hobbling the South African economy. However, shortly after it came into force, the act 
revealed a number of loopholes that blunted its effectiveness.55 For example, article 
501(c) of the CAAA stated that further sanctions were to be imposed only if and when 
the President determined that the Pretoria government had not done enough to 
dismantle apartheid.56 Keeping in mind that Reagan was opposed to economic 
sanctions against South Africa, for him to be the sole enforcer of that rule was almost 
tantamount to assuring the South African government that further sanctions were 
unlikely. Consequently, throughout the remainder of his term, President Reagan used 
article 501(c) to block further sanctions despite evidence that the South Africans were 
determined to keep the structure of apartheid intact. 
Another key problem with the CAAA lay in the lax interpretation of terms and 
implementation of its regulations, particularly when it came to deciding which of South 
Africa’s minerals were strategically important to the United States. Moreover, Congress 
gave the executive branch a free hand to compile its own list of such minerals, which 
were then exempted from the CAAA ban. Left to its own devices, “the executive 
[branch] . . . formulated a broad definition of strategic minerals, thereby exempting a 
greater number of South African exports than the Congress probably intended.”57 
Because mineral exports were among South Africa’s most crucial sources of income, 
Pretoria was able to postpone any major economic setbacks that may have occurred as a 
result of a more effective U.S. embargo or similar sanctions by other important Western 
nations.58 
Definitional problems in the CAAA were even more apparent in determining 
which U.S. investments qualified as “new investments” and which did not. For 
instance, reinvestment of profits into existing operations was not defined as “new 
investment” and became, therefore, an exception to the prohibitions of the CAAA.59 In 
addition, financial and other forms of transactions necessary to allow existing 
operations to continue were exempted from the ban.60Furthermore, apart from the fines 
that could be imposed on companies found to be violating any of the provisions of the 
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CAAA, there were no safeguards to ensure against possible evasion of the 
act.61Companies, therefore, found it possible to circumvent the CAAA through a 
variety of methods. For example, several companies opted to disinvest by relocating to 
other countries, reducing the South African operations to the levels of subsidiaries.62 
These companies also formed trusts, and because they were then based outside South 
Africa, they could legally make loans to those trusts. That situation enabled them to 
purchase the subsidiaries’ assets and then use the dividends from the subsidiaries to pay 
off the loans to the parent companies.63 Haider Khan, among others, correctly pointed 
out that this kind of arrangement allowed U.S. companies to “avoid the moral stigma of 
being involved in apartheid, skirt the foreign exchange regulations . . . and sidestep the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, all at the same time.”64 
Due to the flaws in its format and implementation, the significance and impact 
of the CAAA became arguably more symbolic than real. Because the leverage to 
transform that symbolic character into something more powerful rested with a President 
who was opposed to sanctions, Pretoria could afford to take the risk and regard the 
initial measures of the CAAA as “the maximum to expect.”65 Moreover, the 
ineffectiveness of the CAAA lifted the pressure from President Botha, who not only 
ignored its specific demands but also stuck to his own list of minor reforms that had 
been derided by anti-apartheid groups as a farce.66 
Consequently, the act served primarily as a demonstration to Pretoria that 
stronger actions could be taken if the white minority government did not take 
significant steps to do away with apartheid. However, its ineffectiveness 
notwithstanding, the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over the 
President’s veto did mark an important turning point in the history of United States-
South African relations. To begin with, Congress by the CAAA sent a clear message to 
the South African government that the United States could, when it chose, use both 
sticks and carrots to conduct its foreign policy. Conversely, had it failed to pass the act, 
Congress would have sent the wrong message to Pretoria. The most significant legacy 
of the act, perhaps, lay in the fact that it brought a totally new dimension to the 
American political debate over sanctions against South Africa. For the first time, a 
president was abandoned by members of his own party, most notably in the Republican 
controlled Senate, in the passage of a sanctions bill over his veto.67 
6.1.5  Effects of the CAAA on Constructive Engagement 
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The passage of the CAAA with its token impact reopened the political debate 
over the effectiveness of sanctions as a political tool to pressure South Africa into 
dismantling apartheid. The limited nature of its impact provided the administration and 
others who were against sanctions with ammunition against congressional proponents 
of additional economic sanctions. In his report to Congress a year after the CAAA had 
been enacted, President Reagan declared: 
I regret that I am unable to report any progress leading to the end of 
apartheid and the establishment of a nonracial democracy in South 
Africa. . . . The two sets of economic sanctions imposed against South 
Africa to date . . . have sent a clear message to the ruling white 
community that the American people are outraged by the institutional 
injustice of apartheid. . . . [T]he South African leadership has reacted 
defiantly toward these measures. . . . Yet the most important goal of the 
[Anti-Apartheid Act] was to pressure the South African government to 
meet the unambiguous prescriptions of the act itself. . . . Significant 
progress has not been made . . . in the last twelve month period since the 
enactment of the act. . . . My conclusion is that the imposition of 
additional economic sanctions . . . would not be helpful.68 
Congressional proponents of economic sanctions shared the President’s view 
that the CAAA had failed to achieve its stated objectives. However, they differed with 
him on the issue of further sanctions. Instead, they insisted that he impose additional 
sanctions as required by article 501(c) of the act. However, because the gap between 
the views of the executive and legislative branches could not be bridged, the debate 
over additional sanctions became a highly politicized and never-ending subject of 
proposed legislation for the remainder of Reagan’s tenure as President.69 
The failure of the CAAA to draw any major concessions from the South African 
government, it may be argued, did not necessarily mean that economic sanctions lacked 
the effectiveness required to pressure Pretoria into dismantling apartheid. On the 
contrary, it gave much credence to the argument made by Congressman Ronald 
Dellums (D-California), among others, that “only full and comprehensive sanctions, 
implemented internationally, will cause the South African government to change its 
policy.”70 
Not only was the CAAA too weak to accomplish its goals, but its design also 
destined it to serve merely as a warning to the South African government to choose 
between making the required changes under limited pressure or “suffer painful 
economic consequences” at a later stage for not doing so.71 In short, the CAAA could 
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be seen as the first of a double-phased congressional strategy, in which the second 
phase was to follow if and only if South Africa defied the demands of the first. 
Nevertheless, because the President held the keys to the second phase and his 
opposition to sanctions was well known, Pretoria had a very strong reason to hope that 
the second phase would not be implemented as long as Reagan remained Chief 
Executive of the United States. That message was reinforced further when in 1988 
congressional efforts to pass a new bill entailing tougher sanctions failed. 
Subsequently, other bills also seeking further sanctions were introduced in 1989, but 
they too failed to be enacted into law.72 
6.2 U.S. Dialogue with the ANC 
If the Reagan Administration was able to hold the line in the political debate 
over economic sanctions against South Africa, a more telling shift in its South African 
policy occurred in its relations with South African black nationalist movements, 
particularly the ANC. Throughout the first half of the 1980s, the White House staged a 
virtual boycott of contacts with the ANC, which it accused of being a terrorist 
organization working to bring the Republic into the communist orbit. However, by mid-
1986, some administration officials and most senators and congressmen understood it 
was necessary to reach out to the ANC. They urged the South African government to 
begin negotiations with the organization with the aim of charting a political future for a 
multi-racial and apartheid-free South Africa.73 
Secretary of State Shultz was one key administration official spearheading the 
effort to open negotiations with the ANC. Nothing could have driven Shultz in that 
direction more than his realization that the history of black political opposition in South 
Africa was clearly taking a new and different course. The emergence in the mid-1980s 
of the UDF, trade unions, and other organizations closely linked to the ANC increased 
the local challenge to apartheid. Paradoxically, however, even though the apartheid 
regime had managed to diplomatically deprive the ANC of bases near South Africa’s 
borders, the renewed local challenge helped the ANC to achieve one of its most sought 
goals since going into exile—to establish a strong political presence within the country. 
As David McKean noted, “in the United Democratic Front, the ANC . . . created that 
presence.”74 It is evident, therefore, that the changing political climate in South Africa 
itself had a significant bearing on the Reagan Administration’s decision to consider 
opening talks with South Africa’s oldest black nationalist movement. The ANC’s 
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potential as the only organization capable of staging a serious political challenge to 
white minority domination was finally being acknowledged in Washington.75 
Officials in the Reagan Administration also realized that, if Pretoria were to 
heed their advice to begin talks with the ANC, Washington itself had to overcome its 
ideological bias and establish contacts with the organization. As Secretary Shultz 
revealed in his memoirs, “I wanted to place the United States firmly behind negotiation, 
including talks with the ANC. We would have to talk with the ANC ourselves if our 
advice was to have credibility.”76 
Asked if he had made a miscalculation in assuming the ANC could not 
consolidate the black opposition, Chester Crocker cautioned “not to look at history 
backward.”77 He said that when the policy of Constructive Engagement was formulated, 
it was a “different situation” and the opposition groups had “difficulty sorting out the 
difficulties among themselves.” According to Crocker, it was the “struggle that created 
the conditions for unity.” He added that the administration had concerns about the 
ANC’s use of “terrorist tactics” but “never had any doubt the organization was 
legitimate” and went to great lengths to make certain the group was not compared to the 
PLO and other terrorist organizations.78 
Not only was the ANC the oldest black nationalist organization in South Africa, 
but it was also the most popular and the most respected. An article in The New York 
Times Magazine quoted an editorial comment from Sowetan, one of South Africa’s 
prominent black newspapers, which declared that, “The people are talking ANC, the 
[South African] government is talking ANC, everybody is talking ANC.”79 It was only 
logical, therefore, for Secretary Shultz to come to terms with the undeniable fact that no 
lasting solution to South Africa’s political crisis could be found without the 
involvement of the ANC. When asked if the township uprisings had helped break the 
political impasse in the Republic, Chester Crocker replied that the violence “made clear 
that Pretoria could not govern but it also couldn’t be pushed out.” 80 Moreover, it 
seemed inevitable that, sooner or later, the United States could find itself having to 
negotiate a new political and economic relationship with an ANC-dominated 
government. 
As a first step to co-opt the ANC, the administration in 1986 appointed Edward 
Perkins as its Ambassador to South Africa. Described by Shultz as “a distinguished and 
magnetically capable Foreign Service officer, a pro,” Perkins’ principal mission was to 
establish U.S. contacts with “the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist 
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Congress and a wide array of internal black opposition groups as part of the effort to 
broaden American access to all parties in South Africa.”81At his confirmation hearings, 
Perkins even refused to use the label “Constructive Engagement” to describe American 
policy in southern Africa. 
On January 28, 1987, Secretary Shultz met with ANC President Oliver Tambo 
in Washington. According to Shultz, he made the decision to meet Tambo despite 
“political pressure on [him] to extend a PLO-type ban on American contacts with the 
ANC.”82A statement issued by the State Department after the meeting revealed that the 
discussion between Shultz and Tambo had focused largely on the future of South 
Africa. The meeting, the statement went on, “represented a continuation of [the 
administration’s] efforts to talk with all of the key players in South Africa. . . . In this 
context, we regard the ANC as an important . . . player in the South African 
situation.”83 
However, despite the determination to chart a new course for U.S.-ANC 
relations, Shultz could not conceal his concerns about the ANC’s links with Moscow 
and the South African Communist Party (SACP). In a carefully crafted statement, 
Shultz urged Tambo to spell out the ANC’s “vision of the future with more specificity” 
and emphasized the Reagan Administration’s “opposition to the replacement of the 
apartheid system by another form of unrepresentative government.”84 
Apart from worrying about the ANC’s contacts with the Soviets and the SACP, 
the administration also sought to convince the ANC leader to renounce violence and the 
armed struggle. Shortly before the Shultz-Tambo meeting, several conservative 
Republican Senators, notably Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), had tried to influence 
the Secretary of State to hold off the meeting until such time that the ANC officially 
and publicly renounced violence.85 His objections were mirrored by Jack Kemp (R-
New York), who declared that the meeting would send a signal that “the US has 
abandoned those who are working for peaceful and democratic change in South Africa. 
The Marxist ANC represents only a tiny minority of black South 
Africans.”86Presumably Kemp was referring to Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, who was 
recognized as a potential alternative to the ANC. A secret White House memorandum 
to Reagan reveals the administration’s intention: 
Buthelezi’s visit to the US comes as forces are gathering steam in 
Congress toward the passage of anti-South African legislation, including 
penalties and restrictions on US business with South Africa. During his 
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various meetings. . . . [H]e will be a forceful advocate opposing any 
punitive legislation.87 
For the administration, however, the reality on the ground suggested that contacts with 
the ANC must be increased until a more viable option presented itself. For the 
administration, however, any improved relations must be accompanied by a 
commitment from the ANC to renounce violence. 
Neither Oliver Tambo nor any ANC leader could find an incentive to renounce 
violence, especially in the face of an increasing South African police crackdown on 
black political unrest. In 1985, the South African government had tried to convince 
Nelson Mandela to renounce violence. State President P. W. Botha announced in 
parliament that Mandela could regain his freedom only if he “unconditionally rejected 
violence as a political instrument.”88 However, Mandela refused, not for the first time, 
to have any conditions attached to his release. In his response to the government’s 
offer, Mandela spoke for virtually every victim of apartheid when he threw the charge 
of violence back at the South African government. In a statement read by his daughter, 
Zindzi, at a UDF rally on February 10, 1985, Mandela rejected the government’s offer: 
I am surprised at the conditions that the government wants to impose 
upon me. I am not a violent man. . . . Let Botha show that he is different 
from Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd. Let him renounce violence. Let 
him say that he will dismantle apartheid. Let him unban the people’s 
organization, the African National Congress.89 
More than anything else, the Reagan Administration’s unwillingness or inability 
to pressure South Africa into making fundamental political reforms justified the 
growing chorus declaring its policy of Constructive Engagement a failure. The lack of 
results gave rise to growing public doubts about the sincerity of President Reagan’s 
opposition to white rule in South Africa. By the mid-1980s, it had become apparent to 
most administration officials in the foreign policy-making establishment that what the 
administration needed was a clear demonstration that Washington and Pretoria were at 
opposite ends of the issue of statutory racism.  
Unfortunately, however, the shift in the administration’s rhetoric was made for 
reasons other than that of invoking a sincere and complete reorientation of its policy 
toward the Pretoria government. The strong anti-apartheid statements were combined 
with persistent efforts to frustrate congressional and U.N. drives to impose stronger 
sanctions against South Africa. This track was taken despite widespread evidence that 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
23
1 
the Botha government was not willing to make significant concessions and agree to 
power-sharing with South Africa’s black majority. Even worse, by continuing to praise 
Pretoria for its limited reforms, which, as has been noted, were not aimed at making 
fundamental changes to the status quo, Washington sent a wrong message to the Botha 
regime, thus encouraging it to adopt sophisticated and more extreme forms of 
perpetuating apartheid.90 Assistant Secretary of State Crocker and other administration 
officials did not have to look any further than Pretoria’s violent crackdown on black 
protesters in order to see that the prospect for peaceful change in South Africa was far 
from being a reality. Indeed, the President himself touched on the Botha 
Administration’s increasingly violent methods, writing in his diary that he had evidence 
that the “Govt. of So. Africa is planning terrorist operations against the A.N.C. We’re 
looking in how we can turn that off.”91 
Consequently, after almost five years (1981-86) of offering an extended hand of 
friendship to the South African government, the Reagan Administration, through its 
Constructive Engagement policy, essentially did not achieve anything that amounted to 
influencing positive change in South Africa’s race relations. By the time of the Schultz-
Tambo meeting, Pik Botha was dismissing the U.S. as “increasingly irrelevant among 
its friends and enemies alike in Africa” and declared “this government does not 
negotiate with terrorists over the future of our country.”92 Sanford Unger and Peter 
Vale, among others, maintained that “having been offered many carrots by the United 
States . . . as incentives to institute meaningful reforms, the South African authorities 
had simply made carrot stew and eaten it.”93 Perhaps no other body may have been 
more effective in conveying the message to the Reagan Administration that its policy 
was not working than the report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee in 
January 1987, which stated in part: 
The time for easy and comfortable choices in South Africa has run out. . 
. . In dealing with South Africa, the United States must have a coherent 
and credible strategy that can be sustained over time. A strategy that 
meets these criteria must be based on a recognition that replacing the 
existing racially-based political system with a nonracial, democratic 
system is only necessary first step in what inevitably will be a long and 
difficult process in building a unified nation. . . . The immediate 
challenge facing Western nations is to assist South Africa’s politically 
disenfranchised and economically disadvantaged minority remove 
apartheid and end exclusive white rule.94 
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Nevertheless, despite the origin, nature, and purpose of the modifications made 
to its relations with South Africa’s apartheid regime, it is important not to lose sight of 
the fact that the Reagan Administration was eventually, albeit slowly, bowing to the 
political realities of South Africa’s destiny. Even more important, Washington’s efforts 
to reach out to the ANC marked a significant turning point in U.S. relations with black 
political opposition in South Africa. Even though it cannot be said with much certainty 
what this change meant for long-term U.S. policy, it did indicate the administration’s 
awareness of the significance of the realignment of political forces in South Africa. 
In addition, developments on the ground in South Africa itself, especially the 
resurgence of a strong black political opposition, clearly indicated to the Reagan 
Administration that the terms of negotiation had to be altered. Therefore, the narrow, 
self-serving definition of Constructive Engagement as a policy that could bring about 
peaceful change—when it was in effect a cover-up for giving military, political, and 
economic support to the apartheid regime—had been rendered irrelevant by the chain 
of events. 
Furthermore, by opening its doors to the ANC and to other black political 
opposition groups in South Africa, Washington sent a clear message to the Pretoria 
government that the United States no longer perceived it as the only force for the status 
quo in South Africa, whose existence was vital for the protection of Western interests 
in that country and in the region. As Crocker’s testimony before a Subcommittee of the 
House Foreign Relations Committee revealed: 
[T]he situation in South Africa remains balanced on a knife-edge 
between hope and despair. . . . It is perhaps fair to state that, at long last, 
the many messages being sent to that government-primarily by the 
people of South Africa themselves-are being heard. . . . In South Africa 
we face a moving target where events unfold quickly, unpredictably and 
beyond our control. In a sense, there is no status quo in South Africa.95 
Moreover, it became evident in early 1986 that there was a growing concern 
within the Reagan Administration that the violence that erupted in South Africa in the 
mid-1980s was threatening to escalate into a bitter and bloody civil war. Therefore, it 
was deemed prudent by Shultz, Crocker, and others in the Reagan administration to 
move more quickly in efforts to encourage negotiations before the violence reached 
uncontrollable proportions. 
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Some administration officials, such as Secretary Shultz, had come to realize that 
Washington had wasted too much time by placing too much emphasis on negotiating 
solely with the white minority government while underestimating the ability of black 
South Africans to mount a serious challenge to white political control. Because Pretoria 
had consistently proved to be unable to compel black South Africans to accept the new 
political dispensation, the next best move for Washington, these officials felt, was to 
make attempts to acknowledge the legitimacy of black nationalists to participate in the 
negotiations about the future of their own destiny and to place itself in a position that 
would enable it to influence the outcome of such negotiations. 
Even more important, by 1986 it had become obvious that the black political 
opposition in South Africa had not been defeated and was determined to make South 
Africa ungovernable until multi-racial democracy was achieved.96 Oliver Tambo urged 
black South Africans to create 
a united mass army of liberation, an army that must grow in strength . . . 
able to deliver . . . at every stage . . . with its eyes firmly fixed on the 
goal of the destruction of the apartheid regime and the transfer of power 
to the people. . . . The charge we give to Umkhontowe Sizwe and to the 
masses of our people is to attack, advance, give the enemy no quarter; an 
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.97 
Finally, by the mid-1980s, key officials in Washington had come to understand 
that, in order to reduce the threat of civil war, the cooperation of black opposition 
groups had become just as important, if not more so, than that of the white political 
leadership to Washington’s efforts to achieve peaceful, evolutionary change in South 
Africa. Therefore, there was nothing that the Reagan Administration could gain from 
continuing arguments about the ideological orientation of the ANC or any other 
important nationalist group that could become part of a future South African 
democratic government. 
6.3 Resolution of the Diplomatic Impasse in Southern Africa 
The Reagan Administration began in 1981 with a high priority, at least in policy 
rhetoric, to achieve independence for Namibia and to secure the withdrawal of Cuban 
troops from Angola. Nevertheless, for the whole of its first term and most of its second, 
there was little optimism among observers and the administration’s critics that those 
goals would be achieved. A number of reasons accounted for this failure, the most 
important of which was the flawed analysis made by President Reagan’s regional and 
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security experts about the real cause of instability in southern Africa. For years, Reagan 
officials believed that the main obstacle to regional peace was the Soviet Union and its 
Cuban proxy. In addition, not only did Washington become preoccupied with 
entertaining Pretoria’s fears over Cuban presence in Angola, but its guiding assumption 
was that the United States and South Africa shared a common set of regional interests. 
During the last two-and-a-half years of the Reagan Administration, however, a 
significant shift had occurred in the way the United States viewed its interests in 
southern Africa vis-a-vis those of South Africa. The shift was triggered primarily by 
South Africa’s resumption of its policy of regional destabilization. The purpose of this 
policy was to protect South Africa’s economic and military domination in the region by 
altering through economic pressure and/or military action the policies of neighbouring 
governments. 
The American brokered Lusaka and Nkomati Accords signed in 1984 had 
bolstered the Reagan Administration’s confidence in its southern African strategy.98 
Washington’s optimism that its efforts to achieve peace in the region were eventually 
paying off was short-lived, as South Africa deliberately stalled its withdrawal from 
Angola and violated the Nkomati Accord by continuing its assistance to RENAM0.99 
Consequently, as it became apparent that South Africa’s regional destabilization 
activities threatened to engulf the whole region in a vicious cycle of violence, officials 
in the Reagan Administration were compelled to reconsider their initial position that the 
United States and South Africa shared similar regional interests.100 Even if it may not 
have been announced publicly, it was evident that Washington, during this period, was 
at pains to find ways through which it could rehabilitate its tarnished image as a 
collaborator in South Africa’s regional destabilization strategy. One way to do so was 
to seek alternative options for bringing peace in southern Africa instead of waiting for 
and relying on Pretoria’s cooperation. 
The clearest manifestation of the administration’s shift in its regional strategy 
was its efforts to improve its relations with Mozambique. As Assistant Secretary 
Crocker noted in his testimony to a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, relations between the two countries had deteriorated drastically 
immediately following Reagan’s inauguration.101 In late January 1981, after a South 
African raid into the Maputo suburb of Matola, President SamoraMachel expelled four 
American officials who worked at the American Embassy in Mozambique.102 Frederick 
B. Lundahl, Louis L. Oliver, Arthur Russell, and Patricia Russell were expelled for 
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spying for the CIA and for allegedly having identified to members of the SADF houses 
that belonged to ANC members in Maputo.103 President Reagan responded to the 
expulsions by suspending all forms of U.S. assistance to Mozambique. Relations 
between the two countries, Crocker maintained, remained hostile until the 1982 U.N. 
General Assembly, when Secretary Shultz met with Mozambique’s Foreign Minister 
Joaquim Chissano.104 
The renewal of diplomatic relations resulted in the resumption of much needed 
U.S. economic aid to Mozambique whose economy and infrastructure had been 
ravaged by a decade of fighting between government troops and the South African 
backed RENAMO. In 1984, the United States supplied Mozambique with food and 
other forms of aid amounting to $8 million, with another $30 million following in 
1985.105 
The Reagan Administration’s reasoning was that by giving aid to 
Mozambique’s beleaguered economy the United States could possibly reduce 
Moscow’s influence on the FRELIMO government, induce President Samora Machel 
into sharing power with RENAMO, and win Mozambique’s support for its Angola-
Namibia linkage strategy. As described in a memorandum to Defence Secretary Casper 
Weinberger during Machel’s September 1985 visit to Washington, the United States 
hoped to use its economic leverage to accomplish the following: 
-Encourage FRELIMO to negotiate power-sharing RENAMO; 
-Seek FRELIMO’s cooperation in achieving an Angola/Namibia 
settlement; 
-Press FRELIMO toward serious economic reform -Moderate 
Mozambique’s anti-U.S. votes in the Nations . . . ; 
-Press FRELIMO for] a concrete movement away Soviets and Marxist 
principles, real economic genuine efforts to allow political expression 
factions in Mozambique.106 
The administration’s approach of warming up to Mozambique’s FRELIMO 
government came under serious attack from conservatives and the far right both in 
Congress and the White House. However, Secretary Schultz justified this strategy as 
necessary to wean Mozambique away from the Soviet bloc, thus increasing 
Washington’s chances of drawing concessions from the communists. Schultz briefed 
President Reagan about the importance of improving U.S. diplomatic ties with 
Mozambique shortly before Reagan’s meeting with Samora Machel in the Oval Office. 
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He stressed the importance of “Machel’s evolving defection from Marxism and 
Moscow toward our own strategy for withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola and for 
Namibian independence. Margaret Thatcher, I reminded him, was very much in favor 
of this approach to Mache1.”107 
While Machel’s untimely death may have threatened to disturb the 
administration’s rapprochement with Mozambique, relations between the two countries 
on the whole continued to improve even after he had been succeeded by Joaquim 
Chissano.108 Most importantly, Washington’s strategy seems to have borne some fruit 
because it gained Chissano’s support to continue its bilateral diplomacy in Angola and 
Namibia. As noted by Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker: 
Mozambique . . . quietly but effectively supported U.S. efforts to 
negotiate with the MPLA regime in Angola-negotiations aimed at 
obtaining the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and the 
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 for the 
independence of Namibia. . . . No country in southern Africa has worked 
more consistently than Mozambique with the United States to further the 
course of peace and stability in southern Africa.109 
Washington’s treatment of Mozambique’s Marxist government differed 
dramatically from its attitude toward the MPLA government in Angola. Not only did 
the United States, even when it made serious efforts to step up contacts between the 
two governments, consistently refuse to recognize the MPLA as Angola’s legitimate 
government, but it also embarked on a somewhat confusing track by reviving covert 
military assistance to UNITA.110 The most important reason for this confusion in U.S. 
policy toward Angola lay in the fact that the Reagan Administration continued to view 
the Angolan conflict within the context of the Cold War and, therefore, still saw the 
MPLA government as an enemy that had to be forced into sharing power with the more 
pro-Western UNITA.111 As a result, Washington felt inclined to turn a blind eye on 
South Africa’s anti-SWAPO military activities in southern Angola because it hoped 
that would weaken the MPLA’s operations against UNITA. This perception about the 
advantage of letting the South African forces remain in southern Angola was made 
clear in a State Department memorandum to Secretary of State George Shultz: 
We believe the SADF is conducting substantial operations in southern 
Angola. . . . Anti-SWAPO operations in Angola also provide cover for 
assisting UNITA, by occupying Angolan forces which otherwise could 
be used against Savimbi’s troops, and as a cover for SADF or joint 
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SADF/UNITA operations against preparations for the next government 
offensive.112 
However, if any inference could be drawn from the administration’s policy 
toward Mozambique during the mid-1980s as a policy for the whole region, 
Washington would have been expected by then to strongly condemn South Africa’s 
support to UNITA, just as it had done when it realized that Pretoria had violated the 
Nkomati Accord. But since Angola was still seen by those on the far right in 
Washington as a Cold War battleground unrelated to South Africa, it was necessary to 
downplay concerns about South Africa’s continuing regional aggression. 
Thus, far from provoking additional U.S. pressure, South Africa’s military 
activities in Angola won official U.S. endorsement. A memorandum written by 
Assistant Secretary Crocker to Secretary of State Shultz in early 1986 indicated the 
administration’s hope that increasing UNITA’s military challenge would “pressure . . . 
the MPLA into a negotiated settlement for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the 
region.”113 
The administration, it may be argued, failed to realize two specific problems 
with this kind of approach. First, it was almost inevitable that a stronger UNITA along 
with increasing South African military activity in southern Angola would make it even 
more difficult for the MPLA government to succumb to U.S. demands for Cuban troop 
withdrawal. Second, by continuing to link the presence of Cuban troops in Angola to 
Namibian independence, Washington was constantly eroding the chances of achieving 
a quick settlement in Namibia. It was not surprising, therefore, when the Angolan 
government suspended all negotiations with the Reagan Administration in 1985.  
Although the MPLA was blamed for betraying the spirit of negotiation, it is 
evident that the situation was dictated in large part by Washington’s own decision to 
resume covert military assistance to UNITA. As Michael Clough and Donald Jordan 
noted: 
Although the State Department officials refused to acknowledge it, the 
decision to provide military aid to UNITA put an end, at least 
momentarily, to a five year effort to establish a modus vivendi with the 
MPLA government that would [have] permit[ted] a negotiated 
settlement in Namibia and a phased Cuban withdrawal from Angola.114 
In sum, Washington’s failure to treat the Angolan conflict as an issue outside 
the context of its geopolitical battle with the Soviet Union continued to be a significant 
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obstacle in its efforts to influence change in southern Africa. In addition, there was still 
no indication that extending a hand of friendship to South Africa for almost seven years 
had fulfilled the expectation of change in its policy that those who pursued 
Constructive Engagement had assumed. Instead of working with the United States to 
achieve regional peace and stability, as Assistant Secretary Crocker and others like him 
had hoped, South Africa, in an effort to perpetuate its dominance over its neighbours, 
had embarked on acts of destabilization that drew the region into a spiral of violence. 
That fact had exposed the false assumption behind Constructive Engagement 
concerning the underlying source of conflict in southern Africa, which it, and the Total 
National Strategy, had attributed to the Soviet Union. 
6.3.1  Independence of Namibia 
By late 1987, a new round of negotiations had been opened between Angola and 
the United States, which eventually led to a successful resolution of the diplomatic 
impasse over Namibian independence. A major breakthrough occurred in late January 
1988, when the United States and Cuba made an exchange deal in which Cuba agreed 
to withdraw its troops from Angola in return for participating in the negotiation 
process.115 Meanwhile in Luanda, Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker was involved in 
direct talks with Cuban officials and the MPLA government. Those talks produced a 
new set of proposals through which the Angolan government agreed in principle to 
total Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. It was also agreed that these proposals were 
made within the overall objective of an agreement that would also lead to South 
Africa’s pull-out from Namibia.116 
Over May 3 and 4, 1988, Assistant Secretary Crocker convened a meeting in 
London between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa—with the United States playing the 
role of mediator. Representatives of the parties agreed to work out a formula for the 
withdrawal of both Cuban and South African forces from Angola and Namibia, 
respectively, thus paving the way for the implementation of U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 435 (UNSCR 435).117 In the months that followed, subsequent talks by 
representatives of the parties involved were held in different countries. Delegations 
from Angola, Cuba, South Africa, and the United States met in Cairo on June 24 and 
25.118 Apart from reaffirming the spirit of the London talks, the parties agreed to meet 
again on the week of July 11 in the United States. In that meeting, which took place 
over July 11 to 13 at Governor’s Island, New York, the parties agreed “on a set of 
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essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the southwestern region of 
Africa.”119 These fourteen principles, which were seen as essential to reaching a 
settlement in the region  included an agreement by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa to 
work out and recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a date for the 
commencement of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435. The three 
governments also agreed to cooperate with the Secretary-General in ensuring that 
Namibian independence elections would be free and fair, and they also acknowledged 
the Namibian people’s right to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights. 
In early August, the parties met in Geneva to continue their efforts to find a 
solution that could lead to Namibia’s independence and the withdrawal of foreign 
troops from Namibia and Angola. Building on the progress made in previous talks, the 
delegates from Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed a trilateral agreement in which 
they agreed to recommend to the U.N. Secretary-General that November 1, 1988, be 
the date for the commencement of the implementation of UNSCR 435. 
A critical barrier was overcome in a round of talks held in Brazzaville, Congo, 
between August and December 1988. On December 13, the parties, along with the 
United States in its capacity as the official mediator, signed a protocol confirming their 
commitment to act in accordance with the principles for a peaceful settlement in south-
western Africa.120 On December 22 in New York, Angola, Namibia, and South Africa 
signed the Angola/Namibia Accords, thus concluding the many months of serious 
efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the impasse over Namibian independence.121 
Officially known as The Tripartite Agreement of December 22, 1988, the 
Angola/Namibia Accords established a formal and official basis for a peaceful 
transition to independence in Namibia. They called upon Angola and South Africa to 
refrain from the threat or use of violence against each other, provided for the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and permitted the U.N. Secretary-General to 
seek immediate authority from the U.N. Security Council to commence the 
implementation of UNSCR 435 on April 1, 1989.122 Cuba and Angola further signed a 
bilateral agreement that set a timetable for a phased withdrawal of Cuba’s 50,000 
troops from Angola, beginning with a 3,000 troop reduction on April 1, 1989. 
Meanwhile, the remaining troops were to be redeployed north of the 15th parallel by 
August 1. Another 25,000 troops were to be withdrawn by November 1, with the 
remainder moved north of the 13th parallel. Total Cuban troop withdrawal was to be 
completed by July 1, 1991.123 
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The agreements cleared the way for Namibian independence. Therefore, once 
they were concluded, preparations for the immediate implementation of UNSCR 435 
were begun. A U.N. Transitional Assistance group (UNTAG) was formed to supervise 
the agreements and monitor the process of transition in Namibia. The provisions of 
UNSCR 435 were expanded to include the reduction of South African troops in Angola 
to 1,500 men, to be confined to two bases, within three months of the signing of the 
agreements.124 
The peace process was slightly disturbed, however, when on April 1, 1989, 
more than 1,000 armed SWAPO guerrillas crossing from Angola into Namibia were 
attacked by South African security forces. Over 300 SWAPO troops were killed during 
the two weeks of fighting that followed.125 Fortunately, Angola, Cuba, and South 
Africa responded by quickly resuming talks in an effort to put the peace process back 
on track. Those talks were successful, and registration of voters began on July 3 under 
the supervision of UNTAG.126 Over November 7 to 11, Namibia’s first democratic 
elections were held under U.N. supervision. SWAPO, led by Sam Nujoma, was 
propelled to victory by winning 57% of the total ballots cast, claiming 41 of the 72 
seats in the Constituent Assembly. Full independence under a SWAPO government was 
declared on March 21, 1990.127 
Even though the whole process that led to Namibia’s independence was 
completed in 1990, it is evident that most of the groundwork had been done by the time 
the Reagan Administration left office. Hence, the important role played by Chester 
Crocker and George Shultz, among others, in bringing the negotiations to fruition 
cannot be denied. However, in spite of arguments to the contrary, this dramatic 
resolution of the Namibian independence impasse should not be seen as an exoneration 
of Constructive Engagement. Had the Reagan Administration not abandoned the 
multilateral approach of the Western Contact Group (WCG), it is most likely that 
Namibia would have obtained its independence earlier than 1990, but because 
Constructive Engagement’s bilateral strategy allowed South Africa to extend its hold 
over Namibia for as long as it chose, the world was, in effect, kept waiting for eight 
years before Pretoria would finally give its consent. As Fen Osler Hampson noted: 
It would be a mistake to characterize Constructive Engagement and the 
bilateral approach to the problem adopted by the Reagan administration 
as a complete and unqualified success—unless an eight-year delay is 
part of one’s definition of success. Not only did Pretoria successfully 
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exploit its new relationship with Washington by playing the linkage 
card, thus capitalizing on the Reagan administration’s Cold War 
sensitivities, but it was also able to press ahead with its own military and 
internal political solution in Namibia without incurring Washington’s 
wrath.128 
It is possible that supporters of the Reagan Administration’s bilateral strategy 
would raise the argument that the WCG’s carrot-and-stick approach had also failed to 
produce any positive results in southern Africa. However, that theory is itself arguable, 
because by the time Reagan left office, his administration itself had resorted to using 
both carrot and stick in its dealings with South Africa. It is, therefore, interesting to 
speculate what would have happened had President Reagan not moved quickly to 
distance himself from the policies of his predecessor in the White House. Had he made 
a clear indication that he intended to apply more pressure by working with the WCG or 
even by threatening stronger sanctions, it is most likely that South Africa would have 
responded more quickly to international pressures and relinquished its hold over 
Namibia. 
In regards to UNITA, the United States was not willing to abandon the 
organization and stepped up support in the late-1980s. Even after the 1988 Brazzaville 
Accords, the Reagan Administration would not give up on its rationale for supporting 
UNITA. Secretary Crocker claimed it was continued Soviet involvement in the region 
that necessitated American intransigence: “Our attitude toward UNITA is unchanged . . 
. We have no intention of disengaging unilaterally from the Angolan situation at a time 
when others continue to provide large amounts of hardware to the other Angolan party . 
. . our relationship with UNITA is not a subject for negotiation.”129 President Reagan 
would continue to stress the importance of UNITA to achieving U.S. goals in southern 
Africa: 
In Angola, Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA has been fighting for 13 years 
against the Marxist regime and its Cuban protectors. In 1975, President 
Gerald Ford wanted to help, but some in Congress felt our standing with 
the freedom fighters would only prolong hostilities. A law was passed 
that made aid illegal, and the war dragged on — the Cubans multiplied. 
In 1985 Congress repealed the law and began supporting UNITA. Now 
the Cubans are talking of a pullout. They’re doing business because we 
showed them we meant business. We’ve proved that we can stand united 
as a country that means business — business for peace.130 
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As other parties started to disengage and move towards peace, the Reagan 
Administration tasked the CIA with pushing “in extra supplies before the November 
1988 Bush-Dukakis election” in the event that the Vice President lost the election. 
Simultaneously, South Africa began to increase deliveries of petroleum and arms to 
UNITA to ensure the organization could continue fighting after the Republic’s 
agreement to stop funding Savimbi came into effect in December 1988. According to 
UNITA, South Africa’s shipments were sufficient to supply “30,000 regular troops and 
45,000 guerrillas for two years.”131 
While the MPLA and UNITA signed a peace agreement in June 1989, by 
August Savimbi had resumed the war. UNITA and the MPLA again entered 
negotiations in 1990 and signed the Bicesse accords on May 31, 1991, which was 
followed by the Lusaka Protocol in 1994. Despite these agreements, each time Jonas 
Savimbi was faced with the prospect of losing power, he returned to war with the stores 
of weapons and money he accrued in the 1980s and 1990s from his benefactors and the 
liquidation of natural resources.132 The chief patrons of UNITA were of course the 
United States and South Africa. Though the United State stopped sending military and 
financial assistance to UNITA in 1993, the fact Jonas Savimbi ignored the elections and 
continued to fight until his death in a fire-fight with the Angolan government in 
February 2002, suggests Constructive Engagement’s real legacy in Angola was not 
stability and negotiated peace, but a generation of crippling economic destabilization 
and civil war.133 
6.4 Abandonment of the Total National Strategy 
To say that the significance of the Reagan Administration’s diplomatic mission 
in southern Africa should not be overestimated raises the broader issue of establishing 
those forces that may have actually influenced the events that occurred in the region in 
the late 1980s. It is clear that the peace accords that gave Namibia its independence and 
led to the evolution of the democratic process in South Africa were facilitated in large 
part by interplay of a new set of regional and international realities that bore no relation 
to Constructive Engagement. 
Socially, South African society witnessed a reversal in the trend toward 
militarization. White South Africans tired of a war environment and were eager for 
peace. A 1988 poll conducted by the South African Institute of International Affairs 
revealed that a majority of white South Africans were war weary and believed that 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
24
3 
defence spending and militarization had gone far enough. Support for a negotiated 
settlement in Namibia rose from 38% in 1982 to 55% in 1988.134 
The largest showing of this feeling surfaced in reaction to conscription. Many 
English- and Afrikaans-speakers began to view the extension of conscription and 
increased military activity in southern Africa as potentially threatening their own 
lives.135 With such an attitude, the growth and popularity of the End Conscription 
Campaign (ECC) was not surprising. The primary goal of the ECC had been to 
convince South African authorities to introduce a viable alternative for those who 
object to service in the SADF on moral, religious, or political grounds.136 Pretoria did 
not react favourably to the ECC. In fact, the Defence Minister Malan linked the motives 
behind the ECC to the communist and terrorist impulse designed to undermine the 
qualities of valour and justice intrinsic to the SADF.137 Moves to crush the ECC led to 
the arrest of 143 South African whites from around the country who refused to serve in 
the SADF. These men faced jail sentences of up to six years.138 
Similar problems emerged within the SADF. Increasing rates of desertion and 
draft evasion along with the persistent use of drugs illustrated the widespread 
dissatisfaction with national service.139 Likewise, the Defence Minister reported to the 
House of Assembly that the suicide rate in the SADF had risen to astronomical 
proportions. In 1989, 294 national servicemen attempted suicide, eleven of whom were 
successful.140 Even the number of court martial cases exploded, partly as a result of 
pressures from discipline produced by increased active combat duty in Namibia.141 
Furthermore, protests by ethnic Namibian soldiers over deployment in the war 
against SWAPO did not bode well for South African defence. In November 1987, a 
protest among two black Namibian battalions resulted in the expulsion of forty-seven 
members of the 101 Battalion. This dissatisfaction clearly had profound implications 
for the Defence Force because South Africa depended on Namibian ethnic units to 
counter SWAPO insurgency. Moreover, the majority of the 101 Battalion being 
Ovambo, the ethnic group from which SWAPO drew major support, underscored the 
danger that the protests held for the SADF’s counterinsurgency moves.142 
Even South Africa’s mighty arms industry was not immune to problems. 
Although ARMSCOR development had made South Africa the tenth largest arms 
producer in the world, by 1988 it suffered serious problems in the air industry. 
Specifically, ARMSCOR was unable to produce spare parts for highly sophisticated air 
equipment.143 Moreover, with the phasing out of the Shackleton maritime aircraft in 
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1984, South Africa no longer possessed long-range air reconnaissance capabilities. A 
similar worry was the obsolescence of existing models that were already a generation 
old. Most equipment that was once bought in Europe could not be replaced 
domestically. 
Likewise, regional and international events no longer rendered destabilization 
attractive. Regionally, South Africa both met mounting resistance in its conventional 
war in Angola and lost control of its proxy in Mozambique. Internationally, South 
Africa faced a hostile world willing to impose economic sanctions. The threat to South 
Africa was again increasing, and the means by which Pretoria had hoped to counter this 
threat proved ineffective. 
First, South African military power disintegrated as Pretoria’s adversaries in 
southern Africa steadily improved their conventional capabilities.144 This reality was 
most evident in Angola. After South Africa reinvaded Angola in 1985, the Soviet 
Union provided Luanda with modern weapons, including sophisticated aircraft suitable 
for supporting ground attacks.145 Moreover, the Soviets constructed an air umbrella 
over Angola with 1500 anti-aircraft weapons and 800 surface-to-air missiles.146 
Furthermore, Soviet and Cuban training and supplies transformed the Angolan army 
from an ill-disciplined guerrilla band into a well-equipped, conventional force.147 
South Africa clearly felt this metamorphosis. By 1987, South Africa had begun 
to suffer serious setbacks in its Angola war. A record twenty-three SADF servicemen 
were killed in a two-week period as the SADF attempted to stem the advance of 
Angolan forces. Furthermore, SAAF planes, not readily replaceable, were steadily 
grounded.148 Mounting pressure emerged within South Africa demanding an 
explanation for such losses: “the sacrifices which our young men have to make require 
that their families—and the South African nation—be told what is going on.”149 
In 1988, this situation deteriorated further. Between October 1987 and June 
1988, South African and Angolan/Cuban forces became engaged in what has been 
termed the fiercest conventional battle on African soil since El Alamein.150 With Cuban 
ground forces deployed for the first time, Angola withstood major SADF assaults on 
January 23, February 25, and March 23, 1988.151 Instead of victory, 9000 South 
African soldiers with tanks and artillery were trapped 300 miles from the Namibian 
border in a failed effort to capture Cuito Cuanavale.152 Under heavy rains, South 
African tanks were bogged down in mud with no means to redeploy while 
Angolan/Cuban forces moved to drier ground along the Namibian border.153 In 
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addition, with most of its planes inoperative, South Africa lost its air superiority. 
Moreover, on June 27, 1988, the Angolan Air Force bombed South African positions in 
the Calueque area of the Cunene Province in southern Angola, causing the deaths of 
twenty-six white South African soldiers and the destruction of four Ratel combat 
vehicles.154 
Although the Americans and South Africans would continue to say that “the 
idea that Cuito Carnevale was a smashing victory (for the Cubans) is a joke,”155 the 
battles at Cuito and Calueque had a decisive impact on South Africa. As Pik Botha 
would tell the South Africa generals after the battle, “If you really want to saddle 
yourself with one of the biggest burdens ever, take it (Cuito Cuanavale). You will be 
heroes, headlines in the newspapers here for a day or two until food, electricity, water, 
medical supplies have to be flown in. Then within a day or two you will pray for 
someone to take it off your hands immediately.”156 Even if not inclined to believe 
Botha’s version of events at Cuito, and it is irrefutable that the SADF were more than 
capable of handling any and all comers in the region in the near term, it is undeniable 
that Pretoria could no longer expect to get away with military destabilization without 
incurring high costs.157 The war in Angola drained millions of dollars per day from 
South Africa’s coffers. More importantly, war had become highly unpopular in South 
Africa, especially as an increasing number of white South Africans returned home from 
Angola in body bags.158 To fight and win in Angola would have required 
unprecedented white casualties, carrying tremendous political reverberations. 
Moreover, a military stalemate would have further eroded white confidence in 
Pretoria’s ability to defend the Republic’s national security. Thus, for the first time 
ever, Pretoria had reached the limits of its military power.159 Military destabilization 
was not the solution. 
Second, Pretoria proved unable to police its own peace initiatives in 
Mozambique. Officially, Pretoria had sponsored peace talks in 1984 between 
FRELIMO and the MNR, resulting in the Pretoria Declaration of October 3, 1984.160 
Likewise, Pretoria provided FRELIMO with vehicles and equipment to help defend 
Mozambique from MNR sabotage.161 Despite such efforts to achieve peace in 
Mozambique, the MNR continued its activities, at first with Pretoria’s blessing but later 
seemingly independent of official South African guidance.162 The MNR even 
committed acts of sabotage that undermined South Africa’s attempts to secure 
uninterrupted flows of electricity generated at Cahora Bassa. Once supported by 
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Pretoria, the MNR seemed to be receiving aid from sources in Portugal, Germany, the 
Middle East, and private South African groups through the Comoros Islands, Tanzania, 
and Malawi. Pik Botha repeatedly tried to persuade suspected governments and 
individuals to terminate their assistance to the MNR in order to bring about some 
meaningful peace in southern Africa.163 
Nevertheless, the covert support continued, enabling the MNR to free itself 
from Pretoria’s pressure. In fact, in a statement released in Lisbon in early 1989, the 
MNR explicitly refused to accept South African mediation in Mozambique because of 
Pretoria’s growing economic and security links with FRELIMO.164 Thus, what was 
once a pliant tool of South Africa destabilization had slipped from Pretoria’s control 
and acted increasingly against the interests of South African foreign policy in 
Mozambique. Additionally, the EC imposed modest sanctions upholding the oil and 
arms ban and withdrawing military attaches from South Africa. Sweden and Norway 
adopted a total trade ban in 1987. Even Japan imposed modest sanctions. More 
ominously, during the October 1989 summit in Kuala Lumpur, the Commonwealth 
voted for sanctions, despite objections from Thatcher.165 
The imposition of sanctions and the cost of the country’s destabilization 
campaign had a profound impact on the Republic’s economy. Although the South 
African economy grew by 3.2% in 1988, it soon decelerated. Predictions of near 
stagnation or negative growth were expected in 1990, with a real GDP growth of 
perhaps .5%.166 Additionally, South Africa faced a number of specific economic 
problems that were unlikely to improve in the short term. First, with the slowdown in 
economic growth, black unemployment had reached crisis proportions. Nearly 
1,161,000 blacks, 17.5% of the economically active black population, remained 
unemployed. Because this figure is an official South African number, it excluded the 
unemployed in the “independent” TBVC homelands, thereby rendering the above 
statistic a gross underestimate. In certain regions of the country, the problem was even 
worse. Nearly 57% of the economically active population of Port Elizabeth and 
Uitenhage was unemployed. Likewise, the figure for the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-
Vereeniging industrial area was 18.1%. Future projections were equally discomforting. 
A study by the Institute for Futures Research estimated that South Africa would enter 
the 1990s with only 45% of the economically active population being employed.167 
Second, the depreciation of the rand contributed to heavy inflation. With the 
unit value of exports decreasing by 22% from 1980 to 1985, Pretoria hoped that a lower 
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exchange rate would help overcome the damaging impact South Africa’s trade situation 
had on the profitability of its exports, especially gold, which accounted for 50% of 
South Africa’s total export earnings.168 A depreciated rand, however, cost South Africa 
dearly in terms of inflation. As the rand value sank, inflation rose. 
Third, South Africa’s credit problems undermined international confidence in 
the South African economy.According to Finance Minister Barend du Plessis: “There 
was an international capital war against us.”169 Because of the deteriorating security 
situation within South Africa and anti-apartheid pressure in the West, foreign banks 
stopped lending long-term money and refused to renew South Africa’s short-term debt. 
By mid-1985, South Africa had $22 billion in foreign debts, $12 billion of which was 
due in six months or less. Therefore, du Plessis announced a repayments freeze on 
August 27, 1985, admitting to the world that South Africa could no longer pay its 
debts: “mighty South Africa had defaulted.”170 As a result, international confidence 
waned. With a depreciating rand, soaring inflation, and economic recession, South 
Africa did not possess an attractive investment climate. In fact, the violence and brutal 
suppression of 1984-1986 gave South Africa the dubious distinction of being an area of 
too great a risk for Western investment. Not surprisingly, South Africa experienced 
much capital flight, amounting to $2.09 billion in 1984 and $1.2 billion in 1985.171 
Such a poor economic situation started to affect the average South African 
taxpayer. Because mine and corporate revenue had fallen substantially in the recession, 
South African taxpayers were paying most of the burden necessary to meet current 
expenditures. As a result, white taxpayers experienced a 20% fall in their living 
standards from 1984-1987.172 With such a negative economic environment, a costly 
policy like destabilization was not in South Africa’s best interest. Acts of 
destabilization required the most extensive mobilization of the country’s forces and 
resources since World War II.173 Botha estimated that the 1984-1985 cost of holding 
Namibia was R1143 million ($600 million in 1985 dollars). Even though not all acts of 
destabilization cost as much as those against Namibia, economic woes rendered any 
such costs prohibitive. Furthermore, with Botha and de Klerk committing huge sums of 
money to social services and to support the TBVC states, the money once spent on 
destabilization was not readily available. Thus, from the standpoint of South Africa’s 
stagnant economy, the Total National Strategy was not cost effective.174 
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6.5 Changing Threat Environment 
In 1990, South Africa faced a less hostile and threatening region. First, the 
image of the Soviet Union had changed profoundly from the days of the total 
onslaught. Soviet budgetary and political constraints rendered many of its Third World 
proxy states of less importance to the Soviet Union’s vital economic and strategic 
interests. As a result, Moscow restrained its aid flows to Angola and Mozambique to a 
bare minimum. Pik Botha praised Moscow’s decision to withdraw from regional 
conflicts as a sign of the positive changes in the USSR. The favourable view of the 
Gorbachev leadership boded well for Soviet-South African relations: “If this leads to 
improved relations and to more trade, then why should we be against this?”175 In 1989, 
the first high-level Soviet-South African meeting since 1956 occurred between Pik 
Botha and a Soviet ambassador and minister plenipotentiary, regarding the joint 
committee on Namibia.176 
Second, with increased Western interest in the economic development of 
southern Africa, especially in Mozambique, the region no longer posed a direct threat 
to Western social and economic values. Since 1986, Britain offered military training to 
Mozambican soldiers in Zimbabwe.177 In mid-1987, the Commonwealth established a 
technical fund for Mozambique and pledged to assist large-scale development projects 
such as the Limpopo rehabilitation. By 1988, other western nations were providing 
technical and economic assistance to the Beira Corridor. France and West Germany 
channelled similar assistance to Mozambique, including the sale of helicopters. 
Likewise, the United States, once a bitter critic of Maputo, offered Mozambique 
economic aid for nonlethal purposes and made commitments to the rehabilitation of 
Mozambique’s transport corridors, including a $15 million grant to the Limpopo 
project. 
With decreased Soviet involvement and increased Western interest, the region 
no longer appeared as threatening to Pretoria. Thus, both P. W. Botha and de Klerk 
made several high-level visits to southern Africa. Before Botha stepped down, he 
travelled to Malawi, Mozambique, and Zaire, proclaiming major breakthroughs in 
constructing a peaceful regional order.178 President de Klerk was even more committed 
to peaceful relationships with Africa. In 1989, he twice visited Mozambique and 
journeyed to Zaire, Zambia, and the Ivory Coast. These moves were part of what the 
South African press labelled “Klerknost” and “Pretoriastroika.”179 
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Specifically, the visits to regional states were designed to promote regional 
cooperation and economic integration. Efforts with Mozambique were the most 
substantial. At the Chissano-Botha summit at Cahora Bassa on September 12, 1988, 
South Africa promised to maintain the security of the dam and to involve substantial 
South African capital in Mozambican economic development. Both leaders also 
pledged to cooperate in reactivating the railway from Maputo to the Transvaal and the 
highway from Maputo to the South African border.180 Similar pledges from de Klerk at 
the December 15, 1989, summit in Maputo confirmed South Africa’s role in developing 
the Mozambican economy.181 
Likewise, $4 million worth of South African nonlethal equipment, including 
medicines and food, arrived in Beira on November 28, 1988. Additionally, in 1989, 
South Africa and Mozambique signed a trade agreement in which South Africa agreed 
to abolish all taxes on such Mozambican products as fish, cashews, citrus, cigarettes, 
wood furniture, and palm oil. This move, combined with a 3% reduction in all customs 
taxes, allowed Mozambique to earn an extra $19 million (USD) per year.182 
In the same time period, Pretoria entered into similar agreements with other 
states in southern Africa. In Botswana, South Africa proceeded with plans for the Sua 
Pan soda ash project. To guarantee the success of the project, Pretoria agreed to levy a 
10% duty on imported soda ash in addition to providing 820 million (USD) in export 
credit. Such moves made South Africa virtually dependent on imports of Botswana’s 
soda ash and forced joint cooperation between Pretoria and Gaborone on the Sua Pan 
project.183 Likewise, South Africa and Lesotho concluded the Highlands Water Project 
treaty in 1987, with South Africa contributing $100 million to the $2 billion 
development plan.184 
Such cooperation and economic integration mirrored the changes occurring in 
South Africa’s perception of its security threat. Eager to reach some sort of peaceful 
arrangement with both the region and South African blacks, President de Klerk stated 
that “the season of violence is over . . . the time for reconstruction and reconciliation 
has arrived.”185 Committed to this approach, de Klerk took steps that had profound 
repercussions for South Africa’s regional policy. Most significantly, the unbanning of 
the ANC and the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 completely altered 
Pretoria’s characteristic stance with respect to its neighbours. With the ANC now 
operating legally within South Africa, the region no longer represented a shelter for 
anti-apartheid terrorist subversion. Thus, strikes into neighbouring states to prevent 
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regional support for the ANC were no longer necessary. In fact, General Malan 
announced in a speech on December 2, 1989, foreshadowing the unbanning of the 
ANC, that Pretoria no longer had reason to launch SADF cross-border raids or to 
support anti-government groups in the neighbouring countries.186 
The other major event of the late 1980s that signalled the new direction in South 
African foreign policy was Pretoria’s decision to relinquish Namibia. Such a move 
represented a tremendous watershed in the region, creating an independent Namibia out 
of the last African colony on March 21, 1990. Although South Africa had been 
promising such independence since Vorster, Pretoria never seemed willing to agree to 
any terms that would have led to a SWAPO-led Namibia. With the costs of holding 
Namibia becoming more and more prohibitive and the war in Angola turning against 
South Africa, settlement in Namibia proved most sensible. 
The New York Accords codified South Africa’s acceptance of a new regional 
order in which it would play a vital role: 
For this country, the new situation holds many important developments 
and consequences. The negotiations have brought us into closer contact 
with Russia, which could lead to significant future developments. This 
places South Africa in a new relationship vis-a-vis southern Africa. 
South Africa has proven its good faith and honour; it is quite clear that 
no agreement would have been possible without her. The possibility of 
greater stability and cooperation between South Africa and other states 
in the region has been created.187 
South Africa acted in good faith with respect to the Namibian transition. 
Pretoria had ample opportunity to derail the process, especially in April, 1989, when an 
unexpected large-scale infiltration of SWAPO nationalists returned to Namibia. 
However, South Africa chose to abide by the peace process and allowed the scheduled 
elections to take place in November, 1989, in which SWAPO, once South Africa’s 
most feared and hated enemy, won forty-one of the seventy-two seats in the Constituent 
Assembly. The South African press hailed this election as surpassing all expectations: 
all fears of intimidation, disruption, or military incursions went unfounded.188 
Similarly, de Klerk accepted the results of the election and cooperated fully with an 
independent Namibia “in a spirit of good-neighbourliness, in order to enhance and 
develop peace and prosperity in the sub-continent.”189 
It is impossible to overstate the significance of Namibian independence to South 
African regional policy. For years, Namibia provided a key psychological buffer to 
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white South Africa. Only the existence of the Namibian controversy prevented the 
international community from focusing all of its attention and pressure on the injustices 
of a minority-ruled South Africa.190 Moreover, white South Africa linked the future of 
South West Africa to that of continued white rule.191 Determination to retain Namibia 
seemed to mirror Pretoria’s resolve to preserve the status quo in South Africa. 
As such, the decision to relinquish Namibia would have seemed to represent a 
significant setback for South Africa. Nevertheless, Pretoria capitalized enormously on 
Namibian independence. At the independence ceremonies, foreign leaders—including 
the Presidents of Egypt, Mozambique, Angola, Nigeria, Mali, Zambia, and Yugoslavia 
as well as the foreign ministers from the Soviet Union, Ireland, Finland, West 
Germany, Sweden, and Spain—visited with President F. W. de Klerk. These 
“diplomatic coups” afforded de Klerk the most extensive and varied diplomatic 
contacts any South African leader had experienced since 1948.192 
With the independence of Namibia, South African foreign policy entered the 
1990s in no way reminiscent of Pretoria’s policy a decade earlier. The South African 
government turned to cooperation and economic integration as the best way to achieve 
its modus vivendi with southern Africa. As a result, Pretoria expanded its diplomatic 
and economic links with its black neighbours. Direct contact between de Klerk and 
African heads of state expanded dramatically as did South African economic 
investment in southern Africa. Furthermore, neither the ANC nor SWAPO posed an 
external, communist-inspired threat to the national security of South Africa; instead, the 
former became a legal entity within South Africa, and the latter led an independent, 
multiracial, and democratic Namibia into the future. Even the Soviet Union was not 
regarded with the same fear and hostility that governed the total-onslaught years. With 
such monumental changes occurring in South Africa’s external environment, South 
Africa’s destabilization campaign was abandoned in favour of regional cooperation in 
the 1990s. 
6.6 Conclusion 
As defined by the Botha Administration, the Total National Strategy was 
implemented to counter revolutionary warfare fomented by the Soviet Union by 
marshalling all the resources available to the apartheid state. In order to move forward 
on an “evolutionary” approach to reform, South Africa had to be made safe from 
revolutionary upheavals that threatened the interests and power of white South 
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Africans. This would be accomplished regionally by destabilizing neighbouring states 
that gave sanctuary to the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups operating outside the 
boundaries of the Republic. Using the formidable military assets of the SADF and 
proxy military groups, in conjunction with economic pressure, South Africa would 
bludgeon its neighbours into expelling the ANC and accepting the Republic’s role as 
hegemon of southern Africa. Within the country, security forces would counter internal 
unrest with a counter-revolutionary strategy that would break the anti-apartheid forces 
while the government opened up a dialogue with “moderate” black South Africans that 
would concede to a reform process that ensured that power stayed in white hands.193 
By the signing of the 1988 Brazzaville Accords, Pretoria had seemingly 
achieved a level of physical security that was unthinkable a decade before. In the 
townships the state of emergency had taken a heavy toll on the anti-apartheid 
movement and eliminated the possibility of a revolutionary takeover of the government. 
Regionally, the Cubans were exiting Angola and the Soviet Union no longer saw any 
benefit in involving itself in the affairs of southern Africa. In Namibia, the presence of 
a government run by SWAPO, a traditional fear of the Republic, no longer seemed as 
daunting with communism waning in southern Africa. As for the rest of the FLS, the 
destabilization campaign had forced them to evict the ANC, denying that organization a 
military sanctuary outside South Africa. 
South Africa’s security, however, was an illusion. The fact that the township 
uprisings did not pose an imminent threat to white minority rule obscured the 
fundamental fact that the Botha government was incapable of controlling the black 
majority and violence in the streets would eventually return. Ultimately, the apartheid 
government had to decide whether the reliance on brutal counter-revolutionary tactics, 
a crumbling economy and its international pariah status was a price worth paying to 
cling to power for another few years. The experiences of the 1980s proved it was not. 
The National Party could suppress the township rebellions, and it could push the ANC 
from the Republic’s borders, but not forever and it could only do so at a high cost. The 
white minority faced a reality that violence would return and that chaos within the 
country would eventually overwhelm the security apparatus.194 The Total National 
Strategy could not bring the black majority to the bargaining table on P.W. Botha’s 
terms and it could not effectively protect white power and interests using counter-
revolutionary violence. 
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The Total National Strategy’s inability to decisively end the unrest in the 
townships and to break the ANC helped push the white government to negotiations. 
Even though the eventual negotiations were a response to a combination of civil unrest, 
economic recession, labour opposition by black trade unions, and international 
sanctions and pressure, it is nevertheless accurate to say that the intensification of all 
aspects of the struggle in the 1980s was largely a result of the township unrest that 
forced the Republic to use brutal repression, which “served to highlight the moral 
poverty of even ‘reformed apartheid’”195 which in turn led to increased international 
isolation, which in turn led to plummeting investor confidence and economic sanctions. 
Perhaps the greatest evidence for the impact of the unrest and increased violence on the 
mindset of at least some National Party leaders was the fact that the first discussion of 
negotiations with the ANC began during the township uprisings.196 
More importantly, the ANC’s strategic decision to encourage the township 
uprisings, including arming the participants, helped ensure the legitimacy of that 
organization in the eyes of black South Africans. As the vanguard of the liberation 
movement, the ANC was seen as the heir apparent to power when white minority rule 
ended. Just as P.W. Botha recognized Nelson Mandela as the right person to begin talks 
with in 1985, so too did foreign governments recognize the power of the ANC and its 
centrality to legitimizing the reform process in the Republic.197 Despite a military 
balance that favoured the apartheid government, the ANC’s legitimacy among black 
South Africans and the international community proved more decisive than Botha had 
imagined and his goal of fostering a “moderate” alternative was made obsolete. Thus, 
no matter what conclusions one draws about the actual effectiveness of the 1980s 
uprisings from a military standpoint, it is undoubtedly true that the ANC’s strategic 
shift towards a popular, loosely organized struggle—ironically necessitated by the 
counter-revolutionary strategy of the Total National Strategy—secured its place at the 
head of the liberation movement and chief rival to the Botha Administration. 
By the mid-1980s, it became obvious to certain members of the Botha 
Administration that the ANC had to be drawn into the reform process. In May 1988, 
Botha created a secret contact group, lead by Niel Barnard and Mike Louw, of the 
National Intelligence Service (NI) and the Department of Foreign Affairs respectively, 
to begin talks with Nelson Mandela and the ANC. Despite a positive report from the 
contact group, Botha was not inclined to personally meet with Mandela and talks with 
the ANC languished.198 
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Despite these first tentative steps towards unbanning the ANC, P.W. Botha was 
intent on seeing his reform process through without substantial changes or input from 
the black majority. By maintaining the Group Areas Act, Population Registration Act 
and Separate Amenities Act, Botha signalled to black South Africans and the 
international community that he was unwilling to attack the foundations of apartheid 
and its corresponding racialist assumptions. As he would assure a National Party crowd 
in Pietermaritzburg in April 1987: 
We are not prepared to accept Black majority rule in South Africa. We 
are prepared to, however, to accept the principal of majority rule on a 
diversified basis. We are prepared to bring about devolution of power, 
and we are prepared to share power about matters of common concern, 
but we are not prepared to renounce power in such manner that we do 
not have a future for ourselves and our children in this country.199 
Even if the Prime Minister had gone further than any of his predecessors in 
reforming the apartheid system, it was equally true that he needed a new, bold approach 
to the reform process to gain credibility among black South Africans. As author Christi 
van der Westehuizen would write: ‘These reforms merely added fuel to the fire, and 
boycotts of rent and electricity fees converged with struggles around education, 
unemployment, price increases and a rejection of the tricameral dispensation . . . it all 
came down to the underlying problem: even such limited reforms remained half-
hearted, because the real intent was to sustain white domination. And black people 
knew that, as the insurrection showed.200 
Botha, however, continued to sell the idea of a “system that will combine both 
federal and confederal components” where black South African were represented 
through the Bantustans and local authorities and warned that “Africa is full of examples 
of we should shun like the plague when you see what they have done to their peoples. 
From our budding system of regional governments, we must see to it that devolution of 
power is practiced and then I can see structures where people can come together to 
discuss joint problems and find joint solutions.”201 
From the moment it was introduced, the ANC dismissed Botha’s “bogus” 
reform process, stating: 
We are convinced that the Botha regime has neither the desire nor the 
intention to engage in any meaningful negotiations. On the contrary, 
everything this regime does is directed at the destruction of the national 
liberation movement, the suppression of the democratic movement and 
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the entrenchment and perpetuation of the apartheid system of White 
minority domination. 
The racist regime has raised the issue of negotiations to achieve two 
major objectives. The first of these is to defuse the struggle inside our 
country by holding out false hopes of a just political settlement which 
the Pretoria regime has every intention to block. Secondly, this regime 
hopes to defeat the continuing campaign for comprehensive and 
mandatory sanctions by sending out bogus signals that it is ready to talk 
seriously to the` genuine representatives of our people. 
Fundamental to the understanding of the apartheid regime’s concept of 
negotiations is the notion that it must impose its will on those it is 
talking to and force them to accept its dictates. In practice, the Botha 
regime is conducting a determined campaign of repression against the 
ANC and the mass democratic movement. This includes the 
assassination of leaders, mass detentions, military occupation of 
townships and a programme of pacification carried out by the so-called 
Joint Management Centres (JMC`s). 
The racists are out to terrorise our people into submission, crush their 
democratic organisations and force us to surrender.202 
While Botha busied himself with passing The Promotion of Constitutional 
Development Act, a negotiating forum that provided limited political participation for 
black South Africans through representatives of the independent homelands and 
African local authorities, he directed the security establishment to step up attacks on the 
ANC, effectively doubling down on the counter-revolutionary strategy. This was 
entirely predictable given Botha’s sincere belief that counter-revolutionary violence 
was necessary to maintain safety and order in the Republic. Returning to a familiar 
theme of his administration, Botha warned his fellow National Party members in May 
1987: 
The war being waged against us by the South African Communist Party 
and the ANC, with financial assistance from abroad, is not a struggle for 
the rights of the Black communities in our country. It is a struggle for 
political power. They want to put a clique in power in South Africa, not 
a democratic government, but a dictatorship of Communist origin. They 
are not interested in the so-called underprivileged in this country.203 
With Botha’s Cold War myopia creating an impasse that was crippling the 
South African economy and threatening an endless cycle of violence, in July 1987 the 
Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA) joined the National 
Intelligence Service in opening up contacts between the Afrikaner community and the 
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ANC. The meeting proved to be a major breakthrough that called for the unbanning of 
the ANC, the releasing of all political prisoners and the beginning of a negotiated 
settlement.204 
Though he had originally supported the talks, Botha considered the 
recommendations of the IDASA a bridge too far and informed the House of Assembly 
that the “Government will not sit down at the negotiating table at the point of a gun, 
with the handing over of power to the revolutionaries as the only item on the agenda . . 
. We are prepared to reform, but we are not prepared to abdicate.”205 He would later 
refer to those that participated in the IDASA meeting as “useful idiots” of the 
communists that naively “went to co-ordinate strategies” for the ANC’s “revolutionary 
takeover of power.”206 
In the final months of 1987, the Botha Administration became increasingly 
irrelevant as the Afrikaner business community and political groups sidestepped the 
government and opened up their own talks with Mandela and the ANC. While the 
agenda slipped from his grasp, Botha continued to entrench, warning the members of 
the House of Assembly: “If there is one issue on which we all ought to agree, it is that 
we will not hand over this country to the dictatorship and to the rotten conditions which 
the ANC-SACP alliance wants to force on this country.”207 While Botha deserves 
credit for opening talks with Nelson Mandela and the ANC, it is equally true that he 
distrusted the very notion of majority rule. As Botha would tell the Congress of the 
Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut in May 1987, “Probably the greatest weakness of 
democracy is that in its struggle against revolutionary forces against the forces of 
domination that want to establish power cliques, it does not have at its disposal the 
ways and means it needs to act effectively.”208 Talking to the House Assembly in 1988, 
he would reiterate his suspicion of power sharing with the black majority stating, “I 
believe in a strong democracy, not in a laissez faire democracy. I believe in a 
democracy that is able to defend itself against other systems. A weak democracy cannot 
do that.”209 Even late in the negotiations with ANC, he was warning white South 
Africans:  
I believe in reform that brings about change and allows all people to 
share in the good of the future. But I also believe in reform that takes 
into account the good of the past. I believe in orderly reform, and I am at 
a loss to understand the haste of the present consultations and 
negotiations. I cannot support a spirit of gradual abdication.210 
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On January 18, 1989, Botha suffered a debilitating stroke but doggedly held 
onto office, determined to retake the initiative from his disgruntled cabinet. In July 5, 
1989, Botha finally meet with Nelson Mandela. The half hour meeting was little more 
than an introduction, with nothing of substance discussed. As Robert Harvey would 
write in 2001: “By seeing Mandela for just half an hour and apparently discussing 
nothing at all, Botha hoped to get the best of both worlds: to demonstrate he was not the 
unbending conservative portrayed in the media, to secure the agreement of the black 
Africans to his own constitutional settlement. . . . This was the reverse of the truth, of 
course; but Botha could put it that way.”211 By the time of the Mandela meeting, 
however, Botha was facing a fearsome challenge from the ANC that had declared 1989 
a “year of action.” Fearful of a repeat of the uprisings of 1985 and 1986, Botha’s 
cabinet moved quickly to remove the Prime Minister in what one observer called a 
“brave, clinical coup.” With his cabinet asking him to step-down, on August 14 Botha 
resigned his office without appointing an acting president.212 
Botha’s resignation from government was followed by the emergence in 1989 
of a new and reform-minded leadership within the ruling National Party government in 
South Africa. F. W. de Klerk came to power fully aware that apartheid could no longer 
survive in the new global realities that prevailed when he took office in August 1989. 
As one writer would succinctly put it, “de Klerk, although no sentimentalist, was 
nothing if not a realist.”213 The change in leadership was critical to move the process of 
political liberalization forward. As William Pretorius, a prominent Stellenbosch 
businessman that participated in the Mells Park meetings with the ANC would later 
comment: “He [Botha] got people to think and make concessions,” however, Botha 
“would not have been the one to preside over the transition to majority-rule—although 
he may have accepted that it was inevitable. Nor would Botha ever have negotiated 
with the Communists as de Klerk did.”214 
Understanding the situation for what it was, de Klerk, therefore, quickly made 
known his intentions to begin talks with all the parties involved in the continuing South 
African crisis. Within two months of coming to office, President F. W. de Klerk, 
abandoned Botha’s Total National Strategy and immediately shuttered the National 
Security Management System. In 1990, he lifted the ban on black political 
organizations and took steps to release all political prisoners, including Nelson 
Mandela. Subsequent announcements beginning in early 1990 by de Klerk of his 
intentions to repeal most of the apartheid laws, including those that formed the 
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cornerstone of white minority rule (the Group Areas Act, the Population Registration 
Act, and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act), were clear indications that South 
Africa had begun an irreversible process toward a multiracial democracy. 
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Chapter VII 
It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is 
his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct 
he is bound eventually to be right. 
George F. Kennan, American 
Diplomacy 
1.1 Conclusion 
As articulated by Chester Crocker, Constructive Engagement was a “centrist and 
idealistic conception” crafted to lend American support to P.W. Botha’s “evolutionary” 
process of change within the Republic of South Africa.1 As part of this goal, the most 
important American aim was to minimize Soviet influence within the Frontline states of 
southern Africa and the removal of the Cuban troops from Angola. Other aims included 
effecting normalized relations between the Republic and black ruled states in the 
region—particularly Mozambique—and enabling “South Africa’s regional dominance 
to acquire a legitimate form.” According to Crocker, once the region had attained a 
sufficient level of stabilization, the Reagan Administration felt South Africa would 
proceed more rapidly with internal change, the details and timing of which would be left 
to the Botha Administration. 
According to Chester Crocker, one of the most important steps to resolving 
regional instability was the removal of Cuban forces from Angola. The Reagan 
Administration said it introduced the Cuban issue for two reasons. First, the 
administration believed the Cuban withdrawal from Angola would provide Pretoria with 
adequate incentive to effect its own withdrawal from Namibia and do so on terms 
favourable to the Republic. Without such a presence, the South Africans would not be 
faced with the incessant threat of future Soviet and Cuban intervention in or subsequent 
radicalization of an independent Namibia. Without a communist “balance of forces” in 
Angola, South Africa could ensure Namibia’s dependence and pliability, even under a 
SWAPO government, by its overwhelming military, political, and economic presence 
across the border. 
The second and primary reason that the Reagan Administration introduced its 
plan to link Namibian independence with a Cuban withdrawal from Angola concerned 
Crocker’s and the Administration’s hopes regarding a desired “rollback” of Soviet 
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influence in southern Africa and throughout the developing world. By achieving a 
Cuban withdrawal, the administration believed it would finally be redressing the 
festering wound of unilateral Soviet geopolitical gain in the wake of Congressional 
indecision following the Vietnam War. As Reagan official Richard Perle would explain 
in an interview: “we considered that the United States  . . . was threatened any time the 
Soviet Union enlarged its influence, its control over resources, and there were important 
resources in Angola and to a lesser degree in Mozambique . . . when the other side made 
gains, we sustained a loss.”2 Driven by the zero sum calculations of the Cold War, the 
Reagan Administration was determined to see the Cubans out of Angola. Once this 
objective was achieved and the region achieved stabilization with the economic and 
military power of South Africa serving as the hegemon of the region, southern Africa 
could become a vital part of the West and an integral example of the method in which 
the Reagan Doctrine could aid the developing world in shedding their oppressive, anti-
capitalist ideologies and allies. This break would be of enormous benefit to a newly 
invigorated United States that was ready to vigorously defend its interests and allies 
throughout the world. 
According to Crocker, Constructive Engagement’s second stated goal was to 
encourage and support an ongoing process of evolutionary reform within the Republic. 
Within this goal, the most essential aim of the Reagan Administration was to instil a 
sense of South African confidence in the United Stated in affairs regarding the Republic. 
Administration policy, therefore, concerned itself with “normalizing” its relationship 
with South Africa to the fullest extent possible given the existing circumstances.  
Since the United States had only limited influence to affect South African 
behaviour, the administration said it was critical to support P.W. Botha’s “evolutionary” 
reform process and to shield that course from its detractors, both within the United 
States and internationally. Within this goal, the most essential goal was to forestall 
economic sanctions directed at the South African state. On the future disposition of the 
apartheid state, Chester Crocker would ask that critics concentrate on the “process of 
reform” rather than “distant objectives.” 
Judged by its own stated goals in southern and South Africa, the verdict on the 
Constructive Engagement must necessarily be that it failed. The policy was ultimately 
unsuccessful because of a number of misperceptions, misjudgements and incorrect 
assumptions concerning southern Africa, the domestic environment within South Africa, 
the nature of evolutionary change and its relationship to political violence, and 
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ultimately, because the policy was too closely linked to the fortunes of P.W. Botha’s 
Total National Strategy. 
The first and necessary goal of Constructive Engagement, the stabilization of 
southern Africa, was most dependent on achieving Namibia independence from South 
Africa. The American “linkage” of the Cuban presence in Angola with the continuing 
South African occupation of Namibia, however, introduced a number of problems which 
did little to increase the probability of the plan’s success. Although the administration’s 
coupling of Namibia and Angola was understandable given President Reagan’s desire to 
rollback communist influence in the region, its introduction complicated an already 
difficult negotiation process and made certain assumptions about southern Africa that 
had no basis in reality. 
As Secretary Crocker was no doubt aware, the Cuban presence in Angola was 
not so much to defend Angola from South Africa as it was to protect the Marxist MPLA 
regime from the UNITA insurgency. By advocating a Cuban withdrawal the United 
States was asking the MPLA government to weaken its own position in the Angolan 
civil war. This was unrealistic. Although the Reagan Administration promised American 
recognition and economic aid to Angola if it sent the Cubans home, the American 
demands regarding UNITA and power sharing in Angola were, from the MPLA 
perspective, too high. While the MPLA was exhausted by the civil war with UNITA, 
and while it may have entertained doubts about the high cost of maintaining the Cuban 
military presence, it was determined to not form a transitional government with Jonas 
Savimbi. This inevitably led to a situation where American demands were rebuffed by 
Angola. When this happened, as Crocker anticipated, Constructive Engagement would 
rely on Botha’s Total National Strategy to make the “price and pain grow.” However, 
the fact that Cuban troop levels in Angola increased from 15,000 to 50,000 over the 
course of the Reagan Administration should have suggested to Crocker that the 
American strategy was flawed. 
Though Namibia would finally achieve independence, it could hardly be 
suggested that another eight years of tortured negotiation and conflict to see SWAPO 
take power represented a victory for Constructive Engagement. Putting aside the moral 
implications of linking the democratic aspirations of the Namibian people to American 
geopolitical ambitions, it was the SADF’s pyrrhic victory at Cuito Caanavale and the 
high cost of war with Angola, not Chester Crocker’s diplomatic tract, that forced the 
South Africans to reconsider the terms of a negotiated settlement. 
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After Namibian independence was successfully negotiated, the Reagan 
Administration expected the Angolan government to negotiate and to form a transitional 
government with the UNITA opposition. Although UNITA and the MPLA were in 
negotiations in the late-1980s, the CIA increased its aid to UNITA from $30-$45 million 
in 1988 to $50-$60 million in 1989. Despite ongoing efforts to reach a negotiated 
settlement, U.S. covert aid to UNITA came to an estimated $220 million between 1988 
and the end of aid in 1994. Taken with the amount of aid sent to Savimbi in the last year 
of the Reagan Administration, UNITA was well positioned to begin the civil war with 
Angola again in 1992 when the rebel movement lost the elections that followed the 
Bicesse Peace Accord. Though the death of Jonas Savimbi would come four years after 
the Reagan Administration had exited the scene, the final chapter for UNITA and the 
descent of Angola into a ruinous conflagration could hardly be considered a victory for 
Construtive Engagement. 
Turning to the region as a whole, Constructive Engagement had the stated goals 
to foster a regional environment that removed the prospect of “revolutionary violence” 
aimed at the republic through the ANC and to enable “South Africa’s regional 
dominance to acquire a legitimate form.” As such, the United States' biggest stated 
priority in southern Africa was achieving a stable regional order with South Africa as 
the “regional superpower.”3 For the Reagan Administration, regional destabilization was 
inimical not only to the investment climate of South and southern Africa but also to the 
development of the region's infrastructure in which the United States and its allies had 
much at stake. According to Chester Crocker, with neither the Soviet “proxy” ANC nor 
the communists destabilizing the region, South African policy could focus on those links 
shared between South and southern Africa in an effort to develop fully the potential of 
the region and live at peace with its neighbours. This goal would be achieved through 
P.W. Botha’s Total National Strategy, which would receive support from the Reagan 
Administration at every turn. 
Constructive Engagement had hoped that through American economic 
investment and diplomatic support, South Africa could achieve its goal of being the 
economic leader and guarantor of stability in southern Africa. Instead, by the second 
term of the Reagan Administration, South Africa found itself isolated from both the 
region and the world community. Despite removal of the liberation movements from 
neighbouring countries, the ANC threatened to foment disorder within the Republic and 
render the country ungovernable. Though the Total National Strategy’s destabilization 
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campaign forced the Republic’s neighbours that harboured the ANC to “opt differently 
after carefully calculating the odds and assessing national interests,” Pretoria's quest to 
achieve cooperation and economic integration with its neighbours as the best way to 
preserve the power and privilege of white South Africa was rejected by the FLS. As 
such, the southern African nations committed themselves firmly to the dismantling of 
apartheid and took a leading role in advocating for sanctions against Pretoria. By 1988, 
with the South African economy crippled by divestment and sanctions, and the FLS 
unwilling to acquiesce to South African dominance, the United States had no choice but 
to accept the obvious. The days of Constructive Engagement relying on the Total 
National Strategy to achieve an acceptable regional order were gone for good. 
Constructive Engagement had also attempted to shield Pretoria from sanctions 
on the grounds that it would primarily harm black South Africans and forestall P.W. 
Botha’s “evolutionary” reform process. Here again Constructive Engagement fell short. 
The combination of domestic unrest and destabilization produced an insurmountable cry 
for sanctions in the West. Despite the Reagan Administration’s best efforts, including a 
veto, the U.S. Congress passed into law in October, 1986 the Anti-Apartheid Act 
banning new investments and loans, landing rights for South African Airways, and 
imports of coal, steel, iron, uranium, agricultural products, and textiles.  
Internationally, the administration used its place on the Security Council to 
repeatedly veto sanctions levelled against Pretoria, forcing the sanctions debate outside 
the United Nations. In 1985, the Commonwealth agreed to ban Krugerrand imports and 
end government loans to South Africa. Similarly, the EC imposed modest sanctions 
upholding the oil and arms ban and withdrawing military attaches from South Africa. 
Sweden and Norway adopted a total trade ban in 1987. Even Japan imposed modest 
sanctions. And at its October 1989 summit in Kuala Lumpur, the Commonwealth voted 
for sanctions, despite objections from Margaret Thatcher. 
Constructive Engagement also failed to understand the internal dynamics of the 
Republic. The South African attempt to initiate domestic reform acceptable to all South 
Africans and an American policy to support such an initiative, in Crocker’s view, had a 
fair chance of success because of the nature of both Afrikaner and black politics within 
the Republic. While Crocker viewed the Afrikaner community as a unified political and 
social force, the Secretary saw the various black constituencies as hopelessly divided. 
Because the black majority was split along tribal, economic and regional lines, Crocker 
assumed they could not form a united front against the apartheid government. This 
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division would provide the apartheid regime a decisive advantage in determining the 
final disposition of the Republic. While Crocker was aware that the Botha 
Administration would never accept full political enfranchisement for the black majority, 
he believed that the evolutionary process would create a more democratic society 
acceptable to all South Africans, though perhaps grudgingly, while not threatening 
American geopolitical objectives in the region by turning the reins of government over 
to the ANC. 
As events in the Republic began to unfold in the mid-1980s, Crocker’s 
assumptions regarding the internal dynamics of South Africa proved false. As the Botha 
Administration proceeded with reform, it was the Afrikaner community, not the black 
polity, which became divided by the reform process. Previously reliable supporters of 
the Botha Administration looked to the Conservative Party as the reform process proved 
incapable of providing the safety and certainty that the many South Africans desired. 
And though the National Party’s electoral loses were insignificant, they were enough to 
force P.W. Botha to worry about his right flank and move even more cautiously on 
reform than he might have otherwise. A far more important development occurred in 
1985 when the Botha Administration faced a challenge from elements in the Afrikaner 
community that wanted to break the political impasse by opening negotiations with the 
ANC. This included elements in the administration that were quietly pushing the Prime 
Minister to consider releasing Nelson Mandela, unbanning the ANC and the initiation of 
serious negotiations with the organization. 
By contrast, as the government proceeded with its reform plan, black South 
Africans became more rather than less unified and turned increasingly to the ANC as the 
vanguard of the liberation movement. Although other black groups and organizations 
continued to exist in tandem with and in opposition to the ANC, the organization was 
able, to a remarkable degree, to mobilize blacks against the Botha Administration and 
marginalize or coerce elements of the black community that opposed its revolutionary 
strategy. The presence of the ANC, its opposition to the government’s new 
constitutional scheme, and the outbreak of violence in the townships in 1984 exposed 
Crocker’s assumptions regarding the eternal dynamics of the Republic as erroneous. 
A third crucial Crocker mistake was his implicit assumption that evolutionary 
change that did not take into account the opinions of the majority of South Africans 
could progress without instigating revolutionary violence. While Crocker did anticipate 
that violence would play an important role during the process of evolutionary change—
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in fact he said the best time for bargaining was after the Total National Strategy had 
“broken the back” of the liberation movement—he did not expect it to reach the level or 
the intensity which it eventually attained during the township uprisings. This was a fatal 
mistake. 
Despite the fact that the reforms that Botha offered were a break from the 
previous thirty years of apartheid policy the fundamental pillars of apartheid remained 
and social segregation remained heavily slanted to the sensibilities of the white minority. 
Ironically, Botha’s evolutionary reform process caused both rising expectations and 
corresponding frustration among the black population when such changes were 
perceived as inadequate and deliberately slow in their implementation. The introduction 
of Botha’s byzantine parliamentary arrangement, which included Asians and coloureds 
but which excluded black South Africans, led directly to the ANC as the most vocal and 
best organized anti-apartheid organization within the Republic. The commencement of 
two years of protest and associated violence, moreover, began on the day that the 
Tricameral parliament was established. The ANC’s opposition role in mobilizing this 
political discontent—initially as a protest against the new constitutional scheme—and its 
ascendancy to the clear leader of the liberation movement during the township uprisings 
swept aside the Total National Strategy and Constructive Engagement’s “evolutionary 
versus revolutionary” reform strategy that excluded “terrorist, pro-Soviet groups” like 
the ANC. 
Faced with such rising and potentially destabilizing discontent, the South 
African regime responded brutally to the township unrest. Violence erupted, caused both 
by the regime’s attempt to reestablish control over the black majority and by the ANC’s 
attempt to encourage and exploit the chaos in the townships to their advantage. Given its 
history of suppression, the regime’s brutal counter-revolutionary strategy was entirely 
predictable. Once the Botha Administration declared a state of emergency, the Total 
National Strategy/Constructive Engagement goal to avoid and prevent “a scenario in 
South Africa of revolutionary violence” became increasingly untenable.4 
Even if Crocker had abandoned the moralistic and legalistic rhetoric of 
Constructive Engagement and emphasized U.S. strategic interests as the primary driver 
of Constructive Engagement, as conservative elements in the Reagan Administration 
had advocated, it seems inconceivable that the United States could have followed 
through on such a policy for more than a few years, even in favourable circumstances. 
Once violence overwhelmed the townships and the United States media began its daily 
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reporting on the crisis any chance that Constructive Engagement could have staved off 
the sanctions campaign was gone. The chaos of the South African domestic scene 
became irresistible fare for the American and international press, a media that seemed 
especially eager to report on Pretoria’s violent actions against the protestors. Worse still, 
the situation in the Republic was accurately reported as a revolution in progress, 
effectively undermining the Total National Strategy’s promise to bring stability and 
peaceful change. Given the violence in the streets, Chester Crocker could no longer 
count on the Botha Administration to provide a process of change that was acceptable to 
all South Africans. All that was left for the Botha Administration was naked force. It 
was this violence which, in the final analysis, revealed P.W. Botha’s Total National 
Strategy as a failure and destroyed the American policy of Constructive Engagement. 
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